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CULTURE AND IDENTITIES



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EDITORIAL PREFACE

It can hardly be disputed that culture (or more specifically, a series of cultural properties) occupies a central position in the understanding and experiencing of personal, group, and collective identities, nor can it be disputed that the understanding of identity involves looking at how individuals and collectivities systematically establish and demarcate their difference from other individuals and collectives (Jenkins, 2008). Considering that culture plays the key role not only in terms of nominal identification (naming) through symbolic representation but also in terms of the practical implications of identification and belonging, a new re-examination of the cultural background of personal and collective identities is warranted.

Modern social processes, including globalization, have rekindled the interest in the issue of identity, or rather in how such processes affect the identity of individuals, groups, and communities. The renewed interest was stimulated by the relativization of the boundaries between states, nations, and communities, which, on one hand, can engender fear of losing one's own identity, as Alain Touraine once cautioned, or, on the other hand, can engender hope that celebrates the cosmopolitan culture and the value of intertwining cultures and identities, as suggested by Marx 170 years ago.

A sufficient reason for a fruitful scientific debate is provided not only by the different views of the issue at hand but also by the fundamental theoretical and methodological problems of studying identities. These problems emerge as a result of both the fluctuating character of identities (especially in the late modernist period) and the difficulties with placing their analysis within a specific context, be it the identity of individual social actors, small social groups, or wider collectives founded on common cultural elements and discursive practices. Since identity is determined by the socio-historical and cultural context – different identities have emerged throughout history, whereby history is made by the people of certain identities (Berger and Luckmann, 1967) – we believe that a discussion on the topic of culture and identities is very current and necessary. Therefore, we present to the sociological and other communities within social sciences and humanities this manuscript containing a variety of views and approaches, written by authors from Poland, Russia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia. A portion of the papers in this publication were presented at the international scientific conference *Culture and Identities*, held in Međavnik and Andrićgrad on 25-27 October 2019.

Editors



PART ONE

DISCIPLINARY AND CONCEPTUAL EXAMINATIONS OF CULTURE AND IDENTITIES IN MODERN SOCIETY

CONSTITUTIONAL PREAMBLE – EXPRESSION OF IDENTITIES OF POST-YUGOSLAV STATES IN THE TRANSFORMATION PROCESS

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Abstract

The main thesis of this paper is that the preambles to the constitutions of post-Yugoslav states in the process of transition and subsequent transformation through new constitutional changes particularly emphasized the new political and ethnic identities of these states. In the process of the breakdown of Yugoslavia and its own constitution, all post-Yugoslav countries simultaneously reconstructed their political and national identities. This was especially reflected in the preambles to their respective constitutions, with Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia being immediately constituted on an ethnic basis, as sovereign nation states, while Serbia and Montenegro did so later, after the breakup of their common state, first the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and then the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. Only Bosnia and Herzegovina was constituted on the civic principle, on the basis of the Dayton Agreement. In the preambles to the constitutions of all post-Yugoslav states, a new political identity was also expressed, based on a platform of a neoliberal conception of society. This is especially evident in the emphasis on the rule of law, social justice, liberal democracy, and civil society, human and minority rights, an open market economy, free movement of goods and capital, the division of government, etc. In the development of post-Yugoslav states, which has lasted almost three decades, one might say that their constitutions are in line with the principles of the modern political system, as expressed in the preambles to their constitutions.

Key words: constitution, preamble, post-Yugoslav states, identity, political system

In addition to its legal nature, every constitution also has its political content.

Dragan Bataveljić

Constitution is the reflection of the constitutional and legal identity of a political community.

Andraž Terešek

Introduction

Constitution is the highest law of a country. According to *Andrew Heywood*, a constitution is a social contract with consent and “with a set of unifying values” (Hejvud, 2004, p. 555; Stojiljković, Spasojević & Lončar, 2015, p. 14). A constitution has to maintain the current political, economic, and legal order. If the order changes, for example as a part of the post-socialist transformation process, the constitution also has to change, or, in the words of *Ferdynand Lasalle*, a written constitution (“scrap of paper”) has to reflect the reality (political, social, and economic). The new order in a constitution must particularly legitimize the new understanding of the state, the new understanding of freedom, and the relationship between citizens and the state.

For a constitution to be efficient, it is expected to establish a coherent and stable framework for the reproduction of political power. On the other hand, for a constitution to be legitimate, it is expected to incorporate a set of civil and political rights as well as mechanism that have to ensure a democratic and public character of democratic processes. This should be made prominent, since every constitution is expected to be *anchored* in the values of constitutionalism and in the constitutional culture of each post-Yugoslav state (Podunavac & Đorđević, 2014, p. 9).

Methodological framework of the study

The main focus of this paper is the analysis of preambles to constitutions as expressions of the identity of post-Yugoslav states in the process of their transformation. The main thesis is that a constitution symbolizes the period of every political system, including the political systems of the post-Yugoslav states. Every political system legitimizes itself (comes into force) through the constitution, which also serves as an expression of political, economic, and legal identity of a state. It should be highlighted that, ever since becoming independent and autonomously handling their affairs, all post-Yugoslav countries adopted their own constitution, which legitimized the new democratic form of government and political system. At the time – in the beginning of political system transformation – constitution-makers in the Republic of Slovenia, Republic of Croatia, Republic of Macedonia (which changed its official name to the Republic of North Macedonia in February 2019), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Serbia, and Republic of Montenegro paid particular attention to their own versions of the reason for adopting a new constitution. The aim of the analysis of preambles is to answer the following questions: first, do the preambles to the constitutions of post-Yugoslav states correspond to the most recent principles of the political system; second, do the preambles to the constitutions of post-Yugoslav states contain the most relevant content for the democratic character of the states, especially in terms of rule of law, division of government, social justice, civil democracy, human and minority rights, and free and open market; and third, are constitution-makers interested in constitutional changes (by enacting constitutional amendments) or in changes to the preambles when a state is going through different metamorphoses of its form? In that case, it is worth stressing that the idea of the legal state (*rechtsstaat*), rule of law, and human freedoms is of particular importance for the organization of any modern state and its government. The idea is significant because the rule of law provides legality (read: legitimacy) to the state bodies. It should be strongly

emphasized that a modern legal state is inconceivable without the principle of the rule of law. Modern concepts of a legal state are based on the idea that governing a state, in addition to legality, also requires legitimacy, i.e. the justification for governing in each specific case. It means that a law does not become legitimate (justified) by the mere fact that it was enacted by the state but rather that the legitimacy (justification) of every specific law must also be evaluated on the strength of its content (Lilić & Bulajić, 2008, p. 106, 107). Likewise, it should be noted that the fundamental principle of organizing the highest state bodies in modern countries rests on the principle of division of government. Montesquieu's "The Spirit of the Laws" contains the principle of the division of government. According to him, when the same person simultaneously assumes the legislative and executive power, freedom becomes impossible, because the principles of law do not foresee a restriction by one's own will but by that of another. On this matter, I completely agree with the opinion of *Yoshie Kawade*:¹

The Spirit of the Laws has been considered a pioneering work that led to the establishment of the empirically oriented 'value-free' social sciences and a forerunner of modern positivist sociology (Kawade, 2003, p. 220).

It is important to note that the division of government is an organizational principle that serves as a cornerstone of modern legal and political systems. It is also significant that the legal justification for the division of government is that a legal state is impossible without it. Content analysis of primary sources (constitutions) and the comparative method were used in order to answer the posited research questions.

Research results

Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia from 23 December 1991 has a suitable Preamble, which is very brief but contains the main principles of a sovereign state's political system. It covers the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Slovenia and human rights and freedoms (Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, 1991). Since 1991, Slovenian constitution has been revised several times, mostly due to external political pressure. For instance, in 1997, the revision of Article 68 allowed foreign citizens to buy real estate in Slovenia, as a result of the so-called "Spanish compromise",² which brought Slovenia closer to EU accession. In 2003, on the eve of Slovenia's EU accession, Chapter I (a third article added) and Articles 47 and 48 were revised, allowing Slovenia to join the EU and NATO. In 2004, the Slovenian Parliament revised Articles 14, 43, and 50 through constitutional laws, while the revision of Articles 121, 140, and 143 in 2006 enabled the regionalization of Slovenia (Toplak, 2014, p. 91, 92). After its adoption in the 1990s, the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia) was revised six times by means of nine constitutional laws on amendments and supplements to the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia (most recently in 2013 by means of two constitutional laws). Another two constitutional amendments may be added to the aforementioned ones, but they were added earlier, in 1994, only they did not alter the text of the constitution but were added to the existing

¹ Contemporary Japanese political scientist specializing in modern French political thought; for more details (see: Pavlović, 2012, p. 212).

² Spanish compromise – harmonization of Slovenian legislature with EU standards, which required a revision of Article 68 of the constitution (for more, see: Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, 1997).

text by means of two constitutional laws. Therefore, every amendment to the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia formally reflected the changes the country was going through during its period of transformation of the constitutional and political system (Ceranić, 2016, p. 97).

The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia from 22 December 1990 also contains a Preamble, which is mostly historical in terms of its content. Its fundamental tenets state that the Croatian nation has the right to full state sovereignty, which is based on several historical foundations: first, the formation of Croatian principalities in the 7th century; second, the independent mediaeval state of Croatia established in the 9th century; third, the Kingdom of Croats established in the 10th century; fourth, the preservation of the identity of Croatian state in a personal union with Hungary; fifth, the independent and sovereign decision by the Croatian Parliament in 1527 to elect a king from the House of Habsburg; sixth, the independent and sovereign decision by the Croatian Parliament on the Pragmatic Sanction of 1712; and seventh, the conclusions by the Croatian Parliament in 1848 regarding the restoration of the Triune Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia and the Kingdom of Hungary, grounded on the legal traditions of both states and the Pragmatic Sanction of 1712 (Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, 1990). The Preamble also provides the main principles, which are in accordance with the principles of modern democratic political systems. This particularly refers to the right to self-determination and association, and equality of the members of ethnic minorities (Serbs, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans, Austrians, Ukrainians, Rusyns, Bosniaks, Slovenians, and others), who are guaranteed equal status as the citizens of Croatian ethnicity and the exercising of their national rights in compliance with the democratic norms of the UN and free world countries (Bujwid–Kurek, 2004, pp. 175–180). Constitution-makers define the Republic of Croatia as a sovereign and democratic state that guarantees and ensures equality, freedom, and rights of people and citizens and promotes their economic and cultural progress and social well-being (Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, 1990). As a part of the EU accession process, legislature was re-examined with the purpose of modernizing it in accordance with international agreements. For instance, the ratification of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 1995),³ was particularly important for the protection of national minorities. It should especially be borne in mind that the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and the Rights of Ethnic and National Communities or Minorities was enacted due to pressures from the international community, but it significantly raised the possibilities for national minorities to exercise their rights (Tatalović, 2014, p. 359),⁴ which is in complete agreement with the international legal order on this matter. So far, the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia has been amended several times. The first time was on 12 December 1997, when the word “Republic” was replaced with “State”. The second was on 9 November 2000, mostly replacing the presidential with the parliamentary system, whereby 74 articles were

³ In this context, Part I, Article 2 is of particular interest: Members of national minorities can exercise their rights and freedoms stipulated in the principles within this Framework Convention individually or in association with others (Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 1995).

⁴ See also: Constitutional Law on Human Rights and the Rights of Ethnic and National Communities or Minorities. In late 2002, the Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities was enacted.

amended (Sokol, 2009, p. 37). The third time was on 28 February 2001 and the fourth on 10 June 2010, when the Constitution was harmonized with EU regulations. This showed that the new state (and the new political system) was adapting to a new political reality through its constitution.

Similar to the Croatian Constitution, the Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, adopted on 17 November 1991, also focuses on the history and culture of the Macedonian nation and the centuries-long struggle for national and social freedom and formation of a nation state. Among other things, the Preamble states that the Republic of Macedonia is constituted as a sovereign, independent, civic, and democratic state, that it is established and built as a democratic state ruled by law, that it guarantees human rights, civil freedoms, and ethnic equality, and that it aims at providing peace, social rights, economic well-being, and progress, on both the individual and the community level (Tatalović, 2014, p. 360). The Preamble also states that “Macedonia is constituted as a nation state of Macedonian people, which provides civil equality and permanent cohabitation with the Macedonian people” (Tatalović, 2014, p. 360). So far, there have been numerous amendments to the Constitution, the first one from 6 January 1992, focusing on the borders of the Republic of Macedonia. Most amendments were made in 2001 (IV-XIX), immediately followed by the revision of the Preamble to the Constitution on 16 November 2001 (amendment IV). The revisions from 7 December 2005 introduced ten amendments (XX-XXX). The content of the amendments completely corresponds to the modern political, economic, and social environment of Macedonia.

The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is unique. One should be reminded that the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, reached in Dayton, Ohio on 21 November 1995 and formally signed in Paris on 14 December 1995, stipulates the basic principles of the state, legal, and political organization of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is an integral part of the Agreement (Annex 4) and it contains the Preamble and twelve articles. Article 1 of the Constitution defines the basic principles, such as continuity and democratic principles (Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995). The Preamble to the Constitution from 14 December 1995 also contains principles concordant with those of modern democratic political systems, including the following: respect of human dignity, freedom, and equality; peace; justice; tolerance; reconciliation; democratic foundations of governance; just procedures; pluralistic society; sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with international law; and a guarantee of international humanitarian right and human rights (Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Constitution defines the democratic legal and political institutions, procedures for political decision making, and the catalogues of individual rights. The Preamble to the Constitution reads as follows: “Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, as the constitutive nations (together with the “Others”), are citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Mujagić, 2014, p. 275). This shows that the procedures for political decision making are mostly ethnic-based, and therefore collective, while the catalogue of individual rights is vague for the benefit of collective rights. In addition, it can be observed from a political science standpoint, specifically in terms of theoretical ponderings about what democracy is, that

political power – concentrated by the mobilizing of ethnic identities – is not subordinated to special rules, so a state thus constructed is actually a virtual property of constitutive Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks, whereas all the “Others” are merely subtenants or non-owners of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Mujagić, 2014, p. 275).⁵

I am in complete agreement with the opinion of *Nermina Mujagić* that

[t]he case of Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrates that the *current multicultural constitutionalism*⁶ serves to protect the political positions promoting nationalism and ethnic segregation and generating fundamental inequities both within the ethnic groups they represent and in relation to minority groups [...] by abusing the practice of ‘constitutionality’, with which they are very much familiar when they use it to exhaust the resources of the state and the Bosnian and Herzegovinian society, but from which they are quick to dissociate themselves when it is time to assume the responsibility dictated by modern constitutionality (Mujagić, 2014, p. 276).

This shows that, the experiences from Bosnian and Herzegovinian democracy, although they may have a rationalizing force, do not have what is most important – a civilizing force. There are numerous amendments to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the most important of which was the rejected so-called *April package of constitutional amendments* (Amendments to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2006).⁷ It would appear that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina has to have a special significance, as it has to consider three nations and the federal character of the state. It must not be forgotten that democratic legitimization of governance can have a civilizing character if observed through the concept of human dignity, in addition to human rights. It should be emphasized that human dignity has special prominence, especially in international discourse (Mujagić, 2014, p. 281).

Serbia got its new Constitution by means of the Decision on the Promulgation of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia ratified by a unanimous vote of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia on 8 November 2006. The road leading up to the Constitution was long and unusual (Marković & Brčín, 2007, p. 5; Petrović, 2007, p. 178).⁸ It should be noted that the Serbian constitution-makers provided the explanation for the adoption of the 2006 Constitution. One of the reasons is that Kosmet (Kosovo and

⁵ Zarije Seizović is right to claim that the phenomenon of “constitutiveness” is also discriminatory and as such is actually the cause of the constitutional crisis and poor functioning of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s state institutions over the past two decades (for more, see: Seizović, 2014, p. 7).

⁶ See also: Mujagić & Mujkić, 2012, pp. 189–199.

⁷ The obligatory nature of amendments to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina was covered, among others, by the following authors: Nermina Mujagić, Aleksandar Savanović, and Đorđe Tomić (see: Mujagić, 2014, pp. 274–283).

⁸ Eighth November is St. Demetrius Day (‘Mitrovdan’) in Serbia, which is why the Constitution is sometimes referred to as the “Mitrovdan Constitution” (see: Petrović, 2007, p. 178).

Metohija)⁹ is to be permanently kept, with a special emphasis, “within the sovereign state of Serbia”, as a “constituent part” of its territory (Marković & Brčin, 2007, p. 10). The most important item of the new Constitution is contained within its Preamble.

The purpose of the Preamble to the 2006 Constitution is to highlight two things: the first (the same one highlighted in the 1990 Serbian Constitution) is that Serbia is the creation of Serbian people but that all its citizens and national (“ethnic” is used in the document) communities are bestowed with equal rights; the second, serving as a “patriotic overture” to the Constitution, emphasizes that the Autonomous Province (the document reads only “Province”) of Kosovo and Metohija is an integral part of Serbian territory, that it has the status of a substantial autonomy within the sovereign state of Serbia and that constitutional obligations of all state bodies to uphold and protect the state interests of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija in all internal and foreign political relations proceed from such status of the Province of Kosovo and Metohija (Marković & Brčin, 2007, p. 11, 12).

The Preamble clearly insists on the inviolability of the territorial integrity of Serbia. This idea is expanded in Article 8 of Part One of the Constitution, entitled “Constitution Principles”. It should be clarified that Article 8 pertains to the Serbian territory and border:

The territory of the Republic of Serbia is inseparable and indivisible. The border of the Republic of Serbia is inviolable and may be altered in a procedure applied to amend the Constitution (Stojanović, 2006, p. 5).¹⁰

The Article does not only supplement the Preamble, but also has broader meaning than the Preamble because it pertains to the entire territory of the Republic of Serbia rather than to the Province of Kosovo and Metohija only. The new Serbian Constitution is concise, generally and principally regulating fundamental social and institutional relations in Serbia (Bataveljić, 2006, pp. 1135–1144; Petrović, 2007, p. 178). In terms of modern principles for a democratic political system, it is noticeable that the Preamble gives special focus to the state traditions of the Serbian people, the equality of all citizens, and the equality ethnic communities in Serbia. Regarding the status of Kosovo in Serbia, it states that

the Province of Kosovo and Metohija is an integral part of the territory of Serbia, that it has the status of a substantial autonomy within the sovereign state of Serbia and that from such status of the Province of Kosovo and Metohija proceed constitutional obligations of all state bodies to uphold and protect the state interests of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija in all internal and foreign political relations (Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, 2006).

⁹ It has to be stressed that the Province authoritative bodies of Kosovo and Metohija were not formed in a regular manner. This is due to the so-called special circumstances that led the Serbian Assembly to pass several laws and decisions back in 1990, suspending the work of all governing bodies in the Province of Kosovo and Metohija (see e.g. Law on the Actions of the Republic’s Bodies in Special Circumstances, 1990; Decision on Determining the Occurrence of Special Circumstances on the Territory of SAP (Socialist Autonomous Province) of Kosovo, 1990; Law on Cessation of Work of the Assembly and Executive Council of SAP Kosovo, 1990; etc.). Thus, the governing bodies of the Republic of Serbia took over the duties of the Kosovo governing bodies until the end of NATO air strikes in June 1999. On 17 February 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence, which the Republic of Serbia did not recognize and declared it null and void. At the moment (August 2019), 115 countries have recognized the independence of Kosovo, 23 of which are EU members (see: TVN24, 2019).

¹⁰ See also: Proposals for the New Serbian Constitution II, 2005, p. 10.

The very brief Preamble states three times that Kosovo is an integral part of the territory of the sovereign state of Serbia and thus inseparable from Serbia. This appears to be a message, especially to the public, regarding the current status of Kosovo and Metohija, that Serbia has a constitutional obligation to preserve its territorial integrity and sovereignty on the entirety of its territory and that it legitimately claims Kosovo and Metohija as its own.¹¹

The Preamble to the Constitution of Montenegro from 19 October 2007 contains all the basic values (read: principles) of a democratic society: freedom, peace, tolerance, respect of human rights and freedoms, multiculturalism, democracy, and the rule of law (Constitution of Montenegro, 2006). The Preamble highlights include

[t]he conviction that the state is responsible for the preservation of nature, sound environment, sustainable development, balanced development of all its regions, and the establishment of social justice” and “[t]he dedication to cooperation on equal footing with other nations and states and to the European and Euro-Atlantic integrations (Constitution of Montenegro, 2006),

which apparently portrays Montenegro as a state open to integrations within the world. So far, there have been 16 amendments to the Constitution of Montenegro. The constitution-makers particularly focused on the judiciary branch. For instance, the latest amendment concerns the structure of the Constitutional Court (Decision on the Promulgation of Amendments I to XVI to the Constitution of Montenegro, 2013). This also confirms that Montenegro is trying to hold its legal norms to a highest standard through the Constitution, which is a necessity in the modern democratic world.

In summary, texts from all the post-Yugoslav states’ constitutional preambles contain some new and appropriate principles to accompany the democratic changes in their political systems. It is also apparent that the all-encompassing contemporary processes, such as globalization and democratic transition, have caused an intertwining of constitutional and international law, which in turn affected the chief principles contained within the preambles to the constitutions of post-Yugoslav states. It would seem that the political system transformations in these states revolve around the three key earmarks for modern nation states: sovereignty, democracy, and human rights protection (Basta Fleiner, 2014, p. 22). Moreover, it could be claimed that every post-Yugoslav state has expressed its willingness to become an EU member. Once a state has completed accession negotiations and entered into an agreement with the EU, the natural subsequent step is for it to amend its constitution according to its new status (Samardžić, 2014, p. 43). This raises doubts about whether all constitutions of the post-Yugoslav states are being Europeanized, considering the fact that some of the states’ EU membership is being postponed to an unpredictable future. The answer is that they are not. In Serbia, there is a current political will to Europeanize its Constitution regardless of what the EU wants (Lilić, Bulajić, 2008, p. 137; Trkulja, 2017, pp. 187–191).

¹¹ This message to the “international community” can be interpreted from a national and patriotic perspective, but it has no legal effect whatsoever (for more, see: Marković & Brčín, 2007, p. 12).

Conclusions

To amend a constitution means to supplement elementary political and legal principles with new ones, for example to add to the state-making historical foundation in the preamble to a constitution, to (principally) expand the constitutional law area of human rights and fundamental freedoms, to alter the elements of constitutional balance of powers between state government bodies by extending and/or restricting their authority, etc. (Ceranić, 2016, p. 89). A preamble can be viewed as a foreword to a constitution. It should indicate why a constitution is being adopted and for what purpose. In a way, it is a “story about the constitution”, whereas a constitution is a legal norm. It has to be stressed that a preamble is not a legal norm, so its language is less formal, sometimes even including a heightened pathos (Marković & Brčín, 2007, p. 11).

It is natural for the citizens of any country to want a constitution that establishes its total legal order. A constitution is especially necessary when a state goes through a variety of metamorphoses over a relatively short period and consequently requires a definitive legal shape (Marković & Brčín, 2007, p. 71).

Today, every post-Yugoslav country is undergoing socio-political changes. Accordingly, it can be concluded that these changes are “characterized by the substitution of one (socialist) social system for another (post-socialist, but inherently capitalistic), interest-wise and ideologically different, system” (Bolčić, 2013, p. 29) with different values, which appears to be the regular price of transition. “Constitutionalism and the rule of law follow specific theoretical rules, out of which constitution-makers choose the principles, rules, and legal statutes” (Stanovčić, 2014, p. 129).

From a political science viewpoint, primarily in terms of theoretical examinations on what democracy is, I am led to conclude that the constitution-makers of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro in the preambles to their respective new constitutions provided their own reasons why the constitutions were adopted but also provided an expression of identity to every post-Yugoslav state undergoing transformation. The identity of a state can typically be inferred from the preamble, especially in relation to historical sources, but also with regard to the new post-socialist order with values such as respect of human rights and freedoms, peace, justice, tolerance, multiculturalism, democracy, and the rule of law. Nevertheless, it needs to be emphasized that although these values are universal for all post-Yugoslav states, they are not expressed to the same extent in their constitutional preambles. On the other hand, it should be remembered that all analyses of post-Yugoslav states’ constitutions suggest that they are in keeping with the democratic standards of human rights protection accepted by the international community, particularly within the EU, and that they are comparable to other sovereign and independent states.

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PREAMBULA USTAVA – IZRAZ IDENTITETA POSTJUGOSLOVENSКИH DRŽAVA U PROCESU TRANSFORMACIJE

Apstrakt

U ovom radu se kao osnovna teza ističe da su prambule ustava postjugoslovenskih država u procesu tranzicije i kasnijih transformacija kroz nove ustavne promene, osobito isticala nov politički i etnički identitet ovih država. Svaka postjugoslovenska zemlja, u procesu raspada Jugoslavije i svog konstituisanja, istovremeno je vršila rekonstrukciju svog političkog i nacionalnog identiteta. To se naročito izrazilo u preambulama njihovih ustava, pri čemu su Slovenija, Hrvatska i Makedonija odmah konstituisane na etničkom principu, kao suverene nacionalne države, a Srbija i Crna Gora to su učinile kasnije, nakon raspada njihove zajedničke države SR Jugoslavije, a potom Državne Zajednice Srbija i Crna Gora. Jedino je Bosna i Hercegovina, po osnovu Dejtonskog sporazuma, konstituisana na građanskom principu. Takođe, u preambulama ustava svih post-jugoslovenskih država izražen je i nov politički identitet, koji je zasnovan na platformi neoliberalne koncepcije uređenja društva. To se naročito vidi u isticanju vladavine prava, socijalne pravde, liberalne demokratije i građanskog društva, ljudskih i manjinskih prava, otvorene tržišne privrede, slobode kretanja roba i kapitala, podele vlasti i td. U razvoju postjugoslovenskih država, dugom skoro tri decenije, moglo bi se reći da njihovi ustavi odgovaraju principima modernog političkog sistema, što je izraženo najpre u preambulama njihovih ustava.

Ključne reči: Ustav, preambula, postjugoslovenske države, identitet, politički sistem

HISTORICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NATIONAL IDENTITY OF THE SERBS

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Abstract

A key characteristic of the development of the Serbian people in the 19th and 20th centuries was the weakening of national identity in connection with the growth of the idea of Slav unity in the Balkans in the form of the idea of Yugoslavism. The Serbian character had been developed for centuries, with a view of its role as the protector of the oppressed and united Slavic and Orthodox peoples. The Serbs formed a sense of high national responsibility, a desire to win. The idea of sacrifice on behalf of Yugoslavism, a sense of responsibility for the destiny of other peoples of the multinational country, is an important feature of Serbian consciousness during the 20th century. In post-war Yugoslavia, another problem, which sounds like “Serbian nationalism”, was important for Serbia. However, one cannot understand the processes that have left an imprint on the mentality of the Serbian nation unless one addresses the following historical phenomenon. The fact is that during the war there was another slogan that was supposed to contribute to the unification of the peoples under the Communist banner – the fight against the oppressors from the previous period. Back in the war years, along with the task of liberating the country from fascism, there was also a struggle against “Greater-Serbian hegemony” for the freedom of all peoples. Moreover, the oppressor did not assume a social-class form, but a national one. This is how the phenomenon of fear of “Greater-Serbian Yugoslavia” and the domination of one nation emerged and was cultivated. As a result, Serbs have a so-called “guilt complex”. Serbia under Tito was considered a possible carrier of the ideology of hegemony. There was an identification of Serbia and the Serbian people with a hegemonic ideology, manifested in the idea of “Greater Serbia”. The idea of “sacrifice” was superseded by the idea of guilt over Chetniks and having “Greater Serbia” aspirations, which resulted in the fight against the so-called Serbian nationalism and Greater Serbian hegemony throughout the post-war period. As the country’s leadership thought, posing the “Serbian question” could have disrupted the national balance, which had been achieved with great difficulty.

Key words: Serbia, Yugoslavia, nationalism, Yugoslavism, hegemonism

Instead of an introduction

In recent times, there have been increasing attempts to prove the anti-historical and often regressive role of Serbia in the history of the Balkan nations. The attempts are political in nature, which is why they are bound to fail scientific inspection. Serbia has been accused of hegemonism and aspirations to create “Greater Serbia” to the detriment of other nations. Such accusations were propagated by journalists and co-opted by politicians, thus gradually becoming a mould for each new publication covering the crisis in former Yugoslavia. The greatest disappointment comes from the fact that not even scientists were able to resist this trend.

Serbian national development during the 19th and 20th centuries was characterized by the weakening of national identity caused by the emerging idea about Slavic unification in the Balkans, which was manifested as Yugoslavism. On the eve of the creation of Yugoslavia, Serbia was engulfed by the idea of Yugoslavism, raising the banner that said ‘Uniting all – Yugoslavia’ instead of ‘Serbia’. Serbia gathered other Slavic nations and preserved its statehood, only under a different name – after 1918, Serbia as such was no more. Instead, it was integrated into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

Serbian national identity and the ideas of Yugoslavism until the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

The Principality of Serbia had previously spearheaded the anti-Ottoman movement in the Balkans. The foreign policy program, devised by Ilija Garašanin, stipulated that the Principality of Serbia, ruled by the House of Obrenović, had to initiate the fight against the Ottoman Empire in order to form a state that would incorporate Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia, but also Croatia, in the event of Austria-Hungary’s downfall. The idea of a Balkan union was put in motion by Serbia. In the 1880s, Nikola Pašić considered the preservation and defence of Serbian independence to be the paramount task. Furthermore, one of the items in the Radical Party programme comprised the national agenda of uniting all Serbs into a single state. Afterwards, Nikola Pašić turned toward the idea of a confederation of South Slavic nations and the union of Serbs and Croats. During the 1890s, the ideas of unity between the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and the unification “around democratic Serbia” were already widespread among the Serbian intelligentsia, since “the Serbian people preserved their Slavic features better” (Čurkina, 1997, p. 169). Serbs from Austria-Hungary also began to gravitate toward Serbia, and there were even ideas about the union of Serbia with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Greece, Romania, and a part of Macedonia.

Three components of Nikola Pašić’s ideology, which is based on his national idea of “achieving [...] national liberation and unification of all Serbs” (Šemjakin, 1998), are worth mentioning. The steps of political changes in the Serbian society were subordinate to the achievement of social harmony and the accomplishment of the national idea. Indeed, the goal of the government of the new radical political party was to liberate and unite other Serbs. However, the manner of accomplishing unity was not expansionist in its nature. Furthermore, a task was set to make Serbia “appealing” to the “still unliberated brothers as well as other nations on the Balkan Peninsula”. Such a formula implied a voluntary inclination of the Serbs and other South Slavic nations towards unification with

Serbia, whose political system should be ideally suited for them. This refutes the widespread thesis in the West about the perpetual expansionist Serbian idea, involving the creation of Greater Serbia to the detriment (due to subordination) of other South Slavic nations.

Nikola Pašić was loyal to the Eastern Orthodox Slavic civilization, which he believed needed to oppose the push of “Germanism” toward the Balkans, particularly intensifying after the Congress of Berlin. According to his writings, the Western contagion was dangerous “because it sees truth in force, politics in lies, and piety in hypocrisy” (Šemjakin, 1998, p. 282, 283). In fact, force, hypocrisy, and lies are characteristic of Western politics in the recent Balkan crisis. It was entirely natural for Pašić to view Russia as the stronghold of Slavic Orthodox civilization and to bind the fate of his own nation to that of Russia. One particularity is especially noteworthy. The strong pro-Russian leanings and the devotion to Serbian traditions and Serbianness (or Serbianhood) of such a powerful political figure and a brilliant party leader as Pašić was did not only match the general atmosphere in the community in the late 19th century but also left a profound and lasting impression on the national consciousness. It is this historicism of consciousness, exhibited during the difficult years of modern-day crisis, which eluded the comprehension of both Western and Russian rational politicians who tried to contribute to crisis resolution in the 1990s. Such historicism bothered and angered them. Yet, there are traits in the Serbian consciousness that have stood the test of time, one of them being the hope for help from Russia. Besides, the instances of faith in the wisdom of the ruler and the propensity of the nation to subordinate its will to his have frequently occurred throughout history, which was confirmed and perhaps even reinforced in during the time of Pašić, when he attained a “charismatic” degree of trust by the Serbian people. The 19th century peasants used to say, ‘Baja knows what he’s doing’ (Pašić was nicknamed Baja). The same words could be heard in 1994, when no one tried to explain the actions of Slobodan Milošević but placed blind trust in some sort of infinite wisdom of the ruler.

In the second half of the 19th century, the ideas of Yugoslavism became entwined with the plans for national liberation of all South Slavic people, only some from the “Ottoman yoke” and others from Austria. The theory of Yugoslavism suited the Slovenians, because it provided them with a foothold in their fight against Germanization and the plans for integrating Slavic countries within Greater Germany or Italy. In Croatia (Dalmatia), members of the People’s Party considered the unification of South Slavs to be of Croatian national interest. In their opinion, such unification could have been achieved, at least temporarily, within the Austrian Empire, but in the event that this failed, the unification should have eventually led to the formation of an independent South Slavic state (Frejdzon, 1970, p. 135). They believed that Croats could form the nucleus around which the South Slavs from Austria would unite, whereas the Serbs could form such a nucleus for the South Slavs in the Ottoman Empire. Both Zagreb and Belgrade had leadership aspirations in the national movement of South Slavic unification. Nevertheless, being independent, Serbia had the better chance to achieve it than Croatia, which was a part of Austria-Hungary.

Even though the early 20th century saw a number of new projects regarding the form of government (federation-based state; Croato-Serbian personal union; unified and unitary

state with regional self-government), the idea of unification of all South Slavic nations and territories into a single independent state turned into a political appeal.

The idea of sacrificing in the name of Yugoslavism and the sense of responsibility for the fate of other nations in a multinational country are *important features of the Serbian consciousness during most of the 20th century*.

In the early 20th century, Serbs accepted the idea of Yugoslavism as their historical mission. Serbia was engulfed by the idea of liberation of not only Serbs but also all other Slavic nations. Moreover, they were prepared to renounce their own national individuality and cultural identity for the sake of this idea. In 1918, the Serbian people placed their name and their statehood, and later even their national identity, on the altar of the idea of pan-South Slavic unification. Most of those who declared themselves as “Yugoslavs” were actually Serbs, and the Serbs were eventually the last to contemplate their national interest among the nations comprising the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). They wanted to build the new Federation, formed after 1945, as a federation of equality and in service of the interests of all its resident nations. Some new nations – Macedonian and Montenegrin – were also given their own republics. On the other hand, Bosnia and Herzegovina was spawned from three different nations, with only one of them (the Muslim people) being allowed to fully develop.

There were several contributory factors for the shaping of Serbian consciousness after 1945. It should be recalled that the war-time multinational Yugoslavia was an intricate mesh of ethnic contradictions. Five of these factors are noted below:

1. Unresolved national question in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia: Croats and Slovenians did not forget that they could not gain autonomy, that Serbs ruled the country, and that the plans of the federalization of the Yugoslav state had failed, which is why they were constantly afraid of Serbian dominance in the country.
2. Societal schism: Interethnic contradictions were accompanied by ideological ones, since the antifascist struggle and the People’s Liberation War (WW2) led by the communists managed to unite only one portion of the society. The conflicts between the royalists and the communists were not nationally determined, but they still split the society. Sometimes the ideological contradictions went along the lines, e.g. “Serb-Chetnik vs. Croat-Partisan” or “Croat-Fascist vs. Serb-Partisan”. There was also the contradiction of “Yugoslavism vs. Serbianness/Croatianness/Slovenianness” etc. This considerably muddled the backdrop against which the national politics of the new state was shaped.
3. The Serbian national space was mostly shattered, both geographically and ideologically. Chetniks, Partisans, collaborationists, and royalists were only part of the list of opposing beliefs, the beliefs that not only created a peculiar climate of disunity among the Serbs, but subsequently also left an indelible mark on the mentality of the Serbian nation, which was forced to take upon itself a portion of the blame for both the Chetnik and the Greater Serbia movements and to spend many years fighting against Serbian nationalism and the so-called “Greater-Serbian hegemony”.
4. The manner of resolving interethnic contradictions between two world wars. In 1924, the Comintern’s resolution on the national question in Yugoslavia was based on the assumption that the Serbian bourgeoisie oppressed different nations, which

is why the slogan of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia needed to include the right of Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia to self-determination in the form of secession. The national question was fuelled by the fear of “Greater-Serbian Yugoslavia” and the domination of a single ethnicity, so the communists were supposed to help the oppressed nations in their fight for autonomy.

5. During the war, the task of liberating the country from fascism was shadowed by the burning issue of the struggle against “Greater-Serbian hegemony” and for the liberty of all nations.

To avoid conflicts, principles were put in place to achieve harmony in interethnic relations. According to one principle, there should not be any mention of disagreements, insults, and hatred from the previous period. A young state, with a new program for interethnic relations, was starting over, granting its nations equal rights in the building of the new society. To allow the Serbs to live along the Croats in Croatia, Croatian national chauvinism was equated with fascism. The war-time genocide against the Serbs in Croatia became a forbidden topic, while the Jasenovac concentration camp became a symbol of general condemnation of fascism. Likewise, the genocide against the Muslims by the Chetniks as well as Albanian atrocities and their loyalty to the fascist regime were meant to slide into oblivion. Another principle concerned the surpassing of the concept of the “ruling nation”, which was replaced by the concept of a new nation – “Yugoslavs” – which was built in parallel with socialism. The emergence of Yugoslavism, as the expression of internationalist politics, was intended to be the base for political and national unity of the country. Nevertheless, the Communist Party considered it its task to prevent the occurrence of national egoism and chauvinism. Anything that could potentially shake the solid foundations of the federation or disrupt the national unity was labelled as “treasonous”, “counterrevolutionary”, and “criminal”.

In accordance with the Party program, Serbian communists did not strive toward the unification of all ethnic Serbian territories and agreed to the proposition that their compatriots in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia receive the status of a “state-building” nation.

The Serbian character was shaped over centuries, as did the idea about their role of protectors of the oppressed and unifiers of not only Slavic but also all Orthodox Christian nations. History has always had profound significance for Serbs. It formed in them a sense of heavy national responsibility and a desire for victory and survival. For instance, one need only remember how the tradition of the Kosovo Myth helped the Serbs in Kosovo to survive in the 19th century. The people expected new incarnations of Miloš Obilić (a famous hero of the Battle of Kosovo) to wage a new liberation war against the Turks. The Serbs also waited for a new incarnation of the House of Nemanjić and tried to remain in their centuries-old territories.

Another issue, pertaining directly to the Serbs, was attributed to Serbia during the post-war Yugoslav era and was often cited in literature – “Serbian nationalism”. Yet, it is difficult to understand the processes that unfolded in the Serbian consciousness and impacted the mentality of the Serbian people without focusing on the following historical phenomenon. Namely, there was another slogan during the war that was supposed to aid in the nation’s unification under the communist flag – the fight against the oppressor from the previous period. Another fight was taking place underneath the fight for liberation

from the fascists – a fight against “Greater-Serbian hegemony” for the freedom of all nations – whereby the oppressor did not have a social or class character but rather a national one. This is what spawned and fuelled the fear of a “Greater-Serbian Yugoslavia” and the dominance of a single ethnicity. Consequently, the Serbs developed the so-called “guilt complex”.

Tito used to highlight that the fight would not have been successful had the nations not united not only to stand against fascism but also to oppose those who had oppressed them, primarily against “Greater-Serbian hegemony”. For Tito, this was the very “national sense” of the people’s liberation fight, which provided freedom and equality to all the nations. He stressed that “the twenty-year period of oppression of Yugoslav nations (Croats, Macedonians, Slovenians, and others) by a handful of Greater-Serbian hegemonists” was one the reasons for the prompt Yugoslav capitulation and the fascist occupation of the country.

The issue lay in the fact that during Tito’s rule, Serbia was considered a *possible* carrier of the hegemonic ideology, first Serbia as a political entity and then the Serbian people. The ideology manifested itself as the idea of “Greater Serbia”. The frequently used expression immediately after the war – “hegemony of Greater-Serbian bourgeoisie” – gradually gave way to a new expression – “Greater-Serbian hegemony”. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia took on the task of combating this ideology. To avoid being accused of nationalism, the Serbian communists were prepared to actively fight the ideology of “Greater Serbianness” and hegemonism. The idea of sacrifice was overshadowed by the idea of guilt over the Chetnik movement and “Greater Serbianness”, which resulted in the struggle against the so-called “Serbian nationalism” and the so-called “Greater-Serbian hegemony” over the entire post-war period. According to the country’s leadership, at the time, posing the “Serbian question” could have upset the painstakingly achieved national balance.

In the years after the war, the political consolidation of the war-torn Yugoslavia as the requisite for the country’s recovery took precedence over the national issues. The euphoria surrounding the new socialist society made many people confident that all the hardships and contradictions will be overcome, that the recent devastating war would be the last in their lifetime, and that all the interethnic conflicts, contradictions, and disagreements would sink into oblivion along with war. The concepts of “national state” and “national democracy” yielded the formula for social homogeneity of the society. The individualism, which had been equated with national traditionalism, was now countered with collectivism, which was supposed to help resolve the national differences in the building and strengthening of the political system. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia responded vigorously to any expression of nationalism in culture, science, or politics, believing that the revolutionary centralism and “*uravnilovka*” (Russian term for wage and benefits levelling) in the international relations would guarantee national equality. Considerable effort was devoted to generate nationally-based personnel, to help the underdeveloped republics or provinces, and to balance the economic development of all regions.

However, more recent studies and documents have revealed that there were numerous quietly smouldering unresolved issues pertaining to the heterogeneous ethnic and religious structure of the population in almost all of Yugoslavia. As early as the first post-

war decade, issues began to emerge that could fall under the umbrella term “nationalism”. Yet, nationalism was not the same throughout the federation – it was manifested in the form of ethnic relations but also as a relationship toward the Republic or Central government, i.e. it was slowly assuming the form of separatism.

Instead of a conclusion: Serbian national consciousness at the beginning of the 21st century

The national politics induced the exactly opposite effect, as the majority of the people began to be “afraid” of expressing their national feelings too openly. Interestingly, though, the sense of responsibility for the entire federation only grew stronger among the Serbs, to be clearly articulated in the early 1990s, when, instead of openly discussing their issues just as Slovenians, Croats, and Albanians did, the Serbs fought bitterly to preserve the idea of Yugoslavism.

The following fact should be emphasized: the disintegration of the SFRY provided Serbia with an opportunity to restore its statehood outside of the federation, but it nonetheless spent the longest defending the federation and the Yugoslav idea. *Thus, the national identity of the most populous SFRY nation, stifled in the federal state, assumed a dynamic and volatile shape and a character of sacrificial supranationality.* This is what allowed the international law figures to fairly easily stifle the idea of a Slavic community in the Balkan Peninsula and to deprive it of its statehood. The effortless loss of statehood without the authorization by the legislative body of an independent state is a 21st century oddity. In 2003, Yugoslavia was formally dissolved overnight at Javier Solana’s proposal and was replaced by another “state construct”, Serbia and Montenegro, only to finally dissolve in 2006, when both Serbia and Montenegro became independent sovereign countries.

Interestingly, according to sociological studies, in 1990, 28% of the Yugoslav population completely lacked “social distance” toward other nations (as opposed to 53% a quarter of a century earlier). Comparative studies conducted in 1966 and 1990 revealed that such distancing was the least prominent in Serbia, Macedonia, and Slovenia, and the most prominent in Croatia (with an increase from 15% to 29%). The scope of distancing toward other nations across the Yugoslav republics significantly increased among the Croats and Slovenians toward the Serbs and Montenegrins and vice versa (Yugoslavia at the Crisis Turning Point, 1991, p. 174, 175). The results of the study of “national closed-mindedness” (expressed as the willingness to marry a person of another nationality) showed that the occurrence was the most prominent among Albanians (69%) and Slovenians (65%). Those who declared themselves as “Yugoslavian” were the most open-minded with respect to interethnic marriage (56%) (Yugoslavia at the Crisis Turning Point, 1991, p. 178). There are other interesting data obtained from these studies. Being a part of Yugoslavia was prioritized over being the part of a specific republic by the Serbs, Montenegrins, and Muslims (71%, 80%, and 84%, respectively), whereas the Slovenians prioritized their being a part of their republic (66%) and Europe (45%) rather than Yugoslavia (26%) (Yugoslavia at the Crisis Turning Point, 1991, p. 236).

Whenever nationalism was officially discussed in the SFRY, it was in reference to all republics so that no one would be offended. From this author’s perspective, nationalism was the least prominent in Serbia, where it assumed the form of the “defender” of

Yugoslavism. As the most populous nation in Yugoslavia, which placed its statehood at the altar of Yugoslavism, the Serbs felt greatly responsible for the development of the entire country. This is exactly why the Serbian “nationalism” stepped forward against the separatism of other nations. Whereas nationalism was shaping into separatism in Croatia and Slovenia, it had a dual role in Serbia – the defence of the federation and the defence of Serbian unity.

Another trait of the Serbian people is worth noting: after the dissolution of the SFRY, the Serbian people, who had always advocated the unity of South Slavic nations, were no longer concentrated within a single country but instead even became a national minority in multiple newly-formed countries and were forced to seek new national orientation. This resulted in the awakening of the Serbian national consciousness and national identity in a geographically heavily confined space in times of splintering of the Serbian nation and the absence of its statehood. The issue is also highly translatable to Russia due to obvious historical and political parallelisms.

There is a second turning point in the historical consciousness of the Serbs that warrants highlighting – the consciousness of their “minuscule” role as the defender of Greater Russia on its remote western borders. European countries that see Serbia as the “extended arm” of Moscow, which in turn aims at strengthening Orthodox Christianity and Russian influence in the Balkans, will not let this be forgotten. As a result, the West has always seen and still sees Serbia as being in a “relationship” with Russia. Even in its more recent history, Serbia has suffered due to its Russophilia, among other things.

This is what marks the present historical role of the Serbian people. Serbia has endured terrible ordeals and displayed the finest traits of its national character. Serbs are revisiting the understanding of their role in the history and consciousness of their national identity. Nowadays, the ideas of national self-determination are increasingly prevailing over the ideas of Yugoslavism. This trend also compelled the Serbs to recognize the necessity of having their own country called “Serbia”.

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ISTORIJSKE ODLIKE NACIONALNE SAMOIDENTIFIKACIJE SRBA

Apstrakt

Razvoj srpskog naroda tokom XIX i XX veka karakteriše slabljenje nacionalnog identiteta usled jačanja ideje o ujedinjenju Slovena na prostorima Balkana u obliku ideje jugoslavizma. Srpski se karakter uobličavao vekovima, kao i njihov stav o sopstvenoj ulozi zaštitnika potlačenih, ujedinitelja kako slovenskih, tako i svih pravoslavnih naroda. Kod Srba se formirao osećaj visoke nacionalne odgovornosti, želja za pobedom, za opstankom. Ideja žrtvovanja u ime jugoslovenstva, osećaj odgovornosti za sudbinu drugih naroda višenacionalne zemlje – važne su odlike srpske svesti tokom skoro čitavog XX veka. U posleratnoj Jugoslaviji za Srbiju se vezuje još jedan problem, nazvan „srpski nacionalizam“. Međutim, mi ne možemo razumeti procese koji su obeležili mentalitet srpske nacije ako ne obratimo pažnju na sledeći istorijski fenomen. Naime, tokom rata je postojao još jedan slogan koji je trebalo da doprinese ujedinjenju naroda pod zastavom komunista, a to je borba protiv tlačitelja iz prethodnog perioda. Još u ratnim godinama, uporedo sa zadatkom oslobađanja zemlje od fašizma, i dalje je bila aktuelna i borba protiv „velikosrpske hegemonije“, za slobodu svih naroda. Pritom, tlačitelj nije imao socijalno-klasni, već nacionalni oblik. Tako se rađa i kultiviše fenomen straha od „velikosrpske Jugoslavije“ i dominacije jedne nacije. Kao posledica toga kod Srba se razvija takozvani „kompleks krivice“. Za vreme Tita Srbija je smatrana mogućim nosiocem ideologije hegemonizma. Došlo je do poistovećivanja Srbije, a zatim i srpskog naroda, sa hegemo-nističkom ideologijom koja se ispoljavala kroz takozvanu ideju o „Velikoj Srbiji“. Ideja žrtvovanja pala je u senku ideje o krivici za četništvo i „velikosrpstvo“ što je rezultiralo borbom protiv takozvanog „srpskog nacionalizma“ i takozvane „velikosrpske hege-monije“ tokom celog posleratnog perioda. Postavljanje „srpskog pitanja“ tada je moglo, kako je smatralo rukovodstvo zemlje, da naruši nacionalnu ravnotežu koja je teškom mukom postignuta.

Ključne reči: Srbija, Jugoslavija, nacionalizam, jugoslovenstvo, hegemonizam

RELIGIOUS AND INTERETHNIC HOSTILITY AS A CAUSE OF AGGRESSION OVER TERRITORY AND RESOURCES

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Abstract

Religious and inter-ethnic hostility has been traditionally present in human relations. In terms of strength and duration, it transcends ideological conflicts. In addition, these types of hostility are well suited to manipulate public opinion and initiate conflicts between people. They are usually used to conceal or achieve other goals. After the collapse of the bipolar geopolitical model at the end of the twentieth century, these conflicts became conducive to achieving superiority in the race, or war, for the appropriation of resources located in the territories of other countries.

Key words: religion, nationalism, opposition, USA, Europe, Russia, the Balkans

Instead of an introduction

At the end of the twentieth century, changes occurred that were not only political, although many analysts identified them as such. This is probably due to the continued suggestion that there is a fight between two ideologies, between two social and political systems. In part, this is also true. Political life within the countries of the former socialist bloc did not cease to exist, but only changed its nature, and in many places also its foreign policy orientation.

The political situation not only in the USSR and Russia, but also in the Balkan region, changed significantly during the government of M. Gorbachev and his successor B. Yeltsin. This has contributed to the display of Western aggression in the region, with all the consequences it entailed. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (1991) could have been replaced by a series of bilateral treaties with recent allies – the socialist states. That way Russia would not be in isolation today because it would have their support. The dissolution of the USSR and the destruction of Yugoslavia, two countries created on a similar principle, allow the West to continue its psychological war based on lies, unfounded accusations, and the allegation of non-existent guilt. All this is accompanied by a formation of an increasingly negative attitude towards Orthodoxy and the Slavs, and ultimately towards Russia. Myths both old and new are used for this. The obvious fiction is spread through books and articles

without cited sources. The historical events are “taken” out of context and fictitious facts are added to them and presented as the only and indisputable truth. Purposeful propaganda against Balkan Orthodoxy and the Slavs is in fact propaganda against Russia, too.

Changes in the Balkans and international opposition

The collapse of the bipolar model is accompanied by religious and international opposition.

In the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the secession of the republics took place in the name of sovereignty in the extremely pronounced form of nationalist propaganda. In Romania, political changes were preceded by Romanian-Hungarian contradictions in the western parts of the country. In Bulgaria, the “big excursion” of a part of the Bulgarian Muslims who identified themselves as Turks was being inspired. This event preceded the overthrow of Todor Zhivkov. National division has also led to the dissolution of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The union on a national basis was accomplished only between East Germany and West Germany, which merged into a single country. In Yugoslavia, the process of decaying statehood was mainly due to economic and financial devastation, as a result of external intervention by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

When we talk about religious and international opposition, I would like to refer to a term that has been established in recent years and that does not correspond to the historical reality of the Balkans. I am referring to the concept/definition of “ethnicity”. It appeared in the United States in the mid-1970s, well-grounded by American sociologists Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan. In 1981, this definition also began to be used in Europe, distributed by the American sociologist Joseph Rothschild (Altermat, 1997, p. 57, 58).

Racial issues in the United States and the absence of a consolidated nation as in Europe create a need for new concepts that should explain American society, in which African-Americans, Hispanic and Latino Americans, and Asian-Americans are increasingly establishing themselves as a demographic presence. The introduction of the term “ethnicity” is probably convenient for a country where there is no leading nation that defines the name of the country. In the Balkans, nationality is inextricably linked to religion. This is also true of atheist societies. In the Balkans, historical tradition is linked to the formation of nationality. It is based on faith (religion), which was the basis of national culture and a factor in the creation of cultural values during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. The state is what the nationality preserves and affirms with its laws. In the folk art of the Balkan peoples, the religious affiliation of both the positive and the negative hero is invariably linked to their national identity.

The narrated (sung, described) clash is primarily religious. Most importantly, there is no place for compromise: one or more characters are sacrificed “for faith and nationality”. The importance of religion and, accordingly, nationality is transferred to both the writing and the laws of the restored statehood, and from there to nationality.

The subsequent change of political system in most Balkan countries is proof that any such change in the region occurs after the intervention of a great world power or a group of great world powers. For the first time in recent history, the United States has been given

the opportunity for full and decisive intervention in the creation of the new Balkan charades.

At the end of the twentieth century, with external involvement, two types of “state system” were created in the Balkans – protectorates and puppet states. The turning of puppet states into protectorates of the U.S. and European politics is only a matter of time and it is of particular interest for the West.

In practice, the freedom gained in the former socialist countries is directed solely at their own decision to relinquish their sovereignty and independence for the benefit of NATO and the EU (Bauman, 1999, p. 87, 88). After the United States and its allies of the Alliance receive whatever is necessary, they organize in the former socialist countries the nominations of political leaders without knowledge, experience, and authority. Taking advantage of the well-manipulated dissatisfaction within the society, they destroy not only the totalitarian system, but also the state. The primary consideration in choosing new politicians is based not on their competence and professional government experience but on their loyalty to Western democratic values and the new anti-communist policies.

The changes in the Balkans at the turn of the 21st century were most clearly expressed in the social, political, and economic development of the processes in Yugoslavia that led to its destruction and fragmentation into seven separate countries. This process was the result of foreign economic and financial influence, followed by political, religious, and international opposition. In the final stage of this process, 12 years after Tito’s death, the United States and the EU openly declared their support for nationalist organizations in the various republics forming a part of the federation. This policy was hidden behind the slogans “for the protection of democratic values, such as the right of peoples to self-determination”. At the same time, the Serbian minority outside Serbia was subject to political discrimination. Thanks to the support from the United States, Germany, the Vatican, and the Muslim emirates given to the nationalist forces in Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, nationalists such as Tudjman, Kučan, Gligorov, Izetbegović, and Taçi came to power (Maličević, 1999, pp. 65–67). The international pressure against Yugoslavia, conducted by the U.S. and EU leaders, placed the country in isolation. Russia’s policy in the first half of the 1990s, led by then Foreign Minister A. Kozirev, also contributed to this. Washington’s goal was to impose the U.S. influence over the Balkans and thus move closer to Russia’s borders. Today, 20 years later, the main goal of the United States has been realized (Novikov, 2015, p. 52).

Two new states, in the form of protectorates with significant Muslim populations – Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Kosovo – are emerging in the Balkans.

As a result of the annually repeated propaganda campaign concerning Srebrenica, the global public did not learn the truth about Muslim atrocities and the thousands of Serbs killed in Bratunac, Kravice, Skelani, and other settlements. After the fighting around Srebrenica had ended, vehicles, buses, and trucks were sent to transport the Muslim population to the Tuzla region. At the time, neither the UN soldiers nor their commanders present at the scene spoke of any mass murders. It was only later that new instructions arrived and the creation of the myths of “killing civilians and mass executions” began (Žarkih, 2008). One of the methods of manipulating the public is the use of mass culture. Despite its obvious primitivism, it has had considerable success among young people.

According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, it is precisely this approach, together with military and economic power, that “provides the United States with significant political influence that no other country can boast of” (Sorčenko, 2020). Most often, the manipulation is based on the effect of the first information, together with the presented “authoritative” opinion of mediators, well known by the society, and their comments, a well-chosen false analogy, as well as the method of “encircling movement by flanking”. The latter provides immaterial details that are well known or easily verifiable, followed by a citation of partially true facts and outright lies (Sorčenko, 2020). Much of the information that the world sees and that is rebroadcast on relevant private and state-owned media are actually clips produced in the studios of PR agencies, presented as credible reports and interviews. The main purpose is to manipulate the public opinion by flooding them with fabricated information. In this case, the tried and tested maxim is that the audience usually considers the first information. The refutations, if any, do not produce results (Šišmanova, 2000, p. 18). During the military clashes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the head of the PR agency Ruder Finn Global Public Affairs, J. Harf, admitted to J. Merlino, the deputy director of French TV channel F2, that the U.S. audience “did not know in what part of Africa to look for Bosnia” (Šišmanova, 2000, p. 18). Over the course of three months, 30 interviews with leading media publishers were organized and interviews with representatives of the Bosnian government, Vice President Gore, Secretary of State, 17 influential senators, as well as representatives of three Jewish organizations – the League Against Defamation, the American Jewish Committee, and the “American Jewish Congress” – were published (Merlino, 1994, p. 95). In this way, a preliminary anti-Serb attitude was created in the Western political circles, in the diplomatic circles, and in the media since the end of 1990. Over time, the falsifications forming the moral and political basis for hostilities against the Serbs became publicly known. In 1,500 articles in various Western publications in 1992, the ratio of anti-Serbian publications to those defending the Serbs with an overly cautious tone was 40:1 (Brock, 1993, p. 152 and subsequent). Very often, the publications were guided not by some conviction and partiality, but by the requirements of the information market. Regardless of the reasons, the result is the same in all cases. Of course, there are other opinions, but their announcement happens very rarely. For example, UNPROFOR intelligence chief John Sray explained the activities of Ruder Finn as follows: “In fact, Serbs who suffered in Muslim camps were portrayed on television as Muslims. The ethnic cleansing by the Muslims is ignored” (Šišmanova, 2000, p. 18).

One of the methods the United States use is to pit different nations against each other and politically divide their countries. The White House does not feel uneasy doing this, interfering with its Western allies. In the early 1990s, Russia’s lack of authority over the relations in the disintegration of Yugoslavia was evident. Russian policy concerning Yugoslavia and the Balkans in general was led at the time by Foreign Minister A. Kozirev. In the position he took, he sought to prove his loyalty through the West. This is why Russian diplomacy did what the West expected from “the Kremlin democrats and from the already new, democratic Russia”. New politicians surrounding Yeltsin tenaciously pushed their view that “the Balkans is not a major strand in Russian foreign policy because they are not related to Russian national interests” (Guskova, 1995).

Instead of a conclusion

Russia's authority was on such a decline that even some of its sporadic initiatives in favour of the Serbs were not well received by the Western countries, which is why they were not supported. In early 1993, there was a certain "hardening" of the Russian position regarding the military invasion of the Croats in the Serbian Krajina, an area protected by the "Blue Helmets".

This raised false hope among the Serbs for more decisive Russian actions. Croatia did not withdraw its military forces from the occupied territories and did not comply with UNSCR 802. All subsequent events showed that Russia and the United States had no differences of opinion. Despite the active dialogue between the two countries, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher noted, "Russia and the United States have a lot in common in their position concerning Serbia. This also applies to Mr. Kozirev's position and my position" (Guskova, 1995).

In practice, the Western media managed to manipulate and incite the public in their respective countries against the "evil Serbs", who also support the communist Milošević, are Orthodox Christians, and are protected by Russia. Internationally, the FRY was isolated and any assistance from Russia was underwhelming and in most cases non-existent. During the bombing of the FRY, Russia remained "angrily" silent, which did not stop the aggression. The Declaration of the Presidium of the Belgrade Society for Serbian-Russian Friendship was impressive. It said, "Sorry, Russia. We Serbs can no longer be in alliance with you until you start to control yourself and stop trading your allies and sell them for pennies and slogans ... Sorry, Russia, we love you more than ourselves. You're a myth, just like Kosovo. But it turns out that this myth is a myth of a non-existent Russia".

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VERSKO I MEĐUNACIONALNO NEPRIJATELJSTVO KAO UZROK AGRESIJE NA TERITORIJU I RESURSE

Apstrakt

Versko i međunacionalno neprijateljstvo je gotovo tradicionalno prisutno u ljudskim odnosima. Po svojoj snazi i dugom trajanju ono prevazilazi ideološke sukobe. Takođe, ove vrste neprijateljstava su veoma pogodne za manipulisanje javnim mnjenjem i pokretanje sukoba među ljudima. Obično se koriste za prikriivanje ili postizanje drugih ciljeva. Nakon kraha bipolarnog geopolitičkog modela na kraju dvadesetog veka, ovi sukobi postaju pogodni za postizanje superiornosti u trii odnosno u ratu za prisvajanje resursa koji se nalaze na teritorijama drugih zemalja.

Ključne reči: religija, nacionalizam, opozicija, SAD, Evropa, Rusija, Balkan

THE ISSUE OF FREEDOM AS THE STRUCTURAL BASIS FOR THE SERBIAN CULTURE AND ITS RELATION TO EUROPE OF THE 21ST CENTURY

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Abstract

In this article the author articulates how the question of freedom appears as the foundation for the culture of the Serbs, i.e. as the structural basis for a Serbian pattern, and further places this in the twenty-first century context. This context, first and foremost, is characterized by the split between neoliberalism and its critical opponents and, as such, is equally manifested in the social and cultural spheres. It is argued that market society appears as anti-culture proper and that culture always already presupposes the concept of freedom. In this respect, the culture of “Young Bosnians” is emphasized as a simultaneous reference to the autonomy of the people, the freedom of the individual, and freedom as a universal category. The experience of “the Kosovo thought” in Serbian culture is then traced as the right to self-determination. As such, it is interrelated with the ancient difference between barbaroi and civilized people, which is also the dilemma of contemporary Europe. This is how Handke’s work – and most notably his reference to “the Lifeworld” among the Serbs – arises as a notable example for rethinking the twenty-first century Europe.

Key words: neoliberalism, freedom, culture, history, Serbian cultural pattern

The Crypto-Cultural Neoliberal Pattern – A Manifesto against Freedom

It is indisputably not a matter of chance that – on a global scale – decades of *absolute dominance of neoliberalism* in practically all spheres simultaneously *produced* a certain prevalence of anti-culture as a specific form of action in both theory and practice. This is clear already in the fact that, as Harcourt notices, *the market appeared as the basic process of all social interaction* (Harcourt, 2012). In this light, more precisely, the issue, besides everything else, is about the process of founding a *crypto-cultural pattern as a contemporary mimesis of culture*, which always already ends in a hyperstimulation of the market, i.e. in the infinite reproduction of the same and the favouring of mass consumerism. And the so-called “freedom of the individual” in market societies, as articulated by Bauman in his analysis of contemporary societies, appears first and foremost as a form of soft repression that has melancholy as its final outcome (Bauman, 2007). In such a context, the fact is that what is most relevantly missing in crypto-culture is a *telos*, the ancient understanding of true purpose, which, when missing, has always led

to the loss of a society's ethical landmarks of a society and which, again, is not a matter of pure contingency but rather one of the cornerstones of neoliberal governmentality. Because forcing radical individualism – simultaneously with establishing the materialistic paradigm as the exclusively desirable one – also signified the loss of relation between the particular and the universal, the human being and its community as the bond and the space in which truth and purpose appear.

Moreover, neoliberal prevalence of *the market principle*, instead of *the principle of creation*, manifested a withdrawal from yet another ancient ideal, i.e. the Aristotelian measure as the centre of politics, ethics, and society, in such a way that measure has been replaced by representation and consumption of crypto-cultural products. Articulating philosophy as a critical theory of culture, especially in relation to political economy and the media-mediated society, Baudrillard articulated the anti-culture of neoliberalism as a seductive simulacrum. In other words, crypto-culture's pseudo-metaphysics of symbolic exchange reveals how *the space of culture* transforms itself to a *space of commodity* and then how the self-referential character of signs is established, by which the corporal relation between the signifier and the signified disappears (Baudrillard, 1981).

The signs that, as Baudrillard writes, “no longer designate anything”, so “the entire reality becomes a place of manipulation and structural simulation” (Baudrillard, 1975, p. 7), were the final outcome of this process. The world of signs without reality, i.e. without a real foundation, is precisely the *post-history* for which neoliberalism has been striving and in which, simultaneously, the dimensions of the past and the future would disappear in the so-called “open society”, in which there is only one language – *the language of liberal democracy*, or, more specifically, as shown by Flusser, also *the language of the program* (Flusser, 2013).

The fact is, however, that control of signs could not have been absolute and the virtual neoliberal world, by its very concept, could not have lasted *ad infinitum*, so that the twenty-first century has already disclosed the following two aspects: simulations are *produced* and not spontaneous and the so-called rationality of *homo oeconomicus* is illusory. The direction toward the measureless increase of profit always means transforming everything that stands in the way into assets, which is why the whole of *culture* – and especially its *critical dimension* – was either supposed to become a memory from a past, which itself dissolves in historical revisionism, or has become a constitutional part of the mechanism of control and governmentality. *Crypto-culture* therefore appears as a *pseudo-metaphysics of eternal presence* that is opposed to *both the past and the future*.

The concept of the “*cultural industry*” as a process of transforming *art into commodity*, i.e. its *commodification*, appears for the first time in Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectics of Enlightenment*. With an interdisciplinary approach, especially between philosophy and the sociology of culture, it discloses *the destruction of culture* but equally the relation between *freedom, culture, and critical consciousness* (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2007). The *commodification of art* not only cancels its *aesthetic dimension*, one of the characteristics of late liberalism, but implicitly annuls *education as the first presupposition of culture*, and so the basis of critical theory and practice. How can we read today – in the contemporary world – the well-known statement from *The Dialectics of Enlightenment*, announcing that modern culture is *the new form of barbarism*? Perhaps best if we again recall the ancient Greeks, because the concept *barbaroi* referred precisely to *those who*

are not capable to decide on their own destiny. Therefore, in ancient Greece, the difference between *citizens*, on whom *the culture of the polis* rests, and *barbarians* was manifested precisely in the *acting from freedom and towards freedom*, as opposed to obedience. This is why, therefore, in Adorno's and Horkheimer's association of *barbarism with the cultural fall of Europe*, the entire movement of the *European loss of its own identity* is revealed and, as such, it even corresponds to the loss of *freedom* in its original sense, i.e. as *autonomy* and self-determination. Furthermore, articulating a radical critique of Western societies, the authors of *The Dialectics of Enlightenment* emphasize how the phenomenon of corruption, along with the so-called mass culture, ultimately resulted even in the loss of the freedom of creation because, as explicated by Adorno, crypto-culture spread to practically all spheres of life as one of the forms of control and governing over entire populations (Adorno, 2001).

In this light, it is relevant to remember how the relation between *subjectivity* and *culture* is decisive precisely because *freedom* is the basic concept without which neither cultural creation nor specifically human existence in its wholeness can be conceived. For this reason, the basis for the technology of annulling culture, i.e. establishing crypto-culture as the constitutive part of the process of abolishing freedom, lies in the expansion of transnational markets and especially in the actions of *transnational crypto-elites*. Their affirmation of the so-called "universal culture" consisted, for the most part, of the attempt to use the quest for universality, which appears in every great work of art, for the destruction of cultural specificities – and this is how the neoliberal cultural industry and mass crypto-culture acted in connection with political and economic globalization. Moreover, this is how the basic fact that every culture is by its concept a *national culture* was to be perverted, in spite of the fact that *the dialectics of culture* consists precisely in the interrelation between the particular and the universal, i.e. in the way in which the particular reveals the universal. It also appears that another fact was to be concealed, how *national identity discloses itself as the integrity of a people*, because the disappearance of national memory is interrelated with the ability to evaluate. In the words of Simone Weil, *the foundation of a personality in its culture is the ethical basis which enables us to receive strength from our spiritual grounds* (Weil, 2000). The propaganda of anti-culture spoke in favour of a fake universal, i.e. in which the abstract citizen who does not belong anywhere is the departure point, or of the creation of artificial micro-cosmoses within a wider globalist space, which emerge as the neoliberal substitution of national culture. The seemingly universal "export-import" culture, identified with the use of material goods, became so totalizing in character that it attempts to conceal even a basic fact that *cultural identity is the self-consciousness of a people* that emerges and develops in *history acting from freedom and towards freedom*.

In short, these are the key reasons for the contemporary cultural wars, i.e. one of the most relevant forms of struggle against neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism. More specifically, these are the reasons why every discourse on cultural patterns must *per se* begin as *a discourse on freedom*. *Culture presupposes freedom* but also *simultaneously creates it*, which is why *every true culture is always already a culture of freedom*.

The History of the Serbs as a History of Freedom

In such a light, the exemplary character of *Serbian culture in toto* comes forth on the horizon of its history – *because the history of the Serbs appears as an example par excellence of the culture of freedom*. Therefore, the activity of the “Young Bosnians”, for example, *their poetry as well as their praxis*, appears as *the live form of freedom*. At the same time, the example of “Young Bosnia” is a highly relevant reference because it simultaneously reveals the proximity and interrelation between the concepts of practices of *the autonomy of the people, the right for self-realization, freedom of the individual, and freedom as a universal category*. Gaćinović’s notes on Bogdan Žerajić testify about this as well, i.e. they emphasize the thought about *Serbian liberation* and the same emerges from Ilić’s reference to Pernstrofer that “...every culture is national” because “it begins in a specific people and demonstrates in its highest forms – and especially in the highest ones – a decisive national character.” Socialism and the national idea, it is further emphasized, are not contradictions. Every attempt to weaken the national idea, if successful, must reduce the wealth of mankind (Mitrinović, 2014, p. 11). This type of understanding of the “Young Bosnians” is interrelated with the comprehension of how *the struggle for freedom* simultaneously means *a struggle for equality*, i.e. *a struggle for justice* that comes forth from the foundations of human existence. From the lines that Princip engraved in a Sarajevo prison in 1914, an *ethical, cultural, and political imperative* comes forth: “*the one who wishes to live should die, the one willing to die should live.*” This is the moment in which *the great idea of resistance and rebellion* meets the no less great idea of *absolute sacrifice*: together they build the sense of human existence in the world and present *the structural basis of the Serbian cultural pattern*. Because, simultaneously, this great imperative that Princip places forward also discloses the connection *between freedom, culture, and identity*, i.e. *subjectivity and culture as the Serbian struggle for freedom, as well as the personal and collective resistance to colonization as the only referential sense of true cosmopolitanism*.

In this light, the difference between a mere *survival*, i.e. *bare life*, and *dignified life*, the basic characteristic of life that is called human life, lies precisely in the idea of *freedom* so that *culture* appears as *a way of existence, as a historical and localized existence and one of the greatest forms of the realization of freedom*. As such, *culture has a special bond with tradition* and both simultaneously build identity as a thought and feeling of togetherness and recognition on the horizons of dignified life. This is why culture – as well as tradition – is *necessary for evaluation* and this is why with true culture there cannot be provincialism in time and space. Tradition itself is the continuity of cultural values, i.e. it connects the community into a historical-cultural collectivity.

Therefore, when Andrić (1977) speaks of the generation of *rebellious angels*, he refers to the same relationship between *the particular and the universal* through which *the sense of culture and tradition comes forth*. This is a tradition that is not only given but has to be earned. It is not a passive voice but something that has to be achieved continuously. Moreover, when *freedom appears* not only as a *prerequisite for culture and identity*, but is also *placed in the centre as the basic content of a national culture*, then it *constitutes freedom in a twofold and most profound sense*. Because then, it is the event in which culture appears as something fundamental, i.e. basic and original. From *the beginning a formal condition* and the first presupposition, *it transforms itself to the subjectivity of a*

people. Here we are referring to a specific self-consciousness of Serbian collectivity throughout history and to a dialectical relation, beginning with which *creation from freedom becomes freedom as existence*. Moreover, it is the situation in which cultural and spiritual expression appears as political in the broadest sense, i.e. in which, through *the pattern of rebellion* and *the pattern of sacrifice*, a struggle for *practically every aspect of the human life of a community occurs*. Such is the example of the *Serbian cultural pattern*.

Furthermore, this is why the entire previous cultural heritage is put forth in Princip's line "the one who strives for life should die", from the Kosovo testament and Lazar's curse to Njegoš's *metaphysical and ethical imperative* "Let it be what cannot be!" and the appeal to "ceaseless struggle", and then to the contemporaries, who, like Nogo or Bećković, write the entire metaphysics of "the eternal coping." Moreover, this is why the history of the Serbs, from Kosovo to the First and Second World Wars all the way up to the struggles for freedom at the turn of the twenty-first century, is interlaced with its "rebellion" in culture. They mutually interrelate and create themselves, shaped by an original form of struggle for a dignified life against different forms of colonialism and occupation.

This is how the Serbian pattern has been built throughout history, from Ban of the "small Banjska" to Princip and our contemporaries, from personal to collective breaks and decisions, so much so that it *is worthwhile to unconditionally sacrifice for freedom, because life in slavery is not a human life*. Furthermore, this is the meeting point of *the life of a great myth* and, simultaneously, *the most rational expression of the relation between freedom, the human being, and reason*. Because, in the same way in which myth appears in moments of the interrelation between the highest truths and virtues in Plato, it is precisely the synthesis of mythical meanings that come forth from a culture and critical consciousness about the world in historical time that the relevant relation between *value and truth* is achieved. It is the relation *between the normative and the epistemological element* in which *the collective symbolics of a people flows into universal patterns of existence and meaning*.

The Serbian pattern, beginning from the Kosovo myth, which is based on two basic facts – first, *that the battle against the stronger was fought* and, second, *that this battle was lost* – therefore appears as a life consciousness about the issue that *the process of struggle is always the most relevant and most honourable choice*. In the real history of *Serbian struggles against the stronger*, struggles that are, in Njegoš's terms, "ceaseless," there were losses and there was liberation. But what, however, always reappears as the place of "Kosovo time" is that, precisely as in Princip's verses, *the concepts of life and death exchange places when the issue on the table is freedom*, i.e. that it is worthwhile to sacrifice for freedom even when the outcome is unclear, blurry, or even tragic because mere survival is not a human life. Moreover, this is the inner relation between *freedom and responsibility*, because the consciousness of freedom is the same as consciousness of responsibility, which always relates to the other and the "third," i.e. it refers to the destiny of the entire community.

In this light, in the resistance of the Serbs to a much more powerful enemy in Second World War, Andrić rediscovers the Kosovo model of the Serbian culture. Of course, the historical experience of the suffering of the Serbs in his work *The Bridge on The Drina*

(1977) has been universalized, because the destiny of other peoples was illustrated as well. Even more relevantly, through a specific “extension of time” to a much longer period of suffering – *Kosovo time became the time of continuity and permanence as the ceaseless even in different forms which cannot be escaped.*

In principle, Andrić’s “*fall into history*” represents the point from which the feeling of collectivity and togetherness arises as well as the temporal relation between ancestors and contemporaries. History emerges as *the life struggle of struggle for freedom* and culture emerges as the world and consciousness about the struggle of a people and as the readiness for absolute sacrifice in resistance. This is why Andrić, describing Njegoš’s imperative in the essay “Njegoš as a Tragic Hero of the Kosovo Thought,” emphasizes how “*nowhere in the poetry of the world nor in the destiny of a people has he found a more terrifying code*” (Andrić, 1935). Because, as he writes, “without this suicidal absurd of the terrifying code “Let it be what cannot be!” without this *positive nihilism*, without this persistent negation of reality and the obvious, *neither action nor even the thought of action against evil would be possible.*” Moreover, Andrić concludes how “*under this motto all our struggles for liberation have been fought – from Karađorđe through contemporary times*” (Andrić, 1935). And we can also say that from this “positive nihilism” comes forth the “*building*” nature of Serbian history and culture, because from sacrifice one infinitely creates, so a specific ethics and aesthetics are born – in which, through national struggle, universal resistance is put forth – because the national feeling simultaneously equally appears as the hermeneutical condition for comprehending reality. *The self-relevance of the people in its self-determination, as the meeting point between myth, reason, and freedom, appears through the original character of the Serbian cultural pattern and its subjectivity.* Or, to put it differently, the specificity of Serbian cultural pattern comes forth from the fact that in new historical conditions the cult of beginnings and first memories is always renewed but also that this is not only an issue of a myth but likewise of a real experience of suffering and a live ethos of sacrifice and resistance. *The archetype of the Serbian cultural pattern in infinite Kosovo time persistently repeats that a people will never accept having the sense of their destiny shaped without their participation.* Because it is precisely through *the struggle for freedom and self-determination that a people is constituted* and a culture nurtures, not only consciousness about freedom but equally the space for freedom even in times *when real freedom is yet to be attained and the struggle is ongoing.* Moreover, this is why Andrić reminds us that culture is founded on courageous achievements that seem without much perspective but that always, implicitly or explicitly, become fruitful only if we find *the strength and the courage to realize them – and persist in such action.*

The Serbian Culture of Freedom and the Twenty-first Century Europe at the Crossroads

In light of this, one should bear in mind how it is precisely the *Serbian culture of freedom* that equally appears as a *contemporary landmark for contemporary Europe*, which is today, no less than in the time in which Husserl wrote of it, in a state of “great fatigue.” The crisis of Europe in the twenty-first century is again appearing as a dilemma between *the fall into barbarism* and *renewal of Europe*, i.e. as a choice between *barbaroi* and civilization. This crisis, once again, came forth from a *self-forgetfulness of Europe* and its *self-deception*, only this time it is the immediate outcome of a long-lasting theory and

practice of *political, economic, and social* – and *anti-cultural – neoliberalism*. Simultaneously, in the condition of self-capture, the model of which Badiou calls “the materialistic paradigm” (Badiou, 2006), European people forgot the meaning of the relation between *freedom, responsibility, and self-determination*, which is why the example of the Serbian cultural pattern appears as exemplary for their current crossroad. For once again, *restauratio*, which is necessary for European states and people, refers primarily to the issue of *subjectivity* on the micro and macro levels, i.e. to their interrelation as two aspects of the same process. Therefore, it is highly relevant to distinguish the concept of Europe from the concept of the EU with which precisely *most European values* are brought into question (Koljević & Fusaro, 2016). It is exactly this self-oblivion and self-denial of Europe around the turn of the twenty-first century that Handke articulated through the description of how “the maturing of his generation never happened” (Handke, 1996, p. 130). Moreover, Handke’s work here is exemplary in several different ways because it simultaneously appears as the interrelation between the literary, philosophical, historical, and aesthetic horizons and as a testimony *of a Europe that is still alive* at the moment in which the entire continent is at a crossroads. Last but not least, Handke’s travelogues refer to the example *of the contemporary Serbian question as a whole* and precisely beginning from the Serbian cultural pattern and its relevance for contemporary Europe.

Moreover, Handke emphasizes how the greatest impression he had during his travels along Serbian rivers is the specificity that Husserl calls “*the Lifeworld*” and, moreover, how this Serbian “Lifeworld” has not been given in passing or outside of the relation towards signs of actuality or signs of time” (Handke, 1996, p. 51). This way, it is precisely “the Lifeworld” that equally represents the form of Handke’s travelogues, which themselves consist of aesthetic and historical miniatures such that, in the end, they build an original and specific horizon of historical being. Specifically, in interweaving philosophical thoughtfulness, aesthetic content, and historical observation, Handke himself in fact resembles Andrić, for whom, and not by chance, he has special affinity, i.e. considers him as one of the greatest writers. Simultaneously, Handke’s work itself is a remarkable example of how literature, once again, appears, as Skerlić rightly noted, *as the greatest expression of the life of a people*.

This is why Handke’s relation to Andrić as well as his relation to Husserl is not accidental, because it is exactly in this way, through special interrelations, that the issue of the political and spiritual crisis of contemporary Europe unfolds. And, in contrast to it, there is “the Lifeworld,” which streams forth from the Serbian culture and its pattern and is manifested in different aesthetic, everyday, and social forms. It should also be kept in mind how in *The Crisis of European Sciences* Husserl equally articulated how philosophy appears as the internal history of Europe and how the European crisis at the same time represents a crisis of the highest theoretical reflection and a crisis of freedom, as well as a crisis of self-determination. This, for Husserl, appears as the explicit consequence of Europe’s oblivion, i.e. of its forgetting of its *telos* (Husserl, 1970). Of course, here it refers precisely to the concept of Europe which, as a spiritual determination, has its beginnings in ancient Greece, with the decision that the social life shall be determined by norms of the reason, ergo in action *from freedom and towards freedom*. It is this very moment that represents the founding of Europe and its real *telos*.

In this light, contemporary European man as *homo crisis* appears as a *homo nihilismus* of the neoliberal “eternal present”, in which both the past and the future have been forgotten and in which, precisely for this reason, all the relevance of Handke’s *travelogues as the potential for new birth of subjectivity in the twenty-first century* is manifested. Handke’s reflections on the gloomy civilizational diagnoses of Europe at the end of the twentieth century also refer to widespread practices of re-designing the present, but equally history. This second moment becomes transparent equally on the contemporary example of the attempt to rewrite the history of the Second World War in which precisely the basic aspect of the fight for freedom – and its carriers – is being overshadowed. Moreover, this is the point in which we can remember how, precisely in the ethos of the Serbian people’s resistance to a more powerful enemy in the Second World War, Andrić again rediscovered *the basic Kosovo model of Serbian culture* as a model that has its application in contemporary times, not only for Serbs but equally as the issue for all of Europe. Because this most universal spiritual framework of Serbian culture is at the same time intertwined with the European historical experience and values of freedom and justice, although it appears in a specific form. Simultaneously, the concept of the so-called universal culture is a *contradictio in adjecto* because neither moral norms nor historical experience ever turn out to be identical, let alone lead to the same patterns or models of consciousness. Likewise, it is not always the case that, as in the example of the Serbian cultural pattern, it is the culture that appears as the most relevant precondition of historical survival and the most precious political content.

In spite of this, however, it is a fact that the *crino* in *crisis* always refers to the question of choice, i.e. of decision, and this time, once again, it is about the decision of different European peoples for the twenty-first century. As in the ancient difference between *barbaroi* and civilized people, the issue for the European people is whether they wish to decide their own destiny or have the meaning of their destiny decided for them. It is in this light that Handke’s work appears *as the consciousness of a contemporary Europe* that, by recognizing his work, began to recognize *itself*.

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PITANJE SLOBODE KAO STRUKTURALNE OSNOVE SRPSKE KULTURE I EVROPA 21. VEKA

Apstrakt

U ovom članku autor artikuliše kako se pitanje slobode pojavljuje kao temelj srpske kulture tj. kao strukturalna osnova srpskog obrasca te zatim dalje postavlja ovo pitanje u kontekst 21. veka. Ovaj kontekst je, najpre, karakterisan rascepom između neoliberalizma i njegovih kritičkih oponentata i kao takav se očituje i u društvenoj i kulturnoj sferi. Argumentiše se kako se tržišno društvo pojavljuje kao prava anti-kultura te kako kultura uvek već pretpostavlja pojam slobode. U ovom smislu, kultura „Mladobosanaca” ističe se kao referenca koja u istima upućuje na autonomiju naroda, slobodu pojedinca i slobodu kao univerzalnu kategoriju. Nadalje, iskustvo „kosovske misli” kod Srba ispostavlja se kao pravo na samoopredjeljenje. Kao takvo, ono stoji u relaciji sa antičkom razlikom između *barbaroi* i civilizovanih naroda što je, isto tako, dilema savremene Evrope. Na ovaj način, Handkeovo delo – a posebno njegova referenca na „svet života” kod Srba izvire kao egzemplaran primer u promišljanju Evrope 21. veka.

Cljučne reči: neoliberalizam, sloboda, kultura, istorija, srpski obrazac

**ON SOME FORMS OF DESECRATION OF VISUAL SYMBOLS OF THE
CULTURE/IDENTITY OF THE SERBIAN PEOPLE IN SERBIA
FROM THE 1990S TO DATE**

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Abstract

The focus of this paper is a selection of examples of misuse of some of the most famous works of Serbian sacred and secular visual art, dating from the Middle Ages to the beginning of the 20th century, which have been celebrated for their theme/motif as visual symbols of national culture/Serbian identity (Orthodox Christianity). This paper outlines some of the most indicative examples in Serbia between the early 1990s, i.e. since the beginning of the civil-religious war in the disintegrating SFR Yugoslavia, and the present day, which means that such a practice has been in effect for thirty years, confirming that it is not a transient phenomenon, but a process that persists in poisoning the national organism. Some of these works of art, however widely regarded as visual evidence of the history of the Serbian people and their religious affiliation, have fallen victim to various forms of desecration, banalization, and trivialization within mass (quasi) culture, to the point of being recklessly abused to manipulate the Serbian public in the service of a particular idea/ideology, which is why one may call it an offense as much against the work of art and its real meaning as against those for whom the act was intended. Moreover, it is not only an indicator of a disrespectful attitude (of the media and the so-called elite) towards their consumers, since they – understood/used as intellectually blind beings – are also placed in the context of being instigated to various atrocities against the Other, at best to spreading hatred for the Other, which too often leaves individual and collective tragedies in its wake. Some of the works of art discussed, with the peculiarities of the local spirit of the times, were created behind closed doors, and owing to the “spiritual reach” of the spirit of the place, placed in a context that has no related links to their original message/lesson. It seems that such a milieu gave rise to several recent exhibitions, which, under normal circumstances, could also be classified as manifestations with exhibits intended primarily for the fans of the so-called black tourism. In this case, however, both the art and the public were abused as much as the exhibits. *Vis-à-vis* the experience of contemporary art, e.g. in the framework of postmodernism, according to which every work is subject to a new artistic action, in our case this is a process of “long duration” in Braudel’s terms, during which the work of art has been abused/misused in various ways, and even in order to serve certain purposes

that are by no means artistic. Something similar happened with several icons of Serbian nationality, which were desecrated in various ways due to ignorance, but paradoxically through a strong emphasis on religious and/or national identity.

Key words: Serbia, visual art, abuse of art, culture, identity

Instead of an introduction

As a member of the Committee for Doctoral Studies at the Department of Sociology of one of the faculties financed from the Serbian state budget, I recently opposed an attempt of plagiarism during the public presentation of a doctoral dissertation initial draft focused on Eastern Orthodox Christianity in the context of its contemporary status and trends. The misuse of Serbian national culture with an accompanying baseless glorification of another Christian confession and an attempt at plagiarism is not solely a characteristic of occasional “school assignments” but a growing trend often seen in the Serbian culture in its broadest sense.

The ideas I am presenting might even be considered superfluous had I not understood the aforementioned dissertation draft as an accurate indicator of everything that burdened Serbia and its residents and which, I will take the liberty to say, only occasionally underwent resolute analyses by the professional public. This is perhaps due to the fact that the publicly announced conclusions drawn from such analyses affected the future status of the analysts and interpreters beyond the confines of their professional guild. This is probably why everything was too often reduced to interpreting the particularities of key social currents in contemporary Serbia as an inevitable consequence of wars and subsequent economic transition, without delving deeper into the causes of the crisis. In other words, there were only sporadic diagnoses that would shed analytical light on at least some of the existing phenomena that persistently and ever more thoroughly undermined the key pillars of society, thus contributing to the defiling of Serbian culture and the deepening of the ethical and educational crisis. This led up to a crisis of religion and the church, in this case within the so-called Serbian Orthodoxy, even though this term, often used affirmatively and with pride, actually means nothing and implies even less. Finally, the crises that are more than apparent to anyone actively seeking truth, excluding the economic crises, include among others the crisis of understanding of the Serbian national idea in visual arts, with an emphasis on the Serbianness of the Orthodox faith, this determinant also being highly debatable.

The aforementioned occurrence is exactly what led me to submit my own draft of a paper, which can be taken as a lament but also, as I would prefer, as an incentive to pay more attention to everything that has been poisoning the reality of Serbia via visual arts. The list of examples of misused visual arts within the so-called persuasive art is much longer. However, one should not neglect the effects of postmodernism, according to which no (artistic) content is privileged nor can it be proclaimed as anachronous or without esthetic value and even blasphemy, and which, importantly, was to play a role in some of the recent social stratifications, resolved by the dissolution of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. This leads to a conclusion that the postmodernist maxim “anything goes” not only jeopardized the fundamental criteria of moral behavior, but also, using skillfully channeled anarchy under the guise of democracy, subverted numerous determinants of a single nation and its future, as well as of the state in which this nation constitutes the

majority. Meanwhile, various crises seem to have become an integral part of the nation's culture and identity, lasting uninterruptedly for over three decades, most likely for the sole benefit of their creators.

Selected examples of misuse of visual symbols of the Serbian people's culture/identity in Serbia from the 1990s to date

The struggle against a variety of deceits and delusions, academic and other forms of dishonesty, as well as against the propagation of pseudohistory to serve quasi-culture and pseudo-identity is what motivated this most succinct presentation of the selected examples. The misused visual art in these examples has marked the last thirty or so years of collective history in Serbia. No matter how cautionary it may sound, this period took almost two periods of coming of age, where art was used as a tool for the aspirations that may be referred to as planned abuse of collective and individual health of a nation. The abuse spread to all forms of visual art, even to the sacred art, which turned quasi-religious and was as such used to shape public opinion.

The examples included in this paper are quite notable and deserving of being studied by various social sciences. I am at the same time also aware that someone might qualify them as striking examples of freedom of opinion and expression, i.e. as indisputable evidence of the democratic nature of a region and its most powerful media. Yet, others might deem these and similar examples not only as misuse but also as a premeditated crime, as misdeeds against one's own people, all for the purpose of channeling the collective attitude in order to defend specific ideas and ideologies, regardless of the price required to achieve that goal. As a rule, such a price is never paid by the persons behind the misuse and their closer or distant relatives.

Some of the examples will potentially reveal how much the ignorance intertwined by prejudice can create a distorted *image of life*, in which art becomes a slave to different regimes and value systems and in which unculturedness and ignorance determine the collective identity. Moreover, that very art sometimes served the new social dissolutions, for instance by abusing in a special manner the altar of one confession and its pilgrims, regardless of the actual quality of their belief, which, admittedly, is too often reduced to a level that has nothing to do with the holy books they refer to, thus also challenging the *slava* (patron saint day celebration) *religiousness*, if I may take the liberty to name the phenomenon that brought nothing but harm, since it marginalized if not completely suppressed religious values.

In fact, the presented examples and those similar to them spawned a witty remark that Americans have Donald Duck while the Orthodox Serbs have the *White Angel*, since this very angel, although painted on a wall of the medieval catholicon at Mileševa Monastery, specifically as a part of gravestone iconography, could be found in places not mentioned in any of the *gospels* – from beer bottle labels, napkins, and fountain pens to restaurants and other public places (Figures 1 [a, b, and c]). One may also find woodcut crosses, as the key visible symbols of Orthodoxy, placed inside the bottles of homemade *rakija*,¹ even though no effects of the cross on the chemical properties of the liquid in which it is submerged have been confirmed, even less so the degree of *theosis* combined with patriotism for those drinking it.

¹ For this and similar examples, see Jovanović, 2012.



Figures 1 (a, b, c). “White Angel” for various occasions and ambiences.

Source: Prodanović, 2006

The roots of this practice, and this is purposefully emphasized, began to grow visibly at the time when a priest of the so-called Serbian Church, pressured by hardships, washed off the red and white checkered motifs from the walls of the church in which he served and which was built to resemble medieval Serbian churches, because the motif reminded him of an enemy symbol (Jovanović, 1994). He thus succumbed to the ignorance that led him to his wrongdoing against both the collective heritage and his own church. This all-encompassing set of circumstances initiated the idea of a Serbian brewery to put an image of a traditional *slava* cake with the Serbian Cross (a tetragrammic cross symbol with four fire striker shaped symbols) on their bottle caps, thus sending the message “Srećna slava, domaćine!” (approximately translated as ‘Happy *slava* (patron saint day), head of the household / patriarch!’), and Christmas greeting, transforming the *slava* beer into a Christmas beer, and Serbian on top of that (cf. Naumović, 1994). The idea behind this misuse might even be baser than that. What is certain is that the diverse war against the Other and Otherness became imminent.

This phenomenon occurred a decade or two prior to the recent celebration of St. Sava’s Day, when, during the celebratory event organized by the authorities, the central stage was adorned by the saint’s portrait. However, it was not the one considered to be the authentic portrait of him (Vlahović, 1998), i.e. the one depicting him as he presented himself to the *zographs* (Orthodox church painters) who painted him in the Mileševa catholicon (Figure 2a), but one made more recently (Figures 2 [b, c, and d]). Compared to the original portrait-icon from Mileševa Monastery, other portraits depict St. Sava without his tonsure, which denotes the shaving of a part of the scalp, resembling a wreath, as a traditional Eastern Orthodox rite for novice monks. Tonsure is nowadays ignorantly associated with the Roman Catholic church and its identity (Radojčić, 1975, pp. 19–31; Patrijarh Pavle, 1998, p. 301). Consequently, and based on the fact that tonsure was common among the *Serbian Church* clergy and monastics at least until the mid-17th century, the inauthentic portrait of St. Sava gained significance to the detriment of its authentic version probably to avoid any indication that the most distinguished Serbian

saint and educator had a tonsure, which would associate him with the Catholic church, as his older brother Stefan received the royal crown from the papacy, garnering him the title 'First-Crowned'.




Figure 2a. *St. Sava, fresco painting from the Mileševa Monastery catholicon, 13th century.* Source: <http://zaduzbine-nemanjica.rs/manastir-Mileseva/index.htm>




Figure 2b. *St. Sava.* Source: <http://palankadanas.com/danas-je-sveti-sava-skolska-slava-ne-oblacite-nista-crveno/>




Figure 2c. *St. Sava, 20th century.*

Source: <http://www.zaduzbine-nemanjica.rs/Studenica/latinica/Sveti-Sava.htm>



Figure 2d. *St. Sava, Wax Museum, Jagodina.* Source: Archives of B.

Cvetković

For now, the question of what led to the offense against not only St. Sava but also the admirers of his life and work will remain unanswered. To make things even more interesting, so far the fact that the location of the temple erected in his honor in the part of Belgrade called *Vračar* is not the site where the Ottomans burned his relics has been obscured for the public (Jovanović, 2017, p. 293). If by all accounts strictly controlled *disinterestedness* in the possibility that the portion of his relics could have been carefully preserved is added to this, (Popović, 1998), at least sociology might offer an answer as to why things are as they are even today. To paraphrase, sociologists are not expected to deal with the visual poetics of the Mileševa portrait, the biophysical anthropology of St. Sava, or the St. Sava sculpture in the Wax Museum in Jagodina, but they are expected to focus on the heritage that shapes the present Serbian reality.

It is also worth noting that the Slavs were originally considered to resemble St. Sava in his Mileševa portrait, which means of light skin and with ginger hair (Ostrogorski, 1955, p. 29; Vlahović, 1998, p. 315), because it would suggest a change of the visual identity of those who nowadays feel as *genuine* ‘Sorabs’, due to the *dregs of history*, in poetic terms.

Likewise, no one might expect sociology to focus on the particularities of the Belgrade St. Sava temple, although its megalomaniacal size as well as some of its other features are worth examining. In search for these answers, one must also consider the fact that in the late 20th century the more important issue was the confessional provenance of bronze alloys and the sound of the bells of the said temple (Prodanović, 1994, p. 7),² which more than resembles an earlier issue concerning the choice of brick, stone, or concrete for the temple construction, initiated between the two world wars and assuming the symbolic significance of the defense of the nation and Orthodoxy (Jovanović, 1998, p. 12), or the collective and individual Serbian culture. Mere mention of this was deemed sinful, if not

² That the provenance of the materials is not always the issue is corroborated by the mosaic for the Belgrade Catholicicon, which was recently made of “one and a half tonnes of the most expensive Venetian glass” (Ristić, 2003, p. 16).

even treasonous in term of the national interests. Whoever would question the revised version of reality could be excommunicated altogether instead of only receiving the threatening warning that they should know which altar they serve.

Nevertheless, there were also even more striking examples from the art domain than the ones listed here, and they were once used to incite hatred toward the Other in those who had previously not been filled with it. This is best illustrated by the example from the daily newspaper *Večernje novosti* (The Evening News) from 1994 (*A Painful Reminder*, 1994). It was the time when the paper was one of the more prominent government tools, due to its extensive circulation, involving numerous other actors in addition to editors and journalists, which was also rarely the focus of public attention from experts, in this case the experts who were supposed to analyze the war that media companies were waging against their own readers and viewers.

It was exactly *Večernje novosti* that provided the necessary stimulus; during wartime 1994, they presented the renowned Serbian work of art *Orphan upon His Mother's Grave* as a recently made photograph, even though it was a painting by Uroš Predić from the late 19th century, inspired by the poem "The Frozen Child" by Hungarian poet József Eötvös (Jovanović, 1998, p. 88). In an unsigned article entitled *A Painful Reminder*, *Večernje novosti* first asserted that children are the biggest victims of wars (Figure 3). The same applies, as the article continues, "in the current, most recent war, in which the Serbian people once again fight for their bare survival. The image that went around the world a year and a half ago, from the graveyard in Skelani, in which the little orphan boy mourns on the graves of his father, mother, and the rest of his family killed in a Muslim offensive, still upsets everyone who knows what it is like for a child to suffer. Meanwhile, the boy from the picture was adopted by a family from Zvornik, and he is now a freshman at a military secondary school" (*A Painful Reminder*, 1994).



Figure 3. *Večernje novosti*, November 19, 1994.

Source: <https://akovidiskej.wordpress.com/2010/10/01/bolno-podsecanje/>

Even though it would be ethical toward the public for *Večernje novosti* to publish the current status of the orphan boy, the question remains why the supposed photojournalist, the newspaper editors, and all the rest who allowed this crime against art, but primarily a misdeed toward those who lost their families in the latest Balkan war, were not deemed worthy of closer examination within sociology and similar disciplines. This way, everything was reduced to a joke that was supposed to hearten the war-afflicted population, although it was in fact a case of clear instigation of something much worse than the compassion toward a non-existent orphan child. After all, something similar happened when the same newspaper used a doctored photograph on their front page in 2000, in which the people gathered at a political rally were cloned to make it seem as if there had been more of them. This occurrence closed the cycle of the abuse of fine arts, while the consumers were condemned to be treated as passive and ignorant recipients of content without any capability of reasoning.

There were indications of something symptomatic in the media at the time the Orphan was supposed to become the symbol of suffering, with a simultaneous promotion of his joining the army as an incentive for the conscription of *every young man able to walk*. This was confirmed by the information at the time, provided in the magazine called *Zona sumraka* ('Twilight Zone'), whose readers, soon after the publication of the *fate* of the boy from Skelani, were introduced to the *circumstance* of a winged child, named Jovan, who, according to the said source, was taken to the Hilandar Monastery under the protection of the Serbian Orthodox Church immediately after his birth in the small town of Bratunac, current Republic of Srpska. Subsequent generations of *Zona sumraka* staff saw to it that their articles keep lifting the patriotic spirit and 'strengthening' the culture and identity of their readers, this time in the struggle against the new-old enemies. Hence the conclusion of the *Zona sumraka* successor, who asserted, with regard to the winged boy Jovan, that the hatred toward the Serbian people "is not subsiding, so much so that a secret Albanian organization abducted the Serbian angel," commenting that it was done "out of fear that Serbia, with the help of God and the winged Jovan, would exterminate all Shqiptars from Kosovo" (*Albanian Gypsies Abduct the Winged Child*, s.a.).³

Incessant warring against one's own people did not stop even after two and a half decades since the last example mentioned above. Instead, it continued following the more or less same pattern. This was confirmed by *Večernje novosti*, in their 2017 article entitled *Hilarious: A Survey from Protest Rally Keeps Serbia in Stitches*.⁴ Someone might say that *Novosti* only reposted a TV news clip by one of the most influential media companies in Serbia, whose ratings exceed those of Radio Television Serbia, Serbia's public broadcasting service. The hilarity was found in the use of the name of the author of the painting *Orphan upon His Mother's Grave* and the purpose was to show to the public that the participants in a political rally of a political party from the opposition block were so uninformed that they deserved to be humiliated. This is corroborated by the article's subheading, which states that the current Serbian President coerced Uroš Predić, who died in 1953, to paint a portrait of him, and that Predić even became an aide at the Ministry of Culture, which the surveyed protestors allegedly commented on. Those who are better equipped to perform a more layered analysis of this example, primarily

³ For more, see: *Albanian Gypsies Abduct the Winged Child*, s.a.

⁴ For more, see: *Hilarious: A Survey from Protest Rally Keeps Serbia in Stitches*, 2017.

sociologists and political scientists, as well as those who deal with the segments of the special war even more profoundly, might interpret this journalistic quip not as intended to smear the political party belonging to the opposition, regardless of how deserving it might have been due to its announced but unaccomplished goals, but rather as an attempt to show the ruling parties' voters how little they differ from the opposition voters.

The epilogue of the supposed hilarity was published by one of the lower-circulation dailies, stating that the presented street survey was most likely edited, because "soon after, the pieces of evidence began to disappear from social networks, the evidence that could reveal that the context in which the questions were asked was, in fact, completely different from the context presented in the news clip broadcast on TV stations supporting the government" (Popović, 2017; cf. Vesić, 2017), and which was reposted and commented on by *Večernje novosti*.

Considering that the true determinants of culture and identity under the Balkan skies were undermined for many decades through the strengthening of various forms of manipulation, pseudo-culture, and quasi-identity, there is another example worth mentioning that could potentially tie all the previous examples together.

Through multiple different threads, this example connects the Battle of Kosovo, when the Serbian and Ottoman armies clashed in the Kosovo field in 1389, to the diverse layers of Serbian daily reality, primarily those layers that are characteristic of Orthodox Serbs. Investigators and interpreters of culture and identity have too often neglected the fact that those who currently feel as belonging to Serbianness but are of different religion are by no means less important than those who constantly display, for instance, the icons/portraits of St. Sava. One should equally remember the fact that there have been many atheists who deserved much more prominence as parts of the Serbian culture and identity than the members of some other communities.

Albeit indirectly, this also concerns the memory culture, another important determinant of culture and identity of a nation, which would not be reduced to the memory that reaches only as far as yesterday's newspaper front pages, or yesterday's primetime TV news by national broadcasters. This context also provides the opportunity to highlight the fact that the Serbian people does not yet possess a list of the disasters they experienced over the last hundred or so years, with a definitive but so far still undetermined number of victims of the creators of the art of killing, political officers, and event curators who, together with their auxiliary staff, promoted such art. Accordingly, this poses a question of whether it is at all possible to speak of a culture and identity of a nation.

Whatever happens, which largely depends on sociologists, who are justifiably expected to steer the social currents using their findings so as to avoid being considered relevant only when analyzing electorate behavior, the following paragraphs will focus on the *Kosovo Maiden*, the central figure of a well-known Serbian epic poem, who was made even more prominent through the painting by Uroš Predić, who is frequently mentioned in this paper.

It was seldom stressed that the first painting of the Kosovo Maiden was created in 1879 by Croatian artist Ferdo Kikerec (Figure 4a). However, Predić began to paint his *Kosovo Maiden* on the eve of World War 1 in 1914, with the final version completed by the end of the decade. The former version was intended for the Circle of Serbian Sisters, while

the latter ended up in the Belgrade Municipal Museum, currently the Belgrade City Museum, where it was inventoried in the list of “compositions, landscapes, and flowers” (Jovanović, 1998, p. 122; Medaković, 1990, p. 22), which, as we shall see, may have affected its present-day fate (Figure 4b).

At this time, one needs to be reminded that the Kosovo Maiden is the protagonist of the eponymous folk poem. She is a young maiden, who roams the Kosovo battlefield after the battle looking for her fiancé, her godfather, and her fiancé’s brother, or Milan Toplica, Miloš Obilić, and Ivan Kosancić, respectively. In her search, she comes upon a mortally wounded warrior Pavle Orlović. According to one description, she gave him and other surviving warriors some wine, only to have him expire in her arms, but not before telling her that all of the three men she was seeking had fallen victim to the Ottoman saber. In a way, these were Pavle Orlović’s last rites, which is how Uroš Predić’s *Kosovo Maiden* is to be understood (Loma, 2002, p. 186).

There is an opinion that the *Kosovo Maiden* is a Serbian icon, a symbol of the fatherland, and that Predić was inspired exactly by the first nurse from the national myth. In that context, it is deemed inappropriate to interpret more than merely a dying warrior, even if the warrior is Pavle Orlović, as a “symbol of all the fallen Serbian knights, whose heroic sparks have not died out to this day, casting their light far beyond the site of the ancient battle” (Rajić, s.a.).

To make all the musings about culture and identity fall into place, it needs to be stated that there are numerous tavern and restaurant interiors from northern Kosovo to Belgrade displaying a replica or a copy of this very painting, Predić’s *Kosovo Maiden* with the dying Serbian soldier, who appears to have his own personal troubles, unimportant to the patrons of the restaurants and taverns whose walls he inhabits through force of circumstance. Therefore, it is as if whoever procured Predić’s *Kosovo Maiden* for the Belgrade Municipal Museum understood that Pavel Orlović would one day serve a decorative function among other “compositions, landscapes, and flowers”, although ethnologists might claim that the dying hero adorns the walls of catering establishments so that their patrons could make frequent toasts *to his soul* in their moments of compassion (Figure 4c).



Figure 4a. *Ferdo Kikerec, Kosovo Maiden, 1879.*

Source: Author’s archive, postcard photo



Figure 4b. *Uroš Predić, Kosovo Maiden, 1917.*
Source: “Uroš Predić”, by M. Jovanović




Figure 4c. *Replica of the “Kosovo Maiden” in a renowned Belgrade restaurant.*
Source: Author’s archive

To make the previous assumption even more plausible, Pavle Orlović is not the only historical character from the region that includes Serbia whose suffering can raise someone’s spirits, because it is much more real than the final moments of the mythical hero. I remember a recent exhibition during the *Night of Museums*, where the young schoolchildren from Niš were given the opportunity to wait for the midnight hour having refreshments and snacks next to the Skull Tower in Niš, the one built from skulls of the Serbs beheaded in retaliation from the Ottomans in 1809 (Figure 5).




Figure 5. Skull Tower.

Source: <http://www.panacomp.net/cele-kula-scul-tower-nis/>

Within the same Night of Museums, the Belgrade Military Museum exhibited the bloody clothes of King Aleksandar I Karađorđević, which he was wearing when he died after being assassinated in Marseilles. The long line of curious visitors, who were leisurely chatting while waiting to see the visible proof of the death of the Other, is perhaps the consequence of the desire to find peace in the clear evidence that dying is what awaits everyone, whether naturally or by force.

Another line of *art appreciators* formed almost simultaneously in front of the Museum of Mining and Metallurgy in Bor, instigated by the exhibition of a funeral ritual in eastern-Serbian villages. As one newspaper reported, the organizers “deserved to be congratulated for everything, from the idea to the content and the exhibition,” but mostly for showcasing “an interesting ritual of taking group photos with the deceased, so that the photos could later be looked at in a group with family, friends, and neighbors”. The photos depict the deceased placed on their deathbed, surrounded by the surviving family members and other people, who are looking at the camera lens. This was interpreted as representing the social status of the family as well as the deceased in the community (Photos of the Deceased for Night of Museums in Bor, 2011).

Instead of a conclusion

The question certainly arises whether the last included examples, in addition to the previous ones, also reveal merely one of the *faces* of culture and identity or whether they are the central *mirror* of the general reality in Serbia during the last thirty or so years. Hence, it is not difficult to generalize the thread that ties together all the aforementioned examples, and which could most succinctly be defined as a tendency toward unscrupulous political manipulation through (cultural, religious, artistic) visual symbols that mark an entire historical epoch, reaching the level of thanatopolitics (Kuljić, 2014), when the visualization of death and suffering is used to justify group (read: political) interests. Therefore, it rests upon the conscience of all researchers from social sciences and humanities to recognize such examples and analyze them in order to explain the backdrop of political manipulative patterns, regardless of how diverse the contexts in which they

are used may be and regardless of how many concrete semantic outcomes the (mis)used visual symbols may offer. Accordingly, scientific plagiarism, as much as any ignorant repurposing of the original meaning of cultural symbols, even within the futile 'hiding' behind the (positive) legacy of postmodernism, deserves utter condemnation, among other things, because it constitutes an unacceptable act against one's own (national) culture. Such a direction also leads toward the destruction of overall normalcy, especially the one that shifts to the brighter side of national identity, which allows people to hope that the bottomless pit is not the only viable option for the future of one nation.

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O PONEKIM VIDOVIMA SKRNAVLJENJA VIZUELNIH SIMBOLA KULTURE/IDENTITETA SRPSKOG NARODA U SRBIJI OD 90-IH GODINA XX VEKA DO DANAS

Apstrakt

U fokusu rada je izbor primera zloupotrebe nekih od najpoznatijih ostvarenja srpske sakralne i profane likovne umetnosti, nastalim od Srednjeg veka do početka XX veka, koja su – po temi/motivu – slavljena i kao vizuelni simboli nacionalne kulture/identiteta srpstva (pravoslavne vere). U tekstu će biti navedeni neki od najindikativnijih primera, upriličenih u Srbiji između ranih devedesetih godina XX veka, tj. od početka građansko-verskog rata na području raspadajuće SFR Jugoslavije i današnjeg doba, što znači da takva praksa opstaje već punih trideset godina, potvrđujući da nije reč o prolaznoj pojavi, već o procesu koji uporno truje nacionalni *organizam*. Poneko od tih ostvarenja, ma koliko ona uvažavana i kao vizuelni dokaz istorije srpskog naroda i njegove verske pripadnosti, postalo je žrtva raznovrsnog skrnavljenja, banalizacije i trivijalizacije u okviru masovne (kvazi)kulture do njihove bezobzirne zloupotrebe radi manipulisanja vlastite javnosti u službi određene ideje/ideologije, zbog čega ju je moguće nazvati i zlodelom prema umetničkom delu i njegovim stvarnim značenjima, koliko i prema onima kojima je taj čin namenjen. Štaviše, rečeno nije samo indikator nipodaštavajućeg odnosa (medija i tzv. elite) prema njihovim konzumentima, budući da su oni – shvaćeni/korišćeni i kao intelektualno *slepa bića* – postavljeni i u kontekst podstrekivanja na raznoliko zlodelo prema Drugom, u najboljem slučaju radi raspirivanja mržnje prema Drugima, za kojom su prečesto ostajale individualne i kolektivne tragedije. Pojedina umetnička dela koja će biti predmet naše pažnje su uz osobenosti lokalnog *duha vremena*, kreiranog u kabinetima, kao i zahvaljujući „duševnim dometima“ *duha mesta*, postavljana u kontekst koji nema srodnih veza s njihovom izvornom porukom/poukom. Iz takvog miljea kao da su proistekle i pojedine nedavno upriličene izložbe, koje bi u, uslovno rečeno, normalnim okolnostima mogle biti podvedene i pod manifestacije s eksponatima namenjenim najpre poklonicima tzv. crnog turizma. U ovom slučaju, međutim, zloupotrebljeni su i umetnost i javnost, koliko i eksponati. Spram iskustva savremene umetnosti –

npr. u okviru postmoderne, po kojoj je svako delo podložno novoj *umetničkoj akciji* – u našem slučaju reč je pre svega o – Brodelovski rečeno – procesu „dugog trajanja“, tokom kojeg je umetničko delo na različite načine zlostavljano/zloupotrebljavano, pa i radi služenja određenim nimalo umetničkim pobudama. Slično se događalao i s pojedinim *ikonama* srpstva koje su i usled neznanja na različite načine sknavljene, ali uz, ma koliko paradoksalno, istovremeno isticanje verskog i/ili nacionalnog identiteta.

Ključne reči: Srbija, vizuelna umetnost, zloupotreba umetnosti, kultura, identitet

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THE EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION ON THE MOBILITY OF SOCIAL GROUPS AND ON THE METAMORPHOSIS OF THEIR IDENTITARY CULTURE

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Abstract

Globalization, as a contemporary megatrend, radically influences changes in social structure and dynamic, as well as transformation of identity culture. While A. Maluf wrote about the rise of internecine identities and the new family of identity conflict in modern times, G. Conrad pointed out that the search for identity arises in the age of transition, such as ours. By its implications, the globalization process has penetrated all spheres of contemporary society and all levels (micro, meso, and macro) of social life. This process, as the integral part of the “third civilization wave” (A. Toffler), considerably alters the importance of the economic sector, the professional structure of the labor force, the spatial and social mobility of the social group, as well as their identity culture. This article presents the sociological and culturological aspects of identity culture change in the age of globalization, with a review of literature by foreign and domestic authors. In contrast to the globalophobes’ hypothesis that globalization uniformizes and destroys identities or the hyper-globalists’ hypothesis that globalization leads us into a new era of cosmopolitan identity, the authors highlight the diversity of empirical praxis of contemporary globalization trends and their accompanying contradictions. In this context, the authors analyze the possible implications of the asymmetrical/antagonistic unipolar globalization model and the associative multipolar model, and they discuss their different influences on contemporary identity culture. Finally, the article argues for the development of a social-democratic associative globalization model, which would pave the way for multipolar global development, for a dialog between different civilizations, for respect of the culture of identity diversity, and for support for the culture of peace.

Key words: globalization, mobility of social groups, metamorphosis of identity, right to cultural diversity, culture of peace

The problems of identity come into the forefront when the system is being changed during economic transition.

György Konrád

In modernity the diaspora is made out of people/groups that are torn between two worlds: the local and the global. The industrial proletariat is today being replaced by the intellectual labor force – the cognitariat, as an actor of new productive forces 'The future which has already begun'.

Antonio Negri

Opening remarks: asymmetrical globalization and social inequality

Humanity's entrance into the new millennium was accompanied by new accomplishments of the scientific/technological revolution along with the effects of the third and fourth developmental/civilizational wave. Processes of hyper-technological advancement and social subdevelopment are at work here. In the new context of modernity, social and regional differences are growing ever larger – from class to regional to civilizational differences. We have shallowly and prejudicially interpreted most of them erroneously as a consequence of globalization and technological development, thus absolving capitalism as a social system, which via newer forms of exploitation (through a synergy of old and new forms of global problems and inequality, soft and hard power) is choking and destroying the world.

It is time for researchers to demystify and name the real generators of global issues of modernity (from the expansion of inequality and poverty, through health issues, healthcare, ecology, democracy, and human rights, to newer forms of global risk – terrorism, war conflicts, and crime).

Considering only the last three great World Economic Forums held in Davos and the messages sent by the scientists to the global elite, who have begun to receive some “counter-fire” (Burdije, 2019), we can observe that serious, alarming messages have been sent not only to the leaders but also to the entire humankind. In the same vein, the Chinese president Xi Jinping stated in 2018 that a battle for globalization should be fought with a human face, the benefits of which would be reaped by the whole world. In 2019 Klaus Schwab, the director of the World Economic Forum, highlighted the need for the ‘remoralization’ of globalization, while in 2020, the main message concerned the reevaluation of the need for changes in the current system of capitalism, which has caused numerous inequalities and environmental issues in the form of rising cataclysmic climate changes. Messages such as these are indicative of the fact that, among other things, the awareness of a need for radical structural and systemic changes, which might represent the only way to save mankind, is slowly maturing.

Researchers from *Oxfam* warn that the development of neoliberal globalism has led to enormous inequality in the system of distribution of economic power and social power in the era of modernity. In the published report from the World Economic Forum (2020), researchers from the Oxfam organization have learned that today the 26 richest billionaires have as much wealth as the 3.8 billion people with the lowest income in the

world; that there are 2,153 billionaires in the world who own more than 4.6 billion people, i.e. more than 60% of the world population.¹

Researchers of Oxfam conclude that, among other things, “extreme wealth is proof of the failure of the economic system” and that is therefore necessary to change it, as the system with its mechanism is in the service of the super-wealthy elite which possesses a monopoly on the global market. Similar conclusions have also been reached by the French economist Thomas Piketty in his studies “Capital in the Twenty-First Century” (2014) and “Capital and Ideology” (2019), in which he has laid out the essence of the history of reproduction of economic and social inequalities of capitalism as well as an idea of a possible, more just society.

With a serious and minute analysis of global, regional and national processes and relationships in the manner of reproduction of capital and the distribution of economic and social power since Feudal up to today’s time, Piketty shows how (with the exception of the social democratic period lasting from 1945 up to the end of the 1980s) our civilization has lived in an extremely unequal capitalist system (Piketty, 2015). As multiple sociological analyses have shown, within such a system the rich become even richer and the poor become even poorer. It is in the very periods of extreme inequality that the rich, as a rule, paid extremely low taxes while the expenses of society were shouldered by the workers.

Similar results were also obtained by numerous other researchers (economists and sociologists) throughout the world. For example, this topic was discussed by David Held in his study “Debating Globalization”, by Norwegian economist Eric Reinert in his study “Global Economy” (2006), by Russian authors Buzgalin and Kolganov in their study “Global Capital” (2015), by Canadian sociologist Michel Chossudovsky in his study “The Globalization of Poverty and the New World Order” (2005), and by the Nobel-prize winning author Joseph Stiglitz in his study “Globalization and Its Discontents” (2002). The same problem was also approached by several Serbian authors, such as Miroslav Pečujlić, Danilo Ž. Marković, Zoran Vidojević, Slobodan Komazec, Ljubiša Mitrović, and Branko Milanović, whose studies include the data regarding the contemporary processes of social and regional inequality in the world caused by neoliberal strategies of development and the asymmetrical model of globalization.

Global changes and controversies surrounding globalization and identity

Innumerable stereotypes were ascribed either orally or in writing to the phenomena of globalization, e.g. globalization stereotypes such as the “Great Mechanism” and “The Global Beast” that devours people, nations, cultures, and civilizations and then melts and grinds them according to the model of a “McDonaldized” world. It can easily be claimed that more stereotypes were produced about globalization as a process than about industrialization at the time of its creation, when the rural romantics apocalyptically announced the arrival of a new socio-technological phenomenon that would ravage and destroy the old world like a plague. Humanity and the world did change, but they did not perish. Even among the eminent theoreticians and researchers in contemporary sociology, there are clear differences and controversies regarding the judgments passed on this

¹ For more, see: World’s billionaires have more wealth than 4.6 billion people (2020).

mega-phenomenon and process. Anthony Giddens (1998) wrote about the aforementioned process as a marvelous and all-encompassing phenomenon, which runs through the modern society, whereas other researchers wrote about globalism as a new phase of imperialism. David Held (1997) and Ulrich Beck (2000) gave a more nuanced analysis of this phenomenon in their studies.

In the typologies of different theoretical approaches to the interpretation of globalization, David Held distinguishes between hyper-globalists, skeptics/antiglobalists, and the transformationists, while Ulrich Beck distinguishes between *globalization* as an objective ontological process, the technological interpretation of productive forces and the networking of the global society, *globality* as a social structure (that is molded in this process), and *globalization* as a new world order of social power and inequality. R. Robertson (1992) distinguishes between *globalization* and *glocalization*. Numerous other authors also give their own classifications and perspectives on this process, discussing different types (models) of globalization (asymmetrical/antagonistic and social democratic / associative) as well as highlighting the divisions between different actors with regards to their relationship with this phenomenon, dividing them into globalists, antiglobalists, and alter-globalists.

Based on the previous research praxis and the effects of the globalization processes in modernity, a rising seriousness and a more analytical approach can be observed among the researchers as they reflect on the contradictory process of globalization that networks but also divides the global world system. In that sense, several important studies by Immanuel Wallerstein (1992), Manuel Castells (2002), and David Harvey (1989) are particularly important for the understanding of the very essence of these processes. These authors analyzed the phenomenon from the ontological/technological aspect of the networking of modern society, from the perspective of differentiation of social power and new forms of separation and segregation in modern society, as well as from the perspective of changes that emerge in the contemporary postmodern mass culture. *William Gibson* (2009) wrote about globalization as a challenging process of far-reaching importance, describing it as a “future which has started but which, because of various class monopolies and social/regional inequalities, is not unequally distributed”.

Analyses such as these imply certain conclusions that refer to the naming of the essence and the demystification of the nature of the asymmetrical model of globalization, which today dominates the world. They also imply a need for reform and radical change of the capitalist system, which assumes the creation of an associative social democratic project of globalization in the service of all nations and states of the world.

Contemporary sociological, social-psychological, and culturological literature contains different definitions and interpretations of identity. And while individual psychology, among other things, deals with the issues related to personal identity (the conditions, factors, and dynamics of its formation, and their importance and role in the development of personal character), social psychology and sociology in general primarily deal with the identity of social groups (partial and global) in a socio-cultural context, with the factors of social determination and their role in the life and functioning of social groups. Many different ethnosociologists, social psychologists, and anthropologists, from Gustave le Bon, Émile Durkheim, Marcel Morse, Pitirim Sorokin, and Erich Fromm to Ericson, Edgar Morin, Zygmunt Bauman, Manuel Castells, and Amin Maalouf dealt with this

topic. Across former Yugoslavia, several authors dealt with the problems of identity and social groups, such as anthropogeographer Jovan Cvijić (The Balkan Peninsula and Ethnopsychological Types), Vladimir Dvorniković (Categories of Yugoslavs), and Ivan Hadžijski in his ethnopsychological and sociological studies concerning the Bulgarian people. After the Second World War, several distinguished sociologists, social psychologists, and anthropologists, such as Nikola Rom, Mladen Zvonarević, and Zagorka Golubović, were active in this region.

There are numerous studies concerning cultural identity, its definition, typology, and distinctions. For example, G. Konrad and Zoran Vidojević wrote about transitional identity formed in times of a transitioning society. Others, however, make the distinction between the organic/closed identity in premodern societies and the open/pluralistic identity; between the ethnic and civil; partial and group/collective; professional, cultural, and political; national and traditional; regional and cosmopolitan; and empirical and normative/postulated (Bauman, 1998, according to Mitrović, 2012, p. 176). In the periods of transition and globalization, an ever increasing number of researchers have been writing about the metamorphosis of social groups, the contradictory and transitional identity, as well as the fluid/postulated identity (Bauman, 1998) as a multiply complex phenomenon of European identities in the making (Morin, 1989).

Types of societies and social groups			
	Type of society	Type of social group	Type of cultural identity
A	Traditional	Community	Monotypic-organic ethnic identity
B	Modern	National society	Plural civil identity
C	Postmodern	Post-society – Humanity	Open and transnational project identities

Source: Mitrović, 2013, p. 79.

In contrast with traditional researchers, who discussed collective identities from the perspective of historical, religious, traditional, and collective ethical/epic influence, with most of them commonly representing ethnic and national identities and monolithic and closed fortresses of the habitus and world views, contemporary researchers write about the identity of partial and global social groups as dynamic categories, the transformation of which is socially and culturally determined by the processes and megatrends of modernity.

Accordingly, in his study “Megatrends” (1985), John Naisbitt talks about how identities and the behavior of individuals/social groups in modernity are becoming increasingly determined by the future just as they were once determined by history. In that sense, we are confronted with the phenomenon of postulated/projected identities as unique constructions of individuals and social groups, which result from their value orientation and rationally selected goals and preferences.

As contemporaries of a world of radical changes, today we all live in a global electronic village (M. McLuhan), in the era of the informational civilization and globalization – the networked society (Makluan, 1971). All of these processes influence not only the spatial and social mobility of social groups but also the changes that happen in their cultural identities, which are increasingly less determined by the geopolitics of space and increasingly more by global processes that connect and integrate the world through a global division of labor, universalize the social and cultural processes, and cosmopolitize the world view of individuals and social groups.

The relationship between the national and transnational identity in the era of globalization – some present-day aspects of the metamorphosis of cultural identity

Long time has passed since the era of feudal, atomized, and closed communities with numerous fortifications and “Chinese walls”. The civic revolution has opened up the space for international movement and development of productive forces. Today we are living in the era of globalization, which relies on the productive forces of the third and fourth developmental/civilizational wave with the power to compress time and space, building a global, highly connected, networked, and integrated world. In this context, researchers are increasingly referring to society on the move and *identities on the move*. Identities are not made out of hard granite nor are they closed monads, but are rather multilayered alloys, mosaics, or plural worlds on the move that touch and enrich. An increasing number of researchers argue that, in contemporary modernity of globalization and the creation of a world of postnational constellations (Habermas, 1998), in addition to wealth and variety of national identities, it is also possible to consider the metamorphosis and creation of transnational identities and their unity in difference, but not the inevitability/fate of their conflict.

Research results from foreign and domestic authors provide the knowledge of complex processes by which nations are transmuted in modernity, as well as the knowledge pertaining to the process of metamorphosis of national identities in conditions of globalization and the global migrations in modernity. The results obtained by the researcher Jelena Dinić indicate that

cultural capital of our intellectual diaspora not only represents the reflection of cultural and social norms of one country, but is also developed and shaped by a relationship with both the country of origin and the destination country (Dinić, 2012, p. 147).

In the era of globalization, new technologies and communications have made it possible for relations in the world system to become increasingly open and transparent. Global migrations and the diasporic nature of the world lead to an increased mobility of social groups, for both existential and professional reasons. In this case, processes of cultural, populational, racial, ethnic, and religious blending are at work. In the context of global migration, due to several strong waves of migration happening along the South-North Axis, several changes occurred on the labor market, changes that were not only confined to the “blue collar” sphere but were also particularly seen as belonging to the “gray matter”, or the brain, market. Whereas the world used to face migrations of industrial workers (“the blue collars”, Mills, 1979), today the dominant migrant groups are increasingly made up of highly-educated “white collars”, or the cognitariat (Negri, 2007), serving as protagonists of intellectual work and of the development of productive forces.

In addition to being important for the understanding of the developmental currents of the global economy, hypermobility of productive forces in the era of globalization has attracted much interest among the sociologists of culture, who deal with the metamorphosis of cultural identities. Namely, the international spatial and social mobility of the population brings social groups not only to the global labor market but also to a new socio-cultural context in which, by adapting to new forms of production, processes of modernization, and development, those groups must change their professional image and

by doing so endure more complex influences related to the metamorphosis of their cultural identity. Global processes place them in a field of intense intercultural communication, through which they exchange their cultural patterns, gifting but also accepting the patterns of others, through which they enrich their culture as well as the culture of the country they emigrated to. This is how processes of intercultural communication and the metamorphosis of cultural identity are achieved in such a global maelstrom, as if in a melting pot.

In the era of globalization, workforce migrations originating in the countries of the world's periphery and semi-periphery and ending in the countries belonging to the world center, occurring along the South-North axis, have led not only to spatial but also to social mobility, as well as to changes in cultural identity. An increasing number of researchers have shown how metamorphosis of cultural identities is achieved in the context of globalization, as individuals and social groups in global migrations not only change their territories, companies, or educational and professional profiles, adapting to the needs of a modernized market, but also, through intensifying interpersonal and group communication in new socio-cultural contexts, endure and borrow cultural patterns of the dominant culture of the place to which they emigrated; however, they also gift and lend their own cultural traditions and patterns to the natives and members of other cultures and nations. In the context of intercultural communication, this is how new blends/hybrids of cultures and transitional cultural identities are formed. Speaking in Bourdieuan terms, with time and through additional socialization emerges the phenomenon of a divided habitus or, in other words, a multiply complex multilayered identity, as Edgar Morin would term it.

Recent studies conducted by Jelena Dinić, the results of which were presented in her dissertation "Value orientation of the Serbian intellectual diaspora" (2017) on a sample of 327 respondents belonging to the Serbian intellectual diaspora, show that in the conditions of globalization "an increasing number of people belongs to two or several cultures and societies, without them cancelling each other out" (Dinić, 2017, p 148). Namely, these identities show that the

life of migrants in different cultures and different political and social environments leads to the development of transnational identities that incorporate value patterns from both the country of origin and the destination country (Dinić, 2012, p. 148)

However, the resultant relationship between national and transnational identity in social praxis will mostly depend on the type of globalization and the model of cultural politics that are dominant in the contemporary global society. The key question is whether the processes of associative or asymmetrical neo-imperial globalization are at work. If globalization develops as an asymmetrical process, it will generate social/regional inequalities and neo-imperialism, which on the level of cultural politics manifests itself in the form of an ethnocentric racial hegemonism, leading to the further smothering of primary ethnic and national cultural identities, imposing its own unique patterns of McDonaldisation, dependent culture, and the assimilation of migrant cultures. In contrast, the processes of the social-democratic model of globalization would allow for the creation of a harmonious unity between national and transnational identity, or, in other words, they would allow for both the preservation of unique traits of national cultural

identities and the integration of universal values and the planetary human culture into that identity, forming a transnational identity.

Therefore, the key question is what kind of future humanity wishes to develop: movement and perspective directed towards an open and democratic society composed of equal nations and citizens, or a world of new forms of inequality and conflict. It is obvious that, in the last three decades, humanity has gone through the neoliberal strategy of development, experienced a new social Darwinization, and opened a doorway for enormous inequalities, exploitation, and conflicts. That is why the ruling model must be changed lest it inevitably leads humanity toward new crises and cataclysms. Only within the perspective of a social-democratic tomorrow, in a world of peaceful coexistence and equal nations, can the respect of national cultural particularities of all nations and citizens be expected, along with the building and the democratic adoption of values belonging to the planetary culture (from human rights to bioethics and the culture of peace) and the affirmation of transnational identities as organic upgrades to the manifold wealth of national cultures in a multipolar world of humankind.

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UTICAJ GLOBALIZACIJE NA MOBILNOST DRUŠTVENIH GRUPA I METAMORFOZU NJIHOVE IDENTITARNE KULTURE

Apstrakt

Globalizacija, kao megatrend u savremenosti, radikalno utiče ne samo na promene u strukturi i dinamici društva, već i na transformaciju identitarne kulture. Dok A. Maluf piše o usponu ubilačkih identiteta i novoj familiji identitarnih sukoba u savremenosti, Đ. Konrad s pravom ukazuje da traganje za (izgubljenim) identitetom nastaje u vremenima tranzicije, kakvo je i naše. Proces globalizacije je, svojim implikacijama, zahvatio sve sfere savremenog društva i nivoe društvenog života (makro, mezo i mikro strukture). On, kao integralni deo „trećeg civilizacijskog talasa“ (A. Tofler), bitno opredeljuje promene u značaju sektora privređivanja, profesionalnoj strukturi radne snage, prostornu i socijalnu mobilnost društvenih grupa, ali i metamorfozu njihove identitarne kulture. U radu se razmatraju sociološki i kulturološki aspekti promena identitarne kulture u eri globalizacije sa osvrtom na istraživanja stranih i domaćih autora. Nasuprot tezama globalofobičara o tome da globalizacija poništava i uniformiše identitete ili hiperglobalista – da nas uvodi u novu epohu kosmopolitske identitarne kulture – autori ukazuju na različitost empirijske prakse savremenih trendova globalizacije i protivrečnosti koje oni sa sobom nose. U ovom kontekstu analiziraju se moguće implikacije asimetričnog/antagonističkog unipolarnog modela globalizacije i asocijativnog multipolarnog modela, a ukazuje se i na različite njihove uticaje na identitarnu kulturu u savremenosti. Na kraju se izlaže pledoaje za izgradnju socijaldemokratskog modela asocijativne globalizacije, koji bi utro put multipolarnom razvoju sveta, dijalogu različitih civilizacija, respektu kulture različitosti identiteta i afirmaciji kulture mira.

Ključne reči: globalizacija, mobilnost društvenih grupa, metamorfoza identiteta, pravo na kulturnu različitost, kultura mira

AXIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE ISSUE OF IDENTITY

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Abstract

This article discusses ecological values as a factor of identity, including their disposition in a system of values. The concrete trends of anthropogenic ecological factors, which greatly affect personal health, are analysed. The paper also considers the issue of socio-ecological values (the very values in the socio-ecological sphere), which determine the attitude of the people to their environment, saving the people and saving the health of the nation. The specific areas of the impact of environmental factors on human health are presented. Russian academician Nikita Moiseyev, who calculated the consequences of the “nuclear winter”, introduced a concept that had a noticeable impact on the development of general ecology and became a trigger for the elaboration of social ecology, a field of study made particularly prominent by the renowned Serbian scientist Danilo Ž. Marković. Nowadays, social ecology investigates almost every form and regularity of the interaction between society and social environment as well as the diversity of interconnections and social changes. Ecological anthropology and human geography view social relations as a mediating link between human beings and the social environment. They can be seen as a specific cultural identity, which may be formed in concrete socio-ecological conditions, having a significant impact on human perception, behaviour, and life style. Accordingly, specific ecological values of various Russian cultural and ethnic nations emerged. Socio-ecological values play a dual role in the contemporary social reality. In the conclusion, the environmental values of contemporary Russians are clearly seen through important specific features.

Key words: ecological values, social ecology, socio-ecological values, identity, axiological conflict

Introduction

There are numerous conditions and complex factors influencing the formation of identity of any nation. Russian as well as Serbian cultural, civilizational, national, and religious identities are based on a widespread awareness of the position of the two countries

“between the East and the West”. This idea was developed historically many centuries ago, both in the Russian and the Serbian collective consciousness. Russian and Serbian historical experience shares the opposition between the East and the West as an opposition between the eastern and western life style, which has led to religious and civilizational consequences. This is what plays a highly prominent role in the creation of a value system for every nation.

This primarily concerns the socio-ecological values, i.e. those values in the socio-ecological sphere that determine the relationship of a nation toward its environment and the preservation and health of a nation. The Year of Ecology (2017), which revealed serious environmental issues in Russia, spawned the “Ecology” national project, approved by the Decree of the Russian President Vladimir Putin on 7 May 2018. Project is supposed to be completed no later than 2024. Russian Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment submitted the project draft to the Russian Government, which was followed by a detailed discussion and harmonization with all participants from this sector, including the relevant institutions and the professional and corporate community. One drawback is that the discussion did not involve physicians, sociologists and teachers.

This article discusses ecological values as a factor of identity, including their disposition in a system of values, and highlights the problems of the ecological factors’ significance in their formation of a modern person’s health. The concrete trends of anthropogenic ecological factors that have significant influence on personal health are highlighted. Nowadays, the socio-ecological values may be defined as a projection of base or main values such as health to the socio-ecological sphere. Socio-ecological values are understood as being in two dimensions – on a personal level (individual intentions, aims, and manners of realization) and on a social level, which can be understood as the influence of micro and macro ecological spheres.

The sheer scope of the impact of environmental factors on human health is confirmed by the following data presented by the associate member of the Russian academy of Sciences A. V. Yablokov: in Moscow alone about 12,000 people die each year from illnesses caused by environmental factors, while this number is approximately 5,000 in the region, i.e. two to three times more than the fatalities due to traffic accidents. Simultaneously, in the vicinity of urban roads, when compared to the “cleaner” districts, people contract influenza and pharyngitis up to three times more frequently, conjunctivitis and neuroses two times more frequently, and skin conditions nine times more frequently. The incidence of bronchial asthma in children is up to 1.5 times higher (Yablokov, 2012). Human health and environmental factors should not be treated as separate phenomena but within a specific environmental system proposed by academician N. N. Moiseyev (Modern World and N. N. Moiseyev, 2012). According to the indicators of the health of the Russian population, the following impacts of negative environmental factors (usually anthropogenic) can be:

- impact on somatic health – deterioration due to unfavourable anthropogenic environmental situation and poor work conditions;
- impact on mental health – deterioration due to long-term socio-ecological tension and stressful situations caused by technogenic failures and disasters (according to the date by the Public Opinion Fund, more than a half of the Russian population are concerned about the environmental situation in their place of residence);

- impact on lifespan – shortened lifespan;
- impact on the subjective assessment of one's health – dependent on the ecological risk assessment, etc.;
- impact on medical services – discrepancy between the scope and quality of available medical services and the actual health of the population, primarily the young people, due to the effects of anthropogenic environmental emergencies, etc.

The development of the concept proposed by academician N. N. Moiseyev, who enumerated all the possible consequences of a “nuclear winter”, had considerable influence both on the development of general ecology and on the creation of social ecology, one of the best proponents of which was the prominent Serbian scientist Danilo Ž. Marković (Marković, 1996).

Today, social ecology deals with the study of essentially all laws and forms of interactions between society and the environment, the versatility of their interrelationships, and social change. A more permanent interest of sociologists in the social issues of the environment began in the first decades of the 20th century. At the time, the renowned Russian scientist V. I. Vernadsky played a prominent role in the organization and development of research in this field. It is believed that American scientists Robert Park and Ernest Burgess were the first to use the term *social ecology* in their book “Introduction to the Science of Sociology”, which focused on the methodology of sociological research into the behaviour of people in urban environments (Koptjug, 1992, p. 63). They used this term as a synonym for denoting “human ecology” and stressed that in the given context the phenomenon is not distinctly natural but rather social, having biological features among other things. Among the scientific disciplines that influenced the development of social ecology, ecological anthropology is one of the most prominent, as its research subject makes it similar to the contemporary understanding of human ecology (Girusov, 2006, p. 1160). As one of the leading methodologies for studying the ecological processes, it established a scientific approach that strives toward identifying a direct link between climate, topographic properties of an area, and human behaviour. In terms of climate and geography, Russia's circumstances are particularly complex.

From the methodological standpoint of ecological anthropology and anthropogeography, social relations are the link connecting people and nature, according to academician N. N. Moiseyev (2003, pp. 352–364). Considering that they affect human behaviour, mentality, and mood, i.e. behaviour and life style, they can be viewed as a kind of cultural identity that forms in specific socio-ecological conditions. Hence the origin of particular ecological values in every nation living in Russia.

In fact, the socio-ecological values play a dual role in the social reality. According to the Russian sociologist A. A. Vozmitel,

there are two major factors that determine the social behaviour of people: the personal, reflected in conscious intentions, goals, and ways to achieve them; and the social – a mutual influence of the macro and micro environment (dominant norms, attitudes, relations, values, and the like) – through which social demands are either accepted or rejected, or even modified, refracting through the prism of specific conditions, social orientations, and so on (Vozmitel, 2012, p. 230).

In other words, the value system is the consequence of not only a priori inherent needs but also the processes of “introducing” those values that the society deems positive, by means of social interactions and influences. In addition, it is useful to consider the limitations in the formation of personal values, established according to the concept by A. Maslov, whereby the fulfilment of needs of higher hierarchic levels is activated only after the actual fulfilment of lower-level needs. Thereby, the hierarchy of needs, in its canonical form, has the following ranking: biological needs – water, food, oxygen, etc.; physical and mental security needs; social needs – acceptance, friendship; acknowledgement needs – success, recognition; and self-actualization needs, which are particularly important to young people nowadays.

Socio-ecological values and formation of identity in Russia

The social scientists are concerned by the noticeable difference between the health care sphere and the quality of available medical services, which define the actual health level of the population in different Russian regions. In this way, subjective estimation of population health is seen as a result of ecological risk evaluation. As long-term sociological surveys have shown, the socio-ecological reality based on the main values simultaneously defines the goals and criteria of the management of socio-ecological situations in specific local territories and in the entire country. The purpose of studying these values was to continue to elaborate the methodological basics of sociological surveys of the modern socio-ecological dimension of Russia, and to analyze the socio-ecological environment and its influence on the new quality of life. The potential significance of the quality of life approach is seen as an innovative factor of subjective analysis. The experience of its practical application in contemporary society is generalized. The findings of expert surveys conducted during the past decade present the views about life quality in different regions, comparing the access to natural resources, the socio-ecological circumstances, and the economic level of regional development with the social status of respondents.

Considering the aforementioned opinions and based on the results of sociological studies conducted by the Russian Society of Sociologists in nine regions of Russia during the Year of Ecology (2017) (<https://www.ssa-rss.ru>), the following ranking of ecological values among university students was compiled:

- love of nature – 97% of respondents;
- individual and group ecological safety – 83%;
- public participation in the making of decisions that can affect the environment – 63%;
- presence of communication infrastructure for the creation and expression of public opinion – 62%;
- possibility of complete enjoyment of civil rights regarding the state of the environment – 55%;
- presence of positive ecological ethical standards – 54%;
- presence of civil society and maintenance of the social character of the state – 52%;
- availability of the system of ecological education and upbringing – 51%;

- decent quality of life in keeping with the socio-ecological requirements and standards – 50%;
- development of environmental eco-design as a specific field of activity – 48%;
- availability of reliable empirical information about the practice of interaction between society and nature, etc. – 48%;
- participation in the design, performance, and control of socio-ecological activities of the population in their place of residence and in the entire country – 47%.

The selected data is the result of a comparative sociological research. Factors such as ecologization of education, emotional relation to the nature-society connection, acquisition of specific knowledge, and training for creative action lead to optimal balanced decisions in social management and economics, slowly awakening the ecological morality of the *socium*:

- the actualization of ecological problems happens inside the mass consciousness;
- ecological situation is delicate and its advanced development influences the negative expectations of the population;
- there are insufficient civil society mechanisms to make decisions regarding socio-ecological problems.

Finally, in contemporary Russia the environmental values have relevant specific features. The processes of radical transformation inevitably affect all spheres of vital activity of the population, manifesting themselves in the inter-generational “value fault”, in the changes of social differentiation and stratification, and also in the moral relativism that defines the quality of life in Russia. The present authors believe that the sociological understanding of life quality issues and a sociological foundation of concrete research are necessary for scientific study of the understanding of contemporary society.

Instead of a conclusion

In the opinion of D. Ž. Marković (1996), a study of moral phenomena in relation to contemporary environmental issues is a necessity, primarily due to the fact that there is a value conflict behind every interaction between humans and nature, between every step in economic development, etc. This conflict serves as the gauge that compares the damage inflicted upon nature and such an increase in the degree of fulfilling the ever-increasing new needs of people and society, without which there is no technological progress, which Russia desperately needs. The resolution of such conflict occurs within reality not only in the sphere of rational thinking, but also in the spiritual sphere, and that should not be forgotten (Sosunova, 2010, p. 400).

In modern Russia, the system of ecological values in its entirety contains important specific properties. In fact, the processes of radical transformation of Russian society inevitably infiltrate every sphere of people’s (primarily young people’s) lives, causing, among other things, the “disruption of values”, both within a single generation and among different ones, sudden changes in the field of social differentiation and stratification, moral relativism, and the like. Under such conditions, efficient directions for optimizing the formation of socio-ecological values, primarily among young people, may include the following:

- switching toward the theory and methods of social ecology for the purpose of scientific study of socio-ecological values of the population;
- prioritizing the political development of the state that will help create positive socio-ecological values;
- establishing the useful creation of socio-ecological values in different socio-demographic and professional groups as the dominant direction, and young people relying on the very aspects of an activity.

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AKSILOŠKI PRISTUP PROBLEMU IDENTITETA

Apstrakt

U članku se razmatra uloga ekoloških vrednosti kao faktora identiteta, razotkriva se njihov suštinski sadržaj i mesto u sistemu vrednosti i navodi niz novih definicija osnovnih pojmova. Reč je, pre svega, o socioekološkim vrednostima, tj. onim vrednostima u socijalno-ekološkoj sferi koje određuju odnos naroda prema svojoj životnoj sredini, očuvanju naroda i zdravlju nacije. Prikazani su konkretni pravci uticaja antropogenih ekoloških faktora na zdravlje ljudi. Razvoj koncepcije akademika Nikite Nikolajeviča Moisejeva, koji je pobrojao sve moguće posledice „nuklearne zime“, imao je zapažen uticaj kako na razvoj opšte ekologije, tako i na nastanak socijalne ekologije kojom se, između ostalih, uspešno bavio i istaknuti srpski naučnik Danilo Ž. Marković. Socijalna ekologija se danas bavi istraživanjem praktično svih zakonitosti i oblika uzajamnog delovanja društva i životne sredine, raznovrsnosti veza među njima i socijalnih promena. Sa stanovišta metodologije ekološke antropologije i antropogeografije socijalni odnosi deluju kao karika koja povezuje čoveka i prirodu. S obzirom na to da utiču na njegovo ponašanje, mentalitet i raspoloženje, tj. na ponašanje i način života ljudi, oni se mogu posmatrati kao nekakav kulturni identitet koji se formira u određenim socijalno-

ekološkim uslovima. Otud i nastanak svojevrstnih ekoloških vrednosti kod svakog naroda koji živi na tlu Rusije. Socioekološke vrednosti u socijalnoj stvarnosti imaju dvostruku ulogu. U savremenoj Rusiji sistem ekoloških vrednosti u celini ima značajne specifične odlike.

Ključne reči: ekološke vrednosti, socijalna ekologija, socioekološke vrednosti, identitet, aksiološki sukob

SOCIO-SPATIAL CONSTRUCTS OF IDENTITY: ECHOES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE

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Abstract

This paper discusses the phenomenon of everyday life and the mechanisms that shape it. We believe that concrete situations, such as layout of the living space, fashion, music, urban lifestyles, bureaucratization, and rationalization, are some of the forces that shape everyday life and on the basis of which identities are constructed. We start from the view that all these mechanisms colonize everyday life. On this basis, the individuals accept offered and constructed identities as the benchmarks of their daily lives. It seems that the modern age aesthetizes everyday life, giving it meaning, and transforming it into identity determinants, detracting the actors from the possibility of resistance, but, at the same time, creating new possibilities of identity. We find our inspiration in everyday life, which is a construct of modern times, as well as in the ways in which the actors define themselves in the context of accelerated social changes. In this paper, we emphasize the basic attributes of the categories in focus: everyday life, identity, space, power, city, and rationalization, which we consider to be intrinsically linked in everyday life. The justification of this paper is reflected in the understanding of how economic/political power (as the basic resource of identity determinants) shapes and reproduces everyday practice and the associated identities. Important limitations of this paper include the impossibility to cover all the phenomena of everyday life, but we roughly and concisely emphasized which trajectory should be followed when exploring everyday life and its associated identities.

Key words: power, identity, everyday life, space, city, fashion, music, rationalization

Everyday Life

Everyday life is considered to be an established way to satisfy one's needs, whereby the status position and value orientation of the actor play an important role. Basically, everyday life is a set of patterns and behaviours that are oriented towards everyday life itself.

Important indicators of everyday life include the material, cultural, and recreational

content used by the actors, including communication elements towards themselves and towards others. Class and status differences are also conditioned by differences in daily life (different material, culture, aesthetics, health, nutrition, and other differences).

With the development of urban and consumer societies, there is a democratization of consumption, which resulted in the construction of consumer everyday life. All of the above created the elements of representative form of consumption (the Veblen effect). Even A. Toffler (1964) stated that massive production and massive society, paradoxically, do not unify everyday life and consumption, but create many lifestyles and orientations. He connects this phenomenon with the growing emergence of specialization in the professions, in the fragmentation of society, and in the more complex forms of life in the 1960s, which was a kind of “explosion” of various forms of everyday life and lifestyles. In addition, the actors of that age were also able to change their everyday life, to shape their lifestyle accordingly, and do so relatively quickly if it matched their value preferences.

This fact also resulted in the creation of the notion of “daily life” during the 1960s. The term has been seriously analyzed in anthropology, history, sociology, and cultural studies.

Sociology of everyday life was born within microsociology, as a process of decomposing social structures into situations of interpersonal encounters and interactions, what is called the “desubstantialization” of social institutions (Spasić, 2004). G. Simmel was the first to shift from the structural and firm to the meaningless and banal, but he also warned of a continuum of micro-macro connections.

Everyday life is a *topos* of practice within itself. Importantly, the sociology of everyday life focused in its optics on the personality, the actor who possesses a face and a body, interactions in situations of mutual presence, definition of a situation, personal experience, eroticism, negotiation, neighbourhood, symbolic exchanges, emotions, anxieties, illnesses, etc. Although the sociology of everyday life is the source of micro-phenomena and individual lives and practices, it is also a synthesis of a micro-macro perspective.

Identities

The basic idea of the identity theory is that individuals are sets of inherited and acquired characteristics that determine their understanding of themselves. However, more recent studies counteract this theory, in the sense that identities are fluid, consciously chosen, imposed, and situationally and socially constructed within the social dynamics. Identities are how individuals use their belonging to groups, in terms of understanding themselves as individuals. Among many groups to which a person belongs, some social identities may be particularly emphasized in relation to other identity entities. Age, gender, ethnicity, and class affiliation are inherent forms of identity in societies where this is an important determinant of a person. People in such societies may seek to create a strategic identity, in the sense that they choose and emphasize one of their identities. This process is called identity selection within identity repertoires (Brown, 2004). Within the social dynamics of identity, individuals can often choose or emphasize an identity from which they have some kind of use. Multidimensional identities are often controversial, and a person is often unable to reconcile their different dimensions in the social dynamics. In order to choose a strategic identity, a person undertakes a form of behaviour and a form

of a situation that requires them to create the idea that they are someone who has value and who is connected to the community.

There are many empirical forms and potentials for the selection of identity in everyday life, such as forms of conflict and cooperation, subordination and insubordination, closeness and distance, or rituals. They are all indicators of the potential for how to create or how to choose some form of identity. Everyday life is a paradox of modernity, a simultaneous process of liberation of individuals, but also of identity coercion.

The choice of strategic identity in everyday life will take place between two opposite social situations:

- Similarities rather than differences;
- Harmony and agreement rather than conflict;
- Homogeneity versus heterogeneity;
- Order versus chaos;
- Structure and product rather than formation and process;
- Unity and stability versus plurality and instability;
- Finding and detecting versus inventing and creating;
- Predictability versus unpredictability;
- Existing forms and frameworks rather than formative processes;
- Explained rather than descriptive;
- Logic and mathematics rather than rhetoric and poetics;
- A sense of belonging versus possessive individualism.

Strategic identity is focused on adaptation, but conflicting identities will move in the direction of rebellion and disorder.

Because everyday life is not always predictable, in most cases people will choose those identity options that have a utilitarian character, but do not necessarily agree with the chosen situation. This means that strategic identities may be of short duration, but sufficient to survive in unpredictable social dynamics. Strategic and imposed identities stem from the inability of the individual to make their own choice.

From the point of view of everyday life, creation of identities and roles in terms of household, fashion, music, lifestyle, and urban lifestyle of individuals living in such an environment, implies a significant reduction of freedom of choice and coercion to given identities. Yet, it also incorporates those ideas that create the resistance and alternative identities. For us, it refers to modernity and the related paradoxes.

In this paper we will summarily present those social constructions that shape an individual in the given identities. One of these constructions is power, as a phenomenon that constitutes connective tissues for the choice of imposed identity.

Power

Power, in its most general sense, is simply the product of causal effects, i.e. the relationship of a person who has power and a person without power. Power is the deliberate use of causal power to influence the behaviour of others. Social power is the relationship between two entities, one of which is “the superior” and the other the subordinate. The subject who has the power is “trained” to exercise it over the subordi-

nate. This is a common view of power, and it is common to anyone who thinks about it. Although there are different interpretations, the underlying idea is fundamental.

Influenced by the ideas of Weber (1922, according to Đurić, 1987), especially concerning the exercise of power in traditional organizations – such as states, businesses, universities, and churches – power can be institutionalized and can become impersonal. In this sense, it is not the matter of a person's traits and qualities, but of their institutional position. Such power relations are asymmetrical and organized around the conflicting interests and goals of the participants. Power is a fixed amount, so there will always be winners and losers in any power relationship. Where power is concentrated, it tends to create permanent structures shaped by the executor. In theory they are known as relational structures (Scott, 2006).

The second approach emphasizes the cultural construction of the institutions of the structure. This approach has been developed in the various arguments of A. Gramsci, T. Parsons, and M. Foucault. They are concerned with strategies and techniques of power, perceiving it as diffuse throughout society. For them, power is a collaborative act, which facilitates collective empowerment and collective discipline and which Foucault refers to as the “discursive formation” of power. Power operates through mechanisms of socialization and community-building, which are produced by individuals as subjects with particular types of mental orientation and routine action. Power is organized in such a way that the power holders are those who are “empowered” to discipline others. Power is most effectively realized through forms of self-discipline training over subordinates' behaviour. They are discursively formed into subordinate entities that adapt themselves without the need for any instruction by the holder of power.

These approaches can be combined into a more general presentation of power mechanisms, especially in the more complex patterns of domination seen in states, economic structures, and other associations.

Corrective influence can be called an elemental form of social power, which includes rational, calculated steering towards others and it works through the use of punishments and rewards. The two main forms of expression of power are force and manipulation.

Force involves the use of negative physical sanctions to prevent actions by subordinates, while manipulation involves the use of both positive and negative sanctions (for example, money, credit, and access to employment), as a way of influencing the decisions of subordinates.

Persuasion, on the other hand, depends on the rhetorical use of arguments, complaints, and reasons offered on the basis of socialization, i.e. the belief that it is appropriate to act in one particular way instead of another. Basic forms of power are manifested in everyday life as interpersonal relations of power. Power depends on personal attributes and characteristics, as much as is allowed by resources. A married woman without alternative sources of support depends entirely on her husband for material support, and her addiction will be the basis for her husband's power over her. Family structures and private spheres of intimacy and sexuality are crucial contexts in which interpersonal power is reinforced and exercised, giving a patriarchal form to many other relationships of power.

The elemental forms of power are the foundations from which the relations of power that can be formed as structures of domination are developed. Domination is a power integrated into a stable and lasting social structure. Elites are formed as dominant groups through domination and power over the resources. Coercion and incitement are structures of domination that operate through the basic forms of force and manipulation.

Resources controlled by the holders of power, within the structural distribution of assets, shape the constellation of interests within which both power holders and subordinates must act. Expertise and command are structures of domination that operate discursively and are grounded in the structure of ruling. They correspond to the elemental forms of labelling and legitimation and can be seen as organized forms of persuasive influence that act in an institutionalized way. M. Weber defines it as the “dominance of power”, while A. Giddens simply defines it as “authoritative domination”.

The gendered nature of many forms of interpersonal power is rooted in patriarchy that permeates the public sphere of domination (e.g. inequality in employment at the higher job positions). The embodiment of patriarchal patterns of power, rooted in the private sphere of the household and the family, shapes the ways in which the formal powers of domination will be exercised.

There has been much debate about the relationship between the limiting and the discursive modes of domination, and this has to do with the idea of legitimacy as the foundation of state power. Domination through command operates through the structuring of rights and obligations: the right for the power holder to issue orders as an obligation for the subordinate to obey them. The subordinate demonstrates a willingness to execute the order because of his or her belief in the legitimacy of the command. Legitimacy exists whenever there is a belief that the pattern of domination is right, correct, justified, or valid in some way. Persons who have internalized a prevailing culture (and constructed their identity and the target behaviour that affirms it) will undoubtedly respect domination. Internalization and identification create rights and obligations that support the power of command available to the holders of power.

M. Foucault (1988) has shown that dominance by experts is understood as a power that is rooted in the signifying practice through which their expertise is discursively constructed. The subordinates recognize and accept the knowledge that the professional has, and that gives them the right to mark and name the phenomena. Power researchers have emphasized that any implementation of power will tend to create resistance, while such resistance is also a form of power.

When opposition action is institutionalized and opposed, groups of subordinates receive some degree of recognition and legitimacy. It can be said that they use “pressure” as formal participants in an institutionalized structure. Pressure groups, for example, play a legitimate role in the state. “Protest”, on the other hand, is a contradiction that occurs outside the formal institutions of power, which is a challenge to these very structures. The resistance of subordinates is carried out as counter-mobilization to the existing structure of domination. These analytical differences are often difficult to separate in concrete situations. Protest groups can achieve some of their goals and position themselves within the established frameworks of power, becoming a part of the system.

We have found the firm argumentation in a number of classical and recent sociological papers, but we have also found it in the works and reflections of Florentina Pakosta on the occasion of her retrospective exhibition at Albertina Museum in Vienna in 2018.

In her works, she reflects upon interpretation, condition, movement, and gesture of the body, in which the everyday actors are involved. Her paintings are the residuals of a condition, a happening, or social drama. In that way she broadens the notion of art that problematizes the imposed identities.

With the development of photography and film, the visual arts lost their primacy over pictorial content. 20th Century Art (from Cezanne's Cubism 1905-6 to 1978, when the avant-gardes were exhausted and rejected), contained surrealism, Dadaism, abstract expressionism, supremacism, pop art, and a number of other movements that are actually a scene of the tearing and cracking of the artistic field (Michaud, 2005), recruited from the search for truth. Modern art is more of a state of proceduralism (one expression in relation to other, the present versus the future) and it has produced a number of unexpected products, such as advertising, fashion, design, communication, or techno music. Florentina Pakosta's images are on the verge of posters. Through these expressions, contemporary art is capable of giving up its metaphysical messages of existence towards self-referentiality and self-purpose. In that way modern art enters the realm of everyday experience and aesthetizes it (Michaud, 2005).

a) In the painting "Forming Male Society", everyday life, as a routine practice, uniforms society and vice versa. The main character resembles the actor Bob Hoskins;



Figure 1. *Forming Male Society* (painting), Florentina Pakosta, 1996

b) But everyday life is unpredictable, and it requires forms of knowledge and skills that enable a person to survive in unreliable and uncertain social dynamics. The choice is in the multiple identity argued through the painting "Multi-Headed Man II";



Figure 2. *Multi-Headed Man II (painting), Florentina Pakosta, 1980*

c) Everyday life involves the presence of other influences and forces in the formation of identity, which the painting “Halo for Oppressors, Including Female Ones” tells us as a reinterpretation of M. Duchamp’s ready-made concept. He created it in 1917 – a urinal, defined as a sculpture and signed by an alias R. Mutt, who was the owner of the firm. He named it “Fountain” after the name of the company that produced urinals. This is M. Duchamp’s most famous work, and Florentina Pakosta reinterpreted it as a state of modern age in which the actors are forced to endure influences in order to survive. A part of that strategy is the ability to accept the imposed identity;



Figure 3. *Halo for Oppressors, Including Female Ones (painting), Florentina Pakosta, 1980*

d) Ultimately, the painting “Permanent Smiler” shows us the power of everyday life, which includes powerful economic-political and consumerist forces that shape a person in parallel with “smiling” capitalism.




Figure 4. *Permanent Smiler* (painting), Florentina Pakosta, 1983

Everyday Experience: Towards Understanding Identity Coercion – Selected Elements of a Presentation Exhibited at the Faculty of Criminal Justice, Criminology and Security Studies, University of Sarajevo

Within the central hall of the Faculty of Criminal Justice, Criminology and Security Studies, University of Sarajevo, we made a presentation entitled “Everyday Experience: Towards Understanding Identity Coercion”.



Figure 5. *Presentation*

Closer to the everyday experiences and practices of adoption of identity are the micro pressures that emerge from everyday life. Our idea was to emphasize the basic determinants of everyday life and its routines and predictability through the visual-experiential method. The presentation contains five interrelated elements.

The first element is the door. Two quotes are highlighted at the door, Norbert Elias and Margaret Schütte Lihotzky.

The idea is maximally reduced and its purpose is to emphasize the problem, but only in the main outlines. The quotation, fixed at the door, is taken from N. Elias's famous study, "The Process of Civilization", in which he problematizes the division of interior home space, through the door, as a daily barrier, which divided the public and private spheres at the end of the Middle Ages. Doors, as an everyday usable item, allow the division of a person and space into a public and private person. In that way, the door symbolizes and harmonizes this division. For Elias, in this way, persons, especially women, enter the drama of this division, as the central category of modernity.

The bedroom has become one of the most "private" and "intimate" areas of human life. Like most other bodily functions, sleeping has been increasingly shifted behind the scenes of social life. The nuclear family remains as the only legitimate, socially sanctioned enclave for this and many other human functions. Its visible and invisible walls withdraw the most "private", "intimate", insuppressibly "animal" aspects of human existence from the sight of others (Elias, 1996, p. 213).

The institution of quiet, private, feminine reading emerged at this time.

Margarete Schütte-Lihotzky, a member of the famous Bauhaus architecture school, a socialist by conviction, is the author of the "Frankfurter Küche" (Frankfurt kitchen), which fully corresponds to the idea of housing functionality, but also to a new division within the housing space (Sievers & Schröder, 2001). It completely separates the kitchen from the other rooms, and introduces the housewife into the sphere of unpaid work and dirty and unpleasant activities related to food preparation (in earlier eras the kitchen was handled by the servants).



Figure 6. *The layout of Margaret Schütte-Lihotzky's kitchen* (according to Sievers & Schröder, 2001, p. 50)

The idea is that dividing a person into a public and a private one through a door has a further perspective on the separation of the kitchen, as a separate room within the living space. This fact reproduces the gender and class inequality of husband and wife. A husband is a labourer and earns money outside, in the public sphere, but must eat and sleep as far as possible from the kitchen and the events inside the kitchen. It belongs to the housewife and the private sphere. The statement of Margaret Schütte-Lihotzky is distinctive:

You will be surprised that I had not cooked before I imagined the Frankfurt kitchen in 1926. At home, in Vienna, my mother cooked, in Frankfurt I went to the *Wirthaus* [restaurant/pub]. I designed the kitchen as an architect, not as a housewife (Der Standard, 2005).

It transforms the kitchen into a reduced laboratory where functional principles of preparing food for the husband-worker and other family members are implemented.

Thus, the woman was embedded in the kitchen as a gender-related sphere of being in the drama of housing but also of reproducing implicit inequality. Paradoxically, Schütte-Lihotzky considers that she liberated the woman, but on the other hand locked her inside the kitchen as the main subject of the division of public-private, female-male, and power-weakness, as indicated in the following paragraph:

Every sensible woman must have experienced the conservativeness of the present way of running a household and must, therefore, see in it the basic obstacles to her personal development, and consequently to the development of the whole family. The problem of organizing day-to-day activities of a housewife in a more systematic way than the recent one is equally significant for all classes of society... in order to achieve this, the position of the kitchen and its relation to other rooms in the apartment must first be considered (according to Perović, 2000, p. 390).

One of the ideal types or end goals of the division of housing into intimidating private “women’s” spaces, such as the bedroom and the kitchen, is the division of power and the reproduction of inequality. Obvious spatial definitions of the apartment (Neidhardt, 1999) are, in fact, very precise anthropo-historical dictates through which we form and shape spatial experiences.

The separation of the private and public spheres further extended to the concept of a suburban home, an area of the private sphere and separation from others, which led to the urban explosion of cities after World War I. Some authors emphasize that the suburban space is a matrix of gender inequality and the difference between paid-male and unpaid-female work in the kitchen. This may also be the reason that, for instance, eroticism, women’s riots, daily conflicts, and even crimes (Kondor Langer, 2016) occur precisely in the kitchen and not in any other living quarters. Simply, a long stay in the kitchen has colonized a woman’s time.

Basically, there is no discussion about space without it being a debate about power, its reproduction, and the definition of who enforces it. Through these insights, we can broaden the interpretative horizons about space, but also humanize future spatial practices.

The second element of the presentation refers to music as an essential determinant of identity, inherited, chosen, or imposed. The presentation consists of a framed picture of a group of musicians performing an orchestral guitar piece and is accompanied by hypotheses about the social function of the music presented on the wall. The goal is to make the image and poster visible enough for normal perception.

The hypotheses about the social and identity functions of music are:

- The elemental definition of music is: music is a sound shaped by human being;
- The social aspects of music include all those elements that refer to music as a collective act (listening, singing, playing);
- Music, as a form of culture, harmonizes the social processes;
- Music maintains social cohesion;
- Music hints at social rebellions and change, becoming a dynamic force;
- Meanings in music express relations of power in the social structure;
- Music and the way in which the performative context, event, and genre shape communication, then the audience and, finally, potential social action;
- Music significantly shapes the social identity of the listener;
- Music is often the only link between the diaspora, immigrants, refugees, and travellers with a place of origin and identity;
- Music is one of the most adaptable expressions in the context of modernity (it is heard everywhere and at every opportunity);
- Music, if over-present, tends to colonize public space;
- Music knows and acknowledges class differences;
- Music history is a history of emotions, and as such has the character of a collective memory;
- Music is a frequent “prey” to ideologies, and is an integral part of great narratives;
- Music and its messages tend to become imprinted into the listener’s body.

The sociology of music, in addition to the above definitions, is also interested in experiences related to attending concerts, their organization, sales, advertising, and the music industry in general, which requires significant financial resources.

The third element of the presentation refers to fashion. Fashion significantly influences the definition of identity and has the ability to reproduce and renew it through style. The presentation consists of a drawing that portrays a shoe (often as an object of fashion and intervention) and has artistic value.

The drawing is accompanied by hypotheses relating to the social meaning of fashion and its function. They read as follows:

1. Lasting fashion reflects a sustainable society;
2. Changes in fashion correspond to social change (war, crises, revolutions, etc.);
3. Accelerations in fashion correspond to the accelerations of social change;
4. The existence of a single fashion in a country reveals a society of equality;
5. The coexistence of different fashions corresponds to non-communication of social classes;
6. The class in power demands to influence fashion, but fashion is inspired by the classes that are on the rise;

7. The outfits of groups (women, youth) express their status and social background;
8. We are always inspired by the fashion of the winning countries;
9. The universal spread of men's suits equals the equalization of men;
10. The rapid spread of fashion diminishes with respect to the distance from the point of its appearance;
11. The decay of the exaggerated aspects of a fashion is growing with regard to its duration and its spread;
12. Accelerated fashion is an essential echo of social mobility (Descamps, 1979, according to Todorović, 1980, p.150).




Figure 7. *The drawing of a shoe* (from the author's collection)

The fourth element of the presentation consists of a drawing of an “Urbanman”, which refers to J. Helmer and N. Eddington's conception of an urban person in the city of the future. The city is a paradigm of growing complexities.




Figure 8. *Urbanman* (Helmer & Eddington, 1973, Front cover)

The parts of an Urbanman's equipment:

Anti-power failure headlamp for use in subway tunnels, unlighted streets, etc.;

Air-pollution mask;

Snowshoes in the event of unpredicted heavy snowfall;

Scaling rope for lowering self from office buildings during power shutdown;

Briefcase containing emergency cash for sudden tax hikes, fares, and toll increases;

Identification;

Emergency drought supply (WATER);

Change-maker for exact change for buses, pay toilets, tipping waiters, bartenders, etc.;

Anti-mugger chain for briefcase;

Belt containing skate key and spare skate wheels;

Books to read during next newspaper strike and tutoring children during school strike;

Pistol, holster, and ammunition for citizen's arrest, if witness to a crime;

Aids for getting through demonstrations;

Travel aids during transit shutdown;

Curb feelers.

The picture above shows an urban person in a highly developed urbanity that is already on the verge of collapse. He can no longer function without technical aids, but these aids take on their own purpose in relation to the mentioned person. We think that the observed complexity abolishes old identities, but at the same time creates new ones. It seems advisable to quote two ideas, originating temporally far from one another by more than a hundred years, which speak of an urban person exposed to the external pressures of the metropolis. The first idea is by Simmel:

the forms of individuality include the freedom of the individual, the subjective culture, the tendency for eroticism, Platonism, and modernity. The relationship between individuality and social structure is located in the space of group expansion and development of individuality, explicated in fashion, metropolis, mental life, and subordination and personal fulfilment [...] The headquarters of all central conflicts are located in a metropolis. A person in the metropolis necessarily develops and forms a special type of person, the "metropolitan type" of person, who is exposed to powerful senses in the metropolis. To protect against excessive nerve stimulation, this type of person develops a special type of behaviour and appearance, known as the blasé type. This is the kind of behaviour that intensifies metropolitan intellectual derivations. (Simmel, 1903, according to Sennett, 1969, p. 49).

The content of blasé behaviour and appearance is fundamentally protective. Metropolis requires accuracy, calculability, predictability from humans in order to reduce the complexity of the metropolis's environment to manageable factors. To be able to survive in the metropolis implies the conscious exclusion of the individual from potential engagement in the diverse social situations of the metropolis. The monetary culture of the metropolis objectifies values and makes one believe in mediated truths. At the same time, this type of a person will accept his or her own marginalization as objective, if he or she is not able to counter the marginalization. In contrast, excessive emotional involvement of a person in a city would result in his or her frustration and destruction, while the same engagement in the countryside or in a smaller city, as scarce social systems, would result in greater integration into the environment. The metropolitan type of man, that is, the identity constructed on the basis of this experience, must constantly take care of his resources in relation to the strong impulses of the metropolis, that is, he must not enter into relations in the whole of his structure. Metropolis is at the same time a source of cosmopolitanism and conflicts and the seat of economic power and domination in society (according to Sennett, 1969).

The second idea, in the same spirit, is R. Weatherill's (Vederil, 2005, p. 226) view of a late 20th century person:

A person of post-industrial age (a person of global society and global city) must learn and develop such personal skills, which encompass basic skills such as [...] information retrieval and sources of knowledge, problem solving, identification of creative potential and its development, organizing time, discovering values and beliefs, developing positive self-esteem, making decisions, managing changes, developing healthy lifestyles, coping with stress, and managing sexual needs.

According to the quotes, the urban person has constructed an identity based on environmental external urban pressures that have implications for the self-definition of a person as such.

The fifth element of the presentation denotes the modern age as predicted by M. Weber (1922, according to Đurić, 1987) through the famous constructs of rationalization and bureaucratization. Specifically, he determined, as early as the twentieth century, that knowledge, rather than classical industries, would be the source of wealth. The best indication of discourse is a simple office desk and a chair by the desk, where authentic Weber quotes related to those predictions are presented.

Bearing in mind that the mentioned quotes are well known and often cited, we do not need to quote them again, but we stress that the instrumental rationality and bureaucratization extends to all aspects of life (Abercrombie, Hill & Turner, 2008).

Instrumental rationality means that this action is separated from moral criteria. In a highly specialized division of labour in a bureaucratized, irrationalized world, persons are transformed into parts of the machine into whose operation they do not have the complete insight and of whose work they do not know the consequences. In such a world, technical responsibility is primary in relation to moral responsibility. The elimination of morality and humanization in the bureaucratic-rational world is a constant process, and thus the process of giving sense to their own experience and defining themselves in categories of their identities has become the ideal type of employment.

Implications

The basic implication from the point of view of our presentation and everyday life is the understanding that persons personalize their own lives and construct their working, gender, aesthetic, moral, and spatial identities based on experience (Šabani, 2019). This means that there are different experiences, realities, and associated identities on the scene. The constraints, stoppages, and obstacles that the daily, often banal routine, imposes to the actor must be explored in order to shed light on the complex networks and pitfalls that have been created in today's lifestyle. Identity is imposed as a consequence of the organization of modern life and perhaps represents its illusion.

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SOCIJALNO-PROSTORNE KONSTRUKCIJE IDENTITETA: ODJECI IZ SVAKODNEVNOG ŽIVOTA

Apstrakt

Rad razmatra fenomen svakodnevnog života i mehanizme koji ga oblikuju. Vjerujemo da su konkretne situacije poput rasporeda životnog prostora, mode, muzike, urbanog stila života, birokratizacije i racionalizacije neke od sila koje oblikuju svakodnevni život i na temelju kojih se konstruiraju identiteti. Polazimo od stava da svi ti mehanizmi koloniziraju svakodnevnicu. Na toj osnovi pojedinci prihvaćaju ponuđeni i izgrađeni identitet kao mjerilo svog svakodnevnog života. Čini se da moderno doba estetizuje svakodnevnicu, dajući joj značenje i pretvarajući je u odrednice identiteta, smanjujući akterima mogućnost otpora, ali istovremeno stvarajući nove mogućnosti identiteta. Inspiraciju za rad nalazimo u svakodnevnom životu, koji je konstrukcija modernog vremena, kao i u načinima na koje se akteri definiraju u

kontekstu ubrzanih društvenih promjena. U ovom radu ističemo osnovne atribute kategorija kojima se bavimo: svakodnevni život, identitet, prostor, moć, grad, racionalizacija za koje smatramo da su intrinzično povezane u svakodnevnom životu. Opravdanost ovog rada ogleda se u razumijevanju načina na koji ekonomska / politička moć (kao osnovni resurs odrednica identiteta) oblikuje i reproducira svakodnevnu praksu i pripadajuće identitete. Važna ograničenja ovog rada su nemogućnosti pokrivanja svih pojava svakodnevnog života, ali smo u grubom i lapidarnom obliku naglasili putanju koju treba slijediti prilikom istraživanja svakodnevnog života i njegovih povezanih identiteta.

Ključne riječi: moć, identitet, svakodnevica, prostor, grad, moda, glazba, racionalizacija

GENDER IDENTITIES IN SERBIA – FROM A RIGID CATEGORY TO FLEXIBLE CONCEPTS

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Abstract

Patriarchal mentality and culture, coupled with Christian beliefs, have maintained a rigid division into males and females throughout history. It resulted in a gender-based division of labor with clearly defined gender roles and boundaries, marginalization, and discrimination of women. The centuries-old tradition, supported by strong beliefs and stereotypes, has been changing slowly, stimulated by various social processes and circumstances. However, globalization in the field of culture has also introduced Serbia to a legitimate possibility for a woman to become a man, or vice versa, or to feel and express oneself as something in between. Words such as transvestite, drag-queen, she-male, and queer are also present in the Serbian language. In the street, we can see people whose gender is difficult to determine. We can buy unisex clothes or look androgynous. The author does not take a normative stance, but rather tries to point out the inevitability of change through a theoretical analysis of everyday life, relying on the observations of Anthony Giddens on the opening and reflexivity of the self. Gender identities no longer represent a rigid impenetrable category as they used to. They become fluid, less exclusive, allowing the permeation of previously clearly separated categories. But is gender awareness changing at the same pace as gender identities are?

Key words: gender identity, rigidity, flexibility, changes

Introduction

When a child is born in Serbia, she or he is immediately credited with a status that will largely determine their future: the status of being a girl or a boy. Thus, the sexual organs become a point of reference in our lives immediately after birth.

Although there are different points of view (for example, Butler, 2007, pp. 145–161), sex will be considered a biological property of humans, implying organic – physiological and anatomical – differences between men and women as a function of their reproductive roles, and gender will be considered a sociocultural category (Milić, 2001, p. 13; Gidens, 2003, p. 117), which encompasses social, psychological, and cultural differences between men and women (Gidens, 2003, p. 117). It is a whole system of roles and relations between the sexes, determined by the political, economic, social and cultural contexts – it consists of identity determinants, forms of personal expression, and social constructs in

the form of roles and norms (Stjepanović-Zaharijevski, 2010, pp. 85–86). Therefore, sex can be referred to as “something” that a person has, regardless of behavior, and gender becomes visible only when signaled or through behavior, i.e. “performed” (Segal, 2003, p. 5). Therefore, we exist both as a sex and as a gender (Jovanović, 2001, p. 9).

The word identity signifies sameness, identification (Identity, 2007, p. 320). Identity refers to the image we have of ourselves – a sense of self, of what we feel and think we are, our most important attributes (Haralambos & Holborn, 2002, p. 885), the perception of individuals about themselves as beings different from others and in accordance with themselves, with implied coherence in behavior, motives, needs, and interests (Tap, according to Golubović, 1999, p. 14). It occurs through a twofold process: we internalize what we identify with and distance ourselves from what we are not, what we differ from. Otherness remains outside our identity (Mark, 2009, p. 42). But the others are also different from one another, and we say that identity rests on the concept of difference, or the differential model, because otherness means negation. Women are Other to men, but also to women from different cultures (Bošković, 1998). An essential identifier of an individual or group identity is the name. Its sources are gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, and social status.

The awareness of one’s sex begins in childhood. It is believed that a child becomes aware of his or her sex between one and a half and three years of age, but that a more thoughtful understanding of one’s sex is created around the age of five (McGuire & McGuire, according to Opačić, 1995, p. 47; Brković, 2000, p. 219). Three-year-olds are able to choose “gender appropriate” toys (Smiljanić, 1985, p. 12; Brković, 2000, p. 219; Hudek, 1985, p. 75). Identity based on sex assignment signifies understanding and acceptance of one’s sex and role (Stoller, 1968, p. 2006; Brković, 2000, p. 219). It is a deep, psychic conception of oneself as a man or a woman, or an intersex person. The definition from the end of the last century emphasizes its four components: biological sex, gender identity, the social role of the sexes, and sexual orientation (Smiljanić, 1985, p. 7, 8). Sex-based identity is also constructed through the other, because it is actualized and confirmed in interactions with persons of the same or different sex (Jovanović, 2001, p. 7, 8). It is determined by two types of factors: biological and social. The latter cultivate the biological dimensions of belonging to a sex, giving them meanings separate from the biological functions of the sexes themselves (Milić, 2001, p. 242). In this process, the individual and his/her character are sufficiently complex and receptive to the context of social interaction (Nucci, 1997) and it is obvious that, although the social construction of gender defines identity to a great extent, it does not fully or ultimately define it (otherwise we would live divided into homogeneous, unified sex groups). Feminists refer to the process of internalizing gender characteristics as gender production: “gendering” (Gendering, 1999, p. 134). In psychology, the process of developing gender-appropriate traits in a given culture is called gender typing (Smiljanić, 1985, p. 10, 11).

Gender identity is acquired by realizing the differences between the sexes, much earlier than a child becomes aware of the existence of these differences (Buloh & Buloh, 2004, p. 83). And, as individual authors consider both sex and gender to be social constructs, the same can be said for gender identity: there is no gender identity – there is only an idea of gender (Goffman, 1979, p. 8). Gender identity is a subjective experience of belonging to a gender, consisting of one’s gender role, the manifestation of gender identity through

the fulfillment of expected patterns of behavior in a particular culture, sexual orientation (heterosexual or homosexual), and the cognitive style: spatial perception, reasoning, and similar cognitive characteristics typical of the female or male gender (Rakić, 2011, p. 95, 96). Gender identity is created “in the interaction between the organism, individual consciousness and social structure” (Golubović, 1999). On the individual level, gender identity is independent of the fact which sex is registered at birth, although most of the population identifies with the biological sex (Gender identity, 2011, p. 153). A child most often identifies with the sex to which he or she biologically belongs, which is accompanied by an emotional component: a sense of belonging to one’s gender. Gender identity is considered to be developed when a child learns the name of his or her gender, when he or she generalizes it to other members of that gender, and when he or she realizes that gender is unchangeable. Of course, the claim of sex or gender unchanged ability has become debatable in contemporary societies.

Thus, sex refers to the categories of male and female, and gender to feminine and masculine. Masculinity and femininity as socially constructed identities of men and women contain differences in roles, activities, modes of expression, ways of dressing, and manners – they appear as two different, polarized, socially constructed gender cultures (Levit, according to Stjepanović-Zaharijevski, 2010, p. 85, 86). We know that these differences are not natural, but learned and socially conditioned, thanks to authors like Margaret Mead who found that the same upbringing of children of both sexes shapes girls and boys according to the same temperament pattern, and that different upbringing produces women and men who think, work, and feel according to different opposing and complementary patterns (Mead, 1968, pp. 247–283).

In the past and now

In Serbia, the traditional understanding of gender identities involves identifying with the male or female sex and accepting different and complementary social roles for men and women. Gender identity is understood very rigidly, as a solid construction. It represents an unchangeable, “impermeable” and culturally-defined category, followed by expectations of female and male gender roles in the sense of “knowing one’s place” (for women, it is at home, with children, and for men, it is at work; women are pushed into the private sphere, while men dominate the public one) and “who wears the pants” (the man is the “head” of the house, women are not to make decisions, but to obey). It has always been known what the tasks of women and men are. For a woman to plow the field would be very unusual, but acceptable under certain conditions, but for a man to do household dishes was hardly an acceptable picture in traditional Serbia. Folk Serbian proverbs generally attach more value to men and show disdain for a female being, especially for a proud and beautiful woman, or a barren woman (who does not live up to gender expectations), with the exception of respect for certain categories: the mother, a good housewife (who meet those expectations well), the sister, and the young girl (Brković, 2000, p. 221; Trebješanin, 2001, p. 198 and 1985, pp. 87–100). The superiority of the male role in folk customs and rituals is also evidenced (a male child breaks the ritual bread, rituals are performed only with the hope of having a male child; the rifle is fired when a male child is born; a bride holds a young boy in the lap to give birth to male children).

In our culture, men are socialized to be the “head of the family”. They have adopted the understanding that the role of the breadwinner gives them the right to dominate over it and in it, and the same model is instilled in women through socialization. In modern Serbia, women mostly occupy less-valued jobs compared to men, their jobs are of lower social value, and the professions in which women make a breakthrough become feminized. The marital, domestic and parental roles with all the rights and obligations remain non-redefined in terms of equal distribution of those duties and rights to men and women, completely and on a mass scale. Women who are successful in traditionally “masculine” activities can still be condemned by the environment, especially if they neglect their traditional roles (Havelka, 2001, p. 213).

That is why it is not wrong, in sociological terms, to call such a traditionally understood gender identity a structure with clearly defined elements and strong relationships between them. The patriarchally-determined relations of these elements directly and indirectly produce an uneven distribution of social power between the sexes. The rigid conception of gender identities stems from a Manichean conception of sexuality, rooted in the Serbian patriarchal tradition underpinned by Orthodox (Christian) conceptions of gender (because God created men and women).

However, exceptions are known in traditional Balkan cultures, for instance “a masculine woman”, “a henpecked man”, *virđžina* or *tobelija* (a sworn virgin, also *ostajnica* (‘stayer’) or *burnesha* in Albania). Sworn virgins are women who, when there was no male heir in their family, assumed the role and therefore the power and authority of the male. The environment treated them as men and they socialized in the company of men, smoked, drank, and participated in male gatherings, doing whatever men were allowed to do and women were deprived of (Dvorniković, 1990, p. 140; Djordjević, 1984; Virdzina, 2011, p. 153; Record: The Last Montenegrin Sworn Virgin – Stana Cerović, 2014). Sworn virgins were found among Catholics, Muslims, and the Orthodox Christians. However, this form of “third sex”, concealment of the true sex and the need to imitate men, essentially only confirms the hegemonic asymmetrical form of the relationship between the sexes (Papić, 1997, p. 248).

The Balkan Region is not an isolated example. There have always been cultures that knew and recognized the so-called third gender – people who replaced their biological gender with another, assuming its social roles (Mead, 1968; Haralambos & Holborn, 2002, p. 135): berdache or “two-spirited”, mahu, maohi, rae-rae, kwido, hijra, and guevedoches (Williams, 1992 and Bradley & Phillips, 1991, according to Segal, 2003, p. 5; Wilding, 2015). These are the categories that are “behind” the known categories of male and female because they are neither one nor the other, and their gender and sexuality are determined by their behavior, not vice versa (Elliston, 1999; Levy, 1971, according to Segal, 2003, p. 8, 9), which is the case in Serbia.

Hermaphrodites, persons born with the sex and reproductive organs not defined as explicitly female or male, or with both (Witten et al., 2003, p. 219; Hermaphrodite, 2011, pp. 82–90) should be considered as the “third sex”/“gender”, or “intersex”/“intergender” (Herdt, 1996, according to Witten et al., 2003, p. 216). In addition, in some people the hormones do not function in line with their sex, and there are persons with Turner’s syndrome, which is actually an unusual combination of chromosomes, or the absence of a male hormone, together with the absence of another female hormone relative to the

“normal” hormone combinations in men (XY) and women (XX) (Haralambos & Holborn, 2002, p. 135). People living in celibacy have long been considered the third gender, due to the possibility of the absence of sexual need (Radulović, 2009, p. 76). Androgynous persons can also be considered third-gender persons (Marjanić, 2005). They combine both female and male culturally-defined traits (Bem, 1974, pp. 155–158; Zaharijević, 2009; Kandido-Jakšić, 1985). Androgyny is not biologically conditioned and has nothing to do with sexual orientation (Vidanović, 2008, p. 586).

In contemporary Western societies, there are several categories of people who do not fit the dichotomous gender pattern: transvestites, or cross-dressers, bois, tomboys, packers, gender benders, she-males, she-boys, trannies, drags, or butches (for more about transgender identities, see Antić, 2012). The term *feminine masculinity* (Califia, 2006, p. 434) refers to the observation that a feminine man is no less a man and that masculinity does not make one any less of a woman. Transgenderism is conceptualized with postmodernism, queer theory, transgender theory, and activism, and can thus be distinguished from transsexuality (Sullivan, 2006). A transgender person is one whose gender identity and/or gender expression is not in accordance with the established (imposed) traditional gender roles and norms. They change their behavior and appearance to bring themselves in line with their inner perception of themselves, as identified with the opposite sex, feeling that they are in the “wrong body”. Transgenderism does not entail mandatory gender reassignment. Transsexuals not only change their behavior and appearance, but also seek to change their sex through hormonal therapies and genital surgery (Witten et al., 2003, p. 219; Transgenderism, 2010, p. 82). In this way they also achieve a proper legal identity with the aim of eliminating gender dysphoria, that is, a disparity between sex and gender and the suffering it subjectively causes (Rakić, 2011, p. 95). Transsexual persons also transform their presentation, expressing their sex and/or gender identity and their sense of self. In the medical context, gender dysphoria is now used instead of the earlier term gender identity disorder, considered more descriptive, but transsexuality is still considered a psychiatric disorder (Duišin et al., 2014, p. 40). There is also the term “supernumerary sex”, coined as early as 1975, with the aim of designating cultural categories that do not fit the bipolar understandings of Europeans and Americans (Martin & Voorhies, according to Segal, 2003, p. 3). It is close to the modern term “queer” but not equivalent to it.

Queer is a term used for people who live outside the norms of the heterosexual patriarchal community, but also for their activism and their movement, as well as for theories that challenge imposed patriarchal norms, traditions, and customs, and affirm personal creativity in designing one’s own culture, sexuality, and living conditions (Queer, 2011, p. 127, 128). Previously, it was used in English as a derogatory term for non-heterosexual people (Džagouz, 2007; Simić, 2009). Later, LGBTTIQ people started using it to describe themselves. The term is valuable because it signifies defiance and encompasses diversity (not only of homosexuals, but also of bisexual, transgender, and intersex persons) and heterosexuals who see themselves or live their lives outside the hetero-patriarchal norms (LGBTTIQ, 2011, p. 90). As a tendency, queer offers a new perspective for identity construction, overcoming the existing dualism and recalling the political character of the social construction of sex and gender, in accordance with Foucault’s theory (1988a; 1988b). In the form of an intellectual current, queer examines labeling and forces the right to plurality of identities, refusing the closure into just one and insisting on a constant

reorganization of categories and their porosity. Therefore, queer identity is not defined by what it is, but by change (Serž Šomije, according to Roš, 2009, p. 88). In its most radical form, queer theory emphasizes self-creation and ethical movement beyond the categories of pre-established identities (Kornel, 2003, p. 28). Queer deconstructs the culturally-imposed binary opposition and draws attention to identity, but does not establish it: what anarchy is in politics, queer is in relation to sexual identity (Simić, 2009, p. 187, 191).

Thus, the concept of transgenderism, depending on the context (medicine, social sciences, politics) encompasses a variety of sex and gender variations, from intersex and transgender, through transvestite, cross-dresser, tomboy, gender-bender, and similar identities (more at Zaharijević, 2009; also Antić: 2012; Jovanović, 2009).

Obviously, the Western bipolar understanding of sex, gender, and sexuality is not the only one, so it cannot claim exclusivity. Transgenderism is a phenomenon that cuts across categories of sexual identities (Antić, 2012, p. 243). Such categories, “borderline cases” of sexuality, which do not fit into the dichotomous division into two sexes and problematize the content of the concepts of female and male, can be said to transcend gender (Oboler, 1980; Amadiume, 1987, according to Segal, 2003, p. 6). The so-called biblical gender norm (dichotomous, as in Adam and Eve) is not fully functional, despite being deeply embedded in Western medicine and lifestyle. The principle of inter-forms provides a better understanding of individuals’ characters, since it takes into account the oscillation between masculinity and femininity in each individual (Vajninger, 1938, pp. 81–84). In one community, multiple types of femininity and masculinity coexist, other than the dominant (hegemonic) ones, and they are considered to be formed as interdependent in a particular cultural-historical context (Radulović, 2009, pp. 71–74). The construction of a person’s gender identity is influenced by personal desires, aspirations and personal preferences, as well as the economic, political, cultural, subcultural, racial, and gender situation. It can be said that modern society recognizes a whole range of gender identities (Gender identity, 2011, p. 153).

Writing about the transformation of intimacy, Giddens (1991, p. 123, 124) explains that we now approach the construction of the self as reflexive, a reflexive element of modernity: a person must find their identity among the strategies and options enabled by abstract systems, and the process is accompanied by “opening up” to others. Indeed, in contemporary societies, cultures offer a multitude of diverse, fluid, intertwined identity patterns in which individuals can search for themselves. Contemporary Serbia affected by global trends is no exception and we draw our conclusion in line with Giddens’ observation. The binary polarization of sex and gender identities, although current (Kessler & McKenna, 2006, p. 167), is obviously no longer valid, both in everyday life and in science, so it will have to give way to a more flexible, less rigid, more fluid, and dynamic one. The other does not have to be an opponent, an enemy, or a threat, especially if we also recognize the characteristics we attribute to ourselves or our reference group within it. The rigid ontology of sexual differentiation loses its meaning, despite the “entrenched positions and precipitated meanings” of masculinity and femininity that continue to be imposed on us (Kornel, 2003, p. 27, 28). However, the context of this imposition is changing – younger generations see gender roles in an increasingly fluid way (Jerotić, 2011), so Lyotard (1990, p. 56) talks about the process of gender homologation and equalization, as opposed to the difference in sex that constitutes

sexuality. The legal frameworks for understanding identity and gender are also changing (heterosexism embedded in laws will not survive for long, as it will no longer be functional since it will leave entire categories of people out of reach of, for example, the right to health care).

In traditional Serbian culture, where gender identities are firmly fixed, there were no real alternatives that would fit outside of the existing divide. What is happening in contemporary Serbia with gender identities, traditionally defined according to the Manichean dichotomy – female or male? We are interested in changes in daily life that indicate the permeability of the boundaries of gender identity in language (which testifies to the perception of gender identities different than traditional ones), in laws, and in the attitude of the public.

The patriarchal mentality and culture in conjunction with Christian beliefs have firmly maintained a rigid division between male and female throughout history. It resulted in a gender division of labor with clearly defined gender roles and boundaries, which generally marginalized and discriminated against women. A centuries-old tradition backed by strong beliefs and stereotypes is slowly changing, fueled by different social processes and circumstances. The feminine gender is slowly emerging from the shadow of the male, although discrimination still exists.

However, globalization in the domain of culture has also given Serbia a legitimate opportunity for a woman to become a man, or vice versa, or to feel and declare as something in between. In Serbia, the first gender reassignment surgery was performed in 1989, and only recently has the state agreed to provide 65% of the gender reimbursement costs for people whose treatment is medically indicated. There are four institutions in Serbia today that deal with this issue, and the decision to change one's sex is made by the court (Simić, 2012, p. 300, 301).

Since people name what they observe, words such as transvestite, drag-queen, she-male, queer, and the like are also present in the Serbian language. Our culture is clearly beginning to recognize and acknowledge multiple gender identities. In the street, we can see people whose gender is hard to pinpoint. We can buy unisex clothes – the clothes that young people wear no longer have the prominent gender characteristics that they used to (Jerotić, 2001), so they can choose to look androgynous. Girls and boys are increasingly beginning to resemble each other. They dress and behave similarly. A shoe salesman told me recently that a young man had long been picking and buying women's shoes for himself "as if it were the most normal thing". We are aware of examples of public figures from the surrounding area, such as Božo Vrećo, a performer of traditional Bosnian *sevdalinka* songs; Boki 13, a participant in various TV reality shows; or Andreja Pejić, a young man originally from our region and now a world-famous transgender model. Of course, celebrities require media presence at all costs and there is a possibility that some of them abuse the current nature of gender identities with the intention of attracting greater public attention. Many public figures show support for the abandonment of traditional gender identities in interviews or by attending pride parades.

The majority of the population is made up of heterosexuals, but LGBTTIQ people do not request any special rights for themselves but the same rights that heterosexuals enjoy. The right to one's gender identity and the right of the people who do not identify as

heterosexual persons to not be discriminated against have only recently been recognized in our legislation (for more on the legal status of transgender persons, see Mršević, 2016). The Constitution of Serbia guarantees gender equality and equal opportunities (Constitution of Serbia, Article 15: “The State guarantees equality between women and men and develops a policy of equal opportunities”), and after the Anti-Discrimination Law, in late 2000, the Law on Gender Equality was adopted. From January 1, 2019, amendments to the Law on Registers will be implemented, which provide for the possibility of voluntarily entering nationality data in the registry and registering the change of sex in the Birth Register. The Belgrade Institute for Health Protection has provided the opportunity for students to declare themselves as transgender since 2018 (Milutinović, 2018). However, discrimination is still present, both in everyday life and in the attitudes of some institutions and their representatives. The rights include the right to marry and raise children together, the right to inherit one another, and a number of similar rights that have long since been enjoyed by heterosexuals. Gender identity largely determines the status of an individual and the society uses different criteria to protect the rights of persons with different gender and sexual orientations (Gender identity, 2011, p. 153).

Conclusion

Obviously, gender identities in Serbia are no longer a rigid impenetrable category they used to be. They have become fluid and less exclusive, allowing the once clearly separated categories to permeate one another. However, although gender identities show the permeability of boundary lines, the stereotypes of Balkan gender culture are more difficult to change, and legal frameworks prove ambiguous compared to real life practice. Terms such as “transvestite”, “she-male”, “LBGT”, or “queer” have been incorporated into the Serbian language; certain public figures appear to be advocates of the rights of persons who do not conform to gender or sexual stereotypes. However, we are often able to hear, see, and read about a clear negative discrimination against them through accidentally overheard conversations, graffiti on the wall, online comment sections, and even in the journalistic articles themselves (for example, see Bogdanović, Jovanović & Panov, 2015). There are also public figures who aggressively oppose any change that contradicts the traditional understandings. Transgender and transsexual people in Serbia face a multitude of problems that arise both in terms of experiencing their own bodies and in social terms, due to their legal sex identity. There is also transphobia and violence, or bioethical problems regarding the medical treatment of gender dysphoria (for more, see Rakić, 2011; Duišin et al., 2014, p. 44; Simić, 2012; Mladenov, 2013).

Modern societies emphasize tolerance, liberal thinking, and justice as the values on which they rest. It is fair to allow others the right to be different, especially when they suffer due to this fact (Sullivan, 2006). In modern societies, where people are relatively free from rigid, tight-knit, and homogeneous communities and where traditional landmarks are weak, there are virtually unlimited choices as to who a person can be, and gender and sexual orientation become increasingly important elements of identity that we are constantly discovering and creating (Gidens, 2003, p. 32, 33). The rejection of transgenderism and transsexuality in society is an expression of intolerance, as is the rejection of the right to a personal conception of sex and gender identity and expression, which leads to social marginalization, transphobia, and various types of violence against

transgender persons (Antić, 2012). On the one hand, laws in Serbia guarantee its people the right to privacy and the right to gender expression, but on the other, they invade that privacy by proclaiming gender variants as a disorder. Moreover, despite allowing them such rights, legislation also makes life difficult for transgender and transsexual people in many ways.

All of this clearly shows that gender awareness is changing more slowly compared to the pace at which gender identities change. In the media, we can usually read and hear about “the crisis of gender identities and roles” in a negative context. Traditionalists insist that this crisis is something negative, which undermines both the family and the society. Most people still have an understanding of gender and sexuality in terms of sex, i.e. one’s sex is considered to determine one’s gender and sexuality. Thus, we are still forced to internalize one of the two offered conflicting gender options through socialization and gender typing. However, categories actually do provide us with meanings we use to manage and organize our life, shaping us according to historically-specific forms of identity, but they are not perfect: they are historical, temporary, arbitrary, limited, and therefore “permeable” (Rubin, 2006, p. 478).

Social reality brings about changes like a huge wave that crushes everything in its path. The emergence of multiple identities, fragmentation of identities, cases of overlapping or concentric identities, and the multiplication of identity boundaries are the result of the process of particularization, as a part of global history (Šeleva, 2007, p. 1), of cultural and political turmoil, and of structural social changes occurring in a broad context, and this process cannot be stopped. The reproduction of sex or gender identities can be considered a “natural” consequence of the rapid and profound social change, and Anne Fausto-Sterling (2000, p. 108) initially proposed a five-member gender system instead of a binary one, but later realized that any categorization is neither necessary nor desirable. Foucault, Bourdieu, Butler, and the spiritually allied authors do not criticize these changes, but seek to reach the ideological dimension of gender identities by revealing their functions. The author of the present paper does not want to take a normative stance or to evaluate, but to point out the inevitability of change.

If there were no persistent insistence on Western binary gender definition, there would not be many problems that transgender and transsexual people go through, because they would not even be considered an “exception to the rule”. This is corroborated by the various names for such persons in different cultures (some of them mentioned) and social practices that do not excommunicate them, but integrate them into community life. The political pressures to promote homosexuality, LGBT, and transgenderism are obvious. Human rights, the rights of every human being, have become an inalienable element of every constitution and every law in our western and Christian environment. However, modern society is slowly accepting trans people as variants of a legitimately diversified human nature (Antić, 2012, p. 247, 251) and sociology is already aware that gender roles tend to become more symmetrical (Young and Willmott, according to Milić, 2001, p. 138).

It seems that the complex connection between gender identities and sexual orientation is what most often confuses people. Indeed, if we include sexual orientation in the gender identity equation, it seems that we would get an unfathomable number of variations, where it is difficult to make sense and perceive regularities. In any case, the analytical

category of gender will remain relevant for some time and gender and sexuality need to be rethought (Kornel, 2003, p. 29, 30). We are yet to deal with gender identities, and we have yet to redefine their forms and gender roles that accompany them. Transformations of gender identities in the world, and even in Serbia, remind sociologists *that* identity should be defined not as a creation or a phenomenon but as a structure in the process.

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RODNI IDENTITETI U SRBIJI – OD RIGIDNE KATEGORIJE DO ELASTIČNIH POJMOVA

Apstrakt

Patrijarhalni mentalitet i kultura u sprezi sa hrišćanskim uverenjima kroz istoriju su čvrsto održavali rigidnu podelu na muški i ženski pol. Iz nje je proizilazila rodna podela rada sa jasno definisanim rodnim ulogama i granicama, što je generalno marginalizovalo i diskriminisalo žene. Vekovna tradicija potkrepljena jakim uverenjima i stereotipima se menja sporo, podstaknuta različitim društvenim procesima i okolnostima. Međutim, globalizacija na polju kulture je Srbiji donela i legitimnu mogućnost da žena postane postane muškarac, ili obrnuto, ili da se osoba oseća i izjasni kao nešto između. Reči, kao što su travestit, drag-queen, she-male i queer su prisutne i u srpskom jeziku. Na ulici možemo primetiti osobu čiju je rodnu pripadnost teško odrediti. Možemo da kupimo uniseks odeću, da izgledamo androgino. Autorka teksta ne zauzima normativan stav, već pokušava da ukaže na neminovnost promena kroz teorijsku analizu svakodnevnice, sa osloncem na zapažanja Antonija Gidensa o otvaranju i refleksivnosti sopstva. Rodni identiteti više ne predstavljaju krutu, neprobojnu kategoriju kao nekada. Postaju fluidni, manje isključivi, dopustajući prožimanje nekada jasno odeljenih kategorija. Ali, da li se svest o rodnosti menja istim tempom kojim se menjaju rodni identiteti?

Cljučne reči: rodni identitet, krutost, elastičnost, promene

THE ROLE OF EDUCATION IN PRESERVING NATIONAL IDENTITY

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Abstract

By analysing different roles of education and the educational system, such as training the individuals for taking up various roles in the society, as well as developing the framework of values in which socially acceptable behaviour is emphasized, there is an increasing occurrence of the transformation of the educational system, which tends to maintain an international framework of knowledge, neglecting the building and preservation of national identity as common discursive practices and cultural-historical creations. This research paper analyses the way in which the education preserves or destroys the awareness of national identity, the possible implications for the education of future generations in which the corpus of essential topics about identity values has not been clearly defined, and the possibility of expecting the internationalization of knowledge in terms of neglecting the elements of the value of national identities. In this context, the paper analyses how the education goes further and further away from its component of value defined in Humboldt's concept 'knowledge for knowledge', and it comes closer to reducing the knowledge to the creation of market-oriented competencies as the core values of modern education.

Key words: education, national identity, social awareness, competencies, values

Introduction

Starting from the basic goals and functions of education in the global society, the question arises as to how the education can respond to the preservation of globally recognized values and the preservation of national values as an integral element of identity cultures. This dilemma itself imposes the necessary discourse on the purpose and role of education in the global context and the position of education in countries that do not participate prominently in global economic flows. Instead, through a hegemonic approach, those countries are under constant pressure to be identified with global processes, even though these directly distort the legitimacy of national cultures.

By understanding the contemporary need of education to make an individual into a person capable of assuming certain professional social roles, we come to the conclusion that, in this case, the very concept of education is moving away from its core meaning. Therefore, it cannot be reduced only to the acquisition of specific practical knowledge and skills, because an important goal of education is to develop a person's personality, as well as

individual and moral values. If education were reduced solely to the societal demand for faster reproduction of capital, it would risk creating an incomplete, narrowly specialized, and conformist personality, but without an awareness of the sense of human existence and an awareness of universal values. "Education is above instrumental values and as one of the greatest assets, education gives the opportunity to attain the *honour* of developing a sense of what is good, true, righteous, and beautiful" (Gvozdenović, 2011, p. 84). The very purpose of education is reflected in the education of the personality that one can become if one is given space for understanding the traditions of the society in which one lives, as well as insight into other cultures, knowledge of certain laws, development of certain skills and abilities, etc. Accordingly, contemporary education processes that are more focused on acquiring practical market-oriented skills ignore its emancipatory role, which may ultimately affect the global directions of movement of the whole society. The distinction between *learning for work* and *learning for life* determines the position of contemporary man who, being less aware of, and increasingly neglecting, the basic value orientations of life, either becomes a person deprived of his own sense of existence or finds the sense of the same in the materialization of all that exists. Therefore, the purpose of education is also to pass that which is most valuable from the cultural environment of a particular nation on to new generations in order to develop a kind of value system through identity awareness. If we truly want to use education to create a complete personality who is ready to identify with a particular nation through the assumption of social roles and work responsibilities, thus satisfying the need to belong, it is necessary to focus on the educational system that promotes national or cultural values through different curricula and syllabi, especially since its features have been neglected for many years in the previous system.

Theoretical discourses on nation and nationalism

In an effort to understand the role of education in preserving national identity, three approaches to understanding the nation and nationalism within which the role of education is considered are analyzed here.

Ernest Gellner's (Gellner, 1997; Gelner, 1997a) conception of nation and nationalism is of a constructivist nature, contrary to the organicist approach. Thus, Gellner connects the origin of nation and nationalism with the notion of the industrial, i.e. modern society, which in structure implies the division of labour as an essential phase in the social community development. In addition, in this period political and cultural community and their homogenization coincide, which is the condition for the formation of a nation and nationalism. Thus, in the industrial, modern society, secularization is being increasingly introduced, as a politically-working, economic homogenized culture that can supersede religious beliefs is being imposed. Modern man realizes that society allows one to acquire one's own goods through work, which shifts the boundaries of belief from a supernatural being to one's own strengths and abilities.¹ The division of labour in industrial society by all means required an organized system of reproduction of the existing state, to which only education could respond, so the education system is considered to be a direct link to the consolidation of the nation and nationalism of industrial and later capitalist countries. The new homogeneous culture of industrial growth and modernization of society has

¹ This development of awareness will lead to the secularization of society in the majority of developed capitalist countries.

erased the ethnic and political boundaries. Thus, nationalism is connected with the rapid inflow of labour force into cities and the creation of a new cultural environment, where the state is imposed as an institutional framework for protecting this state. Hence, Gellner concludes that only nationalism creates nations and also precedes them. Structurally, with the existence of power through forms of legitimate government, nationalism was supported by two other elements: *the will* to maintain and protect the existing state of industrial growth and development that contribute to the general development of society and the *high culture*, which implied the use of education to legitimize modernization.

Contrary to this view, Anthony Smith points out that nationalism is of a primordialist character, which means that humanity is naturally divided into certain groups that we call nations. Contrary to Gellner, Smith believed that historical nationalism and nations could not be solely connected with the period of industrial, i.e. modern, society without acknowledging their earlier existence. Namely, Smith believed that the nation was rooted in much older communities from which elements such as names, values, memories, symbols, collective performances, etc. were taken, and which are passed on from generation to generation, *which is a form of education in itself*. Moreover, Smith also opened the possibility of a *perennialist view* that nations have continuity in the process of human development that emphasizes that they change and transform during the time, but still essentially survive. It is indisputable that nationalism and the more recent nation are considered in the sense they have today, but they find their historical base in *ethnicities*, communities that existed long before modern society (Subotić, 2004, p. 196) and which have continuity based on common collective history, memories, symbolic values, etc. According to both Gellner and Smith, nations are not natural but created, and the survival of the nation itself, whether it originated in the period of industrialization or its existence has historically been connected with the earliest forms of human community that Smith calls ethnicities, depends on the state, as a political, legal, and territorial framework.

Albert Reiterer believes that

the nation emerges as a distinct social strategy of hegemony [...] in the conditions of the world of modern capitalist societies characterized by deep interest divergences and conflicts of interest, and comprehensive competition that produces systemic inequalities with formal equality and therefore a systemic burden on social crises (Vrcan, 2006, p. 24, 25).

Reiterer's contribution to the understanding of nation and nationalism is the emphasis on their connection to capitalist hegemony, which occasionally creates and generates certain social crises and influences the awakening of nationalism. Furthermore, proponents of a globalizing society emphasize the importance of abolishing national states and creating a "global culture"² that will pacify belligerent collective identities (nation-states) and

² Cvetković states that "the basic premise of the thesis about a unique global culture is that modern society is entering a "post-industrial" era, which will be based on knowledge and services and not only on (political) power and industrial production. Post-industrialism should be carried by "new social movements", such as environmentalists, feminists, students, marginal groups (racial, ethnic, and gender minorities), etc., which, due to their motivation and easily achievable planetary communication, would create new values and hierarchies of sense. However, the problem is that all these seemingly "new historical entities" have been incorporated into the existing system of power/production for a long time now, with the mass media as the only thing that is really new, but which, again, only facilitates the functioning of old ethnic and other nationalisms, whose origin, for the most part, is indeed in modern technology and the imperatives it carries" (Cvetković, 2001–2002, p. 58).

enable smooth development of individual identities, i.e. self-sufficient individuals (Cvetković, 2001–2002, p. 57). However, the hegemonic approach to creating a global identity speaks in favour of creating a new identity at the cost of national ones, through the activities of global economic and military political organizations that aim to achieve free movement of capital, people, and goods, as well as to establish dominance over the less developed countries, thereby opening new forms of exploitation in different spectra. Thus, proponents of the theories of a globalizing society systematically work to abolish national identities while creating a new, universal supranational identity that would create the preconditions for uncritical exploitation of human intellectual and physical strengths away from understanding the sense of their own existence, historical origin, collective behaviour patterns of their respective collectives, etc.

In principle, what is common to Gellner and Reiterer is the view that nation and nationalism are primarily political phenomena because they represent a special form of establishing and reproducing relations in society. Thus, there is basically always a way to establish state power (Vrcan, 2006, p. 28).

Through all three of these theoretical approaches to understanding the origin and role of nationalism and the nation, one can see the specific role of education. Thus, in the first case, according to Gellner, education should legitimize the existing social order of the industrial modern society based on division of labour in such a way that it will produce, through the educational system, a society ready to take on different social, i.e. work, positions and roles. This theory implies the dominance of capitalist hegemony (Reiterer) in the developed countries, which construct national identities within the boundaries of state borders on the basis of the profit and material values of a consumer society, absorbing all nations and cultures ready to embrace the capitalist rationality within a multicultural society that enables their equal coexistence. In this sense, capitalist hegemony appears as a supranational reality, serving the internationalization of education, which, based on the need for its own expansion, tends to make national differences invisible, irrelevant, and ultimately not important. In this sense, the universal human values embodied in the Declaration of Human Rights favoured the process of creating a new economic and political framework for countries that embraced the capitalist hegemony (EU) but that (however much they disputed it) had to give up a part of their national identity through the membership process. The educational system should now offer the promotion of democratic values by which the strengthening of national awareness reduces the possibility of adopting the supranational frameworks of a global society of hegemonic orientation based on capitalist values. Smith highlighted the continuity in the origin and development of the nation through the existence of ethnicities, which, due to the transmission of certain values, symbols, collective ideas, customs, etc. (which can be considered as a kind of educational process), influenced its present existence. He accepted the state as a framework within which the nation can exist today. Does it mean that the constant denial of the entity of the Republic of Srpska as a form of statehood within the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, defined by the Dayton Peace Agreement, also calls into question the national identity of the Serbs, or does the question of the national identity of the Serbs call into question the existence of the Republic of Srpska?

The concept of Bologna-Process education greatly contributes to the internationalization of the educational process through the acquisition of certain practical skills and

competences of liberated national, some would say nationalistic, topics.³ The harmonization of curricula of study groups and orientations at faculties within the European Higher Education Area was created with the aim of making it equal in quality to the same or similar programs in the countries which have adopted the education reform under the Bologna Declaration. The basic policy of the reform referred to creating specialized, professional individuals deprived of irrelevant, redundant topics that had unnecessarily burdened young generations of students. Among them there certainly was the superfluous content that covered national topics. It is clear that the internationalization of education goes beyond the interests of preserving national values, but there is no clearly identified or preferred public political discourse that requires the reduction of national-value topics from the education process. It all comes down to the responsibility of the state establishment and the department of the authorized ministry that serves to support the dominant policy. In this regard, regardless of the hegemonic politics of capitalist society, as well as the internationalization of education, to which the politics of interculturalism and multiculturalism contribute, the responsibility for insufficient national awareness as a base of a sense of belonging and identity should be sought solely among the political and educational elite of our people.

Historical preconditions for the difficult preservation of the national values of the Serbian people

The need to create a citizen of the world, as imposed by the globalization processes, has influenced the reduction of the corpus of topics on national identity values within the educational process. In this way, preconditions for intercultural education were created that, conditionally speaking, tried to overcome differences by national, ethnic, racial, and any other affiliation in an effort to create space for acceptance of the other and the different. Interculturalism argues that all cultures are equally valuable and that they develop through interaction (Koković, 1997). The processes of interculturalism became especially intense in the 1970s and 1980s, when institutional frameworks began to develop in Europe for a closer integration of European countries into a unified legal, political, and economic system.

On the other hand, as Europe increasingly homogenized itself through various organizational models, countries that did not belong to that corpus were left to their own way of interpreting, protecting, and promoting national values as identities, most often through the processes of education. Unlike in European countries, where interculturalism was preceded by multiculturalism as a politics of equal coexistence of different cultures in one area, in Serbia, more and more has been done to prove the existence of different cultural systems of people who lived in one country until the beginning of the last war, spoke almost the same language, inherited the same or similar cultural values, and also belonged to one nation of different religious beliefs and considerably different historical contexts. One culture can have more nations.

Therefore, culture cannot serve to classify people into nations [...] Also, common language, patterns of behaviour, etc. do not mean that they are the same nation

³ Nurturing national values as well as promoting them in the period after the 1990s is considered nationalist and inciting rhetoric by international representatives and institutions involved in the internal politics of B&H, and thus the Republic of Srpska.

that may belong to the same culture, just as different religions are not a confirmation of belonging to different nations (Kordić, 2010, p. 230).

Due to the specific nature of war events supported by historical heritage and national awareness, emphasizing religious differences in the context of the same culture to which the Yugoslav peoples belonged, the emphasis on and proof of the authentic characteristics of national cultures proved to be the way of creating one's own national identity in this region.

The construct theory shows that origin, history, language, and religion are not objective data that inseparably and by fate connect one group of people through cultural identity, but they are a political instrument for achieving certain goals. How people consider and value origin, history, language, and religion is the result of the decisions made by the political elite, which sets a particular way of looking at it and reinforces it, i.e. diverts it through political steps (Kordić, 2010, p. 232, according to Forndran, in Riedel, 2005, pp. 1–12).

However, all three nations – the Serbs, the Croats, and the Bosniaks – had and still have the same need today to consolidate and preserve their national identity, regardless of how they politically instructed their own independence. In such a discursive practice, the establishment of a preferred intercultural concept of education is absent, since it is not a matter of getting to know one another and seeking common values (some of them have led to conflict, indeed), but rather of highlighting the diversity of one people and cultural characteristics compared to others as a model of consolidation of national positions in a specific territory.

The founders of intercultural education such as Ray and Batela (Rey-von Allmen, 2002; Batelaan, 1999) emphasized the importance of equality of diversity, rejection of ethnocentrism, and rejection of discrimination and racism – the elements which cannot be achieved specifically in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Cultural identity is most often a political construction as a precursor to the formation of the national identity of those who could not survive in the framework of culture of one nation. Consequently, intercultural education could not even be applied in our region (at least not in the European meaning), since cultural differences were minimized by the ideology of Yugoslav society, which, after the last war, when the nationality-based entities were formed, will insist on independent cultural identification. In the period after World War II, the insistence on the concept of belonging to the Yugoslav nation influenced the creation of awareness of common values that were far more important in terms of the creation of cultural identity than the characteristics of ethnicity of a particular nation based on specific historical heritage and religion. It was quite clear that, for example, there were obvious differences between the Serbs and the Croats (historical, religious, cultural, and even linguistic), but those who aimed toward Yugoslav unification neglected these differences. Linguistically, the language of all nations was similar and it served the creation of the Yugoslav nation and cultural ideologization.

National identity became especially significant when the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia made it possible for certain nations to establish national states, thus creating a precondition for proving specific characteristics of national cultures. Apparently, when referring to the people of Yugoslavia in terms of creating cultural identity in the educational processes, attention was paid to the representation of content from the

cultural domain of all nations in art, literature, history, folklore studies, etc. (this is especially evident in the obligatory teaching of Cyrillic and Latin script), thus creating the awareness of a unique culture supported by the ideology of “Brotherhood and Unity”.

In the opinion of many historians, it is this condition and attitude toward different nations and the unification of value and ethnic characteristics of nations that caused the creation of nation-states, with each wishing to show its national characteristics and thus the specific features of its national culture. During World War II, the Serbian people suffered the greatest sacrifice due to the cover-up and concealment of Ustasha crimes in concentration camps such as Jasenovac, Sisak, Jastrebarsko, etc. Failure to confront the truth and the covering up of crimes during this period, especially against the Serbs, only deepened the need for the Serbs to insist on the preservation of the Republic of Srpska entity after the Dayton Agreement was signed.

National identity as grounding for the self

Discourses are also created regarding the relation of the origin of cultural identity. Thus, proponents of the promotion and preservation of national identity, especially politically instructed individuals and those who identify cultural identity in its narrowest sense with national identity, will insist on proving specific characteristics and authenticity in relation to other and different cultures. The peculiarity of this conception of cultural and national identity is a problem because it is used for the purpose of enhancing diversity and expressing preference for certain cultures and associated nationalities to the point of superiority. Structural determinants (language, tradition, customs, scientific and spiritual consciousness) are objective indicators, but the problem is in the interpretation of cultural elements, which can be personal, group, or national, and in a historical perspective, in the interpretation itself there are changes evident in certain periods (Avramović, 2012, p. 48). Therefore, it cannot be disputed that in certain times the emphasis of national awareness can grow into nationalism as a political ideology. However, we do not address this issue here, because it has been discussed by many sociologists and scholars in other fields. The essential question is, if national awareness were raised, having been long denied under different ideologies, in our case the “Brotherhood and Unity”, and if precisely different ethnicities were the backbone of the conflict, specifically in the former Yugoslavia, what is the likelihood that persistent denial of nationality and contestation of the existence of national culture would lead to pacification, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is made up of two entities and the Brčko District. Generally speaking, identity means belonging and the need to belong. With regard to cultural i.e. national identity, it is a matter of personal feeling and the need to identify with a community where one truly belongs, while respecting the different values of others, thus proving one’s own existence in a particular area.

Therefore, being aware of one’s own national values within one culture is a basic condition for accepting the others and the different. In other words, a nationally aware and institutionally stable state implies the nurturing of civic values. National or civic are not mutually exclusive (Cvetković, 2001–2002, p. 64), and institutions should accordingly play a crucial role by combining their functionality with the value system. Therefore, educational institutions play the most significant role. Education should identify the value elements and specific characteristics of national identities in which the “I” and “We” relationships are built, referring to the attitude towards oneself and towards

others. Thus, the inclusion of certain content in the educational system in the domain of national and cultural values and heritage encourages not only the strengthening of one's own identity, but also the respect of diversity. Unless awareness and knowledge of one's own cultural and national values are fostered, it is illogical to expect respect from other cultural and national frameworks.

In this context, the preservation of national values through educational processes can more significantly determine the directions of movement and development of all three nations and eventually lead to their greater appreciation and respect. Since certain national values and differences were the backbone of political decisions during the last war, it is not realistic to expect that a greater understanding and culture of dialogue between the three 'constituent peoples' will be achieved through the underestimation of national identities.

Educational system facing the challenge of preserving national identity

The idea that should be worked on is to insist on multicultural values through the educational system. Respect for the other and the different is built through respect of fundamental democratic principles and values. Multicultural societies, e.g. those in European countries, have achieved a high level of respect for different cultural and national values through the promotion of respect for human rights through strict legal regulations and public practices. Societies that are still struggling to establish certain democratic universal values are generally less tolerant towards the members of other cultures or national identities. Regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is important to note that establishing multiculturalism based on the European model is almost impossible to accomplish for at least two reasons. The first one refers to the fact that during the last war, three constituent peoples emerged from one Balkan Yugoslav culture, which identified national awareness on religion and historical events specific to each of these peoples. The second reason is the fact that two entities were created (Republic of Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and each one is dominated by one nationality, thus reducing the possibility of identifying the needs of minority groups or the ethnic majority from the other entity. Therefore, in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the need to establish multinational awareness in the educational process rather than multicultural awareness in the narrower sense could be discussed. In addition, the establishment of a tolerant and acceptable pattern of behaviour among students is achieved not only by the subject matter of the education process, but also by the attitude of teachers who, by their own example, transmit patterns of behaviour and value orientation towards those who do not belong to the majority.

In a broader context, education should offer sufficient knowledge and content from its own national (cultural) identity, with the need to include content and elements that support internationalism and interculturalism. Through this process of education, students gain knowledge of the specific characteristics of their own national belonging and its contribution to the overall civilizational development on the one hand, and gain appreciation for other cultures and national identities, which are also an integral part of existing social development, on the other. Thus, incorporating national content into curricula does not affect the diminishing internationalization of interpersonal relations and the respect and appreciation of different cultures and national identities if they are retained in a corpus of historical facts without nationalist connotations.

Awareness of oneself as a national and cultural being, of the essential values of their nation and culture, but also of the existence of other nations and cultures and their essential values, as well as of the members of those other nations and cultures, leads the individual to free expression of his identity, but also to the respect of the identity of other individuals who do not belong to his national and cultural community (Mićanović, 2012, p. 153).

National content certainly has its place in the Serbian language, history, art, music, sociology, geography, religious studies, etc. It is certainly necessary to include sociology in the corpus of subjects of national importance, as it deals with the study of society as a whole, which is of paramount importance for understanding all social processes and changes.

Therefore, the need for a certain educational content on national identity in order to form a complete personality is also accepted from the perspective of values of the others and the different, which also determine the characteristics of national belonging according to European values.

Identity is not only a symbol of the nation to which an individual belongs, but also a consideration of other cultures. Relationship to another is an integral part of identity, and this is the circumstance that further complicates identity discussions (Avramović, 2012, p. 48).

Conclusion

Only a real comprehension of complex national relations and the acceptance of the existence of different national entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina can, in the long run, change the protective attitude towards one's national identity into the acceptance of supranational European values based on the hegemony of capitalist countries. As long as the existence of a particular nation is in question in the aforementioned territories, and as long as there is speculation about its state, i.e. territorial borders, it is certain that the step towards integration with the others and the different will not be taken in the near future.

Therefore, in order to be able to talk about preserving the Serbian nation at all, whether we link its origin to earlier *ethnicities* (Smith) that existed in this area or connect it with industrial i.e. modern society (Gellner), we must work on institutional reinforcement of its values through the educational system that prevents national identity from being transformed into a political construct in the form of nationalism as an ideology.

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ULOGA OBRAZOVANJA U OČUVANJU I IZGRADNJI NACIONALNOG IDENTITETA

Apstrakt

Analizirajući različite uloge obrazovanja i obrazovnog sistema kao što su osposobljavanje pojedinca za preuzimanje različitih uloga u društvu, kao i izgradnja vrijednosnog okvira u kome se akcenat stavlja na društveno prihvatljivo ponašanje, sve češće svjedočimo o transformaciji obrazovnog sistema koji teži uspostavljanju internacionalnog okvira znanja zapostavljajući izgradnju i očuvanje nacionalnog identiteta kao zajedničkih diskurzivnih praksi i kulturno-istorijskih tvorevina. U radu se analizira način na koji obrazovanje čuva ili razara svijest o nacionalnom identitetu, te koje su moguće implikacije po obrazovanje budućih generacija u kojima nije jasno određen korpus neophodnih tema o identitetskim vrijednostima, te da li je moguće očekivati internacionalizaciju znanja u domenu zapostavljanja vrijednosnih elemenata nacionalnih identiteta. U kontekstu navedenog rad analizira kako se obrazovanje sve više udaljava od svoje vrijednosne komponente uobličene u Humboltovom konceptu „znanje radi znanja“ i približava se svođenju obrazovanja na kreiranje tržišno orjentisanih kompetencija kao temeljnih vrijednosti modernog obrazovanja.

Ključne riječi: obrazovanje, nacionalni identitet, društvena svijest, kompetencije, vrijednosti

IDENTITY AS INCIDENT
(Deconstruction of the Autocentric Concept of Identity)

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Abstract

In philosophy, the notion of identity is generally thought of in an eccentric way – as a distance from the selves that reveal the experience of the Other and the Foreign (Levinas, Valdenfels). In sociology, it is generally thought of in an autocentric way – as producing differences in relation to the Other and the Foreign. Given this autocentric meta-position, the sociological concept of identity encompasses two narratives: symbolic interactionism (reflexivity) and post-structuralism (power). Since social constructionism is their common horizon (Callero, 2003, pp. 115–133), this paper provides a deconstruction of the autocentric concept of identity. With regard to the French philosophical circles, the crisis of the autocentric concept of identity (crisis of the mimetic concept of identification) manifests itself as an issue of desubjectivisation of the subject (Foucault, Althusser, Lacan, Saussure, Derrida, Baudrillard, Virilio, Badiou, and Touraine). In symbolic interactionism (Callero) and social constructionism (Gellner, Anderson, Balibar, Hobsbawm, Hol, Bauman, and Jenkins) though, the crisis of the autocentric concept of identity manifests itself as an issue of autocentric appropriation of time, space, and existence.

Key words: identity, selves

Introduction: Identity as a symbolic excess of the self-centred function of language

In philosophical and psychological terms, Jacques Lacan and Jacques Derrida offer the best model for understanding the process of formation of subjectivity. What is crucial for the formation of subjectivity (identity) is the dispositiveness of the World picture (pre-experiential symbolic space) and not the subject (individual) as such, since the subject (individual) cannot acquire their subjectivity (personality) outside some symbolic order (culture), but exclusively within the valid symbolic order and through the internalisation of the symbolic order in which it is located.

The issue of identity, as the greatest issue of the humanities and social sciences, is probably raised in its purest form by Derrida's deconstruction of its ontological status in an interview entitled *A certain 'madness' must watch over thinking* (Derrida, 2001). Thinking incidentally and excessively, Derrida shows that the identity is an unwanted

phenomenon, because it is nothing more than a retroactive attribution of meaning to our biological presence. My biological birth, or the biological birth of me, is not the place of my identity. The statement 'I was born' is logically impossible, because at the moment of my birth, the birth of me, in that act, my ego did not exist. There was no consciousness of mine, my self-consciousness, or my self-experience. Therefore, it is impossible that, by the act of my biological birth, as a kind of biological exposure to the world, those who gave birth to me at the same time gave me an identity, since that identity is therefore not mine but theirs. Am I what begins before me? In this situation, no matter how hard they try, there is not the slightest argument that can prove otherwise. Not only was there no ego of mine in the act of my biological exposure to the world, but there was also no idea of me whatsoever. What could have existed is only a mere expectation of those who brought me into the world of what I should become, but, then again, that in itself is not a sufficient basis for any foundation of my identity. Even if it were, that is only an expectation. But expectation as such already belongs to the domain of the future and the possible. Therefore, an attempt of any identification already belongs to, depends on, or is placed in the domain of the future, in the domain of the possible. Identity is yet to happen. Identity just might happen. Therefore, the possibility of identifying as such already irrevocably belongs to the domain of the non-existent. The possibility of identity is yet to come. Identity is just a chance. My identity, the identity of me, can be embodied (incorporated, *in corpore*, attributed to my body). I get my identity only when it becomes embodied, only when a particular meaning is attached and attributed to my biological presence. Hence, my biological birth is not my true birth (although it is a first birth), because it is not a place of my identity. The real birth comes afterwards – by attaching some meaning to the act of my biological exposure, to the fact of my biological presence, and by attributing some meaning, some notion of me – of what I am or what I am not. Therefore, identity, as a retroactive reconstruction (design) of my biological presence, is inevitably nothing more than a narrative.

From Lacan's perspective (Milutinović, 2012), identity has no ontological status. Symbolic order is subjective, and identity as subjectivity is only a symbolic-relational construct, almost a mere discursive inscription. Identity is not really (substantially) present as a real quality or feature of an individual, but as a derivative of the symbolic order. It only indicates the symbolic presence of the individual to whom it is attributed, whereby the individual becomes displayed and indicated within the symbolic order that creates it. Identity (subjectivity) exists only symbolically, it has no real objectivity, it is factually lost. It also means that reconstruction of identity is not possible, because identity (subjectivity) as a relational-symbolic construct does not have any ontological or archetypal meta-structure that could be the basis for a return in times of crisis. Therefore, identity as such is in itself the place and the expression of crisis. Existing only symbolically-realistically and self-referentially (in relation to the self and based on the self), identity (subjectivity) necessarily represents self-eroticism – the metaphysical capture and preoccupation of the ego with its own representation (image).

The sections below attempt to contribute to the understanding of the problem of identity through a comparative analysis of different theoretical approaches.

Philosophy and Sociology of Identity

From the phenomenological perspective, the problem of identity can be divided between two paradigms. The first paradigm is the experience of identity as an ontological status, and the second paradigm is the experience of identity as a social-discursive construction (Šijaković, 2013, p. 64). Identity as an ontological status is based on the eccentric presence of transcendence (absolute, abstract, and concrete others). In this sense, at the individual level it appears as a personality, and at the general level it appears as a community. Identity as a social-discursive construction is the result of auto-centred logic of power. Thus, at the individual level it appears as a role, and at the collective level it appears as a society. The former refers to identity as an integral part of the spiritual order – higher, wider, and deeper level of reality, while the latter refers to identity as a self – the act of self-constitution. The transformation of identity as an ontological state into a space of social-discursive construction is a basic feature of the modern conceptualisation of identity. In essence, it is the colonisation of identity – through the act of political construction of identity, the habitus of identity is delocalised from the field of ontology into the field of politics. Thus, identity becomes a strategy and a policy. Identity politics discursively produces identity as a structure and function of power. Hence, modern conception of identity radically deletes transcendence from identity as the purpose of identity. In the pre-modern world, identity signified belonging to something, while in the modern world identity signifies separation from something. Hence, the difference between the philosophical and the sociological conception of identity reflects a difference between the pre-modern and the modern conception of identity as an eccentric and autocentric phenomenon, respectively.

The sociological conception of identity is situated within two theoretical paradigms: symbolic interactionism (reflexivity) and post-structuralism (power). Their common horizon represents social constructionism (Callero, 2003, pp. 115–133). Within the tradition of symbolic interactionism, especially within the contemporary paradigm called ‘structural symbolic interactionism’, identity is understood as a self – an expression of social structure, an expression that, although produced and shaped by social structure, subsequently produces and shapes social behaviour through its structure (Stryker & Burke, 2000, pp. 284–297).

The difference between identity and self and, consequently, the difference between the sociology of self and the sociology of identity, lies in the fact that identity is ‘my experience of myself mediated by others’, while self, which can be defined as ego, oneself, selfhood, and loneliness,¹ represents my experience of myself not mediated by others (my experience of myself from which others are excluded). In other words, self is the self-objectification, reification, and embodiment of my notion of myself. Or, this is how Callero, in the spirit of symbolic interactionism, claims: “In its essence, the self is defined as a reflexive process, as universally human experience of its own self-objectification” (Callero, 2003, pp. 115–133). This difference between identity and self is extremely important, because identity can be thought of exclusively ethically (as a distance between myself and others that reveals experience to the Other and the Foreign), while self can be thought of exclusively intentionally (as reification of own individuality).

¹ The difference between identity and self corresponds to the difference between consciousness and self-consciousness. Consciousness has no knowledge of self. Self-consciousness involves the experience of self.

Hence, the discourse about self is a narrower, reduced, limited, value-negative form of question about identity, whose narrowness, reducibility, and value negativity increase in parallel with the demand for its universal validity.

On the other hand, the possibility of the sociological thematicisation of identity depends directly on the fact that any attempt to think of identity has been posed within the 'French philosophical moment' (Foucault, Althusser, Lacan, Saussure, Derrida, Baudrillard, Virilio, Badiou, and Touraine). Its reach is considerably determined by the metatheoretical horizon of the epoch. The importance of French (post) structuralism arises from the fact that the issue of the self-centred conception of identity has been presented as an issue of desubjectivisation of the subject (deconstruction of the modern idea of subject). According to Foucault, modern identity (the identity of the self-constitutive subject) is not a timeless principle of self-recording, but rather a historical product of a particular order of discourse. Althusser, in opposition to Hegel, believes that history is not a process of development of absolute spirit – it is not the arrival and discovery of the subject-substance but the rational, regulated process without the subject. The identity of the subject arises as a result of ideological interpolation produced by subjectivity. Lacan shows that the subject is not substantive, that it has no nature, and that its identity is a contingent function of language, which is always an individual historical object of desire (Badiou, 2001, p. 5, 6). Identity, in terms of the contingent function of language, is also observed by Saussure and Derrida. Saussure believes that language constitutes reality. Hence the notion of meaning structuring identity. According to Derrida, the identity is an unstable linguistic excitability. Baudrillard and Virilio derive the problem of desubjectivisation from the excess of the symbolic. According to Touraine, we are at the extreme point of postmodern social decomposition caused by the desubjectivisation of the subject. Thus, essentially, the latter is a crisis of the mimetic conception of identification.

What is the link between these two approaches (symbolic interactionism and post-structuralism)? How is a common horizon of modern and postmodern discourse on identity possible, considering their paradigmatic difference? The answer is simple. Modern and postmodern approaches to identity (self) are not paradigmatically different and even less paradigmatically opposed. In explaining this problem, we need to start with an analysis of the concept of universality. The notion of the universal has to be understood in two ways. First, the universal signifies temporal and spatial universality in terms of historically cultural universality. For example, language is a universal phenomenon because it is a fact of every historical epoch and every culture. Furthermore, identity is a universal phenomenon because it is characteristic of every historical period and of every cultural form. Therefore, there is no historical period or cultural form without some form of language and identity recorded. However, in another sense, universality also signifies something else. However, the fact that language and identity are universal historical-cultural phenomena does not imply that universality exists, that it can exist, or that there should be one language or one identity.

If we designate the first form of universality as diachronic and the second as synchronic, then the Enlightenment, by demanding that the question of identity be thought of as an issue of universal citizenship of the world (Kant, Habermas), actually performs an ideological interpolation (Lefebvre), in which the fact of diachronic universality is taken as the basis for the construction and legitimation of synchronic universality. This means

that the diachronic universality of identity (as identity) is taken as the basis for the construction and legitimation of diachronic identity (as self). This act of ideological interpolation of the Enlightenment provides the so-called 'universality of modern identity' – the essentiality, substance, and autonomy of its nature; thus, the modern project legitimises the demand for its universal normative validity. If postmodernism has become aware of this ideological interpolation, and thus demonstrated that the nature of modern identity is social-constructivist, then how can it itself be blamed for social constructivism (relativism)? The postmodern problematisation of modern identity (self) is situated within the modern discursive space (self) and not in the space of pre-modern self-experience (identity). That is precisely the social-constructivist horizon that ensures the inclusivity of symbolic interactionism and postmodernism. The modernist and postmodernist conception of identity (Gellner, Anderson, Balibar, Hobbsbam, Hall, Bauman, Jenkins) is built within the positivist paradigm, based on the conception of autocentric appropriation (time, space, and existence). The following notions represent the key places of this autocentric appropriation:

1. *The notion of development.* The secular idea of development is an autocentric form of appropriation of time. The positivist experience of time assumes a secular idea of temporal teleology that ends in the triumph of modern Western civilisation, which is the highest in the hierarchy of universal diachronic historical development and therefore a universal norm in the taxonomy of all forms of sociability (Hobson 2012). The concept of development, the favourite argument of secular experience of time, is misunderstood because it assumes the history (teleological organisation of time) as a condition of its validity. The events that organise time and transform time into history are 'messianic moments' – apocalyptic events that establish the idea of development as a historical movement towards the eschaton as extra-historical aim and the sense of history, by which time becomes history getting order, sense, and purpose (Taubes, 2009; Berdyaev, 1952).
2. *The notion of role.* The idea of role is an autocentric form of space appropriation because it implicates socio-economic determinism as a horizon of identification. In these circumstances, what happens is the reduction of internalisation to socialisation and, consequently, the reduction of personality to identity and, finally, identity to self. If identity is reduced to a role, then it can only be derived from the presupposition of the system to the world of life – from the assumption of social structure as the only existential framework. But this is incorrect because the community does not have a power-based structure. As a liturgical way of life, the community represents a collective engagement on the principle of deaconess. To be part of a community means 'to be ordained' and to serve the Other (a concrete other – another person; an abstract other – a community; and an absolute other – the God). Identity reduced to the role becomes a matter of expressiveness of social structure rather than a matter of meaning. Hence, it follows that the social structure is superior to man. The notion of humanity becomes thinkable only in the domain of functionality, because it is reduced and deducted from the assumption of System (power) to the Lifeworld (meaning). That is why Vattimo could say that humanism does not have the right to survive because it represents only rational anthropocentrism (Vattimo, 1992). Thus, the (post)modernist theorists of identity,

claiming that identity depends on the power (or role in social structure), are caught into a false-Marxist position that prevents them from understanding the general possibility of pre-modern identity. They especially get caught into an unsolvable problem – in fact, transgressiveness of power now appears to them as identity instability.

3. *The notion of hostility.* According to Levinas, inside the autocentric World Picture, identity can only be established as an economical form of conquest and appropriation of the Foreign that promises to preserve the foreign if it is processed and absorbed. Hence, from a position of power, from a position of self-preservation, the stranger (foreigner?) is always the enemy (Šmit, 2001). From the position of power, in the interests of self-preservation, hostility is the categorical interest of existence, because for the citizen (self), the essence of their existence is the defence of their own existence. Against whom? Against hostile anti-existence. The idea of the citizen (self) is always the deontologisation of ecstasy as the essence of existence itself.² In other words, as Valdenfels writes, “It is a being that does not need a foreign existence to satisfy its own interests” (Valdenfels, 2005, p. 51). The modern conception of the world consists of the deontologisation of the world through the centric conquest of the world. The first form of conquering the world is the imposition of individual self (egocentrism), the second form is the imposition of collective self (ethnocentrism), and the third form is the imposition of a general idea that negates one’s own and foreign (logocentrism). In the former two cases, the foreign is appropriated by being reduced to one’s own, while in the latter case foreignness is appropriated by inclusion in the generality (Valdenfels, 2005, p. 51). Hence, for the modern citizen, foreignness is a hostility. Strangeness is the negation of my egoistic existence, because strangeness (which is shown for me only if it escapes me) does not extend the sphere of my selfhood.

Hence, the question of identity (self), in the modern and the postmodern key, cannot appear but as an issue of ideology. The recognisability of the postmodern approach to identity (self) is contained in Foucault’s understanding that power produces identity. For Foucault, self is a direct product of power and it can only be understood in terms of the product of a historically specific system of discourse. If identity (self) is a product of power (discourse), does this then necessarily mean that identity has a discursive character and content, and does this necessarily imply that identity (self) as such must necessarily be placed in discourse? Regimes of power discursively produce identity (self) by using disciplinary practices of the body to control the limits of the experience of the rational subject (the limits of rational experience). The power creates identity in the sense of ‘putting self into existence’ or ‘bringing self into existence’. A disciplinary practice is implied here as a pre-experience framework that predetermines the boundaries within which self-constitution of consciousness can occur at all. In this sense, power produces identity, because a concrete self-experience (self) happens or can only happen within the previous and the pre-set horizon of power. Thus, power produces identity by pre-determining disciplinary practice of the body as a horizon and a way of establishing self-experience. Therefore, identity is not free, because it is itself predetermined (a way of self-experience) in a way in which it can experience itself and become aware of itself.

² For more on ecstasy and hypostasis as the essence of existence, see: Janaras, 2009.

Hence, disciplinary practices or even wider regimes of power, by placing the body in a predetermined framework of self-understanding, actually manage self-perception and self-experience. This refers to two things. First, that, in developmental and psychological terms, self-experience is reduced to the initial experience of one's own body. Second, that the way we become aware of our body is actually the determining way we later become aware of our presence. Therefore, it is not so much about the body as a biological entity, but about the body as a starting point in relation to which consciousness is built. This in fact means that power is interpolated into presence and reified as presence. Thus, power, within the horizon of rational self-experience, becomes a presence in itself. In the regime of power, the experience of our own existence, but also the existence of others, can only take the form of power. In fact, power in the final sense prevents its own transgression. By reducing identity to self, the power excludes the possibility of the existence of something that is not already included in power – there is no possibility of taking a rational position from which power could be surpassed unless, of course, that position is already cynically involved in the dialectical return of power to itself. As Levinas has shown, starting from the ancient Greek World picture, ontology as 'metaphysics of the Same' has been the basis for the Modern conceptualisation of identity as self-identity (self). The experience of the Other is not possible in the Modern World picture, so identity must be experienced in a radically non-Greek manner, which means removed from the ancient Greek World picture (Badiou, 2001, p. 19). The ancient Greek World picture is a cosmo-centric, static conception of the world as space. The ancient Israel World picture is an anthropocentric, dynamic conception of the world as a historical time (Berdyayev, 1952, p. 197). Therefore, a radical non-Greek experience of identity, according to Levinas, can only occur in the Jewish tradition (experiencing the world as a historical time instead of experiencing the world as a space), because only in the eschatological reconstruction of presence can the horizon of the Other be opened (Taubes, 2009, pp. 3–10). Here, the dramatic horizon of Western history suddenly and unrestrainedly emerges as a matter of Semitic-Aryan (temporal-spatial) constellation (dialectic). As Levinas claims, what really matters is the Bible and the Greeks, everything else is a game. In fact, the Bible and the Greeks are the only ones possible – Christianity occurs in the World picture of ancient Israel and (post)modernity in the World picture of the ancient Greeks. Hence, following Levinas, the only viable conceptualisation of identity can only be ethical. Ethics is a new name for thinking that occurs beyond the limits of logic and in which the established mimetic principle of identity necessarily conceptualizes the Other as own alter-ego. Identity must be perceived in a radical meta-theoretical turn from (social) ontology and not as the radicalisation of its positions, as modernists and postmodernists perceive it. Social ontology, as a part of philosophical ontology, cannot guarantee the experience of distance that is perceived spatially. Spatial conceptualisation of distance is already an autocentric appropriation that induces sovereignty (*Lebensraum* as autocentric appropriation of space) and hostility (anti-existence as autocentric appropriation of existence). Ultimately, it is the imposition of spatial-political identification ($\Delta\tilde{\eta}\mu\omicron\varsigma$) over historical-generic ($\xi\theta\nu\omicron\varsigma$) or eschatological ($\Lambda\acute{o}\omicron\varsigma$) identification.

Hence, the basic problem for the sociology of identity is the problem of power – that the sociological experience of identity is reified. Sociology itself is the founding project of Modernity, in which the foundational function of being, as the central notion of

philosophical ontology, should be socially defined through the political idea of society. Sociology, understood as the science of society, makes an epochal reduction of sociability to society as the only possible form of sociability. In this way, sociology also makes an anthropological reduction, because personality and identity can only appear as an expression of political and economic relations. Without the Eucharist (ecstatic logic of community), society becomes a civilizational project of the historic closure of Modernity from the essence of sociability - the petrification of the democratic-liberal assumptions of Aryan supremacy. If sociology, through the notion of society, as well as philosophical ontology through the notion of being, commits metaphysical violence by reducing Sociability to Society, or the Other (*Autre*) to the Same (*Même*), then the Community, as a liturgical encounter with the Other (Levinas), becomes a definite place of its deconstruction. The liturgical experience of the community (characteristic of religious communities, for example), shows that there still exists an authentic form of sociability, which has never been infected by the social metaphysics of the Same. Only eschatological collectivity can take away the power of the epochal anthropological discursivisation of the Modern Self as an ontology of nothingness.

The Fluid Self

Foucault spoke of Disciplinary societies of the 19th century, while Mannheim talked about Planned societies and Deleuze about Control societies. In the 20th Century, Bauman spoke of Fluid societies from the late 20th and early 21st centuries, and Touraine talked about programmed societies and the end of the idea of society. A common link of this social genealogy is, simply, a recognition that the modern World picture, based on the negation of the metaphysical dimension of reality, is gradually falling into crisis or, more precisely, into its own entropy, because the process of individualisation of itself and the concept of society as a modern (political-economic) form of sociability are finally revealed as the biopolitical practice of production of bare life. Accepting the metaphysical dimension of reality as a primary part of reality is a premise of closed World picture – typical of Antiquity and the Middle Ages. By negation of the metaphysical aspect of reality, Modernism has abolished the possibility of an ontological foundation of identity.

In the modern World picture, the idea of personality (*zoe*), which indicates the particular and privileged (Aristotel, 1988), existent and hypostatic (Janaras, 2009), and the vertical (Buber) mode of existence, has been successfully reduced to the idea of identity – to social and biological presence (*bios*). When referring to personality, Aristotel (1988, p. 4, 5) uses the term ζῷον πολιτικόν, which expresses a special and divine mode of existence. In the World picture of the ancient Greeks, *diferentia specifica* of man as a human being, what man is or is not, was determined in the relation of man toward the Gods, not towards animals. Comparing humans with animals is an achievement of evolutionism as a modern metaparadigm, which occurred 2,000 years after Aristotle. Within Evolutionism and other modern narratives deduced from it, the idea of *Man* as an ontological category has been successfully reduced to the idea of the *Citizen* as a political-economic category. In that sense, Branka Arsić lucidly observes, “Citizen as an independent subject of the modern era is not free, he is an idiot, he is crazy. He is a scandal that founds the epoch” (Arsić, 1997).

This social genealogy is particularly evident in the transformation of the idea of social relation. The *relationship* always has an intersubjective character. Relationship is always an intersubjective We (We-relationship) (personality relationship). Relationship in the ancient World picture belongs to the domain of practice. First, the *relationship* is reduced to *relation*, which is always the relation between subject and object, and which, in the ancient World picture, belongs to the domain of theory. Secondly, the *relation* is reduced to *interaction*, which is always the relation between objects and which, in the ancient World picture, belongs to the domain of pragma. Finally, the *interaction* is reduced to *contact*, which, as an expression of the extremely instrumentalised logic of the technical connection, becomes a basic form of interpersonal relationship in a fluid society. In contrast to the *relationship* that presupposes mutual engagement, *contact* is always technical, and it belongs to the network as a matrix of simultaneous connections and disconnections, which removes other types of relationships (Bauman, 2009, p. 14).

Contact, as opposed to a relationship that always occurs *face-to-face* (Levinas, 1998, p. 53), is always the pragmatics of the self (Fuko, 2010, p. 12, 13). Contact is always based on the logic of technical mediation relationship to the Other, either through a technical instrument or through a technical constitution of relationships. In the first case, the technical instrument intervenes in the relationship, mediates the relationship, controls the relationship, and determines the nature of the communication, because the participants in the relationship are no longer directly related to each other but each of them is individually related to a technical instrument that provides communication. In this way, the technical instrument becomes the subject of the relationship and depersonalizes the communication. In the second case, the technical constitution of the relationship implies that the relationship is freed from a technical instrument, so the participants physically participate in the relationship, but the logic of technically mediating relationships is present through the social roles that participants play and establish the relationship. In this way, the roles produce the relationship - in fact, they transform the relationship into interaction because the nature of the relationship is already predetermined by the logic of the roles, or more precisely, by the authority (whether political or economic) behind those roles and reproduced through those roles.

According to Foucault, the pragmatics of the self should be understood as the technology of producing instrumental self-experience (instrumental relation to self and others). Implicating individualism as a mandatory (obligatory) social norm, the technical logic of contact is based on the ability of symbolic inclusion and exclusion of Others from Lifeworld in order to preserve the purity of its identity (Arsović, 2010). In this way, the contact based on individualism transforms relationships into a network – a framework of interaction that is free and independent of participants. Contact, as the dominant logic but also a form of communication in a fluid society, does not allow for the establishment of stable relationships, because it does not allow for, or cause the loss of, the fundamental ability to relate daily activities and past experiences. This gap between past experiences, on the one hand, and current and future activities and expectations on the other, is caused in modern times by the development of communication technologies, which are becoming the primary agent of socialization, transforming the nature of the experience per se.

For the most part, the experience of a modern human being is not the experience of a personal encounter with an object. Moreover, it is a predominantly adopted representation of an object – adopted narratives about an object, the corpus of information about something. During the presentation of an object, we form a direct experience of that object – we adopt the object visually. Re-presentation is the correction of an object in reflection. During the re-presentation of an object, we adopt a speech about that object rather than the object per se. In this sense, the experience of a modern human being is discursive, not real. Because of changes to the nature of experience, the current and future activities and expectations of a modern human being are formed according to a pattern and are not essentially an expression of personal will or freedom. It has become quite certain already in that social constellation, called planned societies by Mannheim (Manhajm, 2009, p. 17), societies of control by Deleuze (Deleuze, 1990), and programmed societies by Touraine (Turen, 1980), that all social processes relevant to the reproduction of the existing system are coordinated, managed, and planned from some formal or informal centre of power. Owing to the post-structuralist revolution (Foucault, Derrida, Saussure, Barthes, Eco), which revealed the plausibility of the relationship between the sender, the recipient, the sign, the meaning, and the signified, we became aware of the fact that the one who establishes and controls the process of understanding, production of symbols, rules for combining them, and meanings attributed to a particular order of symbols and to the object to which they are nominally related, also controls what may appear to us as an object of our experience and therefore our motivation, our decisions, and our activities, which we believe are the expression of our free will. The establishment of control at the level of formation of our perception in the process of socialisation is, in fact, the establishment of control over a system of motivation that arises from a certain way of understanding reality and the activities that are the result of a particular system of motivation (Đukić, 2014).

Since the process of socialisation (as opposed to the process of internalisation) has always been aimed at building a socially functional rather than a healthy personality,³ identity itself, understood as a social-discursive construction versus personality as an ontological status (Šijakovic, 2013, p. 64), has actually never been anything more than a product whose nature is determined by authority (political or economic). Socialisation as a branding process of the idea of humanity always transposes the general characteristics of the epoch to the personal experience of oneself. The idea of humanity in Antiquity was branded with philosophy and mythology as the dominant logos of that era. The idea of humanity in the Middle Ages was branded by religion as the dominant logos of that era. The idea of a human being in Modernity is branded with science, whereas in Postmodernity it is branded with technique, as the dominant logos of these epochs. Hence, socialisation and, consequently, identity itself have always been necessarily dependent on the current needs of the political or economic market. Therefore, they entail the construction of only those personality traits that are necessary for successful role-playing and thus the reproduction of an existing constellation of power. Accordingly, the instability of the political and economic market also causes the instability of identity.

In a fluid society, the absence of a stable and permanent identity becomes a condition and assumption of any identification at all. The absence of the possibility of stable identifi-

³ For more on the difference between a healthy and socially functional personality, see: Vlahos, 2007.

cation, due to its own nature, possesses a negative formative character and, as such, produces a void as the central experience around which the entire psychological organisation of a modern human being begins to structure itself. In order to overcome the extreme instability of their identity as a socially constructed self-experience (self-concept based on playing a social role), modern human beings seek to neurotically construct, fix, and preserve a permanent image of themselves. Therefore, they are incapable of experiencing the actual quality of relations, events, and personalities, but instead view them in such a way as to attune them with their current vision of self (the so-called cognitive dissonance), for the purpose of preserving what they consider their own self.

The self (self-experience) of a modern human being is a simulacrum; at first, it is separated from the metaphysical reality as such and then it is based on an autocentric interpretation of the physical reality. The self-centred interpretation of a relationship, event, and personality in the psychological organisation of a modern human being neither contains nor expresses in itself the real quality of the relationship, event, or personality that it interprets, but contains and expresses only those beliefs that are necessary for us to secure the semblance of stability and continuity of our image of ourselves. What kind of relationship we establish, what kind of event or what kind of personality we meet is never revealed to a modern human being in real time. Their experience arises later, when these first impressions are captured and interpreted in some available narrative, and subsequently produced retroactively. In this sense, the experience of a modern human being is not only self-centred but also always retroactive and belated – it necessarily lies outside the realm of the real. In this protective mechanism of self-centred, subsequent, and retroactive assurance of the consistency of self-image, any experience that threatens the currently valid self-image becomes actively discarded or corrected. This way, the ability to overcome identity instability is actually directly involved in the logic of maintaining it, because it is also an attempt to overcome the fluidity of identity, which is based on maintaining its own self-centredness. Therefore, not only did the triumphant individualism of Modernity as a social norm become the assumption (post) of modern identity, but it also became the assumption, content, and outcome of its negation.

Conclusion

We stand at the extreme point of the postmodern decomposition of the social caused by the entropy of individualism (Turen, 2011). In the tradition of the West, based on the World pictures of the ancient Greeks, the notion of identity is generally thought of in an autocentric way – as producing differences in relation to the Other and the Foreign. An autocentric conception of identity represents a reification and embodiment of power. Power, by its nature, controls its own transgression (Badiou, 2003, p. 79). An attempt to rebel against power has already been included in the logic of reproducing the power it seeks to overcome. In this way, power controls its own transgressions (Fuko, 1997, p. 295). Hence, by analogy, any conception of identity that seeks to deconstruct another conception of identity is already caught up and put into the logic of reproducing the politics and strategy it seeks to challenge. According to Levinas, a radical change in the concept of identity and sociability is possible but it assumes a radical change in the World pictures. The World picture of the ancient Greeks can only be replaced by the Jewish World picture (Badiou, 2001, p. 19). The autocentric conception of identity needs to be replaced by an eccentric conception of identity. The identity is necessary to be understood

in an eccentric way – as a distance from the selves that reveal the experience of the Other and the Foreign. In different ways, authors such as Foucault, Althusser, Lacan, Saussure, Derrida, Baudrillard, Virilio, Badiou, and Touraine have provided a specific contribution to establishing an eccentric conception of identity and deconstructing the autocentric concept of identity (the mimetic concept of identification and desubjectivisation of the subject).

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IDENTITET KAO INCIDENT (Dekonstrukcija autocentrične koncepcije identiteta)

Apstrakt

U filozofiji, pojam identiteta uglavnom se promišlja na ekscentričan način – kao distanca spram svoje vlastitosti koja otvara prostor iskustva za Drugo i Strano (Levinas, Valdenfels). Kada je sociologija u pitanju, pojam identiteta uglavnom se promišlja na autocentričan način – kao stvaranje razlike u odnosu na Drugo i Strano. Imajući u vidu tu autocentričnu metapoziciju, sociološki koncept identiteta obuhvata dva narativa: simbolički interakcionizam (refleksivnost) i poststrukturalizam (moć). Njihov zajednički horizont predstavlja socijalni konstrukcionizam (Kalero, 2003, str. 115–133). U članku koji slijedi bavimo se dekonstrukcijom autocentrične koncepcije identiteta. Unutar francuskih filozofskih krugova, kriza autocentrične koncepcije identiteta (kriza mimetičke koncepcije identifikacije) pojavljuje se kao pitanje desubjektivizacije subjekta (Fuko, Altiser, Lakan, Sosir, Derida, Bodrijar, Virilio, Badju, Turen). Unutar simboličkog interakcionizma (Kalero) i socijalnog konstrukcionizma (Gelner, Anderson, Balibar, Hobsbom, Hol, Bauman, Dženkins), kriza autocentrične koncepcije identiteta pojavljuje se kao pitanje autocentričnog prisvajanja vremena, prostora i iskustva.

Ključne riječi: identitet, sopstvo

THE WORLD OF MASS CULTURE: THE SPIRIT OF TIME BY EDGAR MORIN

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Abstract

This article deals with the anthropological and sociological perception of mass culture presented in the work *The Spirit of Time* by Edgar Morin. The comprehension of mass culture aspect that Morin outlines is compared with the authors who dealt with this phenomenon in different ways. The purpose of this investigation is to emphasize the importance of Morin's work for the study of mass culture, which after more than a decade has not lost its timelessness. Morin perceives mass culture as a product of developed technical means and bureaucratic organization of creativity. It was produced based on the model taken from other industries, but it cannot be reduced to them. As a product of human creativity, it needs inventiveness. In Morin's work, mass culture is represented as a heterogeneous group of modern creativity of different artistic values. Morin sees mass culture as modern festivity, which turns into a spectacle.

Key words: mass culture, Edgar Morin, spirit of time, subculture

Introduction

The term mass culture already implies a type of culture that is acceptable to the widest audience, i.e. the type of culture used in everyday life, easily and repeatedly adapting to current fashion, market, and other influences. Theorists such as Dwight Macdonald agreed with this opinion. However, this seems to be only a general portrayal of what is usually referred to as mass culture.

In Sociology, the term mass culture is frequently associated with other similar terms such as: mass, mass society, mass production, means of mass communication, etc. Massive scale is considered as one of the general features of modern society.

Theory of mass society is widely spread in contemporary Sociology, especially the one in the West. This conception was theoretically considered and designed in the papers and books of some famous American sociologists: E. Fromm, D. Riesman, R. Mills, D. Bell, E. Sheels, and D. Martindell (Koković, 1976, p. 18).

Edgar Morin and the mass culture

In his book *The Spirit of Time*, Edgar Morin comprehensively deals with mass culture as a sociological and anthropological phenomenon. This type of culture, according to him, is characterized by the so-called ultra-easy industry, whose representatives are the press, radio, television, and film, and nowadays the Internet as well. Therefore, we are talking about 'easy' means for the production of cultural content. Furthermore, it is also easy in terms of the produced goods, displayed on the newspaper pages and film tapes, or transmitted via radio waves. The essential characteristic of mass culture is the fact that its consumption is not physical, but mental. Anyway, the system of mass culture or cultural industry is organized according to the most concentrated industries in the technical and economic sense.

Regardless of whether we are talking about a newspaper or a television station, it is always about a bureaucratic way of organization. This gigantic bureaucratic apparatus inside cultural production filters creativity out before it reaches the ones who decide about it: producers, editors, etc. It is these exact aspects of mass culture that lead to its defacement. Rational organization is in opposition with inventiveness. The difference between other industries and industrial culture is represented by the fact that, for example, automobile industry can afford a classic pattern of mass production, pattern production. On the other hand, cultural industry, regardless of its bureaucratic organization, has to create based on the individuality pattern, no matter how much that specific creativity stays within the boundaries of a general creative model. Therefore, Morin concludes that mass culture creativity cannot be fully integrated into the system of industrial production (Morin, I, 1979, pp. 26–29).

Hence, mass culture is overall marked by a paradox. Within it, stereotype works aimed at the widest audience are created, but also some works of excellent artistic value, especially the ones which resulted from subcultural activities (Morin, I, 1979, p. 31). Just as the reason for standardization of its products is a fairly logical consequence of the production pattern, that is, a practiced pattern of industrial production in general, so is the individuality inside it a consequence of general requests of artistic creation, since, as Morin says, cultural industry needs individualized units. "Film can be conceptualized by standard recipes (love plot, *a happy end*), but it has to have its own touch, originality, its uniqueness" (Morin, I, 1979, p. 27). He is wondering how it is possible for the cultural industry to function while being in this paradoxical situation all the time. He explains that it is possible owing to *mere structure of the imaginary*, and it is formed according to archetypes. In his opinion, role-models of human spirit rule over dreams "and especially over specialized dreams that are topics of myths or novels". External structure of works is imposed by rules and conventions, after which typical situations and personalities create their inner structure. Every structure that has a fully constructed shape can be reconciled with the industry demands. Cultural industry demonstrates this by "standardizing great fictional topics, turning archetypes into stereotypes. Novels are produced according to a chain system based on patterns, which now become conscious and rationalized" (Morin, I, 1979, p. 28).

The requirement, says Morin, is that chain products be individualized. All kinds of common techniques, by which a set of different elements is changed, serve individualization. Hence, mass culture cannot rest only on the standardized creation. In

order to reach individuality, it needs more: it needs *the inventiveness*. The need for inventiveness actually illustrates the fact that production cannot suffocate creativity. Even a strong bureaucratic organization such as cultural industry depends on inventiveness. Therefore, the inventiveness appears as the factor in mass culture that aimed at improving the stereotype culture product. Morin claims that even other industries, e.g. detergent industry, have the need not only to launch a greater number of certain detergent brands on the market, but also to embed in each one of them a greater degree of independence. Even on that level, there is the need for diversity and individuality (Morin, I, 1979, p. 28, 29). Whenever there is such a need, and primarily when we talk about potential or real economic losses, cultural industry reverts to its basic principle of capitalistic economy – competition and the accompanying diversity of products. In order to illustrate this complex phenomenon, Morin names the example of film. A film needs to find its audience each time and, in relation to its expectations, each time it has to create a synthesis of the standardized and the original. The standardized came out of the previous success, and originality as a stake, expecting some new success. However, the already created patterns risk becoming boring for the audience, while the original ideas risk not being liked.

Consequently, film looks for a star that connects in itself something from the archetypes and something individual: based on that we realize that a star is the best guarantee of mass culture, especially film (Morin, I, 1979, p. 30).

Contradiction in Morin's work is perceived as regularity that essentially characterizes mass culture. This situation that mass culture is constantly in appeared as an invention of mechanism for the adjustment of mass culture works to the audience.

The essence of Morin's concept consists of the fact that numerous, purely industrial aspects of production, such as division of labor (especially visible on film), collective ways of creation, its bureaucracy, etc., are not fully opposed to individual creation, true art, and inventiveness. As well as the principle of classic creation of former periods, this system also creates masterpieces, especially the film industry. This actually refers to the skill of finding a solution in between. Objectively, the relationship between standardization and individualization in mass culture creation is not constant. It changes with each new work affected by special circumstances. "That's how the 'new wave' in film led to a withdrawal of, we do not know how big and long-lasting but nevertheless real, distancing from standardization" (Morin, I, 1979, pp. 34–37). Considering that mass culture creation is substantially characterized by the model of industrial production, it requires strict principles of division of labor. According to Morin, it

is similar to the one applied in the factory, from the moment of entry of the raw material to the final product; raw material is a synopsis or a novel that needs to be adapted; the chain starts with adaptors, screenplay writers, dialogue writers [...] at the same time with directors, decorators, operators, sound engineers, and finally musicians and the film editor, who finalize a collective work (Morin, I, 1979, p. 32, 33).

The author's problem with the type of culture in question is about the extremely high fees received for the work. The price authors pay is expressed in requests for the standardization of the art product. Such a product needs to meet the criteria of

organization that the author belongs to, on the one hand, and what is in direct connection with the survival on the market, the taste of a wider audience, on the other hand. Morin perceives that every industrial system, apart from the inclination to profit, has the ambition to propagate itself. That is the case with cultural industry as well. The main preoccupation of cultural production is the actual creation of universal audience. Various magazines that indeed address certain categories of the audience are actually addressing everyone. Consequently, eclecticism is an extremely important strategy of mass culture, in whose products religion, sports, politics, art, travel, etc. find their place. Such culture belongs to everyone. It wants to satisfy all esthetic tastes and provide mental satisfaction to the members of all social strata, as well as to the representatives of both genders. Its content is therefore a combination of aggressive and sentimental motives. Morin calls these aspirations in mass culture production *syncretism*. It is especially related to film, which syncretizes such a small number of topics within film genres. Its essence is perceived as a unity of *information sectors* or a *fictional (novelist) sector*.

In the information sector the highest rank goes to *small news* (that is a part of reality in which, unexpectedly, a mysterious murder, an accident, or an adventure, penetrate everyday life) and prominent people who look like they live outside of everyday reality (Morin, I, 1979, pp. 39–41).

Everything that reminds you of a dream is therefore transmitted. On the other hand, in the imaginative sector, realism is aspired to. For example, literary fiction is built in a way that reminds us of reality. Morin considers that this very instance is one of the most important aspects of mass culture creation. Following the words of Karl Marx, according to whom production not only creates an object for the subject but also vice versa, Morin points to the fact that culture production sees as its main goal the creation of mass, universal audience. On the other hand, mere cultural production is determined by market conditions, which makes mass culture significantly different in comparison with all other previous forms of culture. This culture, according to Morin, can be interpreted as a relationship that exists between the producer and the consumer. Cultural consumption constantly ‘feels the pulse’ of the audience, which only reflexively reacts. “A consumer does not speak. She/he listens, watches, or rejects to listen and watch” (Morin, I, 1979, p. 52). From a sociological perspective, mass culture is a culture of mediocrity. The factors that contribute to the formation of mass culture as the culture of mediocrity include industrial structure with its standardization and capitalistic economy with aspirations towards a maximum audience. However, concerning the concept of Edgar Morin, it must always be remembered that for him mass culture represents not only a set of trivial standardized cultural content, but also a form of cultural creation that he is able to produce and excellent works of art.

Roger Brown is one of the authors who emphasize the predominant influence of economic circumstance and evaluation of popular art based on external and economic indicators. These concepts start from the strict classification of ‘high’ and ‘popular’ arts. Traditional forms of artistic expression, such as theatre and ballet, are preoccupied with the quality of interpretation of work, whereas the commercial goal prevails in the film industry (Brown, 1968, p. 616). Industrial culture is presented as exclusively rationally set machinery, which applies numerous business techniques. In such a cemented structure, there is very little space for “expressing artistic temperaments”. According to

the author, high and popular cultures are essentially different because the latter is better adjusted to the organization of precise business practices. Brown is aware that matters in the field of culture and art, such as the matter of taste, can only be partly successfully studied and with many difficulties. In spite of it, the author insists on a culturally absolutely inadequate following of popular culture's economic effects. He claims that those effects provide comparative advantages to popular culture in relation to "high" culture. In order to prove the "superiority" of the popular over the elite culture, Brown resorts to drafting small number of famous artists' biographies. The purpose of this procedure is to highlight the importance of the economic factor, which significantly influences creation. The author finally concludes that the works of high artistic value have also been created by means of instrumental rationality. As opposed to the works of high culture, popular arts do not need historical verification. They are identified by financial profit. Thus, according to Brown, artistic accomplishment that has made more money automatically becomes a worthy work of art as well, since the financial profit becomes the unit of value for that work of art. This indicates that the creation of great works of art is characterized by a combination of instrumental and expressive motivation.

For Brown, the matter of alienation of the artistic in the contemporary "business" environment is completely irrelevant. The artist of our age has completely adapted his work to the principles or organization. Popular artists are characterized by successful internalization of organizational expectations and flexibility to the working conditions on the market. The matter of alienation, according to Brown, is exclusively associated with the creators of classic and avant-garde art (Brown, 1968, pp. 619–622).

It remains unclear which works of popular culture the author refers to. Based on the way he describes popular art, it could be said that he primarily referred to the most trivial works of mass culture. The author did not make a distinction between these and the works of popular culture that are creatively closer to the works of avant-garde art and that are less dependent on general market conditions. By studying the creative process in popular art, he has only succeeded to show that, during the 20th century, popular culture is constantly expanding the range of its audience, which means the profit from creating that art is getting bigger. This results in a more stable social position of the popular art creator in comparison to his/her predecessors, the avant-garde and classic creators. It has to be concluded that even if Brown's implications were true, they would not, in any way, explain the essence of "the creative process". Boundaries between popular and "serious" art have become loose since the very beginning, especially starting from the second half of the 20th century, which was pointed out by many authors. The interactive and multimedia approaches are becoming increasingly present, so there is no reason to view them as being in opposition. These interferences can only be a consequence of apprehending the new possibilities for creation and by no means for pragmatic economic calculation. Otherwise, such creativity has to bear the label of kitsch creativity.

Critical theory of society, which directed the subject of analysis mostly towards the discovery of mechanisms of mass society, presents Adorno's perception of industrial culture as the greatest work of its creator, within that society. He also advocates the foundation of sociology of music, whose subject would be on the one hand music itself, viewing even its technical elements as a form of human creativity, and on the other hand, music social conditionality with all the resulting effects of this activity. What can be

sociologically perceived, says Adorno, is the fact that in modern society all artistic and specific music expressions are subjected to actions of industrial culture. Hence, he says that in that sense even the most authentic Beethoven's compositions were relegated to the level of cultural products under the strong influence of music industry, consequently treating listeners as consumers who are at the same time equipped with a reputation but also with emotion, which do not exist inside them (Adorno, 1973, p. 20). The declining trend in taste, which he talks about, is not just a product of the modern era; it occasionally appears in all historical epochs. However, the declining trend in taste in contemporary society exists as a constant, not only as a consequence of action of cultural factors in a traditional sense of the words. It has been induced through actions of a gigantic system of industrial culture. Artistic and special music creativity should not be abandoned but rather embraced. However, the dominant musical consciousness of the masses is preoccupied with trivial musical content. The matter of taste becomes redundant, since the subject who could critically evaluate such taste no longer exists. The industry of culture within reception offers superficial answers, which are reduced to "liking" or "disliking". Taking into account the views on worthiness, liking becomes just a fiction for someone who is looking for communication with the help of standardized music products (Adorno, 2001, pp. 29–31). Adorno classifies music to the one which is a typical product of cultural industry, which he calls the new mass music and which includes all musical creations from jazz to obviously commercial pop music and classical music. Such music, not only through strong action of cultural industry but also through the general imperatives of mass society, adjusts in such a way that impairs the critical sharpness of recipients and thus visibly decreases, or rather standardizes, the difference between them during the reception of the work. In simplest terms, cultural industry does not require an "old school" music admirer, an exceptional expert in its history, theory, and practice, but a superficial listener who reacts tentatively to its lowest appeals. Nowadays, the dominating term "joy in music" is in his opinion incompatible with the imminent constitution of a work of art (Adorno, 2001, p. 32, 33). This view, as opposed to Morin's, does not leave any possibility to observe works of mass culture as artistic creativity in a traditional sense. It only allows the application to certain traditional works categories of bad taste, in which the triviality accessible to masses would bring victory over the strict artistic criteria. Industrial culture does not have a real interest in artistic creativity but in continuous consumption of art, or more specifically, in the products of cultural industry.

John Storey is among those authors who consider the concept of popular culture useless or full of confusing and contradictory meanings. In his view, popular culture is perceived as a merely relational or contrasting term. It is intertwined with and dependent on the related but also opposing terms, such as folk culture, mass culture, dominant culture, working class culture, etc. Therefore, the definition of popular depends on the previous definition of these terms. Storey stresses that this is why the term popular culture is presented as a conceptually empty category. According to him, the concept of popular culture includes differences that are mutually opposed, and the mere term depends to the greatest extent on its contextual usage (Storey, 2009, p. 1).

Božilović has noticed that the authors, in terms of reflecting upon the mass culture phenomenon, emphasized its different features and, more importantly, observed mass culture from different positions. Kloskowska considered folk culture creativity to be different from mass culture production, i.e. its standardization. The sophistication of this

point of view is evident in the recognition that folk culture also has a conformist character, but unlike mass culture created by experts, it has been indirectly created by the social community. It speaks about mass culture in a broader and narrower sense. In the broader sense, mass culture is represented by sport, tourism, various crafts, photography, growing decorative plants, etc. In the narrower sense, mass culture is perceived as the activity of reception of content launched through mass media.

Dwight Macdonald's attitude has a tendency towards open-mindedness, simultaneously leaning towards narrowness to include the creations such as radio, film, comic books, detective and science-fiction stories, and television. According to Macdonald, there is a sign of equality between popular and mass culture. This view is opposed by Božilović and Dragićević-Šešić. They believe that, unlike mass culture, popular culture is not unified regarding its audience. The author takes as an example a music audience, which is divided into national and generational. Generational differences are built by the relationship of the members of different age groups with rock and pop music (the young love it, and the elderly reject it), whereas nationally defined music forms, such as French chansons, do not strive towards winning audiences outside of France (Božilović, 2016, pp. 9–13).

In addition, Božilović and Petković discussed the term mass audience. It consists of the term *mass*, used in social sciences to explain an unorganized gathering of a large number of individuals. Within that context, the term began to be used with the development of industrial society. As opposed to it, the term *audience* points to the existence of mutual interest of one part of the population based on which communication takes place among its representatives. The authors want to highlight a seemingly antinomic character of this term, and, naturally, underline the importance of character of the communication actor in contemporary society, who is usually called a recipient and whose structure, through the actions of the mass media, increasingly resembles the cultural form of mass. It now loses those mutual features, because of which the term audience was created as relatively opposed to the term mass. It is concluded that, in the context of media communication, the opinion of members of the masses is subjected to the authority of those who control the information channels. Thus, it turns out that a permanent feature of masses is to accept other opinions to a greater extent but to also defend their own (Božilović & Petković, 2015, p. 183, 184).

If we return to Morin, we will realize that, anthropologically speaking, mass culture content brings to life the spirit of festivity, games, and rhythms of ancient folklore, but not its creation. On the contrary, it destroys the unity of primitive culture, because within it coexist both the creators and the recipients of cultural creation, e.g. a performance of a tribal ceremony, a religious ritual, etc. In mass culture man only mentally participates in the media-produced social habits. In that sense, according to Morin, spectacle takes the place previously occupied by festivities. Audience is separated as a single social category, and the festivity man, who is at the same time the creator and the recipient of art, goes into oblivion. Morin believes that folk, especially working culture has kept some features of the folklore culture throughout the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century. Its main feature, apart from collective creativity, is that it represents the culture of close relationships, with taverns as their central places. Mass culture presented folk culture to wider audiences as the most simplified cultural pattern. Its function in such a reproduced

form is no longer collective creativity and improvisation, but the boosting of content that essentially implies a fictional model of the past time of ‘paradise lost’. Such product has dealt with the creativity of the individual, touching in it upon sensitive sentiments, which also serve as means of mass demand (Morin, I, 1979, pp. 72–74). It is preoccupied with love and happiness.¹ However, mere focus on the production of something sociology of culture calls kitsch, i.e. the “art of happiness”, as Abraham Moles says, is not the only source of mass culture creativity. We think that the terminological distinction between *popular culture*² and *mass culture* would be the most useful. Popular culture is characterized by a higher degree of creative inventiveness, individuality, and interest in political participation, as well as basic matters of culture, for instance, works in the field of subcultures and countercultures.

On the other hand, *mass culture* as a culture of broad masses is characterized by creative superficiality, passive acceptance and approval, and far greater presence than the works of popular culture. This differentiation seems even more important due to the fact that numerous supporters of popular culture (members of music subcultures and film lovers) categorically reject mass culture, considering it to be the culture of the lowest level. It expresses the awareness of the importance of popular culture’s creative range. Consumers of works of mass culture do not have any similar “esthetic filter”, but accept almost any possible content broadcast through mass communication. As a rule, the lower the value of these works, the easier they are received by a wider audience.

It is important to bear in mind that mass culture of the 1960s has begun to take interest in all aspects of human life. This reveals an attitude that the distinctiveness of mass culture is not a presentation of specific type of content that will reach the widest audience. The power of mass culture consists of its demonstrating enormous capability of re-interpretation, or reproduction. All areas of human thought and behavior, even the works of philosophy, can become a subject of mass culture. The condition for that is for their essence to be conveyed and then reproduced and launched through the mass media in a way that everybody can understand.³ Apparently, mass culture audiences are not interested in intellectual or esthetic pleasure, but in consuming the esthetic subject. Hence, to ponder to the audience’s superficial taste is a strategy used in mass culture production.

Morin believes that mass culture is the exact area where magical turns into esthetic.

Powers of projection – which also means powers of leisure, escape, compensation, pursuit, that is, transfer with sacrificial character – are expanding in all

¹ Siegfried Kracauer’s opinion that the culture of broad masses is characterized by the emphasis on strong visual moments needs to be added to this. The basic feature of this activity is the tendency towards embellishing. Bodies appear for the purpose of creating geometrical elements, whereas personality is absolutely deprived of its individuality. For more, see Kracauer, 1995.

² The attitude presented here is close to Fisk’s definition of the popular. Božilović is also aware of this issue. He believes that in addition to rock music as “the music of youth”, popular culture is also made of other forms of artistic expression, such as painting, film, photography, and graphic, artistic, and video design (Božilović, 2016, p. 41).

³ Milos Ilic also points to the fact that different actions of reproduction of authentic cultural material have already become classic forms of winning a wider audience by the creators of mass culture works. “Actually, the evening or homogenization involves not only the disappearance or soothing out of social and cultural differences with the help of culture, but also the mere process of qualitative evening of different levels of culture” (Ilić, 1980, p. 83).

perspectives of the imaginary. They weave the emphatic worlds of epic, magic, and fantastic (Morin, I, 1979, p. 95).

Creating itself as a modern mythology, mass culture pays special attention to everyday Eros, praising the values of woman, the cult of youth, happiness, pleasure, and carelessness. Regarding that, Ratko Božovic points to the difference between idleness and inactivity of some regular idler. He connects idleness with freedom, free and creative personality, considering it a “requirement for creativity”. In that sense, idleness (apart from relaxation) implies capability of an individual to fantasize, become mature, contemplate, reflect, and meditate (Božović, 2003, p. 169).

Some authors rely on the fact that mass culture is identified by the influence of mass media and that some individuals need practical knowledge, while comprehending the essential importance of their actions, in order to be able to discern the signs that the modern culture produces. There is a belief that everything started with the mass spreading of literacy, since it was literacy that contributed to the loss of capability for the critical assimilation of what was read with the growing number of readers. Critical distance is becoming lost at the expense of identification with media icons. That is why they are now in a position of constructing a seemingly better world (Bezdanov-Gostimir, 2005, p. 232, 233). The others start from the fact that mass culture, constantly referring to the most numerous groups in society, creates programs that neglect marginal social groups. “Television and Hollywood films still offer inadequate or nonexistent presentations of many social groups in our culture” (Bernstin, 1999, p. 38). Hollywood and other powerful productions are not capable of such presentations, but poetry and smaller publishers are, because they serve small markets and marginalized social groups (Ibid.).

After World War II, in the period of flourishing mass culture, and especially after the 1960s, sociology got stuck within the current political crisis. It started turning into a social myth, whereas sociologists increasingly found their employment in corporate departments for management and planning. Therefore, revolted students were turned to the sociology that stood in the midst of social conflict itself. Works of Wright Mills, David Reisman, Herbert Marcuse, and Henri Lefebvre were becoming the intellectual center and the engine of revolted students’ ideology. In that way sociology as a discipline was also questioned, and there were discussions during the turbulent 1968 regarding its role in contemporary society (Morin, II, 1979, p. 25).

Morin sees the entire student rebellion and the following hippie movement as a huge festivity, a sudden eruption of a growing need for a carnival. In this show policemen don the masks of evil spirits, against whom young people must fight in order to become adults (Morin, II, 1979, p. 45). In a certain way Morin tries to perceive the entire culture of our age as a festivity. Although he speaks about how student culture, and its typically associated rock culture, together confronted mass culture, he starts from the fact that our global culture is a kind of simulation of festivity, present both in mass culture and in subcultures.

From a purely sociological stance, Morin agrees with other theorists regarding the 20th century art, particularly the position of the artist and modern creator in general. That position is questioned from various sides: bourgeois cultural sensibility, capitalistic production, democratization of culture, as well as its bureaucratic process.

Morin comprehends subcultural movements as a rebellion against the world of adults on the one hand, and as expressed anger against mass culture content on the other.

To watch an ‘underground’ film or a film by a ‘young author’ [...], to wear ‘hippie’ or ‘retro’ clothes, or to go to pop music concerts are not harmless acts, they mean taking a political and existential ‘minimal’ stand (Morin, 1979, II, p. 162).

The overall cultural “repertoire” of the 1960s youth did not only consist of ridiculing the well-established civil system of values, but it also presented a cacophony, facing the noise coming from the outside. To be “different” now has a cultural in addition to the generational mark. An individual marked in this way automatically represented an antithesis to mass society uniformity.⁴

Andy Bennett relies on the fact that the concept of subculture no longer reflects even the general taste and style preferences of the youth, let alone their specific musical preferences. Accordingly, the concept of subculture is marked as an objectively unpractical analytical tool in the sociological study of youth, music, and style. According to him, subculture ties taste and style to the issue of social class, whereas the taste and style of contemporary youth are in fact examples of their modern lifestyles, where the notion of identity is seen as “‘constructed’ rather than ‘given’, and ‘fluid’ rather than ‘fixed’” (Bennett, 1999, p. 599). Bennett claims that this fluidity is also the product of some form of collective association, as was the case with subcultural movements, but in another way. Fluidity has also been built upon associating the youth with music and style preferences, but without involving class identity, which is primarily characteristic of subcultures. He therefore realized that it is much more advisable to analyze the relationship between youth, music, and style using Maffesoli’s concept of *tribe* (*tribus*), which is far more suitable for the description of cultural characteristics of creators and recipients of contemporary dance music than the term subculture. Bennett adopts the term *neo-tribes* to refer to youth gatherings, especially those revolving around dance music. For him, the youth involved in the dance music scene represent a pure example of late-modern form of sociality, so the older term subculture is shown to be non-applicable (Bennett, 1999, pp. 603–607).

Morin particularly focuses on the phenomenon of individualism within student groups during the 1960s. This individualism can be identified with the proclaimed civil individualism, since the latter is the individualism of property and ownership. Individualism of the student population is the expression of feelings and pleasure. More precisely, a cultural revolution is characterized by the hedonism of the soul as opposed to the hedonism of having, which is a value of civil society. Inside the essence of cultural aspiration there is a broader basis of empirical knowledge, which contributes to the building of one’s personal identity. That is why the cultural period in question is characterized by the possibilities of connecting different living and ideological practices:

⁴ Herbert Marcuse complained about the importance of youth rebellion against the Vietnam war, but far more about the new means of expression brought by the rebellion through a connection of various artistic forms and rock music; he complained about the traditional language not being able to convey modern world current events: “When I saw and participated in their demonstrations against the war in Vietnam, when I heard them singing the songs of Bob Dylan, I somehow felt, and it is very hard to define, that this is really the only revolutionary language left today” (Markuze, 1979, p. 33).

from ecology, life in a commune, eastern religious and philosophical views of the world, and love of rock music to left-wing oriented political discussions.

Considering the issue of a system, regardless of whether it is a social or a natural system, Morin starts from the fact that everyone maintains unity and diversity within oneself. Diversity and unity are perceived as necessary for the existence and functioning of the system itself, but also for the existence of special system constituents. In order for the system organization to survive, the ability of transforming diversity into unity is absolutely necessary. However, in order for the system to function, it needs to develop diversity within itself. In that sense, Morin implies the problem of complex relations: complementarity, competition and antagonism between diversity and unity or, as he states, “between a repetitive system and developing variations” (Morin, 1992, p. 113, 114). Repetition of a system smothers the possibility of distinction, and final diversity risks system dispersion. What is actually happening is the development of complexity, during which system unity does not dissolve: “On the one hand, greater abundance in diversity and, on the other, greater abundance in unity” (Morin, 1992, p. 114). The system enriches inner differentiation and individuality with quality. Systems and their unity perceived in this way have a more complex identity. Any part within the system has at least a double identity. “They have their own identity, but participate as parts in the identity of the whole” (Morin, 1992, p. 114). When he considers the issue of human societies, Morin perceives that individuals are endowed with a double identity – personal and family – as soon as they are born. Individuals aspire towards development – in culture, and create next to it their own authenticity, which represents a correlation with their social identity. Therefore, every system allows a relationship between identity and distinction. Morin agrees with Ferdinand de Saussure that the “entire language mechanism is about the identity and distinction” (Morin, 1992, p. 114).

Instead of a conclusion

In the context of discourse on mass culture and the issue of identity, it is necessary to take into account the view of Zygmunt Bauman, according to whom life in a ‘liquid’ modern society, as he calls it, cannot stand still. It constantly needs to change, which leads to rejection of identity. The question of identity, in a society of constant change and unsteady values, is set as the most significant. However, class expressions of identity are essentially different. Those at the top have the opportunity to make choices about identity, naturally market-justifiable. “At the bottom, the problem is to cling fast to the sole identity available and to hold its bits and parts together” (Bauman, 2009, p. 15). Those who are in between these two extremes are forced to create identity as a compilation of the two. According to Bauman, it is almost implied that knowledge classes will easily classify this question of identity in contemporary culture, an activity that is termed “hybridization” and those who practice it “cultural hybrids” (Bauman, 2009, p. 40). Hybrid culture, the culture of liquid modern society, has its origin in non-belonging, or the absence of constant identity. He notes that, for the intellectuals of the first half of the 20th century, such as Sartre or Ricoeur, identity would represent a hardly conceivable or absurd term, since the identity for them was a life-long project that implied coherence and consistency. Such concept simply eroded in the second half of the same century (Bauman, 2009, p. 41, 42). Ephemerality, offered by contemporary culture, is easily recorded in the mass media programs. It represents the difference between being popular and famous.

Fame is personal and is acquired by a person's own effort while popularity depends on the perception of others. Hence, hybrid identity of contemporary culture significantly depends on the market valorization and presentation in the media. This culture does not classify taste, but, as Bauman states, is *omnivorous* (Bauman, 2009, p. 44, 45).

From Morin's presentation, as well as from Bauman's quotes, it is clear that mass culture and its market orientation shift the question of identity away from its traditional theoretical and methodological roots. In Frommean terms, the question of identity does not rely as much on *being* as it does on *having*, bearing in mind that liquid modernity and unsteady identity of hybrid culture adds *looking* to the mix, and it is very frequently called upon in contemporary sociological thinking.

Mass culture imposed itself as the culture of the entire modern society. Youth groups of the 1960s had an extremely ambivalent attitude towards it. Subcultural youth movements basically confronted the mass culture superficiality. However, the majority of authors, and to a great extent the followers of music subcultures, are aware of the fact that their entire creativity depends on the system of cultural industry. On the other hand, from a practical point of view, movements of beatniks and hippies present living utopias, which nurtured totally different cultural patterns in relation to the rest of the world and especially confronting the mass culture ethos (Morin, II, 1979, pp. 164–170). It seems that this is the same paradox that Morin had already emphasized when he talked about the contradictions of mass culture in general.

Mass culture, as can be concluded from the study *The Spirit of Time* by Edgar Morin, expresses different and also mutually contradictory creative impulses. As a whole, it is the product of cultural industry, which is aimed at a wider audience. It was created based on the motives of folk culture but next to the actions of primarily avant-garde as well as other subcultural movements in the second half of the 20th century. It significantly enriched the creative-receptive practice and in a way solidified itself as the official modern age culture.

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SVET MASOVNE KULTURE: DUH VREMENA EDGARA MORENA

Apstrakt

Članak se bavi antroposociološkim shvatanjem masovne kulture iznetim u delu *Duh vremena* Edgara Morena (Morin). Razumevanje aspekata masovne kulture koje Moren iznosi, dovodi se u komparativnu vezu sa autorima koji su se na različite načine bavili ovim fenomenom. Cilj istraživanja je isticanje Morenovog dela za proučavanje masovne kulture koje i posle više decenija ne gubi na aktuelnosti. Moren masovnu kulturu vidi kao proizvod razvijenih tehničkih sredstava i birokratskog organizovanja stvaralaštva. Ona se proizvodi po modelu drugih industrija, ali je nesvodiva na njih. Njoj je, kao produktu čovekovog stvaralaštva, potrebna invencija. Masovna kultura se, u Morenovom delu, pokazuje kao raznorodan skup modernog stvaralaštva različite umetničke vrednosti. Moren masovnu kulturu vidi kao modernu svetkovinu. Svetkovina u masovnoj kulturi postaje spektakl.

Cljučne reči: masovna kultura, Edgar Moren, duh vremena, supkultura



PART TWO

CULTURE AND IDENTITIES: SOCIAL RESEARCH

UNIVERSALISM AMONG STUDENTS IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE

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Abstract

According to Schwartz (2017), universalism has three subtypes: nature, concern, and tolerance. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to explore to what extent universalism is important to students in Southeast Europe: as a value in general; in terms of preserving the natural environment; in terms of a commitment to equality, justice and protection for all people; in terms of acceptance and understanding of those who are different from oneself; and in terms of differences between countries, including the country's membership or non-membership in the European Union. The aim is also to compare the value of universalism to other basic human values (independence, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, tradition, conformism, and benevolence). To those aims, the Shalom H. Schwartz's PVQ-RR questionnaire on basic human values was used to conduct a survey on a sample of 1,419 university students in seven Southeast European countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia, Hungary, North Macedonia, Slovenia, and Serbia) based on the quantitative survey method. The results of the descriptive and multivariate statistical analysis show that universalism is ranked high in the hierarchy of basic human values among Southeast European students, and that there is a statistically significant difference in the importance of universalism among the countries. The contribution of this paper is of a comparative and international character in an area where such research is lacking, while the results indicate the need for further exploration of the value system of young people in Southeast Europe.

Key words: universalism, Schwartz, values, Southeast Europe, European Union

Introduction

In philosophy and social sciences, the concept of values is defined in several different ways. Taking into consideration that the theoretical hypotheses of American-Israeli psychologist Shalom H. Schwartz are the starting point of this paper and that Schwartz's measuring instrument was applied in the research project, we will also define the concept of values according to Schwartz as desirable goals of various significance that transcend specific situations, and act as guiding principles in man's life (Ferić, 2009). In fact, within

Schwartz's theory of *universal content and the structure of human values* as motivational actuators of man or his guiding principles, the author distinguishes ten motivational types of values: universalism, self-direction, benevolence, security, conformity, hedonism, stimulation, achievement, tradition, and power (Schwartz, 1992).

Furthermore, Schwartz (2012) defines *universalism* as the value that contributes to man's positive social relations with people who are not in the first circle of his socialization, but they function as the model of value transmission from the level of primary to that of secondary socialization. That value includes motivational goals: *understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection of the wellbeing of all humans and nature* (Schwartz, 1992), and it also follows specific values: *equality, inner harmony, world at peace, unity with nature, wisdom, world of beauty, social justice, tolerance, and environmental protection* (Schwartz, 2012). By examining the said specific values of universalism, we can differentiate between three groups of variables – *tolerance, concern, and nature* – as the variables that will be also be especially elaborated in the results section of this paper. *Tolerance* refers to the acceptance and understanding of those who are different from us, *concern* to the equality, justice, and protection for all people, while *nature* refers to the protection of the natural environment (Schwartz et. al., 2012, Schwartz, 2017).

Alongside his theory, Schwartz has developed two basic measuring instruments, the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) and the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ), both of which possess good measuring characteristics. However, since frequent application has revealed that the PVQ instrument is a less abstract method of measuring values and that it is applicable to each sample of subjects (older subjects, less educated or uneducated, rural region inhabitants of less developed countries, and younger teenagers), Schwartz has developed a new instrument, PVQ-RR, which was applied in this research, among other things, because he himself recommends it as the research instrument. In this questionnaire, a total of 19 value variables are measured, and in this paper the authors address the three values of the motivational type *universalism*. With the help of other researchers, Schwartz (2006, 2012) conducted the research of the system of values in more than eighty countries, involving members of different cultures, language communities, religions, and ethnic groups. It is therefore interesting that such a research-wise fertile instrument has rarely been applied to the research of value systems of different populations of subjects in the observed countries of Southeast Europe.

According to the available scientific research, the research on the population of students in the Republic of Croatia was conducted by Ferić (2009), using Schwartz's SVS questionnaire. In the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the research was conducted on the population from 18 to 27 years of age (N=545), also using the SVS questionnaire, while there were 383 or 70.3% students participating in the research (Visković & Škutor, 2019). In the Republic of Serbia, the research was conducted on the population of students – future teachers (Marušić and Oikonomon, 2013), while Marušić-Jablanović (2018) conducted a research by using the PQR questionnaire on the population of future preschool and school teachers (N=232). A group of authors (Verkasalo, Lönnqvist, Lopsanen, & Helkama, 2009) conducted a large cross-national research involving nearly 30,000 subjects from 20 countries and using the PVQ questionnaire. The research included 1,481 subjects from the Republic of Slovenia and 1,500 subjects from Hungary, aged 15 and older. The research on the population of students from the Republic of North

Macedonia was conducted by Romanyuk, Dimitrova and Spasovski (2014), involving 226 subjects altogether. For the area of Montenegro there were no data found on any research regarding the value system for a population of university students or younger people.

Considering the perceived lack of research on the value system for students in observed national populations and the fact that the value systems of a student population or a younger population can indicate the trends of value orientations of future total national populations (Ilišin, 2011), the aim of this paper is to compare the motivational type of value *universalism* to other motivational types of values in the observed subject populations, and then to examine to what extent *universalism* as a value in general and the specific values – *concern*, *tolerance*, and *nature* – as variables, are important to students in Southeast Europe. It is also the aim of the paper to determine whether there is a difference in the prominence of the said variables of the motivational type of value *universalism* among different countries and whether the results differ regarding the membership status of a country in the European Union, which is certainly relevant not only for the observed countries but also for the European Union as a whole.

Aim and hypotheses

The aim of paper is to explore to what extent universalism is important to students in Southeast Europe: as a value in general; in terms of preserving the natural environment; in terms of a commitment to equality, justice, and protection for all people; in terms of acceptance and understanding of those who are different from oneself; and in terms of differences between countries, including the country's membership or non-membership in the European Union. The aim is also to compare the value of universalism to other basic human values (independence, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, tradition, conformism, and benevolence). Given the aim of the research, the following hypotheses were constructed:

- H1: There is a statistically significant difference in the value *universalism-nature* among students depending on the country of residence;
- H2: There is a statistically significant difference in the value *universalism-concern* among students depending on the country of residence;
- H3: There is a statistically significant difference in the value *universalism-tolerance* among students depending on the country of residence;
- H4: There is a statistically significant difference in the value *universalism-nature* among students depending on the EU membership status;
- H5: There is a statistically significant difference in the value *universalism-concern* among students depending on the EU membership status;
- H6: There is a statistically significant difference in the value *universalism-tolerance* among students depending on the EU membership status.

Methodology

The research was conducted by using the quantitative method of a survey. The instrument for collecting data was an *online* questionnaire. The data were collected by posting the questionnaire in student *Facebook* groups and asking students to fill out the questionnaire. The research was conducted in January and February 2019. The questionnaire

contained the portrait value questionnaire constructed by Shalom Schwartz (2017) (PVQ-RR). The PVQ-RR scale of values had 57 statements, i.e. descriptions, of different people, whereby the respondents had to answer to what extent they were similar to the described person on the scale from 1 to 6, where 1 means “not like me at all” and 6 means “very much like me” (Schwartz, 2017). Using Schwartz’s scale, 10 basic values were examined as well as specific values: power as domination and power over resources. The following are the basic values with pertinent levels of reliability (Cronbach α): self-direction ($\alpha=0.822$), stimulation ($\alpha=0.653$), hedonism ($\alpha=0.706$), achievement ($\alpha=0.652$), power ($\alpha=0.84$), security ($\alpha=0.801$), conformity ($\alpha=0.806$), tradition ($\alpha=0.729$), benevolence ($\alpha=0.85$), and universalism ($\alpha=0.85$). Specific values that were tested were self-direction-thought ($\alpha=0.692$), self-direction-action ($\alpha=0.759$), power-domination ($\alpha=0.793$), power-resources ($\alpha=0.796$), security-personal ($\alpha=0.669$), security-social ($\alpha=0.838$), conformity-rules ($\alpha=0.847$), conformity-interpersonal ($\alpha=0.712$), universalism-nature ($\alpha=0.848$), universalism-concern ($\alpha=0.772$), universalism-tolerance ($\alpha=0.781$), benevolence-concern ($\alpha=0.759$), benevolence-reliability ($\alpha=0.778$), face ($\alpha=0.721$), and humility ($\alpha=0.465$). The questionnaire also contained questions about socio-demographic characteristic (age, sex, place of birth, socio-economic status, field of study, year of study, and college success). The questionnaire and the research were approved by the Ethics Committee of Croatian Studies, University of Zagreb. The research was conducted among 1,419 students in seven countries – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Hungary, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia. Since the research was international, the questionnaire was translated into the languages of investigated countries.

Respondents

The survey was conducted on a nonprobability sample of 1,419 students (age: $M=22.399$; $SD=2.858$).




Figure 1. *Distribution of students by country*¹

¹ Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Statistical Office of the Republic of Montenegro, Croatian Bureau of Statistics, Hungarian Central Statistical Office, State Statistical Office of Macedonia, Statistical Office of Slovenia, Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia

The research was conducted in seven countries of Southeast Europe: Bosnia and Herzegovina (n=241), Croatia (n=227), Hungary (n=201), Montenegro (n=160), North Macedonia (n=155), Serbia (n=222), and Slovenia (n=213). The distribution of students by country in the population and the sample is shown in Figure 1. The respondents were both male (20.6%) and female (79.4%), with different sizes of the place of birth (Figure 2) and socio-economic status (Figure 3).




Figure 2. *Place of birth*




Figure 3. *Socio-economic status*

Furthermore, the respondents were in different years of study and had different perceived college success, as shown Figures 4 and 5.




Figure 4. *Year of study*




Figure 5. *Perceived college success*

Likewise, the students studied different fields of study: arts (1.5%), technical sciences (9.4%), natural sciences (4.8%), humanities (14.8%), social sciences (49.4%), biotechnical sciences (3.4%), biomedicine and health (13.7%), and interdisciplinary fields of science (3%).

Results Descriptives

According to Figure 6, *universalism* is important to students in Southeast Europe. On average, it is as important as *benevolence* and *self-direction*. Figure 6 shows that the value system in the investigated countries is approximately equal, where *benevolence*, *self-direction*, and *universalism* are the most important, while *power*, *tradition*, and *conformism* are the least important values.




Figure 6. Basic human values by country

Considering all the investigated countries, *universalism* is generally important to students in Southeast European countries ($M=4.91$; $SD=0.82$). Furthermore, the mean value of *universalism-concern* is $M=5.18$ ($SD=0.91$), of *universalism-nature* $M=4.5$ ($SD=1.14$), and of *universalism-tolerance* $M=5.02$ ($SD=0.96$).




Figure 7. Value of universalism by country

Considering the descriptive results by country (Figure 7), there are small differences in the value of *universalism*. In general, the highest value of *universalism* was found in North Macedonia (M=5.1; SD=0.87), and the lowest in Serbia (M=4.49; SD=0.78). Other countries have similar values: Bosnia and Herzegovina M=4.94 (SD=0.87), Croatia M=4.92 (SD=0.74), Hungary M=4.84 (SD=0.73), Montenegro M=4.93 (SD=0.81), and Slovenia M=4.77 (SD=0.91).

Furthermore, *universalism-concern* is important to most investigated students in all countries. According to the descriptive results, it is the most important to students in Bosnia and Herzegovina (M=5.29; SD=0.94) and Croatia (M=5.27; SD=0.89), and the least in Hungary (M=4.99; SD=0.79) and Slovenia (M=4.99; SD=1.07). North Macedonia (M=5.34; SD=0.86), Montenegro (M=5.22; SD=0.85), and Serbia (M=5.2; SD=0.84) are somewhere in the middle (Figure 7).

The descriptive results of *universalism-tolerance* are also shown in Figure 7. However, according to the extent of the importance of tolerance among the countries, they are listed in the following order: Croatia (M=5.14; SD=0.92), Montenegro (M=5.12; SD=0.92), North Macedonia (M=5.09; SD=0.99), Bosnia and Herzegovina (M=5.03; SD=1.04), Serbia (M=4.92; SD=0.85), Slovenia (M=4.89; SD=1.06), and Hungary (M=4.83; SD=0.88).

The analysis of variance (one-way ANOVA) was used to determine if there is a statistically significant difference between the countries.




Figure 8. *Universalism in relation to EU membership*

Figure 8 shows the descriptive results in relation to the membership in the European Union. The descriptive results showed that *universalism* in general is more important to those who are not EU members ($M=4.96$; $SD=0.84$) than to those who are ($M=4.84$; $SD=0.8$). However, considering all the descriptive results, all types of universalism are more important to those who are not in the European Union (*universalism-concern*: $M=5.26$, $SD=0.88$; *universalism-nature*: $M=4.56$, $SD=1.16$; *universalism-tolerance*: $M=5.08$, $SD=0.95$) than to those who are (*universalism-concern*: $M=5.09$, $SD=0.93$; *universalism-nature*: $M=4.48$, $SD=1.1$; *universalism-tolerance*: $M=4.96$, $SD=0.97$). However, further analysis was performed to show if that difference is statistically significant.

Results of ANOVA – Differences between countries

According to Table 1, the analysis of variance showed that there is a statistically significant difference in the value of *universalism-nature* ($p<0.001$). The results of the Scheffe post-hoc test showed that there is a statistically significant difference between Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia ($p=0.017$; *Mean Difference (I-J)* = -0.401*) in so far that *universalism-nature* is more important to students from North Macedonia. There is also a statistically significant difference between students from Croatia and North Macedonia ($p=0.002$; *Mean difference (I-J)* = -0.47*) and Croatia and Slovenia ($p=0.026$; *Mean difference (I-J)* = -0.35).

Table 1. *Summary of ANOVA of the universalism-nature value regarding the state*

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Universalism-nature	Between groups	30.589	6	5.098	5.665	0.000
	Within groups	1222.177	1358	0.900		
	Total	1252.766	1364			

Statistically significant differences are shown in the ANOVA Figure (Figure 9).




Figure 9. Means plot – universalism-nature

Furthermore, there is a statistically significant difference between countries in the value of *universalism-concern* ($p < 0.001$) (Table 2).

Table 2. Summary of ANOVA of the universalism-concern value regarding the state

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Universalism-concern	Between groups	16.075	6	2.679	5.978	0.000
	Within groups	610.369	1362	0.448		
	Total	626.444	1368			

The Scheffe post-hoc test showed that there is a statistically significant difference between Hungary and: Bosnia and Herzegovina ($p = 0.004$; *Mean difference (I-J) = -0.283**), Croatia ($p = 0.001$; *Mean difference (I-J) = -0.31**), North Macedonia ($p = 0.003$; *Mean difference (I-J) = -0.33**), Slovenia ($p = 0.002$; *Mean difference (I-J) = -0.31**), and Serbia ($p < 0.001$; *Mean difference (I-J) = -0.33**). The results of the post-hoc test are shown in the ANOVA Figure 10.




Figure 10. Means plot – universalism-concern

The results show that there is a statistically significant difference between countries in the value of *universalism-tolerance*. However, according to the Scheffe post-hoc test, there is a statistically significant difference between Hungary and: Montenegro ($p=0.041$; *Mean difference (I-J) = -0.295**) and Croatia ($p=0.002$; *Mean difference (I-J) = -0.34**); and Slovenia ($p=0.001$; *Mean difference (I-J) = -0.366**) and Serbia ($p<0.001$; *Mean difference (I-J) = -0.295**).

Table 3. Summary of ANOVA of the universalism-tolerance value regarding the state

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Universalism-tolerance	Between groups	21.611	6	3.602	6.368	0.000
	Within groups	766.417	1355	0.566		
	Total	788.028	1361			

Statistically significant differences are shown in the ANOVA Figure (Figure 11).




Figure 11. Means plot – universalism-tolerance

Regarding the membership in the European Union, ANOVA showed that there is no statistically significant difference for *universalism-nature* and *universalism-tolerance* between those countries that are in the EU and those that are not (Table 4).

Table 4. Summary of ANOVA of the universalism-tolerance value regarding EU membership

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Universalism-nature	Between groups	0.037	1	0.037	0.040	0.842
	Within groups	1252.730	1363	0.919		
	Total	1252.766	1364			
Universalism-concern	Between groups	2.574	1	2.574	5.641	0.018
	Within groups	623.870	1367	0.456		
	Total	626.444	1368			
Universalism-tolerance	Between groups	0.357	1	0.357	0.616	0.433
	Within groups	787.672	1360	0.579		
	Total	788.028	1361			

However, there is a statistically significant difference between the EU members and those that are not regarding the value of *universalism-concern*, with *concern* being more important for those who are not EU members. The difference is shown in Figure 12.




Figure 12. Means plot – universalism-concern (European Union)

Discussion

Four hypotheses have been confirmed in the paper: H1: There is a statistically significant difference in the value *universalism-nature* among students depending on the country of residence; H2: There is a statistically significant difference in the value *universalism-concern* among students depending on the country of residence; H3: There is a statistically significant difference in the value *universalism-tolerance* among students depending on the country of residence; and H5: There is a statistically significant difference in the value *universalism-concern* among students depending on the EU membership status. Two hypotheses are rejected: H4: There is a statistically significant difference in the value *universalism-nature* among students depending on the EU membership status; and H6: There is a statistically significant difference in the value *universalism-tolerance* among students depending on the EU membership status.

In addition to the confirmed hypotheses, this paper has shown that universalism as a value is very important to Southeast European students and is among the most important values together with benevolence and self-direction, as shown by the research in non-SEE countries (Schwartz, 2017). In addition, these findings confirmed the findings made so far in this area. An example of such research is the one conducted by Marušić and Oikonomon (2013), according to which the value of universalism in the Republic of Serbia ranks second in the value hierarchy, immediately after the value of benevolence.

With regard to the specific values of universalism, *universalism-nature* is the most important value to students from North Macedonia, and the least important to students from Croatia. *Universalism-concern* is the least important value to Hungarian students, while it is significantly more important to other countries. *Universalism-tolerance* is the least important to students from Hungary, while it is more important to students from Slovenia, Serbia, and Croatia.

The reasons for these differences in values may lie in the policies of a particular country or in other factors, such as the social changes that individual countries have undergone.

However, there are some limitations to this research, such as the non-probabilistic sample and the online methodology. A limitation in the online survey may be that the respondents voluntarily complete the questionnaire, so it may generally be the case that respondents possessing an equal value system are involved, which may affect the representativeness of the sample (Vehovar, Lozar Manfreca, & Callegaro, 2015). However, online student surveys have so far proven to be good, since students are a population inclined to participate in such surveys. Online research is hence recommended in the case of the student population, especially through social networks (Kosinski, Matz, Gosling, Popov, & Stillwell, 2015). However, further research into the value system of young people is needed, especially that of the comparative nature in Southeast Europe, where it is lacking.

Conclusion

This research encompassed university student populations from seven countries of Southeast Europe (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Serbia), while the selection of subject populations simultaneously posed limitations on the research and an incentive for further research involving other populations. The scientific contribution of the research refers to the fact that the conducted research of the value system is among the first in the observed countries and it carries practical implications, because the system of values of younger subjects represents a clear predictor of a future value system of the general population subjects (Ilišin, 2011), which in turn hints at a traditional, modern, or postmodern system of values of a society (Inglehart, 1997) and its potentials of social and economic development (Schwartz & Sagie, 2000).

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UNIVERZALIZAM MEĐU STUDENTIMA JUGOISTOČNE EUROPE

Apstrakt

Univerzalizam prema Schwartzu (2017) ima tri podtipa: priroda, briga i tolerancija. Stoga, cilj ovoga rada je istražiti koliko je univerzalizam kao vrijednost općenito; univerzalizam u smislu očuvanja prirodnog okoliša; predanosti jednakosti, pravdi i zaštiti svih ljudi te u smislu prihvaćanja i razumijevanja različitih od sebe važan studentima u jugoistočnoj Europi; razlikuje li se među državama te razlikuje li se s obzirom na članstvo pojedine države u Europskoj Uniji. Također, cilj je usporediti vrijednost univerzalizma s ostalim osnovnim ljudskim vrijednostima (nezavisnost, poticaj, hedonizam, postignuće, moć, sigurnost, tradicija, konformizam i dobrohotnost). Kako bi se ostvario cilj rada, korišten je PVQ-RR upitnik Shaloma H. Schwartza o osnovnim ljudskim vrijednostima. Istraživanje je provedeno na prigodnom uzorku od 1419 studenta u sedam država jugoistočne Europe (Bosna i Hercegovina, Crna Gora, Hrvatska, Mađarska, Severna Makedonija, Slovenija i Srbija) kvantitativnom metodom ankete. Rezultati deskriptivne i multivarijatne statističke analize pokazuju kako je univerzalizam visoko rangiran u hijerarhiji osnovnih ljudskih vrijednosti

kod studenata jugoistočne Europe te kako postoji statistički značajna razlika u važnosti univerzalizma u pojedinim državama. Doprinos ovoga rada je u komparativnom, međunarodnom karakteru na području gdje ovakvih istraživanja nedostaje dok rezultati ukazuju na potrebu za daljnjim istraživanjem vrijednosnog sustava mladih u jugoistočnoj Europi.

Ključne riječi: univerzalizam, Schwartz, vrijednosti, jugoistočna Europa, Europska unija

IDENTITY AND TOLERANCE AMONG UNIVERSITY STUDENTS IN NORTH MACEDONIA

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Abstract

As an indicator of the acceptance of a religion, religiosity is especially important in multi-confessional societies, especially in the context of globalization, which has driven strong integration processes, especially within religious communities. This was the impetus for the present research on the influence of ethnic factors on the religious tolerance of students at the Faculties of Philosophy in Skopje and Tetovo. The practical goal of this research is to determine the main ethnic factors that positively or negatively affect the attitudes towards religious tolerance among the students in Skopje and Tetovo. The same factors should be taken into account when preparing legal frameworks, projects, and media campaigns for the practical implementation of religious tolerance in North Macedonia. By precisely defining the ethnic factors that negatively affect religious tolerance, they will be detected and marginalized through social activity, thus preventing possible conflicts as a result of religious intolerance. The analysis of the results of this research will provide an insight into the factors that affect religious tolerance and into the degree of religious tolerance among the surveyed population. These results will later be used to build a long-term strategy that will stimulate the positive aspects of religion and its social role as a promoter of morality and social order and stability. A well-studied religiosity will help us to better understand the ethno-nationalism that affects religiously motivated extremism. This will be the basis for a longer-term strategy, which will be aimed at preventing the action of religious nationalism in North Macedonia.

Key words: religious tolerance, ethnicity, ethno-nationalism, religious nationalism

Introduction

Religiosity as an indicator of the acceptance of religion is important in multi-confessional societies, especially in the context of globalization, which has driven strong integration processes within ethnic and religious communities. It is precisely this current relevance of

religion and religious affiliation that has been the impetus for this research on the factors that influence the religious tolerance of students at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje and students of the Faculty of Philosophy of the State University of Tetovo. The connection of this research with previous research has given us the opportunity to illuminate the dynamic component of religiosity in our region. It can also serve as a basis for a more extensive future research, which could include all students in North Macedonia. Students, with their particular characteristics, face a multitude of factors that affect them. Religion offers and provides answers to many of the problems faced by young people. Such a reality makes the relationship between religion and students, with all its specificities, relevant today. Family, education, globalization, religious communities, social status, youth issues, and the numerous unanswered questions and dilemmas affect the formation and profiling of students' religiosity (Bashkimi, 2009). Most modern sociologists of religion associate religiosity with values as a generic term, whereby values are defined as relatively stable, general, and hierarchically organized characteristics of individuals and groups, formed by the interaction of historical, social, and individual factors. They direct the behavior of their holders towards certain goals (Pantić, 1993, p. 179). The alternating spread of secularism and religiosity over a short period of time has marked the modern historical scene. According to many theorists, the 20th century was both the most secularized and the most religious. The process of social, economic, and cultural modernization, which many assumed would accelerate the end of religion, has led to its revitalization. The enthusiasm of modernization processes has waned and the centuries old human need for security, order, and harmony of life remained the same (Kuburić & Stojković, 2004, pp. 321–342). The post-socialist period is characterized by an increase in religiosity not only among the elderly but also among the younger generations. Belonging to a particular ethnic group and religion are the basic cohesive factors in the Balkan region.

Methodological structure of the research

The research aims to determine whether there is a causal link and a degree of influence of ethnicity on religious tolerance among students at the Faculties of Philosophy in Skopje and Tetovo. According to the subject of this research, the aim is to determine the social factors that affect the religious tolerance of the student population. The unit of analysis of this research comprises students from the Faculty of Philosophy of Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje and from the Faculty of Philosophy at the State University of Tetovo. The research involves the following tasks:

- To determine the most important social factors affecting the religious tolerance of the students at the Faculties of Philosophy in Skopje and Tetovo;
- To emphasize religious tolerance as a socially desirable behavior of the student population in the circumstances of multi-confessional and multiethnic reality in the country;
- To determine whether and how the Macedonian Orthodox Church, specifically the Orthodox Ohrid Archbishopric, and the Islamic Religious Community promote religious tolerance among the student population;
- To determine the confessional characteristics of religious tolerance of the student population (the characteristics of Christian and Islamic tolerance).

This research focuses on the religious tolerance of students from the cities of Skopje and Tetovo, the social factors influencing it, and the way these factors exert their influence. Previous studies of this phenomenon have identified numerous factors influencing the occurrence, manifestations, and degrees of religious tolerance among young people. The impact of social status on religious tolerance has been confirmed in the research of Besic and Djukanovic (Bešić & Djukanović, 2000). Regarding the influence of the family, Stefica Bahtijarevic claims that the religious life of children is greatly influenced by their parents. Numerous studies on religiosity conducted in different parts of the world show a very close connection between the attitude towards religion between children and parents (Bahtijarević, 1975, p. 238). Gender with its two categories, as a relevant factor in the family upbringing of the male and female child, certainly has an impact on the attitude towards religion and tolerance (Kuburić, 1996, p. 179). The present research aims to discover, confirm, or deny the connection between the abovementioned factors and the traditional religious tolerance among students from the Faculties of Philosophy in Skopje and Tetovo. Ethnos defines people who consider themselves or are considered by others to share similar characteristics, according to which they differ from other collectivities in a society and on the basis of which they develop separate cultural behaviors (Marshall, 2004, p. 136).

General hypothesis

Religious tolerance among students from the Faculties of Philosophy of Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje and the State University of Tetovo is influenced by social factors such as ethnicity and confessional affiliation.

Special hypotheses

Ethnicity influences students' attitudes toward religious tolerance.

The intensity of religious tolerance among students at the Faculties of Philosophy in Skopje and Tetovo is correlated with their confessional affiliation.

Methods and techniques of the research

From a methodological point of view, this research is aimed at assessing the impact of social factors, such as ethnicity and the type of confessional affiliation, on the traditional religious tolerance of students from Skopje and Tetovo. The research detects the causal links between these factors and religious tolerance among students. The research method consists of a quantitative approach. The quantitative approach involves conducting a survey and processing a questionnaire prepared for that purpose. The findings are used to test and finalize the hypotheses. The first part of the questionnaire contains a series of independent variables related to social factors. The key aspects of religious tolerance are determined in the second part of the questionnaire.

The research was conducted on a stratified sample of the available population, which was divided into several strata based on the relevant variables. An electoral framework was subsequently defined for each stratum and a separate sub-sample was formed from each electoral framework with randomization. The complete stratified sample was obtained by association. From the basic set of units of the available subject population of students studying at the Faculty of Philosophy of Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje and at the Faculty of Philosophy of the State University of Tetovo, a sample was selected

that represents 0.25% of the total number of units. In order to achieve the validity of the sample, care was taken to accurately reflect the structure of the target group in terms of age, gender, socio-demographic characteristics, level of education, ethnicity, and confessional affiliation. For that purpose, we used the data from the Student Services of the two Faculties. By comparing those data, we saw that the structure of the sample corresponds to the structure of the target group that is necessary for a single research.

Results of the survey

Table 1. *Ethnic structure of the respondents*

Ethnicity	Total	
	N	%
Macedonian	74	41.57
Albanian	97	54.49
Turkish	3	1.68
Serbian	3	1.68
Bosniak	1	0.56
Total	178	100

The research was conducted on students from the Faculty of Philosophy of Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje and students from the Faculty of Philosophy of the State University in Tetovo. The ethnic structure of the respondents is as follows: 74 or 41.57% Macedonians, 97 or 54.49% Albanians, 3 or 1.68% Turks, 3 or 1.68% Serbs, and 1 or 0.56% Bosniaks. The total number of respondents in the survey is 178 (100%). For the purpose of this research, the answers of the Macedonian and Albanian students were analyzed. The survey was conducted during the second half of 2019.

Table 2. *Respondents' answers to the question 'Do you believe in God?' according to ethnicity*

Ethnicity	Yes	Not	I don't know	No answer	Total
Macedonian	25.28% (45)	8.43% (15)	6.74% (12)	1.12% (2)	41.57% (74)
Albanian	53.93% (96)	/	/	0.56% (1)	54.49% (97)
Turkish	1.69% (3)	/	/	/	1.69% (3)
Serbian	1.69% (3)	/	/	/	1.69% (3)
Bosniak	0.56% (1)	/	/	/	0.56% (1)
Total	83.15% (148)	8.43% (15)	6.74% (12)	1.69% (3)	100% (178)

Upon first impression, the high percentage of students who believe in God is surprising. It is an elementary question of the degree of religiosity. In the following section we will see what kind of intensity and type of religion it is. In any case, this percentage is higher compared to similar previous surveys where this question was asked. All surveyed Albanian students (except one) believe in God, which is to be expected, given the high intensity of the elementary religiosity of Albanians in North Macedonia. Research on this issue shows a higher intensity of religiosity of ethnic Albanians in North Macedonia, compared to those in Albania, Kosovo, and Serbia.

Table 3. Respondents' answers to the question
'Does religion improve ethnic relations?' according to ethnicity

Ethnicity	Yes	Not	I don't know	No answer	Total
Macedonian	11.80% (21)	15.17% (27)	13.48% (24)	1.12% (2)	41.57% (74)
Albanian	35.96% (64)	2.25% (4)	15.73% (28)	0.56% (1)	54.49% (97)
Turkish	1.12% (2)	/	0.56% (1)	/	1.69% (3)
Serbian	1.69% (3)	/	/	/	1.69% (3)
Bosniak	/	/	0.56% (1)	/	0.56% (1)
Total	50.56% (90)	17.42% (31)	30.34% (54)	1.69% (3)	100% (178)

Although almost a third of the respondents do not have an opinion on this issue, we can still see that most of them acknowledge a positive function of religion in the relaxing of interethnic relations in the post-conflict contemporary Macedonian society. For the students from the Faculty of Philosophy in Tetovo, this attitude is more prevalent. It is a message to the Islamic Religious Community (IRC) to use its influence on believers and work much more actively on the implementation of religious dialogue and cooperation in the country. Unfortunately, from the actions of the IRC so far, we can deduce the exact opposite. This is especially true of the statements and messages of the head of the IRC, Reis-UL-Ulema Sulejman Rexhepi, which nurture religious and ethnic exclusivity. These are messages on the basis of which the ideology of religious nationalism lies. It is interesting that the percentage of students from the Faculty of Philosophy in Skopje who think that religion does not play any role in improving the ethnic relations in the country is relatively high. In-depth research should be conducted to show which other factors (political, economic, cultural) have a substantial impact on the improvement of ethnic relations in North Macedonia.

Table 4. Respondents' agreement with the statement 'Multiculturalism has led to segregation more than to the integration of Macedonian society' according to ethnicity

Ethnicity	Strongly disagree	Disagree	I don't know	Agree	Completely agree	No answer	Total
Macedonian	3.37% (6)	5.62% (10)	10.11% (18)	15.17% (27)	6.18% (11)	1.12% (2)	41.57% (74)
Albanian	2.81% (5)	5.06% (9)	30.90% (55)	11.24% (20)	3.37% (6)	1.12% (2)	54.49% (97)
Turkish	/	0.56% (1)	1.12% (2)	/	/	/	1.69% (3)
Serbian	/	/	0.56% (1)	0.56% (1)	0.56% (1)	/	1.69% (3)
Bosniak	/	/	/	0.56% (1)	/	/	0.56% (1)
Total	6.18% (11)	11.24% (20)	42.70% (76)	27.53% (49)	10.11% (18)	2.25% (4)	100% (178)

Although most respondents do not have an opinion, the high percentage of those who answered this question with a 'yes' is high enough for us to draw certain conclusions. It is obvious that the concept of multiculturalism has not shown the expected results. North Macedonia is still in a post-conflict period and the situation in terms of inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations has not improved at all, although 19 years have passed since the conflict in 2001. On the contrary, in some segments it has even worsened. Macedonian society is completely segregated along the most important axes of its functioning. Unlike before, educational institutions are completely ethnically segregated in primary, secondary, and higher education. For example, in high schools in Skopje (Nikola Karev and Zef Ljus Marku), Kumanovo, Tetovo, and Struga, students are completely ethnically segregated, even though they have previously studied together. Likewise, in the western part of North Macedonia, in towns and villages with a mixed ethnic composition, Macedonians and Albanians are spatially segregated. Therefore, the concept of multiculturalism needs to be replaced by interculturalism, which is a much more dynamic concept.

Table 5. Respondents' agreement with the statement 'Any conflict in which religious feelings are abused is unacceptable to me' according to ethnicity

Ethnicity	Strongly disagree	Disagree	I don't know	Agree	Completely agree	No answer	Total
Macedonian	0.56% (1)	2.25% (4)	5.06% (9)	20.79% (37)	12.36% (22)	0.56% (1)	41.57% (74)
Albanian	1.69% (3)	5.62% (10)	27.72% (44)	14.61% (26)	7.87% (14)	/	54.49% (97)
Turkish	/	0.56% (1)	/	1.12% (2)	/	/	1.69% (3)
Serbian	/	/	/	1.12% (2)	0.56% (1)	/	1.69% (3)
Bosniak	/	/	/	0.56% (1)	/	/	0.56% (1)
Total	2.25% (4)	8.43% (15)	29.78% (53)	38.20% (68)	20.79% (37)	0.56% (1)	100% (178)

Most respondents have a positive attitude towards this issue. Students are aware that the abuse of religious sentiments, especially by the political and religious elite, can contribute to further divisions and discrimination within society. Certain political parties in the country (especially the right-wing) often use religious sentiments to achieve their goals. In North Macedonia and the Balkan region, there is political religionization and politicization of religion.

Table 6. Respondents' agreement with the statement 'Describing some types of violence with the adjective religious is unacceptable' according to ethnicity

Ethnicity	Strongly disagree	Disagree	I don't know	Agree	Completely agree	No answer	Total
Macedonian	1.12% (2)	6.74% (12)	10.67% (19)	15.17% (27)	7.30% (13)	0.56% (1)	41.57% (74)
Albanian	1.69% (3)	4.49% (8)	11.80% (21)	28.65% (51)	7.87% (14)	/	54.49% (97)
Turkish	/	/	/	1.12% (2)	0.56% (1)	/	1.69% (3)
Serbian	/	/	0.56% (1)	0.56% (1)	0.56% (1)	/	1.69% (3)
Bosniak	/	/	/	0.56% (1)	/	/	0.56% (1)
Total	2.81% (5)	11.24% (20)	23.03% (41)	46.07% (82)	16.29% (29)	0.56% (1)	100% (178)

The students have a positive attitude towards this issue, as well, which clearly shows that they are against any kind of religious extremism and terrorism. This is especially important for Albanian students, who show a high degree of negative attitude towards certain ideologies in Islam that lead to violence. In order to crystallize such an attitude, the IRC, which has a strong influence on Islamic believers in the country, also has a positive impact. This religious institution has an extremely negative attitude towards all forms of Islamic fundamentalism, such as Wahhabism. This religious and political ideology has its followers in the country, but they are maximally marginalized by the IRC and the DUI (Democratic Union for Integration, the largest Albanian political party in North Macedonia).

Table 7. Respondents' agreement with the statement 'All citizens of a country should belong to one religion' according to ethnicity

Ethnicity	Strongly disagree	Disagree	I don't know	Agree	Completely agree	No answer	Total
Macedonian	15.73% (28)	16.85% (30)	5.06% (9)	1.69% (3)	2.25% (4)	/	41.57% (74)
Albanian	21.91% (39)	17.98% (32)	10.67% (19)	2.81% (5)	0.56% (1)	0.56% (1)	54.49% (97)
Turkish	/	0.56% (1)	0.56% (1)	0.56% (1)	/	/	1.69% (3)
Serbian	/	1.69% (3)	/	/	/	/	1.69% (3)
Bosniak	0.56% (1)	/	/	/	/	/	0.56% (1)
Total	38.20% (68)	37.08% (66)	16.29% (29)	5.06% (9)	2.81% (5)	0.56% (1)	100% (178)

The percentage of respondents who do not agree with the view that all citizens in a country should belong to one religion is extremely high. This could be ascribed to at least two factors. First of all, a previous study (Matevski, 2013) showed that in North Macedonia and the Balkans, there is an overlap of religious and ethnic identity, as the two most powerful mechanisms of personal identification. Almost without exception, anyone who is ethnically Macedonian, Serbian, or Greek is a member of Orthodox Christianity; every Croat is a member of Catholic Christianity; every ethnic Albanian in North Macedonia or Kosovo is a member of Islam. The only exception is the Macedonian Muslims. Second, in North Macedonia and the wider region there is no mechanism for converting from one religion to another. There have been almost no cases where a member of Orthodox Christianity converted to Islam, or vice versa. This is mostly because such converts would be declared as traitors by their own religious and ethnic group.

Table 8. Respondents' answers to the question 'Do you want to live in an environment with religious and ethnic diversity?' according to ethnicity

Ethnicity	Yes	Not	I don't know	No answer	Total
Macedonian	22.47% (40)	7.30% (13)	11.80% (21)	/	41.57% (74)
Albanian	18.54% (33)	17.42% (31)	18.54% (33)	/	54.49% (97)
Turkish	1.12% (2)	/	0.56% (1)	/	1.69% (3)
Serbian	1.12% (2)	/	0.56% (1)	/	1.69% (3)
Bosniak	0.56% (1)	/	/	/	0.56% (1)
Total	43.82% (78)	24.72% (44)	31.46% (56)	/	100% (178)

The answers lead to a conclusion that the Macedonian students most prominently want to live with members of other religions and ethnicities. This is again due to the fact that the citizens of Skopje, much more than the citizens of Tetovo, have accepted the multi-confessional and multiethnic reality. The consequences of the 2001 conflict are also likely to be felt in Tetovo.

Table 9. Respondents' answers to the question 'Do you want to work in an environment with religious and ethnic diversity?' according to ethnicity

Ethnicity	Yes	Not	I don't know	No answer	Total
Macedonian	27.53% (49)	5.06% (9)	8.99% (16)	/	41.57% (74)
Albanian	37.08% (66)	7.87% (14)	8.99% (16)	0.56% (1)	54.49% (97)
Turkish	1.69% (3)	/	/	/	1.69% (3)
Serbian	1.69% (3)	/	/	/	1.69% (3)
Bosniak	0.56% (1)	/	/	/	0.56% (1)
Total	68.54% (122)	12.92% (23)	17.98% (32)	0.56% (1)	100% (178)

Almost all students have nothing against working in a multiethnic environment. This is due to at least two factors. Firstly, according to the Ohrid Framework Agreement, a large number of ethnic Albanians are employed in all public enterprises. Students are aware of that reality and have nothing against it. Secondly and more importantly, students are not discriminated against on ethnic grounds. As academic citizens and future driving forces of the Macedonian society, they will be able to build a society for all with their competencies. In such a society, all citizens, regardless of their ethnic, racial, religious, political, and cultural background, will have equal opportunities and access to the labor market and all educational, social, healthcare, and cultural institutions.

Table 10. Respondents' answers to the question 'Do you regret the unfortunate developments among young people due to religious or ethnic differences?' according to ethnicity

Ethnicity	Yes	Not	I don't know	No answer	Total
Macedonian	31.46% (56)	4.49% (8)	5.06% (9)	0.56% (1)	41.57% (74)
Albanian	48.88% (87)	1.69% (3)	2.81% (5)	1.12% (2)	54.49% (97)
Turkish	1.69% (3)	/	/	/	1.69% (3)
Serbian	1.12% (2)	/	0.56% (1)	/	1.69% (3)
Bosniak	0.56% (1)	/	/	/	0.56% (1)
Total	83.71% (149)	6.18% (11)	8.43% (15)	1.69% (3)	100% (178)

Through the answers to this question, the students from both Faculties took a clear position that they are against any type of violence based on religious and ethnic grounds. They complain about the consequences of the fights between the youth in the schools, buses, stadiums, and other public places in Skopje and Tetovo. This means that they are already formed as tolerant persons and as such show predispositions for building a religious dialogue and cooperation in the modern Macedonian society. It will help the political elite persevere in implementing a strategy of *one society for all* and inter-culturalism.

Table 11. Respondents' answers to the question 'How do you define yourself?' according to ethnicity

Ethnicity	As a religiously tolerant person	As a religiously tolerant person only in exceptional situations	As a religiously intolerant person	No answer	Total
Macedonian	30.90% (55)	8.99% (16)	/	1.69% (3)	41.57% (74)
Albanian	43.82% (78)	9.55% (17)	/	1.12% (2)	54.49% (97)
Turkish	1.69% (3)	/	/	/	1.69% (3)
Serbian	1.69% (3)	/	/	/	1.69% (3)
Bosniak	0.56% (1)	/	/	/	0.56% (1)
Total	78.65% (140)	18.54% (33)	/	2.81% (5)	100% (178)

The percentage of respondents who declared themselves as religiously tolerant persons is unusually high. It is gratifying that no student has declared themselves a totally intolerant person. This exceeded my expectations in a positive way, although this was evident from the answers given to the previous questions. We will now look at the factors that influence students the most to develop into tolerant individuals ready for mutual communication, dialogue, and collaboration.

Instead of a conclusion

Total respondents: 178

1–3 – low-factor impact factor

4–7 – secondary level of factor influence

8–10 – high level of factor influence

Table 12. *Factors influencing religious tolerance*

Factors	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	No answer	Total
Education	6	3	7	9	26	13	11	18	16	56	13	178
Family upbringing	2	/	1	/	6	10	8	16	19	106	10	178
Religious affiliation	7	5	2	7	19	9	14	18	21	62	14	178
Nationality	6	9	6	10	32	13	20	20	19	28	15	178
Social status	14	5	16	10	27	17	19	26	15	14	14	178
Level of communication between people	5	/	5	8	19	11	21	30	26	40	13	178
General knowledge level	1	7	2	3	15	15	14	28	24	57	13	178
Political determination	57	11	19	11	24	8	10	10	6	7	15	178

From the answers given by all respondents of Macedonian, Albanian, Serbian, Turkish, and Bosniak ethnicity, we can conclude that family, as the primary agent of socialization, plays the main role in the improvement of religious tolerance. This indicates that their parents do not perpetuate the religious and ethnic stereotypes that burden children with their upbringing. The older generation (their grandparents) are probably even less burdened by the presence and practical action of ethnic *others*. These data follow a number of previous studies showing that in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia there was a higher intensity of ethnic tolerance than today. The intensity of religious and ethnic tolerance declined after the break-up of the Second Yugoslavia and the formation of the former Yugoslav Republics as independent states. This was followed by violent conflicts, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Kosovo. Educational institutions, as a secondary agent of socialization, have proven to be a very important factor for religious tolerance among students at the Faculties of Philosophy in Skopje and Tetovo. This means that there are still good curricula in primary, secondary, and higher education. In addition, the textbooks at all three levels of education do not contain any content that ties students to religious and ethnic discrimination. Teachers and professors also play a big role in this process. Through educational upbringing, they convey to students the moral norms and values associated with non-discrimination, solidarity, altruism, love, etc.

Religious affiliation appears to be a positive factor influencing students' tolerance. This once again demonstrates the positive function of religion, whether students believe in

God or not. The ethical function of religion through which religious norms and values are transmitted is particularly important. Christianity and Islam as Abrahamic religions have far more similarities than differences. They are based on the same foundation – the Old Testament. Properly covered, it will withstand a great deal of adverse conditions. Christianity and Islam are also basically religions of love. The level of communication between people of different ethnic backgrounds is also a positive factor that leads to religious tolerance. Conducting dialogue is the best way to understand people with different views on any issue. Through the dialogue, the similarities are perceived and the differences are accepted as part of the multicultural palette of North Macedonia. This builds trust between the parties, identifies everyone's needs, develops alternatives and ways to resolve conflicts, and brings together different religious, ethnic, social, and political views. This also paves the way for joint decision-making in finding the best solutions for peace, cooperation, dialogue, and understanding between the people in the country. Communication between believers of different faiths leads to mutual tolerance, understanding, and better familiarity between them. The level of general knowledge is the final important factor increasing the intensity of religious tolerance among the surveyed students. The level of general culture is very significant. Students are aware that they need to have a general knowledge of all social phenomena, except the scientific field they are studying. In this context, the knowledge of all religions, which are present in the country through their religious communities and religious groups, is very important for students to develop as true academic citizens of their country.

According to the respondents of Macedonian ethnicity, family upbringing, the level of communication between people, and the level of general knowledge are factors that have a high level of influence on religious tolerance. Education, religious and national (ethnic) affiliation, as well as social status are factors that have a medium level of influence. Political affiliation is a factor that has a low level of influence on religious tolerance.

According to the respondents of Albanian ethnicity, education, family upbringing, religious affiliation, national (ethnic) affiliation, the level of communication between people, and the level of general knowledge are factors that have a high level of influence on religious tolerance. Social status is a factor that has a medium level of influence, while political determination is a factor that has a low level of influence on religious tolerance.

We can conclude that Albanian students listed more factors that influence their religious tolerance than Macedonian students. Family upbringing, the level of their mutual communication, and the level of general culture are common to the two surveyed populations. The Albanian students are led by the factors that detect the influence of educational institutions and their religious affiliation. With the latter, they may want to point out that Islam is a peaceful religion, which, through its surahs and ayahs in the Qur'an, emphasizes tolerance towards other religions with which it is in contact. All of this is contingent on the continuation of the fact that North Macedonia has no visible and exposed elements of religious extremism and terrorism. What should be emphasized, of course, is that for both Macedonian and Albanian students their political affiliation does not have a statistically significant impact on their religious tolerance. This needs to be further explored. However, the initial impression is that students believe that the political elites not only do not contribute to the practical implementation of the principles of ethnic

and religious tolerance, but some of them also rely on ethno-national and religious exclusivity to win over their voters. This is especially true of right-wing political parties.

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INTERKULTURALNOST I IDENTITET U REPUBLICI SEVERNOJ MAKEDONJI

Apstrakt

Interkulturalnost je pristup koji treba da prevaziđe neke nedostatke multikulturalnosti. Multikulturalnost se više fokusira na različite principe, propise i politike u multikulturalnom društvu, a koji formalno prepoznaju i potvrđuju postojanje različitosti i određenih zajednica – uspostavljaju i garantuju njihova prava kao i jednak status i adekvatnu zaštitu. Interkulturalnost, pored toga što podrazumeva prethodno iskazane postulate multikulturalnosti, posebnu pažnju posvećuje međusobno isprožimanom postojanju određenih zajednica, njihovim zajedničkim interesima i aktivnostima koji dovode do novih praksi i kultura u kontekstu stalne evolucije kultura i njihove koegzistencije. Centralni cilj interkulturalnosti jeste omogućavanje prožimanja, saradnje i aktivnog zajedničkog (su)života, s obzirom na to da se u takvim procesima određene kulture i identiteti neprestano razvijaju i transformišu, te mogu dovesti do stvaranja i razvoja novih. Prednosti koje karakterišu ovaj pristup su interakcija i dijalog, težnja ka zajednici i snažna socijalna kohezija. Glavni aspekti socijalne kohezije jesu: osećaj pripadnosti koji podrazumeva zajedničke vrednosti; identifikacija sa

lokalnom zajednicom i poverenje u institucije lokalne samouprave; osećaj socijalne pravde i jednakosti, koji, između ostalog, uključuje procenu javnih politika od strane građana; osećaj i želja za aktivnim učešćem u javnom i političkom životu države. Sa stanovišta identiteta, svi građani, bez obzira na nacionalnu pripadnost, imaju jednak pristup pravima zagwarantovanim zakonom i resursima društva kao što su tržište rada, obrazovanje, zdravstvo, socijalna zaštita i kultura.

Ključne reči: interkulturalnost, multikulturalnost, socijalna kohezija

PERCEPTION OF CULTURAL CONFLICTS AMONG THE UNIVERSITY STUDENT POPULATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of the position and perspective of youth in our social reality, much of which will depend on the perspective of B&H society, or more precisely, the perspective of the Republic of Srpska as one of the entities of B&H, in the coming period. Special attention will be paid to the dominant aspects of youth cultural conflicts in the Republic of Srpska. We consider it important to pay attention to the problem of cultural conflicts, because they are essentially treated as conflicts in social values. Cultural conflict is especially visible and often disastrous when arising in the form of discrepancy between the ideology and the socio-cultural system. It is considered as a gap between the planned change and current cultural form. We think that presenting and analyzing the results of the research on cultural conflicts gathered during the April-May research period in 2019 among the university student population in the Republic of Srpska will lead to a more efficient identity formation among young people and prevent a negative socio-cultural impact in their way of perceiving “the other” and “the different” in the Republic of Srpska, because the data obtained indicated that the idea of multiculturalism is underdeveloped.

Key words: cultural conflicts, young people, Republic of Srpska

Introduction

Before going into detail about the perception of cultural conflicts among the university student population in the Republic of Srpska, it is worth considering a phenomenon of perception of conflicts in general from the sociological point of view. On this topic, Wright Mills clarified that conflict situations are one of the determinants of development since, as he saw it, development was always based on conflict, and not conformism, cohesion, or integration (Mills, 2001). Society has never been stable due to constant struggle between different social groups and their different interests. Mills based his conclusions – that power struggle has always been the ultimate manifestation of conflict – on the ideas of K. Marx, M. Weber, V. Pareto, and G. Mosca. German sociologist R.

Dahrendorf believed that all complex organizations were based upon the balance of power (Dahrendorf, according to Mitrović, 2008, p. 104). According to his opinion, conflicts are caused by political and not economic reasons. The so-called *homo politicus* is the source of conflict. By classifying conflicts (between the same level parties, subordinate and superior, as well as between a part and a whole), he noticed several types of conflicts, studied them in detail, and provided some of the possibilities for their resolution. Another proponent of this idea, American sociologist Coser, defined a social conflict as an ideological phenomenon that reflects ambitions and feelings among social groups in their mutual struggle for power, change of the social status, distribution of income, revaluation of moral values, etc. (Kozer, 2007). Most proponents of this approach indicate the significance of conflict in the prevention of the ossification of society, creating new opportunities in innovations and encouraging development and progress. This approach rejects any notion of spontaneous conflict and insists on the possibility and need for its resolution. Modern sociological literature abounds with numerous classifications based on different criteria.

Theoretical context

On the topic of cultural conflicts, one should point out that a theory of cultural conflict defines a conflict as an occurrence based on different influences that individuals or groups of different cultures are exposed to, [...], since norms and ways of life of one culture call for different reactions and responses from those belonging to another culture or cultural group (Koković, 2005, p. 247). Cultural conflicts, according to David Rothkop, can be divided into three categories: religious, ethnic, and conflicts among similar cultures (these refer to historically similar cultures with significant differences that are used as justification for the conflict) (Rothkop, 1997).

Conflicts based on religious struggle exist among Christians and Muslims, Christians and Jews, Hindus and Muslims, Protestants and Catholics, etc. *Cultural conflicts due to ethnic differences* are conflicts between the Chinese and the Vietnamese, the Chinese and the Japanese, the Slavs and the Turks, or the Turks and the Greeks. *Conflicts between "cultural relatives"* over the territories or resources existed between the British and the French, the French and the Germans, Libya and Egypt, and many others. Rothkop introduces another category of cultural conflicts, which could be named *quasi-cultural conflicts* and which are based on ideological differences. This type of conflict does not have a traditional background since it cannot be classified according to any standard definition of culture, but it possesses all the characteristics of cultural conflicts (Zakić & Milutinović, 2014, p. 488).

A conflict in values between two or more cultures or struggles within the cultures themselves belong to a field of theory of cultural conflict. From the perspective of social pathology, as noted by Thorsten Sellin,

a conflict between the norms is present when more or less different rules of behaviour can be applied to a certain life situation. Behavioural norms of one group to which an individual belongs can warrant one response to a given situation, while the norms of another group can call for a completely opposite response (Bošković, 2007).

According to Sellin, conflicts between cultures are unavoidable when the norms of one cultural or subcultural field migrate or come in contact with the norms of another culture; it is interesting to note that the greatest number of specialized studies on cultural conflicts and delinquency deal with this aspect of conflict (Sellin, according to Ignjatović 2006, p. 249). The theory of cultural conflict has as its starting point a different understanding of culture when compared to a positivist concept that advocates the existence of a universal value system in the global society (Milosavljević, 2003, p. 312). Theorists belonging to other social fields, such as psychologists or psychiatrists, define cultural conflicts as internal or external. Internal conflicts deal with the analysis based on the data from life histories, since their guiding thought is that through revealing an experience of an individual one can reveal the experiences of the entire group. Cultural conflict is mental (internal) when an individuals are aware that they do not follow the prescribed social rules and when they have reached a necessary level in the acculturation that makes them able to understand that their actions are illegal. On the contrary, external conflicts appear in the absence of mental ones, which means that external conflict refers to persons not being aware that their actions are not in line with the dominant culture and its norms. Furthermore, from the sociopathological standpoint, the notion of conflict is defined as an explanation and issue within the category of aggression, which refers to the social occurrences in which opposite interests, attitudes, goals, or values among individuals or groups are solved with the use of force and violence. According to the sociologist Šljukić, violence is a form of interaction and it has always been used for the purpose of protecting certain interests; according to its content, it can be physical or psychological; according to its action mode, it can be direct or indirect; according to the performers of violence, it can be individual or collective; and according to distribution criteria, it can be mass or dispersed (Šljukić & Šljukić, 2018, p. 74). The reason why special attention should be paid to cultural conflicts is that one of the theses of the theory of cultural conflict emphasizes that cultural conflict does not necessarily entail the conditions necessary for the occurrence of deviant behaviour, but it is one of the preconditions. One should also be reminded of Mills' interpretation and reevaluation of the theory of social disorganization, where he points out that conflicts occur among traditional symbolic and cultural models and their new forms, which disturb the functioning of the status and roles of the society members and their understanding of the meaning of society, even more so since individual cultural elements do not change simultaneously (Mills, according to Milošević Šošo, 2013, p. 17). Some of the earlier studies about cultural conflicts as forms of deviant behaviour in the region of Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) have shown that a system of polarized attitudes, values, and goals, the glorification of one's own ethnic group, and the degradation of other ethnicities that condition national exclusion, assimilation, or discrimination, can lead to conflict situations in B&H as serious as the last war in the region (Milošević Šošo, 2013, p. 200). For scientific purposes, in the 2008-2010 period, the author conducted a research on the influence of certain social factors that cause deviant behaviour in a multi-ethnic society and, regarding the sphere of ethnic and political relations in B&H society, examined characteristic cases (individuals) who are treated as delinquents in one ethnic group and as positive examples and deserving national individuals in others. Such examples are illustrative for the understanding of the practice that uses all available means to achieve a full ethnic identification in order to use individual engagement for the promotion of its ethnic group (nation) as much as possible (Milošević Šošo, 2019, p. 210). Answers to questions if anything has changed for the

better on this issue in the last three decades and if the idea of multiculturalism has sufficiently matured in the B&H region will be provided through the results of the research conducted as part of the project *Influence of cultural identity of the young people as the determinant of cultural conflicts within the frame of social perspective of the Republic of Srpska*, which was co-financed by the Ministry of Scientific and Technological Development, Higher Education and Information Society of the Republic of Srpska.

From this perspective, the results of this paper have not only theoretical but also practical significance.

Analysis and interpretation of research results

The abovementioned research was conducted on the sample of 403 respondents from the population of students from two public universities (East Sarajevo and Banja Luka) as well as two private universities (Sinergija and PIM) in the Republic of Srpska during April and May 2019. For the purposes of our research, we used the questioning method (also known as an interview, a questionnaire, or a scientific interview) as the most appropriate method for exploring people's attitudes, feelings, information, and behaviour. Methodologically, a single i.e. an ad hoc survey was conducted, for which the respondents were to be randomly selected and interviewed individually, as well as a group survey, involving multiple respondents in the same room. Statistical method by means of the SPSS software was used for data processing and analysis. The sociodemographic structure of the sample is shown in Table 1.

The data in Table 1 indicate that the largest number of respondents (191 respondents or 47.39%) come from the town of Banja Luka, then from East Sarajevo (140 respondents or 34.74%), and finally from the area of Bijeljina (72 respondents or 17.87%). Regarding age structure, the largest number of respondents belong to the 18-25 age group (371 respondents or 92.1%) and the 25-40 age group (29 respondents or 7.20%). There was a single respondent over 40 (0.2%) and two respondents under 18 (0.5%). The structure of the respondents based on their religious affiliation is as follows:

- 373 respondents, or 92.6%, declare themselves as Orthodox Christian;
- 5 respondents, or 1.2%, declare themselves as Muslim;
- 4 respondents, or 1%, declare themselves as Catholic;
- 2 respondents, or 0.5%, declare themselves as Jewish;
- 7 respondents, or 1.7%, declare themselves as atheists; and
- 12 respondents, or 3%, remained undeclared.

Concerning the years spent at a university, the results show that out of the total number of respondents, 141 respondents (35%) are in the second year, 128 respondents (31.8%) in the first year, 79 respondents (19.6%) in the fourth year, and 55 respondents (13.6%) in the third year of study.

Table 1. *Sociodemographic structure of the sample*

		N	%
Gender structure	Male	110	29.5
	Female	284	70.5
	Total	403	100
Age structure	Under 18	2	0.5
	18 to 25	371	92.1
	25 to 40	29	7.2
	Over 40	1	0.2
	Total	403	100
Place of residence	East Sarajevo	140	34.7
	Banja Luka	191	47.4
	Bijeljina	72	17.9
	Total	403	100
Structure by nationality	Serbian	383	95
	Bosniak	5	1.2
	Croatian	3	0.7
	Romani	1	0.2
	Undeclared	11	2.7
	Total	403	100
Structure by religious denomination	Orthodox Christian	373	92.6
	Muslim	5	1.2
	Catholic	4	1
	Jewish	2	0.5
	Atheist	7	1.7
	Undeclared	12	3
Total	403	100	
Structure by year of study	First year	128	31.8
	Second year	141	35
	Third year	55	13.6
	Fourth year	79	19.6
	Total	403	100

Table 2 showcases the attitudes of the respondents towards the members of the aforementioned peoples and nations. In other words, the results indicate how the respondents see themselves in the company of the members of other peoples or nations through maintaining social distance or displaying familiarity with the representatives of some of the mentioned ethnic groups. If social distance is determined as a prevalent attitude toward the members of other cultural groups or as our affection toward or familiarity with some other cultural groups, then the data show that highly negative social distancing among the respondents, measured by twelve attributes, was directed toward the members of the Bosniak and Croatian ethnicities, as well as Montenegrins, the Romani, and Arabs. These peoples and nations are not seen as brave or diligent, but as insensitive, conflictive, and uncivilized. The results revealed a feeling of affection for the members of the Russian people, while the Chinese were also positively characterized in one segment (Table 2).

Table 2. Attitudes about specific nations/peoples (answer 'yes')

Characteristics	Nations/peoples							
	Serbian	Bosniak	Croatian	Montenegrin	Romani	Arab	Chinese	Russian
Brave	315 77.2%	70 17.2%	59 14.5%	82 20.1%	51 12.5%	44 10.8%	59 14.5%	207 50.7%
Coward	25 6.1%	93 22.8%	107 26.2%	55 13.5%	47 11.5%	39 9.6%	47 11.5%	17 4.2%
Diligent	247 60.5%	101 24.8%	93 22.8%	31 7.6%	60 14.7%	69 16.9%	186 45.6%	137 33.6%
Lazy	35 8.6%	51 12.5%	42 10.3%	276 67.6%	77 18.9%	26 6.4%	19 4.7%	15 3.7%
Sensitive	247 60.5%	92 22.5%	74 18.1%	63 15.4%	69 16.9%	38 9.3%	55 13.5%	106 26%
Insensitive	23 5.6%	85 20.8%	106 26%	37 9.1%	54 13.2%	86 21.1%	44 10.8%	29 7.1%
Honest	225 55.1%	80 19.6%	65 15.9%	81 19.9%	38 9.3%	51 12.5%	115 28.2%	149 36.5%
Dishonest	32 7.8%	83 20.3%	102 25%	50 12.3%	133 32.6%	72 17.6%	27 6.6%	27 6.6%
Civilized	188 46.1%	78 19.1%	126 30.9%	66 16.2%	33 8.1%	61 15%	130 31.9%	156 38.2%
Uncivilized	46 11.3%	111 27.2%	69 16.9%	61 15%	149 36.5%	62 15.2%	21 5.1%	16 3.9%
Conflictive	124 30.4%	164 40.2%	144 35.3%	77 18.9%	96 23.5%	69 16.9%	23 5.6%	51 12.5%
Non-conflictive	80 19.6%	36 8.8%	39 9.6%	49 12%	46 11.3%	34 8.3%	116 28.4%	74 18.1%

Social distance measures attitudes toward members of other groups, indicating a particular social distance that individuals in a group feel toward other groups that are not similar or identical to their attachment group. Social distance and national stereotypes noted here are actually a part of a mentality modelled by the factors of socialisation (cultural transfer), group categorisation (us vs. them), and individual psychological characteristics (Previšić, Hrvatić & Posavec, 2004). This can certainly lead to new divisions and conflicts, which confirms the thesis that multiculturalism as an idea is not yet sufficiently developed in this region. It was observed that the respondents were able to make estimates and characterize the members of ethnic groups with whom they had not been in close contact due to territorial distance; they only had sporadic contact with them due to globalization and demographic processes, which lead to intercultural contact. Therefore, it is more than obvious that their views about someone different from them form the basis of the established stereotypes where cultural differences are not treated as cultural wealth, but as a threat. In Kecmanović's interpretation, the cognitive dimension of prejudice is subsumed under the concept of social distance, while the cognitive dimension includes stereotypes of prejudice (Kecmanović, 2014, p. 114). It is important to establish that stereotypes can often be the consequences of one's insufficient desire to truly learn about the values and qualities different from oneself on cultural grounds. Another characteristic of our society, as well as of most post-communist countries, where turbulent economic, political, and social changes took place over the last two or three decades, is the strengthening of ethnic identification and the custom of openly approaching other ethnic, national, or religious groups with caution, suspicion, and doubt.

Occurrences of this type can certainly lead to new divisions and conflicts, which supports the thesis that the idea of multiculturalism has not taken root in our society. The reason why certain individuals adopt biased or stereotypical attitudes towards other groups is that people perceive the bad or evil among others, often labelling the differences between different groups with derogatory terms, and display a constant tendency of adding a number of similar attributes while socializing with individuals from the environments prone to stereotype propagation (Kecmanović, 2014, p. 115).

Figure 1 shows the respondents' attitudes about the factors and circumstances in the Republic of Srpska and B&H that influence current conflicts. According to the respondents' replies, the leading factors for current conflicts in B&H are ranked as follows: memories of past conflicts (14.24%), religious differences (14.13%), and national differences (11.68%). Lower-risk factors include ideological differences (10.12%), political culture (10.01%), media propaganda (9.6%), unemployment and poverty (9.45%), and the gap between the rich and the poor (7.78%). In the Republic of Srpska, however, the picture regarding these factors is completely different. The respondents here believe that unemployment and poverty are the main reason for the conflicts inside the RS (15.15% of the answers). According to their answers, the gap between the rich and the poor is the second highest risk factor (14.34%). The obtained results can be placed within the context of Weber's contribution to the conflict theory because he used to point out that social inequality represents the cause for conflicts in every society. He analysed in detail different forms of conflicts based on different dimensions of the stratification system (Mitrović, 2004, p. 105). Additionally, such results fit into Merton's anomie theory, because structural disturbances within a society make it impossible to achieve cultural goals, such as material wealth, status, or position, which facilitates the occurrence of deviant behaviour (Milošević Šošo, 2018, p. 94), including conflicts.




Figure 1. Causes of conflicts in the RS and B&H (in %)

When asked what the main cause for the conflicts in B&H in 1992 was, the respondents replied that, according to them, the primary cause was the agency and influence of the international factors (26.30%), followed by the emergence of nationally oriented political parties (21.84%) and religious differences (14.64%)



Figure 2. Attitudes toward primary causes of conflicts in B&H in 1992

Historical facts prove that the Balkan region, and therefore all countries from this area, has always been targeted by the more powerful and more numerous forces with different interests. It is worth mentioning, in the geopolitical context, that almost all wars and conflicts in this region were organized and directed by great world powers, so it is not surprising that the international factors were precisely the perceived main cause for the conflicts in B&H in 1992. It is also interesting to note that only 0.5% of the respondents believe that differences between the rich and the poor during this period could have triggered the conflict. This can be explained by the fact that the ideology of that time did not force class differences, albeit far from offering a utopian vision of society, but nevertheless guaranteeing basic human rights and social protection.

Figure 3 shows the research results concerning the respondents' attitudes about the issue of their safety in places with different national or religious affiliation. The data show a somewhat more positive picture of our society, since 57.32% of the respondents disclosed that they do not feel fear or awkwardness about residing in places whose population is of a different nationality or religion. On the other hand, 42.68% of the respondents think the exact opposite.




Figure 3. Attitudes about feeling safe in places with a population of different nationality or religion

Figure 4 presents the respondents’ attitudes toward the issue of potential unpleasant experiences due to their ethnic origin. They show that 39.45% of the respondents experienced unpleasant situations due to their ethnic origin usually regarding their employment treatment, and 6.95% of them experienced some form of abuse or threat in their workplaces. The problem of psychological abuse was present in 16.38% of the cases, while 6.20% of the respondents experienced some form of physical abuse. Problems with approaching institutions were present in 10.92% of the cases, while 8.93% of the respondents were exposed to attacks in the media due to their different ethnicity. Only 11.17% of the respondents reported that they had no problems whatsoever due to their ethnic differences.




Figure 4. Attitudes toward potential unpleasant situations due to ethnic origin

Compared to the indicators of the experienced unpleasant situations owing to a difference in ethnic origin and according to quantity criteria, our respondents reported somewhat different attitudes about the same issue of experienced unpleasant situations, only this time due to differences in religious affiliation (Figure 5). Thus, 32.51% of the respondents reported that they had experienced unpleasant situations at work owing to their religious affiliation and 23.33% of the respondents reported that they had experienced some form of psychological abuse. Problems with approaching institutions were present in 13.15% of the cases, while 7.69% of the respondents experienced attacks in the media. Some form of physical abuse was experienced by 5.69% of the respondents while 4.47% of them experienced abuse or threats at work due to their religious orientation. As with the previous parameter, the results concerning the number of those who did not experience any form of abuse is nearly the same, since 12.90% of the respondents expressed how fortunate they were not to go through any ordeals of such kind. Normally, the respondents were very categorical toward the issue of religious intolerance, since they consider it to be one of the main factors for the destabilisation of peace in B&H. This is quite evident from the results given in Figure 6.




Figure 5. Attitudes toward potentially unpleasant situations experienced due to religious differences

Figure 6 represents the results concerning religious hostility as a potential factor for the destabilization of peace in B&H. The results are overwhelming, since 87.84% of the respondents think that religious hostility is a risk factor and threat for peace, while only 12.16% have a different opinion.




Figure 6. *Perception of religious hostility as a factor for jeopardizing peace in B&H*

Closing remarks

Conflicts are considered to be the main cause for numerous deaths in the twentieth century, but global processes in general, such as increased dynamics of life and the resulting life changes, the existential problems and mutual relations between the subjects, increased stress levels and tension – all of these are fundamental to making the problem of conflicts more prominent in many fields of study. Social conflicts, as a part of conflictology or any other scientific discipline, such as social pathology, are a rather visible topic in modern society. This topic concerns the analysis of intrapersonal contradiction, interpersonal confrontation, and confrontation from the standpoint of social determinism, considering that every conflict in a society is preconditioned not only by psychological but also by social factors. As shown by the research results, the subjects in conflict situations are individuals from different social strata, or the bearers of specific social qualities and characteristics, as well as representatives of certain social groups. That is why the information that poverty and unemployment are seen as the main cause of conflicts in the RS (15.15% of the answers) is extremely important for our research. The same could be said about the second factor of conflicts in the RS, the perceived gap between the rich and the poor, which received 14.34% of the respondents' votes. All the respondents found that the reasons for the development of a pre-conflict phase, and ultimately the conflict itself, lie in different personal interests and needs, which manifest as conflicts in value orientations and behaviour motivation, as well as in different forms of social depravity, such as the lack of essential values and spiritual and material benefits. To support this statement, there are research data that reveal unpleasant situations experienced by the respondents due to their different religious orientation or ethnic origin. Singling out the most frequent forms of unpleasant experiences due to difference in ethnic affiliation, we established that 39.45% of the respondents experienced some kind of unpleasant situation at their place of work, and 16.38% of them experienced some form of psychological abuse. Likewise, the issue of religious difference is still a rather delicate

one, since 32.51% of the respondents experienced some kind of unpleasantness at work due to their religious affiliation, and 23.33% of them experienced some kind of psychological abuse. Employment inequality and psychological abuse stood out as two most frequent models of unacceptable behaviour on the basis of the analysed differences in our society, which revealed the reality of incompatible life between different ethnic and cultural groups. Circumstances in our society have not yet reached the level where one could say that the necessary mutual (intercultural) value frame is developed among different ethnic groups, although they have been living in the same region and sharing many cultural values for centuries (Milošević Šošo, 2013, p. 201).

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PERCEPCIJA KULTURNIH KONFLIKATA STUDENTSKE POPULACIJE U REPUBLICI SRPSKOJ

Apstrakt

Osnovni cilj rada je da doprinese boljem sagledavanju položaja i perspektive omladine u našoj društvenoj stvarnosti, od čega će umnogome zavisiti i perspektiva bosansko-hercegovačkog društva, tačnije, perspektive Republike Srpske kao jedne od entiteta BiH u narednom periodu. Poseban osvrt ćemo imati na dominantne aspekte kulturnih konflikata mladih, u Republici Srpskoj. Smatramo važnim obraćanje pažnje na problem kulturnih konflikata, jer se u suštini tretiraju kao konflikti vrijednosti. Kulturni konflikt je naročito vidljiv i često poguban kada se javlja u formi raskoraka između ideološkog projekta i društveno-kulturnog sistema. Primjećen je kao jaz između planirane promjene i jedne kulture. Mišljenja smo da će predstavljanje i analiza rezultata istraživanja o kulturnim konfliktima, prikupljenih tokom anketnog istraživanja u periodu april-maj 2019. godine među studentskom populacijom u Republici Srpskoj, doprinijeti kvalitetnijoj izgradnji identiteta kod mladih i spriječiti negativan uticaj na formiranje pozitivnog mišljenja o drugom i drugačijem u Republici Srpskoj, jer su dobijeni podaci ukazali na nerazvijenost ideje multikulturalizma.

Ključne riječi: kulturni konflikti, mladi, Republika Srpska

DETERMINANTS OF IDENTITY OF THE UNIVERSITY STUDENT POPULATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA

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Abstract

The research of a university student population's cultural identity belongs to a complex of studies of the cultural life of youth in general, a very current issue that this population faces in the context of the extremely dynamic social changes in the Republic of Srpska. Being a product of human action and interaction, identity is constructed and changed based on a multitude of influences coming from the intimate, economic, cultural, and other spheres. Through interaction and interdependence, individuals and groups exchange knowledge and experiences and develop beliefs about the existence of similarities and differences on which they build their own personal and collective identity. An environment with poor social support can induce an identity crisis in young people and increase feelings of fear, suspicion, dissatisfaction, and a sense of being unworthy of themselves and of the group they belong to. The prolonged duration of instability, conflict, and uncertainty leads to a situation where the original, "true identity" is perceived as the main disruptor of stability and prosperity, which leads to its rejection and the desire to become someone else. This paper is based on the research of the dominant determinants that form the contemporary cultural identity of the youth in the Republic of Srpska.

Key words: culture, identity, youth, students, Republic of Srpska

Introduction

Research on the cultural identity of university student population, as an important aspect of cultural life in societies with highly dynamic changes such as the one of the Republic of Srpska (RS), is a very relevant topic. The Republic of Srpska was established on January 9, 1992, on the eve of civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as an autonomous region¹. During the war it functioned as a fully institutionalised but unrecognised state, and since 1995 it has been one of the two confederate entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Consequences of the war, such as destruction of the economy, human casualties,

¹ Under the name Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

migrations, and changes in ethnic/religious structure of the population, are ever-current issues that influence cultural identity development. According to the 2013 census, the population of the RS is 1,170,342. In 2019, the RS had 2 public and 7 private universities, with a total of 93 faculties, 5 academies, 2 theological faculties, and 29,006 enrolled students (RSIS, 2019). The World Bank Group (2016) ranks Bosnia and Herzegovina 16th in the world according to the emigration rate in relation to the country's population.

The most important aspects that have to be considered when theorising about identities, as observed by Bernd Simon (2004, p. 25), include the notions that identities are relational (differentiation in relation to other), socially constructed (constantly negotiated meanings through social interaction), socially structured (reflecting a structure of the social context of interactions), multiple (reflecting a multiplicity of social roles), and that they have social consequences (as a source of motivation that can direct and shape behaviour and social interactions and impact social structure). Elements of cultural life, such as cultural consumption, cultural creativity, and/or cultural values, have a significant influence on the development of identity awareness among young people. Cultural identities interact and exchange values even when they are in collision, because culture is a basic expressive medium (Kalanj, 2007, p. 135), the one that we use to prove ourselves in our own eyes and in the eyes of others. Being a product of human action and interaction, identity is constructed and changed based on a multitude of influences coming not only from the cultural, but also from the intimate, economic, and other spheres. Koković (2005, p. 289) defines the notion of identity as a sense of self belonging that develops through a process of differentiation. The subjective experience of identity differs among individuals, as well as among groups. For an individual, it implies existence of an awareness of oneself as different from all others. One of the most important issues in the process of self-identification is the connection and reconciliation of the individual and the collective identity, two dimensions of the humanisation process of people (Ćorluka, 2014, p. 56). Individual and collective identities are strongly correlated, as the one cannot exist without the other.

Through interaction and interdependence, individuals and groups exchange knowledge and experiences, creating beliefs about the similarities and differences on which they build their personal and collective identities. Individual identity is developed by being aware of oneself as well as in relation to the environment. It is closely related to attitudes towards other individuals, as well as toward itself. In this interwoven network of interactions, various forms of collective identity emerge, such as national, religious, political, cultural, and ethnic. When developing their identity, individuals draw their lifestyles from their culture. Cultural identity is often seen as synonymous with cultural diversity, and as such, for authors like Brian Barry (2006, p. 158), it is one of the values associated with the protection of human rights. According to Giddens (1991, p. 54), identity fragmentation represents the possibility for unifying modernity, enabling individuals to unite the pluralism of identity into a so-called cosmopolitan identity, transcending the boundaries of broader collectives.

One can easily identify similarities and differences that affect individual identity development, because they are directly encountered in everyday life. These include the manner of speaking, eating, or dressing, as well as habits, expectations, values, etc. According to Alain de Benoist (2014, p. 2) identity is not immutable, and it cannot exist

by itself. It is developed in contact with others, by the modality of how we view others and how others view us. In its essence, identity is largely dialogic, shaped more fluidly through proximity with other identities. Fully isolated individuals (or groups) cannot develop their identity, since it provides meaning to existence and can never be developed “behind”.

The influences that allow individuals to identify their belonging to a collective are much more subtle. Developing a collective identity requires discovering the existing ones and constructing new connections, interests, and boundaries (Polletta & Jasper, 2001) based on a multitude of symbolic materials, on antagonisms and solidarity that flow from various social groups in the broadest sense. When we encounter cultural differences of which we were previously unaware or when we meet people or groups whose way of thinking and behaviour differ from ours, we experience insecurity and doubt, so our “unquestioned” identity becomes “questionable” (Stojković, 2009, p. 354) and starts to change. That kind of behaviour confirms that identities are based on differences and that an emotional description of ourselves needs the “other”, the description that others make of us, as a vital element in identity construction. Since it is developed and recognised in the opinion of differences, identity has no positive or subjective meaning (Božilović, 2014, p. 541).

One specific problem of the young people’s cultural identity arises in a state of poor social support, in an environment that provides conditions for the emergence of fear, doubt, dissatisfaction, and the sense of being unworthy of oneself and of the group to which one belongs. Society plays an important role in the survival and development of culture as a complex entity that consists of everything we think, do, and have as members of that society (Bierstedt, 1957, p. 312). According to Kalanj (2005, p. 58) identities are constructed by communities: community of places (physical and geofigureical connection with a locality), a community of memories (shaped by the past), and psychological community (ties to common goals and values). Those communities are established with common good in mind and driven by feelings of trust, altruism, and cooperation.

Globalisation processes accelerate changes in modern societies and, with the influence of economic instabilities, emerging technologies, and urbanisation, make it more difficult for young people to understand the social environment and social relations. They have greater freedom of choice and fewer social constrains, but with weak social ties they feel lonely and confused faced with complex dilemmas presented by that choice (Mutavdžić, 2017, p. 143). According to Castells (2002), organisations and institutions that influenced the construction of identities lost their ability to relate to real life and values, and thus lost their legitimacy. Without support from state institutions, new space opens up for the construction of new identities that can go in the direction of “burying” into the local (based on ethnic, national, and religious influences, and values such as God, family, or territory) or in the direction of radical individualism promoted by globalisation processes. Jenkins (2001, p. 135) has noted that everything that the members of a nation share (language, history, culture) and everything that symbolises social, economic, and political order of the state can be subject to change and manipulation.

The specificity of societies such as ours, with prolonged duration of instability, conflict, and uncertainty, has made the original “true identity” feel like a major impediment to stability and prosperity, which leads to its rejection and spawns a desire to become

“someone else”. Old identities that had a stabilizing function in society were shaken by the development of new identities and the fragmentation of modern man as a single subject (Baltazarević, 2017, p. 70), which leads to an identity crisis.

The consequences of the identity crisis (collapse of the value system, lack of clear perspective, economic deprivation) place a psychological burden on young people and lead to their disinterest in change and to their migration to other societies. For Alain de Benoist (2014, p. 2), the identity crisis is linked to the “ideology of sameness” or “ideology of the same” – global homogenisation whose main goal is to eradicate differences between nations, cultures, and languages, and to serve the global market by erasing borders in favour of a single united world. Yet, according to Kellner (1992), modern age identities do not disappear but are just redefined and reconstructed, becoming a play of choice in which the individual changes her or his identity at will. There are contradictory identities within a person that pull them in different directions, which is why their identifications are undergoing constant change (Hall, 1987, p. 45). This leads to an identity crisis that can easily get out of control. Koković (2005, p. 296) links the crisis of identity to the “hysteria” of identity. He believes that modernity has provoked identity reflection and created an environment in which individuals, deprived of the power to search for themselves, become lost in space and time without an idea about who they are. The identity crisis most often occurs when people are uncertain about the present and the future is uncertain, threatening, and full of fear and apprehension, or when individuals are treated only as statistics and not as personalities – this is the time when we can speak of complete loss of identity (Stanković-Pejnović, 2015, p. 391). “New awareness” is being created in the global community, while the old way of thinking about ourselves, our nation, our state, and the world is abandoned and we begin to think completely differently (ibid, 2015, p. 398).

Methodology

This paper is based on the data obtained from the project “Impact of Cultural Identity of Youth, as a Determinant of Cultural Conflicts, on the Social Perspective of the Republic of Srpska”, implemented by the Department of Sociology of the Faculty of Philosophy Pale. The aim of the project was to identify the dominant aspects of the cultural identity of youth in the Republic of Srpska. This paper presents the partial results from the project, specifically those related to the influence of value orientations on identity construction. Our assumption is that patriarchal and traditional patterns dominate the construction of youth identities in the RS but do not play the primary role in their decisions to emigrate.

The data were collected using the survey method on a sample of 403 students of two public and two private universities in the RS during May 2019. The survey was conducted on 191 respondents in Banja Luka (Faculty of Political Science, Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, Faculty of Philosophy, Faculty of Agriculture, and PIM – Faculty of Law), 140 respondents in East Sarajevo (Faculty of Economics, Faculty of Physical Education and Sport, and Faculty of Philosophy), and 72 respondents in Bijeljina (Faculty of Pedagogy, Faculty of Business Economics, and Sinergy – Anglistics study programme).




Figure 1. Respondents by city and gender

The number of male and female students in the sample is approximately in line with the structure of the population under 30 years of age at universities in the RS. There were 67.85% female respondents in East Sarajevo, 71.72% in Banja Luka, and 72.22% in Bijeljina.




Figure 2. Respondents by year of study

Figure 2 shows that there is a good inclusion of students from all years of study in the sample from the faculties in Banja Luka and East Sarajevo. Due to logistical issues, on

the dates of the visits to the faculties in Bijeljina it was not possible to survey any third-year students. The first year of study constitutes 31.8%, the second year 35.0%, the third year 13.6%, and the fourth year 19.6% of total students in the sample.




Figure 3. Respondents by total population of their hometown

As shown in Figure 3, respondents came from hometowns of various population sizes. Since the RS consists mainly of small towns, it was expected that the largest share of the students (40.4%) would come from hometowns with a population between 5,000 and 30,000. Due regional characteristics, most students from big towns are studying in Banja Luka, and there are a small percentage of them in East Sarajevo. Banja Luka is the largest city in the RS with a population of 180,053 (RSIS, 2017) and it is less than an hour's drive from Prijedor, the third most populous city with 80,916 citizens (Ibid). East Sarajevo, population of 59,916 citizens (Ibid), is not a spatially coherent city but consists of several widespread mid-sized municipalities, and the nearest larger cities in the RS (Bijeljina and Trebinje) are more than three hour's drive away. Since the city was established less than two decades ago, most of the population still identify themselves as residents of their respective municipalities, rather than citizens of East Sarajevo.

Results

What are the dominant factors that influence the development of value orientations of students in the RS and what are the principal reasons for their emigration?




Figure 4. *Main sources of information about social events (results in %)*

The Internet is the main source of information about social events for students in the RS, as 65.01% of them are receiving their news from web portals and 11.91% from social networks. Conversations with friends, acquaintances, and family members (a total of 9.67%) are represented as the source of information almost as much as all of the “traditional” media combined (a total of 12.38%).




Figure 5. *The most important values (results in %)*

Figure 5 provides information about the most important values for young people in the RS. When presented with only one choice, they exhibited the prevalent patriarchal

patterns where healthy family relationships (34.24%), love for one's neighbours (23.57%), and love for God (21.09%) are much more valued than nature (5.21%), education (2.98%), legal state (2.23%), or good interethnic relations (2.23%).




Figure 6. *Prevalence of script usage*

More than three quarters (78.16%) of students in the RS write in the Cyrillic more often than in the Latin script. Since 95% of the respondents identified themselves as Serbs by ethnicity, it is an indicator of high awareness among young people of the Cyrillic alphabet as an important element of identity and cultural heritage.

Table 1. *Main influences on the development of attitudes (in %)*

	Family	Peers	Media	School/ College	Religious institutions
About politics	33.5	3.7	50.9	10.7	1.2
About religion	64	5	3.5	6.2	21.3
About the state	29.5	4.7	46.2	19.4	0.2
About love	72.7	17.9	3.5	4.5	1.5
About education	33.5	5.2	3.7	57.3	0.2
About social justice	44.2	8.4	20.8	25.1	1.5
About freedom	59.3	11.4	16.1	10.4	2.7
About diversity	40.9	18.6	22.8	14.6	3
About cultural heritage	55.3	4.7	11.2	24.6	4.2

Table 1 shows that most respondents think that their family had the most influence on the development of attitudes about love (72.7%), religion (64%), freedom (59.3%), cultural heritage (55.3%), social justice (44.2%), and diversity (40.9%). The media had the most influence on the development of attitudes about politics (50.9%) and the state (46.2%). Educational institutions prevailed at developing attitudes about education. The influence of religious institutions is negligible to the extent that the influence from family (64%) is three times stronger than that of religious institutions (21%) regarding the attitudes about religion.




Figure 7. Country considered as students' homeland

If asked which country they consider as their main homeland, three times more students opted for the Republic of Srpska (62.53%) than for Bosnia and Herzegovina (20.60%). Serbia is considered the main homeland by 12.16% of the respondents and other countries by 4.71%.




Figure 8. Students with an acquaintance who has emigrated from the RS in previous 5 years

Figure 8 shows that almost all of the students (92.54%) have an acquaintance that emigrated from the RS in the previous five years.




Figure 9. *Main reasons to emigrate from the Republic of Srpska (results in %)*

The dominant reason for emigration is unemployment and poverty (73.70%), followed by political instability (7.69%), and corruption and nepotism (5.71%).

Discussion

The right to cultural identity implies the right of every individual or group to have access to an accumulated cultural heritage. Cultural rights are based on the existence of traditional cultural values that are the basis for the preservation of cultural identity. The Republic of Srpska has an excellent environment for cultural identity development, as there is rich tradition and social heritage, homogenous territory, and a population in constant interaction and exchange with other cultures. Although state institutions are fairly detached from any serious attempts to strategically shape and define cultural identity, generations born after the civil war are keenly aware of their cultural heritage. In the era of computerisation and the development of social networks, the Internet is their main source of information about social issues, but they still rely on family as the authority for the development of attitudes about values such as freedom, social justice, love, cultural heritage, religion, and diversity. Although many aspects of family are diminished in contemporary society, it preserved and maintained itself as an important social category in the RS. Students in the RS consider healthy family relationships as the most important value, followed by love for their neighbours and love for God. They dominantly use Cyrillic over Latin script and consider the RS as their homeland. In order to strategically support cultural development and the cultural identity within, it is necessary to involve proactive state actors. One problem in shaping the cultural identity in the RS is the lack of strict criteria for determining the expediency of certain activities in cultural life. The development of political (party) identity cannot be of superior interest to the development of cultural identity. Cultural identity should be tied to the moral conditions that enable and stimulate cultural creativity, as well as its adequate social and financial valorisation. Regardless of the high level of cultural identity awareness among young people, there are obvious economic issues that, together with uncontrollable

corruption and nepotism, create the social environment without a clear perspective. Ambiguous and slow development of new social values has left young people torn between traditional values and transitional challenges of poverty, deep social disparities, and persistently high youth unemployment rates. Therefore, the result is more than 95% of students who have an acquaintance who has migrated from the RS in last 5 years. Regardless of the widespread belief that the biggest issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina are national and cultural intolerance and memories of the past war, unemployment and poverty (73.70%) are the dominant issues for young people and the dominant reasons for their migration. The seriousness of the situation is best demonstrated by the fact young people identified unemployment and poverty as the main reason why they would leave the RS (73.70%), which is thirty-seven times higher than armed conflict (1.99%).

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DETERMINANTE IDENTITETA STUDENTSKE POPULACIJE U REPUBLICI SRPSKOJ

Apstrakt

Istraživanje kulturnog identiteta studentske populacije pripada kompleksu istraživanja o kulturnom životu omladine uopšte, veoma aktuelne teme u kontekstu izrazito dinamičnih društvenih promena s kojima se ova populacija susreće u Republici Srpskoj. Identitet kao produkt ljudskog delovanja i interakcije konstituiše se i menja na osnovu mnoštva uticaja koji dolaze iz intimne, ekonomske, kulturne i drugih sfera. Pojedinci i grupe interakcijom i međuzavisnošću razmenjuju znanja i iskustva, stvaraju uverenja o postojanju sličnosti i različitosti na kojima grade svoj lični i kolektivni identitet. Poseban problem u kulturnom identitetu mladih javlja se u stanju slabe društvene podrške, kao osnove za nastanak osećaja straha, sumnje, nezadovoljstva i nedostojnosti samog sebe i grupe kojoj pripadaju. Produženo trajanje nestabilnosti, konflikta i neizvesnosti u okruženju dovodi do situacije da se izvorni, „pravi identitet“ oseća kao glavna smetnja stabilnosti i prosperitetu, što dovodi do njegovog odbacivanja i želje da se bude neko drugi. U ovom radu autori, na osnovu istraživanja studentske populacije u Istočnom Sarajevu, Bijeljini i Banjoj Luci, analiziraju dominantne determinante formiranja savremenog kulturnog identiteta mladih u Republici Srpskoj.

Ključne reči: kultura, identitet, mladi, studenti, Republika Srpska

SOME DETERMINANTS OF THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL IDENTITY OF THE ROMANI COMMUNITY IN SERBIA

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Abstract

Following the sociological perspective of the concept of identity, which implies the close connection between identity and social interaction within which socialization and internalization of the elements relevant to its construction take place, this paper will present some aspects of the social and cultural identity of the Romani community in Serbia. The presented results pertain to the attitudes of the Romani people in Serbia toward the use of language and their linguistic practices, their attitudes toward religion, their values, their attitudes toward the characteristics of their own culture and their willingness to preserve it, and their relations with non-Romani people and with the elders as an essential aspect of the Romani culture. The findings support the assumption that social and cultural identities, as well as the attitudes and particular social practices that result from them, are an expression of the overall social position of this minority ethnic group. The use of language, attitude to religion, and certain cultural values are conditioned by the need to preserve one's own minority identity, on the one hand, while on the other hand, they are an expression of the unequal distribution of social power between majority and minority communities in Serbia. That is why cultural and social mimicry emerges as a form of reaction to marginalization and avoidance of stigmatization. The results reported in the paper are part of the research findings within the project Social and Cultural Potential of the Romani Ethnic Community in Serbia, conducted in 2014 on a stratified sample of 1212 respondents.

Key words: Serbia, the Romani, social identity, cultural identity, social and cultural practices, inequality

Introduction

Difficulties of studying identity stem from the very fact that there are numerous factors that influence its development/construction. Even though there is no agreement among authors on whether essential factors such as shared ancestry, language, culture, religion, and territory are crucial to the conception of identity, or whether they are fluid constructions in the process of continuous creation that can be interpreted within a particular discourse (see Hall, 1990), the sociological perspective most often respects the

relational character of identity. Thus, sociologists emphasize that identity is formed in social interaction and in the process of cultural exchange and complex relationships between the individual and society (Cifrić, Nikodem, 2006; Woodward, 2004), as well as the fact that identity choices are a necessity in contemporary society (Giddens, 2003). In addition to social organization itself, class, gender, ethnic, residential, and other factors are also important for the formation of the cultural and social identity of individuals and groups (Woodward, 2004). In the case of the Romani ethnic community, other social factors are also important. The Romani people do not have their own state, but shape and nurture their own cultural and social identities as minority ethnic communities in different types of societies and cultures. It is a community still working on the standardization of its own language, preserving indigenous culture largely through oral traditions, the transmission of which is shaped by the experience of life as the “guardians” of traditions in different cultural contexts. All of the above represent the reasons why there is no systematic and complete picture of their identity.¹ Despite the fact that the Romani people make up the largest pan-European minority, their lives take place on the margins of communities, which not only affects their identity but somewhat diminishes the interest of scholars in this topic. For all these reasons, we consider the interest in the cultural and social identity of the Romani a sufficient, though not the only, reason for exploring this topic in a sociological way and thus enriching the existing knowledge.

Methodology

The findings we present are part of a broader study conducted in 2014 on a stratified sample, based on the results of the latest census in the Republic of Serbia, with strata formed according to the territorial distribution of the Romani people in Serbia² and covering as many as 34 municipalities with high Romani participation according to the 2011 census. Special attention during sample formation was given to the residential diversity of the Romani population, which is an important dimension from the aspect of the autochthony of Romani communities and cultural practices, as well as to the integration of the Romani into the social majority, which is important for the formation of cultural and social identity. The surveyed settlements are classified into urban/rural micro-regions (in which there is no territorial concentration of the Romani people, but they are integrated into the rest of the population), Romani settlements (mahallahs) in a city/village, slums in a city/village, mahallahs and slums outside a city/village, as well as suburban neighborhoods.³ The gender structure of the respondents corresponds to the census results.

The questions in the instrument of relevance to the topic pertain to the assessment of the importance of particular characteristics of Romani culture for the specificity of the

¹ There have only recently been some efforts in this direction within the context of interdisciplinary romological studies and the sociology of ethnic minorities and groups that are increasingly suppressing a mere descriptive study of Romani folklore.

² It should be noted that, according to the latest census results, most Romani people live in Eastern and Southern Serbia, 39%, while 29% live in Vojvodina, 18% in the Belgrade region, and 18% live in Šumadija and Western Serbia.

³ 11% of the respondents were surveyed in the urban micro-region, 38.2% in Romani settlements in a city, 4.7% in city slums, 8.4% in Romani settlements near the city, 3.3% in slums near a city, 6.8% in suburban neighborhoods, 16.9% in the village, 9% in Romani settlements in the village, 0.2% in village slums, 1.1% in Romani settlements near a village, and 0.4% in slums near the village.

Romani ethnic group. Additionally, linguistic practices, attitudes toward religion, values, and willingness to preserve the specificities of Romani culture, and attitudes toward non-Romani people as well as the elders in their own ethnic community as an important aspect of Romani culture were also examined.

The key research questions addressed in the paper include the following: 1) Which markers of cultural identity do the Romani highlight as the key features of their own ethnic and cultural background? 2) In the case of the Romani ethnic community in Serbia, can we speak of a developed linguistic identity and linguistic practices that support it? 3) What is the religious affiliation of the Romani people in Serbia and what does their religious self-identification indicate? 4) What is the attitude of the Romani people toward the non-Romani in Serbia? 5) What is the attitude toward the elderly among members of the Romani ethnic community in Serbia (bearing in mind that this is an important aspect of Romani culture)?

Research results: analysis and discussion

Attitudes toward key markers of the cultural identity of the Romani community in Serbia

The question of what makes the Romani community special helped to determine how the Romani people perceive the importance of particular elements of culture for their own collective identity. The data show that they perceive music, their own language, and Romani customs as three key pillars of identifying their own ethnic group (mean score of about 4). The least valued markers, judging by the respondents' views, include tribal affiliation, Romani cuisine, and Romani clothing (mean score 3.4; 2.82; 2.72). The mean values of the obtained answers, more specifically the arithmetic mean scores of the offered elements of cultural identity, are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. *Descriptive statistics for the answers to the question: Rate 1 (minimum) to 5 (maximum) what makes your community special*

Which of the following makes your community special?	N	Mean score	Median	Standard deviation
Romani language	1209	4.09	5.00	1.27524
Tribal affiliation	1206	2.89	3.00	1.55370
Romani customs	1206	3.98	5.00	1.28725
Romani music	1205	4.32	5.00	1.14547
Romani clothing	1204	2.72	3.00	1.55879
Romani cuisine	1203	2.82	3.00	1.56607
Part of the Romani settlement	1204	3.40	4.00	1.53199

Romani music is a traditional cultural marker that makes the Romani community recognizable, not only because a significant part of the Romani associate their existence with music, no matter how unfavorable some musicologists and other scholars have evaluated its quality (Đorđević, 1946; Đorđević, 1984; Dvorniković, 1990; Rihtman, 1971; cf. Petrović, 2016). It should be remembered that

the Romani people occupy a prominent place in European (classical) music, not only as interpreters, but also as an inspiration to some of the most important composers [...] In Serbia, the Romani people certainly represent a significant musical group, without which one cannot imagine traditional tamburitza music in

Vojvodina or the temperamental Southern melos, dominated mainly by brass orchestras, contributing to the popularity of that music worldwide (Petrović, 2016, p. 110).

However, this paper will not elaborate further on this determinant of the Romani cultural identity, as well as their customs, at the expense of considering less studied cultural practices related to the Romani language, which is certainly one of the most important elements of collective identification of Romani people.

Linguistic identity and linguistic practices of the Romani ethnic community in Serbia

The preservation of the language of the Romani ethnic community is one of the key issues of their cultural and social identity, since it goes beyond the scope of linguistics. The field of language use is the scene of struggles for symbolic domination, as Bourdieu (1991) observed. Therefore, linguistic practices cannot be viewed outside the socio-historical and political context, or beyond the issues of power, inequality, as well as linguistic policies (Petrović, 2019). Language use is somewhat shaped by the social context, or more precisely, it is partly socially-determined and channeled (Grenfell, 2009, p. 441; cf. Bourdieu, 1991).

The issue of attitude toward the language and language practices is extremely important in the case of the Romani ethnic community, given that the Romani people do not have the standard mechanisms for nurturing and preserving the cultural identity of communities that have their own state and institutions intended for that purpose. However, the results of this study show that, for the average speaker, the preference for the predominant use of one's own language cannot be motivated solely by a sense of belonging to one's own ethnic community and the awareness that one's relationship to the language is crucial to preserving cultural and ethnic specificity.

When asked about their mother tongue, more than three quarters of the respondents, 78.5% to be precise, answered that it was Romani, 15.4% said that it was Serbian, while the rest cited other languages as their mother tongue (6%). However, regarding the use of the Romani language, it was shown that 74.9% of the respondents speak this language perfectly, every tenth respondent (10.8%) speaks it poorly, 6% of Roma in Serbia do not speak Romani but understand it and what is particularly interesting, every twelfth respondent (8.3%) neither speaks nor understands the language of their ethnic community. In sum, every eighth respondent does not speak the language of their ethnic group.

In light of this distribution of answers, the question arose as to who the most faithful guardians of the Romani language in Serbia are, so we observed in what region the Romani language is most used, and how the educational status reflects on the preservation of this language. It turned out that this question made sense because out of the Romani people who did not speak the Romani language, the majority lived in Vojvodina (17.2%) and in the Šumadija region and Western Serbia (13%), slightly fewer in the Belgrade region (8.1%), while there were none in Southeastern Serbia. The differences in the level of knowledge of the Romani language among the residents of northwestern Serbia and those living in the southeast of the country proved statistically significant ($\chi^2_{(3)} = 49.178$ [N=1210] Sig. 0.000; Cramer's V= 0.202), as did the differ-

ences among the respondents with different levels of education ($\chi^2_{(21)} = 38.8578$ [N=1197] Sig. 0.010; Cramer's V= 0.110). Specifically, respondents with no education or those with the lowest level of education are better acquainted with the Romani language than those with a higher level of education.

In the researchers' opinion, this information can be interpreted in the light of the acculturation process, perhaps even the assimilation that takes place in the educational process and in the field of everyday communication determined by the residential factor. The former is realized through the mechanism of imposing the language pattern of the majority that dominates the formal education system. Its strength is unquestionable, growing with time spent in school. The impact of the residential factor could, in turn, be summarized as follows: "the higher the concentration of speakers of the standard language the lower the tolerance for the use of stigmatized language and of other languages representing stigmatized groups" (Petrović, 2019, p. 215).

In simple terms, in the parts of Serbia where several linguistic variants of the Serbian language are used and where few standard-language speakers live, it is possible that there is less pressure on speakers of non-standard varieties and speakers belonging to marginalized groups to use the standard language, which favorably reflects on the frequency of use of the Romani language. Another important factor is the number of the members of the Romani ethnic community in the region of southeastern Serbia and their concentration in separate settlements, where people not only use the Romani language but also have an opportunity to use it in daily communication with their neighbors, peers groups, etc. It could be assumed that the chances for social integration of the Romani people and their upward mobility are better in economically more developed areas. However, the impact of this factor has yet to be verified in a new research.

With regard to linguistic practices, as expected, the Romani language is often used (always/often) in private communication. Almost three quarters of the respondents always use their mother tongue in communication with their parents (72%) or spouse (71.2%), while two thirds of them always use it when talking to their relatives (67.3%) or their own children (65.6%). In other speech situations – communication with their neighbors, friends, colleagues, or people outside the immediate environment in which they live – the use of the Romani language is less frequent (see Table 2).

Table 2. *Use of mother tongue in different speech situations (sample level findings in %)*

Use of mother tongue in communication with	Always	Often	Rarely	Never	Σ
Spouse	71.2	14.4	7.3	7.2	100
Children	65.6	16.3	11.7	6.4	100
Parents	72.0	14.8	7.2	6.0	100
Relatives	67.3	20.5	9.1	3.1	100
Neighbors	51.5	21.7	16.7	10.0	100
Friends	47.5	23.7	20.7	8.2	100
Colleagues	22.5	9.6	20.1	47.8	100
People who are not from the immediate environment	17.5	8.8	24.6	49.1	100

In addition to the Romani language, ¾ of the Romani people in Serbia use another language for communication, 7.1% poorly speak another language, while 3.1% do not

speak but understand another language. Among the Romani people, there are also some who neither speak nor understand any other language (4.6%). When asked about what language it was, 80.7% of Romani people said it was Serbian. Summing up, every fifth member of the Romani ethnic community in Serbia does not use Serbian, which indirectly confirms the problems related to the social integration of this community, many times highlighted in various studies. In addition to Serbian, the Romani people most often speak English, German, Romanian, and Albanian. Of those who speak two languages in addition to Romani, the combination of the languages mentioned above is the most common. There are 29% of them in the sample. We assume that they are Romani people who have spent some time in one of the countries where these languages are spoken, that is, Romani people from Kosovo and Metohija who have learned the languages of the majority ethnic communities in the area.

Not only due to the problems with the use of the language of the majority community in Serbia, but also in light of the responses that language makes their ethnic community special, it is interesting to observe the views of the Romani people regarding the education of their children in the Romani language. Although the majority of the surveyed Romani people (almost three quarters) consider their own language to be one of the most important features of their own ethnic group, only 31.6% of them think that they should educate their children in the Romani language on all education levels, while 21.8% say that they would only do so until the completion of primary education, and as many as 43.4% would not educate their children in Romani at all (Figure 1).




Figure 1. Attitudes of the Romani people toward education in the Romani language

From the explanation of such an attitude, it becomes evident that linguistic practices that mark the linguistic identity of the Romani population in Serbia are part of the efforts of individuals and groups to avoid discrimination on other grounds. Specifically, respondents estimated that the use of the Romani language would be inadequate because: they live in Serbia – 77.4%, do not benefit from it – 13.7%, do not speak the language –

4.4%, or are not interested in such a possibility – 2.0%. An important question is why the use of the Romani language in education is undesirable, since not speaking the Serbian language is emerging as a key obstacle in the education of the Romani (Čekić, Marković, 2016), with a significant proportion of the Romani people belonging to the group of the least educated population (Raduški, 2003; Sokolovska, Jarić, 2014). By all accounts, theorists such as Bourdieu are right to point out that language is a tool for the “battle” fought in the field of education, economy, politics, and ideology, and therefore, when choosing a language, speakers anticipate their own social position resulting from the use of a particular language as a form of symbolic capital that they can have at their disposal (Petrović, 2019). Therefore, we can conclude that the linguistic practices of the Romani community in Serbia and their justification for avoiding schooling in their own language is a reflection on their own position and the value of the linguistic capital they have at their disposal. Insofar as they choose to educate their children in the Serbian language, they must be aware of the benefits of coming closer to the majority population. That is why the attitudes of the Romani people toward the education of children in the Romani language are a response to the fact that “the school system tends to reproduce the universal recognition of the language of the majority as the only legitimate and prestigious language” (Petrović, 2019, p. 218). Consequently, the use of the Romani language is in fact linked to the avoidance of other forms of discrimination (see more in Petrović, 2019).

A good support for this conclusion is the information we obtained in this survey – as many as 63% of the respondents know a Romani person who does not acknowledge their own nationality and presents himself/herself as belonging to some other nationality. This is explained by the need to be better accepted by the immediate environment (55.7%) or the desire for personal achievement (34.9%). This finding is in line with the decades-long practice of Romani people presenting themselves as Serbs, Yugoslavs, and the like, which has been reported by other researchers as well (see, for example, Baucal, Stojanović, 2010; Đorđević, 2010; Jakšić, 2002; Jovanović, 2003), interpreting it in different ways: as an escape from the uncertainty of everyday life, an expression of distrust toward the non-Romani, a departure from paternalism and a reluctance to cooperate with state authorities, or the pursuit of better social integration.

Religious affiliation of the Romani people and religious self-identification

Researchers of Romani culture and customs emphasize religious diversity as one of its key characteristics (Đorđević, Todorović, 2003; Đurović, 1996; Đorđević, 2010; Raduški, 2015). Religious affiliation and religious practices, just as other characteristics of their identity, cannot be viewed outside the context of broader historical, political, and economic factors, including influences from intercultural exchange (Petrović, 2019). The delicate social and cultural position of the Romani people resulted in the fact that, in addition to preserving their old, mostly pagan beliefs and customs, they most often embrace the religion of the majority communities among which they live (Todorović, 2012, p. 87). Studies of religious beliefs and practices of the Romani people in several countries have shown this (e.g. Bogumilova, Cvitković, Vukadinović et al., see more in Đorđević, Todorović, 2003). The results of the present study confirm this. Specifically, 53.9% of Romani people choose to belong to the Orthodox religion, slightly less than a third or 30.5% are believers of the Islamic faith and 4.4% are members of the Catholic

religion. There are 2.7% of Protestant Romani people, while other religious options (Pentecostals, Baptists, Adventists, and Evangelists) amount to 2.4%. One in twenty respondents did not want to declare their religious affiliation (5.6%).

Judging by the same findings, the Romani people find the religious affiliation of their partners to be very important, since this distribution of answers was also maintained regarding the faith and confessional affiliation of their spouses. Namely, the tendency of the Romani people to preserve ethnically pure marriages is well-known, which researchers cite as one of the most important characteristics of the identity of the Romani population (Đorđević, 2004). Therefore, we also investigated how pretensions to “pure” marital communities were distributed in terms of religious/confessional affiliation. A comparison of the religious and confessional affiliation of the respondents and their partners shows that Romani marriages are homogenous in terms of religion, as well. Thus, most Romani people choose spouses of the same religion/confession, and this practice is most widespread among Roman Catholic respondents – 97.6%, followed by Orthodox – 94% and Protestant – 93.8%. Members of the Islamic faith are somewhat more flexible, but still with a strong preference for choosing a spouse of the same religion – 87.5%. Testing the differences in the responses of respondents of different faiths/confessions,⁴ we concluded that the variations found in efforts to preserve religiously homogeneous marriages were statistically significant ($\chi^2_{(9)} = 1979.416$ [N=885] Sig. 0,000).

The results were similar regarding the transgenerational transmission of faith. The largest share of the Romani people preserve their parents’ religious affiliation, with significantly more respondents not knowing the answer to the question of what religion their parents belonged to.

There are different interpretations as to why the Romani people actually embrace the religion of the community in which they live. Part of the answer can certainly be interpreted in a similar way to language and other cultural practices – they accept it as a form of ethnic mimicry in an attempt to avoid discrimination (Mirga, Mruz, 1997). On the other hand, part of the explanations found in the literature is that the Romani people are trying to find their way to better social integration through religious orientation, i.e. toward building bridges to the communities in which they live. Of course, it is not unreasonable to attribute part of the explanation to the fact that due to the lack of written evidence on their own ancestral faith, they resort to the religious beliefs that have the greatest influence in the area in which they live, thus accepting the most common beliefs of the majority population, often practicing them in combination with the preserved elements of their ancestral faith and/or elements of other religions/confessions. Thus, the religious beliefs of the Romani population are a kind of religious syncretism. The Romani people in Serbia and the region, regardless of whether they are members of Islam or of the Christian faith, celebrate most holidays belonging to both options, practicing similar or identical customs (Đorđević, Todorović, 2003). However, it is clear from the information we have provided that a portion of the Romani remain open to new religious options that are not part of the religious tradition in the area in which they live, as evidenced by the wave of Protestantization of Romani people in Serbia in recent decades,

⁴ After discarding low-frequency responses.

which will undoubtedly change the image of their collective identity (see Todorović, 2016).

It is interesting to show the results obtained on the scale of religious self-identification.

Table 3. *Religious self-identification of Romani people in Serbia*

What is your personal attitude toward religion?	%
I am religious because I accept everything my religion (the church) teaches	42.4
I am religious because I adhere to all the customs that my religion (church) dictates	24.0
I am religious, though I do not accept everything that my religion (the church) teaches	15.2
I do not belong to any particular religion (church), but I believe in God	8.8
I am not sure if I am religious or not	1.7
I am not religious, but I adhere to the most important religious customs of my people	4.4
I am not religious, but I respect the religious beliefs and religious affiliation of other people	1.8
I am not religious and I am not interested in religion	1.4
I am an opponent of every religion	0.2
Total	100.0

The data shows a pronounced religiosity of the Romani people – as many as 90.4% of Romani people in Serbia declare themselves as religious, and almost a half of them are devout believers who accept whatever their religion requires while another quarter of those surveyed practice their religiosity at the level of custom. At the same time, there is a notably negligible proportion of atheists and those who oppose any religion. It is obvious that religious affiliation, religiosity, and the practice of religious customs are important segments of the cultural being of the Romani community in Serbia, judging by their religious self-identification. The theorists' claim that these boundaries appear to be shifting toward another sphere, in fact, toward distancing and the "erection of walls" between religious believers and those who are not, is not unfounded (Đorđević, 2004, Todorović, 2014).

Attitudes of the Romani people toward the non-Romani

A large number of studies and texts have been written on the attitude of the majority population toward the Romani people, most often as a minority community living on the margins of different societies, while there are relatively few studies dealing with the relationship of the Romani people toward others. It is also true that in recent years the number of such of texts has increased. When interpreting these relationships, the authors often rely on a set of rules known as *Rromanipe(n)* – a kind of a system of social and cultural norms that form the backbone of Romani identity (Mirga, Mruz, 1997; Đorđević, 2004; Todorović, 2014), essential for cultural communication and social interaction between members of the Romani ethnic community and individuals from other cultures or ethnic groups. These unwritten rules actually highlight the boundaries between the Romani people and the non-Romani. They include, inter alia, the rule that group solidarity of the Romani people is desirable as well as that there are clear borders between the Romani and the Others, as evidenced by the avoidance of mixed marriages, the professions of the non-Romani, etc.

In the research we are presenting, we observed the attitude of the members of the Romani ethnic community toward the non-Romani through several indicators. First, we were

interested in whether the Romani people have friends among the non-Romani, their sense of security in the environment of non-Romani neighbors, and how they get along with neighbors who do not belong to their ethnic community. Interestingly, 91.1% of the Romani people have non-Romani friends, and 88.3% get along well with the neighbors who are not of same ethnicity.

However, it is worrying that when the question is reduced to a sense of security in the environment, every tenth respondent decisively states that they do not feel safe in the environment of their non-Romani neighbors (10.7%), and when we add to that the respondents who did not express their opinion (11.3%), the question remains how many Romani people are truly accepted as equal citizens in Serbia.

Table 4. *Relationship between the Romani people and the non-Romani in Serbia (findings in %)*

Agreement with the claims	I agree	I do not agree	No attitude about it
I do not feel safe in the environment of my non-Romani neighbors	10.7	78.0	11.3
I get along well with my non-Romani neighbors	88.3	4.0	7.8
I have friends among the non-Romani	91.1	4.3	4.6

Such a question takes on an additional meaning when the data related to the frequency of discrimination in different social situations in communication with fellow citizens or institutions are observed (Table 5). The data show that there is no social relation (from those surveyed) in which there was no discrimination against members of the Romani ethnic community. From the data presented, we can see that every twelfth Romani person in Serbia has often⁵ experienced some form of discrimination in the above social relations. The Romani people are most often discriminated against by their fellow citizens, as well as by healthcare and educational institutions, which are actually the contacts they most frequently make in their daily lives, so the stigmatization experienced during these contacts can actually be considered as a kind of discrimination against the Romani people in Serbia.

Table 5. *Discrimination against Romani people in Serbia (findings in %)*

As a member of the Romani people, do you encounter any form of discrimination by:	Never	Sometimes	Often	I cannot assess
Fellow citizens	39.1	39.1	17.9	3.8
Coworkers	52.4	20.1	8.3	19.3
Municipal institutions	52.3	27.9	13.6	6.2
State institutions	54.8	21.5	8.7	15.0
Educational institutions	52.2	29.2	14.1	4.5
Healthcare institutions	54.3	25.7	16.8	3.1
Cultural institutions	59.4	20.2	8.2	12.1
In public buildings (cafes, taverns, restaurants ...)	48.5	25.4	12.2	13.9

The issue of discrimination against the Romani people is partly explained by the respondents themselves while answering one of the questions in our survey. Namely, when asked about the extent to which other peoples in Serbia are familiar with Romani

⁵ In none of the options offered does the percentage of respondents fall below 8% in the 'Often' column.

culture, we received answers which, in our opinion, suggest that the Romani people in Serbia live next to but not together with others. In fact, respondents believe that very few citizens of Serbia who are not members of the Romani ethnic community are fully aware of Romani culture (6.6%). At the same time, as many as 42.5% believe that other people are poorly acquainted with Romani culture, while every tenth respondent claims that they are not at all familiar with Romani culture.

Of course, the attitude toward the Romani ethnic community is not only conditioned by the ignorance of Romani culture, which suits stereotyping and higher ethnic distancing, as indicated by numerous studies (Turjačanin, 2004; Todorović, 2007; Miladinović, 2008; Ivanov, 2008; Lazar 2005; Mantarova, Zaharieva, 2007; Petrović, Šuvaković, 2013; Petrović, Šuvaković, 2015), but also determined by their social status in the community in which they live. We therefore agree with the view of researchers who claim that social distance comes from their unfavorable “subclass”, “sub-proletarian” position (Mitrović, 1990; Mitrović, 1996).

Attitudes toward the elders in their own ethnic community as an important aspect of Romani culture

Elders in Romani culture have always had special significance, so the respect for an older family member's authority is considered to be one of the important determinants of Romani culture. Part of the explanation is to be found in the fact that a significant part of Romani identity and Romani culture is preserved through oral tradition. Thus,

[i]n the absence of written cultural monuments, the elder Romani were often the only source from which the Romani communities were able to get to know the segments of their own history, get to know their cultural heritage. Persecuted, repeatedly and throughout history, systematically exterminated, without a homeland, subject to the influences of the cultures of nations who make up the majority environment (often hostile), forced to live on the margins of different societies, mostly illiterate, the Romani people relied on oral tradition transmitted from generation to generation. In the circumstances of nomadic life, the family represented the organizational pillar of the Romani community and a framework for survival. Therefore, older members of the family also have a special place as guardians of the heritage, and being more experienced and wiser, they are left to resolve family and external disputes, make key decisions, and counsel and protect the younger (Petrović, 2014, p. 45, 46).

At the same time, given the transformation of family relations in the Romani community (see Petrović, 2014), the question arises as to what extent this element of the cultural profile of the Romani remains intact today. The results of our research show that a small proportion of the Romani people still choose to respect this tradition today, 71.8% of the respondents agree with the view that older family members should have the “final word” in the family. The question arose as to who the guardians of this traditional attitude are – the women or the men, the young or the old, the more educated or the less educated?

Additional statistical testing has shown that although men and the elderly are more inclined to believe that the elders should decide on family issues, these characteristics are not a predictor of attitudes toward the elders. However, the less educated respondents are

more likely to follow the tradition of respecting the rights of the elders to make family decisions. The difference is especially large between those with no formal education and those with the highest education. For the more educated, authority and the right to decide obviously do not rest solely on "life experience". Generally speaking, differences in terms of the right of the oldest household member to make family decisions were statistically significant in groups of respondents formed according to the level of formal education ($\chi^2_{(14)} = 115.129$ [N=1198] Sig. 0.000).

Attitudes toward older members of the Romani family were also examined by establishing the degree of disagreement with the statement that young people should listen to the elders unconditionally. Although, at the level of the surveyed population, there is somewhat less agreement with this attitude than with the statement that the elders should have a "final say" in the household, over two thirds of the respondents (69.7%) still believe that the young should show obedience to the older members of their family. When considering the attitude toward the inviolability of the authority of the elders by sex and age, it was observed to not be equal in the groups of respondents formed according to the mentioned characteristics. However, the differences observed are not statistically significant. However, the level of formal education of the respondents is a significant predictor of the respondents' attitude toward the inviolability of the opinion of the elders regarding young people. Thus, while the overwhelming majority of the respondents with no education accept this view (as many as 90.5%), only one in five respondents with a university degree (21.4%) thinks that young people should listen to the elders unconditionally. Differences are also evident among other groups, where they are also statistically significant ($\chi^2_{(14)} = 120.751$ [N=1194] Sig. 0.000).

The obtained data demonstrate that the patriarchal attitude toward older members of the Romani family is largely preserved, despite the somewhat transformed model of family life in the Romani community. Judging by the established differences among the respondents on the authority of the elders and the extended community, the most educated portion of the Romani population are ready to change the tradition of attitude toward the elders, feeling able to independently decide and solve important life issues. Nevertheless, it seems that the Romani family is far from adopting the dominant pattern of marginalization of the elderly as it exists in the surrounding culture.

It is interesting to note that the results of our research have shown that there is solidarity among the Romani people in Serbia regarding the preservation of their identity. Specifically, as many as 68% of our respondents are willing to engage in the work of cultural and artistic societies that preserve their heritage for the benefit of their own ethnic community, an approximate share of those willing to engage in humanitarian activities or voluntary work being 71.2% and 77.8%, respectively. The data indicate that solidarity is one of the elements of the value matrix of the Romani ethnic community in Serbia. However, when we consider their opinion on how much other members of their community are willing to engage in preserving national and cultural identity, the answers are different. According to these answers, only 14% of the Romani community are very interested in preserving their own culture and identity, while in the opinion of the respondents, 28.8% are interested but not sufficiently, which makes 42.8% altogether. The ones who are not interested at all (8.3%) and the ones who are barely interested (36.6%) make up 44.9%. Thus, it seems that the Romani are more realistic when

assessing other members of their ethnic community than when they speak of their own willingness to care for their cultural heritage and identity.

Toward a conclusion

The identity formula of Romani social and cultural identity in Serbia is an expression of the overall ethno-class position of the Romani people in the local social milieu and beyond. In an effort to reconcile the desire to preserve the characteristics of their own culture and the need to integrate into the society in which they live, Romani people resort to a mode of living that draws them closer to others, but also protects them from those same Others. By living mostly in segregated urban and rural enclaves, by choosing the same ethnic and confessional members as spouses, and by respecting the principles of solidarity and family life that include nurturing their own language and respecting the voice of the elders, they preserve their authentic culture. Yet, in trying to change their fate of life along the margins of society, they approach the Other most often by embracing the religion of the majority population or by practicing their religiosity as a kind of syncretic mix of their own religious customs enriched with the elements of other religious cultures of the majority, accepting the language of the majority and often renouncing the right to schooling in their own language.

The Romani people hold the highest regard for Romani music and their own language and customs as elements that describe their ethnic community. When cultural practices in the domain of one of the most important elements of cultural identity such as language are put under the sociological “magnifying glass”, it is observed that one portion of the Romani population in Serbia not only do not know their own language, but also do not emphasize it as their mother tongue or use it in everyday private communication situations, and even in some forms of public communication, although normative standards allow them to do so. In addition, the use of the Romani language is less common in the more developed regions of Serbia, as well as with the most educated part of this population, who should have an awareness of the need to preserve their own language. We believe that this paradox can be explained by the fact that social factors govern the trajectory of social integration of a marginalized individual or group. Although they have friends among non-Romani people and do not feel threatened by their neighbors, the majority of the Romani population have experienced some form of discrimination in Serbia. Thus the social mimicry and break with the cultural practices of one’s own ethnic community is a model followed by a part of the Romani population in Serbia, giving up the desire to pass on its language and culture to the next generation through the process of formal education. In other words, one portion of the Romani people opt for the principle of integration, which in part involves acculturation and even cultural assimilation. Some Romani people live by following the norms written in *Rromanipe*. The Romani people from underdeveloped environments and the least educated respondents remain the most faithful guardians of indigenous culture summarized in the contents of this system of rules and values that constitute the identity pattern of this ethnic community. All of the above leads to the conclusion that specific cultural practices of the Romani people identified in the research currently reflect not only their social position of being a marginalized ethnic community, but also the level of the marginalized individual. Therefore, those who are highly educated and able to live in

a more favorable economic environment with more chances for personal prosperity often find it easier to renounce the traditional cultural practices of their ethnic community.

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NEKE ODREDNICE SOCIJALNOG I KULTURNOG IDENTITETA ROMSKE ZAJEDNICE U SRBIJI

Apstrakt

Sledeći sociološku perspektivu koncepta identiteta, koja podrazumeva usku povezanost identiteta sa socijalnom interakcijom unutar koje se odvija socijalizacija i internalizacija elemenata bitnih za njegovu konstrukciju, prikazaćemo neke aspekte socijalnog i kulturnog identiteta romske zajednice u Srbiji. U radu su predstavljeni rezultati koji se tiču odnosa Roma u Srbiji prema upotrebi jezika i njihove jezičke prakse, odnosa prema religiji, vrednostima, kao i rezultati ispitivanja stavova romske zajednice prema osobenostima romske kulture i spremnosti na njeno očuvanje, zatim odnosa prema neromima i starijima kao bitnom aspektu romske kulture. Dobijeni nalazi podržavaju pretpostavku da su socijalni i kulturni identitet, kao i stavovi i određene socijalne prakse koje proizilaze iz njih, izraz ukupne socijalne pozicije ove manjinske etničke grupe. Upotreba jezika, stav prema religiji i određenim kulturnim vrednostima uslovljeni su, s jedne strane, potrebom za očuvanje vlastitog manjinskog identiteta, dok je, s druge strane, izraz neravnomerne raspodele društvene moći između većinskih i manjinskih zajednica u Srbiji. Upravo stoga se kulturna i socijalna mimikrija pojavljuju kao vidovi reakcije na marginalizaciju i izbegavanja stigmatizacije. Rezultati saopšteni u radu deo su nalaza istraživanja u sklopu projekta *Društveni i kulturni potencijal romske etničke zajednice u Srbiji* izvedenog 2014. godine na stratifikovanom uzorku od 1212 ispitanika.

Ključne reči: Srbija, Romi, socijalni identitet, kulturni identitet, socijalne i kulturne prakse, nejednakost

IDENTITY AND SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATIONS OF POLITICAL VALUES: THE EXAMPLE OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS IN KOSOVSKA MITROVICA

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Abstract

Collective identification constitutes one part of a society's dialectic in which individuals participate as actors, tending to define their social world in accordance with the objectively determined meanings of the social reality. Collectivity assumes the sense of belonging, preceded by the creation of identity by means of subjective and objective dimensions of social reality. By participating in dual internalization of not only proper identity but also social world, social actors are positioned differently within the so-called symbolic universe. This is particularly aided by the process of internalization of the institutional order and institutionally based subuniverses. Social organizations can intentionally and unintentionally influence the creation of multiple loyalties, which are expressed in the diversity of collectivities and identities. Taking into account the social ideal as a motive for identification amongst actors who perform similar social roles and are members of similar or different social origins and collectivity, it is expected that they will share certain material and symbolic means with certain solidarity and loyalty. This paper discusses symbolic representations of political values of 'brotherhood', 'unity', 'freedom', 'equality', and 'democracy' in specific social organizations that were active in Kosovska Mitrovica during the socialist period. Using the socio-historical perspective and on the basis of analysis of the presented secondary data about the way these organizations function, the aim of this paper is to describe the use of the said values by both Serbian and Albanian nationals during the development of the socialist self-government in Kosovo and Metohija.

Key words: identity, symbolic representations, internalization, social organizations, Kosovska Mitrovica

Introduction

Societies make history, but history is made of people of certain identities, so historical social structures give birth to *types* of identities, recognizable in individual cases, which are manifested in everyday life. P. Berger and N. Luckmann considered everyday life to be presented to everybody as the reality *par excellence* or as the supreme reality – due to

the fact that 'the tension of consciousness' is highest within it; it is life in the state of complete alertness (Berger & Luckmann, 1992, p. 39). Using the language of E. Durkheim, these theorists of social constructionism believed that institutions oppose the individual as 'indisputable facts' – they will survive as objective reality regardless of whether (s)he understands their purpose and mode of operation or not. Such 'forced facts', that is, derivatives of integration, are revealed as the authority over the individual and his/her temptations to redefine them (Ibid, p. 84). The roles are 'types of participants' in the context of materialized stock of knowledge, which participants of one community share, and by playing the roles, they participate in the social world as the subjectively real world (Ibid, p. 95). Legitimation and integration imply a complimentary performance of roles, which would lead to a successful connection of various representations into one cohesive unity that will create some meaning. As a process of 'explaining' and 'justifying', legitimation also contains the cognitive and normative (value) element.¹ The third branch of legitimation consists of theoretical judgments in rudimentary form, while the fourth is constructed by 'symbolic universes'. Thus, the symbolic universes are the highest level of reflexive integration of institutional orders and individual biographies, as a space in which the whole world is created (Ibid, p. 119). Symbolic universes are 'protective arches above the institutionalized order', creating a certain continuum that sums up the past, the present, and the future with the established memory (Ibid, p. 125). This means that more individuals share the collective social time and 'the overall perspective which intersubjectively connects the series of situations into a whole' (Ibid, p. 156). In addition, internalization happens only when identification happens. The significant 'other' plays an important role here. Therefore, this is the issue of dialectic between identification by others and self-identification. Within the secondary socialization, 'internalization of the institutionalized and institutionally-based 'sub-worlds' is fulfilled, which thus only make 'partial but more or less cohesive realities' opposed to the 'base-world' built in primary socialization (Ibid, p. 164, 165). By applying, in this case, analytical analogy with the Marxist understanding of society through 'base and upgrade', Berger and Luckmann offered a model of explanation of the types of sociability and its forms of identity. Identities can thus also be transformed into variable expressions of counter-identities, which depend on the needs and possibilities of redefining the meaning from the so-called stocks of common knowledge, the gap between objective and subjective reality, the absence of legitimacy and integration, and so on. With regard to the socialist society, especially the Yugoslav society, there are some unfinished analyses on the topics of (mis)use of 'brotherhood and unity', expressed on the one hand in the demands for preservation of the democratic principle of multi-ethnic tolerance, equality, collectiveness, and freedom, and on the other hand, in the demands for national affirmation and cultural development of different (other) nationalities. Brotherhood and unity are understood as political values that implicitly contain one part of the meaning of democracy. Thus, the positioning of the political systems within the modern world order is practically inseparable from the question of democracy and fulfillment of its constitutional principles. The process of spreading democracy, which there is now talked about more than ever before, both in scientific circles and in the media, even in political

¹ Here, the knowledge precedes the values: "Legitimacy 'explains' the institutional order by attributing cognitive validity to its objective meanings. Legitimacy justifies the institutional order by giving normative dignity to its practical imperatives" (Berger & Luckmann, 1992, p. 116).

leaflets, is a part of contemporary global social-political movements. Today the significance of democracy, among other things, is recognized on the basis of evaluation of the ratio of negative consequences of former political systems, which have spawned the so-called transitional 'post-societies'. Such an approach often strengthens the use of the blurred dichotomy 'authoritarian vs. democratic'. The rigid opposition between the idea of equality and the concept of freedom is surpassed in the normative meaning of democracy, which, as an idea,

cherishes the original meaning of political life as 'social', essential, which saw the light of day in the first republics of the world's history, as life of the people who are free and equal (Stevanović, 2008, p. 25).

A full-fledged democracy would be the one that is understood as a goal as well as a means, while holding both freedom and equality as its value substrate. However, it is not before uniting the two ideals that the most important principle of the contemporary (democratic) political systems is accomplished – the principle of *autonomy*. The attempts to fulfill the criteria of 'personal autonomy and the rule of the people' resulted in a large number of political systems that achieved this only to a small extent, so the meaning of democracy in the contemporary world is most frequently expressed in the form of 'limited and indirect democracy – liberal democracy' (Heywood, 2004, p. 768). Symbolic representation of the political values thus becomes the subject of interest of modern scientists, and so implies the use of symbols, events, personalities, the media, and so on with the purpose of creating and confirming the legitimacy of the given values. Representation is the key dimension of the political presentations, but here social organizations also have important roles. In her book 'The Concept of Representation', Hanna Pitkin distinguishes between representations on two grounds – representation in the sense of 'advocating for' and representation in the sense of 'working for' (according to Stokke & Selboe, 2009). Within this classification scheme, symbolic representation implies commitment to a social group. Symbols can be arbitrary or natural, but what is important for symbolic representation is to what degree people believe in the symbol (Ibid, p. 59). Symbolic representation can be understood as a practice of constructing social groups and the legitimization of their interests, i.e. as a political practice that places these representations in the context of political economy and power (Ibid, p. 60). Its functionality also depends on the type of political culture.² The political culture³ of ex-Yugoslavia was shaped by certain ethno-national conflicts, through which the members of certain nationalities opposed the institutionalized use of the basic principles of the ruling ideology. First of all, dissatisfaction of the Albanians with their position in Yugoslavia was not only expressed in the streets of big cities, within the student population, but was also present among the workers in numerous work organizations. Demanding an equal representation of their countrymen at all levels of government, decision-making, and production within work organizations, members of this national

² Political culture is defined as a 'politically complex system or network of values, beliefs, styles, symbols, and patterns of behavior, which are developed within the processes of socialization and crystallization of collective experiences and 'memories' of the members of one community about politics, that is, about general terms of their life within the community' (Matić, 1998, p. 304).

³ Considering Almond's typology of political culture, it can be said that communist ideology showed some creative potential, but, through its embodiment as a form of social-political community, it paved the way for a submissive political culture.

minority had gradually sought out the protection of their cultural rights on all state levels. Socioeconomic divisions were interwoven with ethno-national divisions, and this problem affected the industrial development in Kosovo and Metohija (K&M).⁴ On many occasions, the communist government tried to devise and apply appropriate strategies and action plans that were supposed to help prevent any 'counter-revolutionary acts' and preserve Kosovo as a socialist autonomy of equal and free people, united on the basis of brotherhood, equality, and solidarity. This situation is illustrative in the example of Trepča mine, as one of the most important industrial combines in K&M. We will highlight specific data with regards to Trepča industrial complex and the issue of the position of Serbs and Albanians, as well as the relationship between them. At the same time, we will also present certain measures of the League of Communists (CCLCY; CCLCS), which were aimed at solving the structural problem of K&M, especially the question of the Albanian national affirmation.

The Development of a model of socialist self-government in Kosovo and Metohija

The early period of the Yugoslav socialist model in the entire former country, and also in the northern part of K&M, is characterized by very harsh conditions left over by the destruction during World War II. First of all, it was very important to feed all of the people, and then to rebuild the economic and industrial infrastructure, which was laid to waste by the Wehrmacht army during their retreat. However, the primary task was to mobilize the manpower in the PLA (People's Liberation Army) to fight against the remnants of the enemy ballistic and Chetnik army, i.e. to suppress the counter-revolution in K&M. As will be shown below, mobilization for the needs of the industry was met with great resistance from the peasantry; however, mobilization to reinforce the units of the PLA did receive a remarkable response (Jevtimijević, 2008, p. 291).

One of the reasons for this lay in a clear need for defense in times of danger to the local population before the mass strikes of the Albanian Quislingian formations, 'which were backed by the greatest part of the Albanian population from the River Drenica area' (Ibid, p. 291). Simultaneously, the task was to seize individuals and groups of the broken Chetnik corps, mostly members of the Second Chetnik Kosovo Corps. These units represented an ideological threat to the newly-established authority.⁵ Another reason, according to Jevtimijević, was that for the people from this region participating in wars for liberation it was the patriotic duty for which no other benefits are expected but to be remembered by it and to continue the tradition of fighting against the invaders. In favor of this claim, it is stated that, from 87 fighters from the Banjska municipality, only 19 regulated their official status as the fighters in the people's liberation war (Ibid, p. 292).

After the initial enthusiasm generated by the liberation and the vigor it brought in engaging the population in the restoration of the country, there was a retrograde moment. Namely, immediately after the war, Tito maintained intensive and proactive relations with Albania,⁶ and since Stalin considered this country his sphere of interest, he requested

⁴ Hereinafter, the abbreviation K&M will be used instead of the full name Kosovo and Metohija.

⁵ 'Within the overall measures for the liquidation of the remains of the defeated Quislingian formations, the Operational Headquarters of the Yugoslav Army Kosmet troops publicly, through posters, called for all 'renegade Shqiptars and Chetniks' to report to the authorities thru March 10, 1945'. (Jevtimijević, 2008, p. 294).

⁶ The same as with Bulgaria and Greece, where a civil war broke out, his dream was a Balkan federation, which did not suit the great world powers.

from the Yugoslav government the harmonization of foreign policy actions with the Kremlin. As Tito did not fulfill this request, on the historical June 28, 1948 (St Vitus Day), the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) was excluded from the Cominform. Because of the harsh condemnation of the USSR, Albania withdrew from further cooperation with Belgrade. The situation became so volatile that it resulted in the shortage of food in the entire country (until material aid arrived from the West in the form of loans) and complete cessation of the cultural relationships with Albania, which came to life after the war.

At the same time, there were ongoing processes which paved the way to modernization, such as restoration, renewal, and construction of the industries, which implied mass migrations from rural into urban areas, and the industry became the meeting point of ethnic and national groups and peoples. 'Between 1945 and 1953, 1.5 million people left the countryside in favor of living in the cities. Additional 800,000 people became occasional industrial or commuting workers' (Kamberović, according to Čalić, 2013, p. 230). Employment in the industry sector was not a lucrative way of earning at the time, and the peasantry indeed strongly resisted these rapid and radical changes. The situation in Kosovska Mitrovica region confirmed this claim. Namely, Trepča had a significant role to play in the production plans, considering that it participated with 2% in the Yugoslav export and with 10% in the total Serbian export (Jevtimijević, 2008, p. 326). However, the problem this industry faced was the lack of work force. On that issue, Jevtimijević stated:

County and local boards within municipalities keep this an open question on the daily agenda. The sending of workers was first planned as voluntary, and later it somehow turned into a mobilization of people. However, people from the countryside, burdened with inherited stagnancy and attachment to the land, could hardly be separated from the land. They did not even consider any perspective in the industry and mining, as there was hardly anything that could be obtained with money, except with ration stamps... People were simply forced to go there to work. There are documented examples of people jumping out of trucks on their way to Trepča and going back to the village (Ibid, p. 326).

However, in time and with additional benefits for industrial workers (in terms of regular provisions for workers, better health insurance, and commuting) the relationship of the peasantry towards industrial labor began to change; nevertheless, they would remain living in the countryside with families for a while, but with agriculture as their secondary profession:

People went to work outside their municipality area, but not to settle there. People commuted 20 to 30km daily from their home to their place of work, but all their earnings were invested into expanding their households in the countryside, where they erected buildings and expanded their estates by clearing land for cultivation or buying the land. The inherited attachment to the land prevented them from bringing their place of work and place of residence closer together (Ibid, p. 336).

The state invested a lot into reducing illiteracy in the countryside and into introducing mandatory primary education. The activities to promote literacy for the population were intended both for men and women who outgrew the primary education. Jevtimijević

states that in the Zvečan county in the 1947/1948 school year, 1,526 women and almost as many men were taught how to read and write, while in the entire K&M territory in the same school year the total number of people who were taught how to read and write was 42,172 (Ibid, p. 325). Literacy and health culture courses, as well as legalization of abortion, lead to the second great modern phenomenon – the decrease of the birth rate. Thus, the rapid process of industrialization accompanied by other forms of modernization in this region, as well as in the entire country, was guided through strong pressure by the partisan leadership.

Another very important modernization process was in fact the main task of the Yugoslav socialist government in K&M and throughout the country – the society was to be organized on a multi-ethnic basis. In youth brigades, the Communist Party, and the Yugoslav People's Army, which represented the embodiment of the ideal of 'brotherhood and unity', the identity of people was supposed to be formed on the principle of belonging to the Yugoslav socialist self-governing local community, the so-called 'self-government'. The most important among the myths, symbols, and rituals were the partisans and other symbols of the partisan fight, in which all Yugoslav nations participated and upon which rested the principal legitimacy of the Communist Party and its lifelong and inviolable leader Tito, that is, his personality cult (Marković-Savić, 2019, p. 306). 'Brotherhood and unity' was more than an ideological motto; it was the question of the highest patriotic value.

Nevertheless, 'the golden age' of the 1960s, reflected in political liberalization, the success of industrialization, international relationships, and favorable geostrategic conditions of Yugoslavia, began to reveal the cracks in the ideology on which the system of 'brotherhood and unity' was based. There were two ongoing parallel processes, economic and ideological-political: Yugoslavia suffered a negative industrial growth but the personal income grew. 'Since then, Yugoslavia lived above its possibilities: the deficit in the trade balance and inflation were increasing, and the economic growth was decreasing' (Bilandžić-Vukadinović, according to Čalić, 2013, p. 281). In such a climate, discussions began among the republics about the two essentially opposed positions: strengthening the republics at the expense of the federation (advocated by Slovenia and Croatia, 'the state should invest by the criterion of profitability, and should not pursue a policy of development of underdeveloped parts of the country') as opposed to greater control of the state (centralism) 'with the aim of a more efficient overall economic policy and encouragement for the development of the poor parts of the country'. On top of these problems, another phenomenon of concern emerged – unemployment. At the same time, even though the government and the Party promoted good international relationships, the state experienced an internal rift, of which regular citizens were unaware due to a lack of information about the developments inside the elite circles. Namely, nationalism was not easy to sustain and prejudice and war traumas were too deep, so the supreme arbiter (Tito) used his authority to constantly remind them to 'cherish brotherhood and unity as the apple of one's eye'. One group of Kosovo's leaders who never truly gave up the idea of accession of K&M to Albania and whose ideas found a foothold and support with extreme Albanians could not have implemented and maintained such ideas on their own had it not been for another important factor – the attitude of the Central Committee of Serbia and Yugoslavia, which did not want to tackle even the hints of problems in K&M fearing a misunderstanding among the management and the disclosure of these conflicts,

which would disrupt the notion of monolithic leadership within the League of Communists. To all this, Jevtimijević added,

such behavior of a number of Serbian personnel from Kosovo and Metohija represented the typical example of striving to preserve the cushy positions in the government and winning new points in the announced reconstruction of the government in Serbia (Jevtimijević, 2008, p. 381).

Brotherhood and Unity vs. Freedom and Equality in social organizations in Kosovska Mitrovica

Kosovska Mitrovica was a smaller industrial town in the socialist period, coming a long way from an old town and ‘kasaba (kasbah) of the pre-socialist age’ to an urban and administrative center renamed Titova Mitrovica (Tito’s Mitrovica). Within the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo (its full name from 1974 to 1990), Kosovska Mitrovica also bore the name Titova Mitrovica during the 1981–1991 period. It is possible to follow the development of this town from the 1950s to the 1980s, when urban planning was based on the socialist model of urban development mostly in the area ‘north of the Ibar River’ (see Troch, 2018, pp. 33–61). The preliminary analysis showed that the economic, sociocultural, and political characteristics of this urban center were significantly shaped by the influence of the development of Trepča. Trepča, as the industrial mining, metallurgical, and chemical production complex, was the origin of not only economic but also sociocultural security, which was mirrored in residential and educational privileges for many citizens of the north K&M, regardless of their nationality. Trepča became the leader in the production of lead and zinc in the country in the second half of the 20th century and an important distributor of silver and gold, with almost the highest number of employees at 20,000 (Marković-Savić, 2018, p. 12). It functioned this way until the late 1990s, as the ethnic turmoil affected Trepča equally harshly as the rest of K&M. After 1989 and the final strike of the miners of Albanian nationality from Stari Trg (today’s part of South Mitrovica), Albanians left Trepča in large numbers, either forcefully or voluntarily. As an industrial conglomerate, Trepča functioned at its best until the 1970s – before a massive exodus of over 300 workers, mainly of Serbian and Montenegrin nationalities – although it was still formally operational until August 2000.⁷ Trepča has remained nonfunctional ever since and, as such, has become the subject of the dispute between the Serbian and Albanian governments. During its operation, the motives for Serbian–Albanian conflicts changed from economic to nationally-motivated ones and vice versa. The following data point to the division and problems of social layering, which initially manifested vertically – between the administrative staff on one hand and the semi-qualified and non-qualified workers, prevalently Albanians, on the other hand. In the beginning of the 1950s and 1960s, Trepča was an attractive job opportunity not only for the local experts but also for many experts from other European countries. By the end of the 1960s, Trepča hired around 11,000 people, but the occupational structure was as follows: 6,000 production workers with only 441 with vocational education and only 86 with higher education (Troch, 2019, p. 221). High salaries, different loan funds, and

⁷ The data provided by B. Petranović showed that from 1939 to 1974 the total number of employees in former Yugoslavia increased by about four times, reaching 4,514,000 employees, whereby 97% of the total number of employees worked in the social sector, mostly in industry and mining, trade and hospitality, cultural and social activities. During the 1980s, there were around 700,000 Yugoslav people abroad (Petranović, 1988, p. 431).

social benefits convinced many experts to spend their entire careers in Trepča.⁸ A research recently conducted among the retired workers and engineers of Albanian nationality, who still live in K&M, showed that they considered such stimulation to be proportionally 10:1 in favor of highly qualified experts, who were given around 3,000 apartments and 600 houses in total built from Trepča's funds in Kosovska Mitrovica and Zvečan (Ibid.). In addition, the Albanians also thought that the management became corrupted, citing different examples referring to Serbian managers. The Albanians had a general attitude that the League of Communists artificially created the social elite in Trepča according to political criteria by employing experts and managers of Serbian or other non-Albanian origin, mostly from Belgrade. Nevertheless, the data available to the management of the League of Communists showed that the Albanians were poorly educated at the time due to which they as well as other nationalities were offered a package of measures with different scholarships for training and secondary education.⁹ During 1961/62, the first technical schools were opened in Mitrovica and Priština, and Trepča began to grant educational scholarships. In the late 1970s, Trepča, as one of the founders, initiated the establishment of the Technical Faculty in Priština as well as the Faculty of Metallurgy in Kosovska Mitrovica in order to generate proper staff for its further development. Nevertheless, the Albanians constantly complained that the Serbian ethnic community was privileged and that all Albanians' requests for the same scholarships were usually declined by the human resources department. A very important role in all of this was played by the Brioni plenum in 1966, where the 'violence and discrimination' towards Albanian workers in K&M were openly discussed, accusing the Trepča management of national inequality and the prevalence of the Serbs among the white collar workers (Ibid, p. 222). Human resources continued to maintain the party ideology and principles, by which it was not allowed to set a national criterion before the quality criterion, considering that this disproportion had been caused by the lack of expert personnel of Albanian nationality. Consequently, an analysis of the employee structure in Trepča was performed, revealing that the number of those with completed vocational studies increased from 86 to 260, meaning the number of Albanians in the management structure improved (Ibid); however, the altered employment structure influenced the gradual exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins. The Central Union of Workers reached a decision to solve the staff problems through a more balanced national representation of workers, considering for example that the university educated staff comprised around 70% Serbs and only 9% Albanians. According to this ambitious plan of the Central Union of Workers, the employee organization should have reflected the principle of the population's composition (Ibid, p. 223). The Union wanted to ensure a sense of complete equality and freedom, so one of the changes was to impose bilingual administrative correspondence and company's documentation. After these decisions, the riots did not subside, but there were cases when the revolt in the whole country was simultaneously

⁸ Social benefits were part of the socialist policy in all of Yugoslavia, so that during the mid-1970s each resident had 13m² of living space at their disposal, while the Yugoslav residential fund had 5,000,300 apartments by the end of the 1970s (Petranović, 1988, p. 422).

⁹ Statistical data from 1948 showed that the number of the members of Albanian nationality settled in the territory of Yugoslavia was significantly smaller (750,431) compared to the number of Serbian residents (6,547,117) (Petranović, 1988, p. 313). At the time, in Serbia only Albanian was spoken by 523,011 people, who shaped the majority population in K&M in the second half of the twentieth century. The number of 'people speaking Albanian' in Belgrade from 1960 until 1990 significantly increased, but then their total number declined not only in the capital of Serbia but also in the territory of Serbia proper (Mandić, Sivački, 2015, p. 264).

accompanied by smaller incidents between Serbian and Albanian groups in work organizations. As early as 1968/69, 336 Serbian and Montenegrin employees left Trepča, 70 of whom were managers, while most of them were engineers, technicians, and highly qualified workers (Ibid.). The general manager at the time declared that the high socialist principle of unity and equality of the peoples and nationalities suddenly turned into a direct confrontation on the national basis, considering the insistence on a quick resolution independent of technological and staff capacities (Ibid, p. 224). In spite of everything, the human resources policy strategy was adopted from 1967 to 1970, with a target group of 2,000 non-qualified workers, mostly of Albanian nationality, employed in the mining and metallurgy departments. Trepča then granted 114 scholarships, 70% of which were given to Albanians, while 580 workers were financed to receive training in business schools for qualified workers (Ibid.). It was suggested that the Serbs were opposed to these measures, but there were numerous interpretations of such rudimentary changes. On the one hand, the League of Communists believed that irredentist and nationalist pretensions quickly consumed the Albanian population, starting with the intelligentsia and the elite, which controlled secondary schools and universities, and soon started to spread among workers and peasants; on the other hand, the Serbs were accused of misuse of their political power for the purpose of strengthening the position of their people, even though the principles of the company stated that the issues of nationality must be put aside. The Albanians believed that, 'instead of brotherhood and unity' and socialist self-government, only the principle of mono-nationalistic self-government was embodied. There was a tension among the Serbs and a desire to leave, because they realized that they could be replaced only on the basis of their nationality.¹⁰ The operation of this company could not avoid the problem of ethnic nepotism, which later also greatly contributed to the decrease in productivity, considering a frequent change of employee structure on the ethnic basis (Serbian or Albanian). Even though the data from that period suggest that Kosovo had a very young population, with a high percentage of both full- and part-time students of the University of Priština, there was a very distinctive lack of personnel and university students from the technical and natural-mathematical sciences.¹¹ The Trepča management tried to resolve this shortage by co-financing the establishment of the necessary faculties in K&M in the early 1970s. The Albanians thought that Trepča management was delegated on the basis of political eligibility and that the same principle (political, not professional) was used in the staff hiring policy. That is why the Albanians' request represented the appreciation of the national criterion even though it was thought that mostly communist Albanians were given the management seats in unions and some production sectors. Their role in such organizations was helpful in confronting the current status and amendments in normative acts, which reflected extremely centralist decision-making by their estimate, and in asking for the fulfillment of requirements for including

¹⁰ In the meantime, there was an anonymous survey conducted by the magazine issued by Trepča in order to obtain the data about the attitudes of employees towards the changes and especially towards the departure of highly trained and educated workers. According to the data of Peter Troch, the obtained attitudes can be classified into four problem categories: 1) lack of loyalty and work ethics among younger employees; 2) lack of respect toward experts, very poor social conditions of work, and conflicts with production workers; 3) economic difficulties of the company and financial limits for the employees; 4) national tensions and insecurities over job positions due to the influx of Albanians (Troch, 2019, p. 225).

¹¹ This problem was also noticed for all of Yugoslavia, which had over 500,000 graduated students in the period from 1945 to 1974. In the socialist period, social sciences and humanities prevailed over vocational, technological, and natural-mathematical sciences in higher education (Petranović, 1988, p. 423, 424).

all workers into self-government flows, from management and decision-making to the distribution of production income (Ibid, p. 14). Later, after the great Albanian demonstrations, it was precisely the Union of Communists that accused first of all its communist management of having allowed the influence of 'irredentists' and 'Albanian chauvinists'.

The Union of Communists tended to (re)define and exercise precise control and development measures of K&M, as a region that exemplifies the socio-political community of brotherhood and unity, democracy, freedom, and human rights. One of the most important platforms was called 'Political Platform for the Action of the League of Communists in the Development of the Socialist Self-government, Brotherhood and Equality, and Unity in Kosovo' (1981), and it was adopted on the 22nd meeting of the CCLCY, on the 17th of November, 1981. The second important document was published on the 15th of February, 1990, entitled 'The Program for the Realization of Peace, Freedom, Equality, Democracy, and Prosperity of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo'. Both platforms point to general and special reasons for the 'rejection' of the idea of brotherhood and equality, unity, and openness, which the Central Committee identified due to the continued demands of the Albanians. The Committee did not recognize these causes in the social discontent of the Albanian people, but in the organized indoctrination conducted over them by foreign 'pro-fascist enemies'. In addition, certain causes were derived from the generally poorer socio-economic development of the region, which had the almost highest share of industrial investment in the entire country, but also the lowest share of income in the social product. K&M survived owing to the funds, which, according to these platforms, would still be active. The main objective of the Communist Union was not only to restore Albanian faith in the activities of socialist self-governing society, but also to show them the concrete socio-political advantages achieved by the province of K&M up to that point, primarily owing to the historical connection between the Serbian and Albanian people, the benefits of which they would continue to promote, while respecting the freedom and human rights in all spheres of social life. Certain measures demonstrate the interest of the League of Communists in strengthening the cooperation of the two peoples through different institutional channels – economic, social, political, and cultural. However, certain measures to prevent the activities of Albanian irredentists had been highlighted, such as initiation of the proceedings to seize their property, strip them of their citizenship, and expel them from the country. Among other things, there was a plan to take control over secondary and higher education in K&M from the 'Albanian indoctrinators', together with nurturing cultures of all nationalities. At the time, there were about 40,000 students in K&M.¹² The platform identified Kosovo as a unique case in the world where the national minority enjoyed exclusive rights and which sought to protect at all costs the values of equality and brotherhood, cooperation and democracy, associations, and solidary cooperation. These measures encouraged stronger cooperation between the Serbs and the Albanians, learning of each other's language, and equality of the Albanian and the Serbo-Croatian language. In view of the expressed problem of unemployment in this

¹² The plan pertaining to education involved unified plans and curricula, stimulating the (Serbian) staff who wished to come to work to the University of Priština and establish the scientific youth, and stimulating the young who wished to study and later work in K&M. Yugoslav society allocated about 3% of the gross national product of the social economy of the whole country from 1966 to 1984 to stimulate the development of its underdeveloped republics and the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, as the province with the share of 63.4% of these incentive funds (SORS, 1986, p. 28).

region, the Platform also discussed the adoption of legal solutions for the reduction of birth rates in K&M.¹³

Instead of a conclusion

By implementing these measures, the League of Communists sought to influence the work of various social organizations in K&M. They regarded the Albanians' demands for secession and 'national closure' as unfounded, pointing out that full freedom was only possible in a democratized and self-governing society of united nations in which the 'working man' is the most important social entity.¹⁴ The League also pointed out that the problem of Kosovo indicated that 'there was a lack of daily and firm connection of communists to the citizens, the working people, and the youth' (Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, 1981, p. 17). Numerous measures were taken, but they could not be implemented, as civil unrest in the territory of former Yugoslavia occurred a year after the adoption of the second Platform (Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, 1990). In the 1990s, the Albanians sought to boycott state institutions, and finally a bloody ethnic conflict emerged as an expression of the struggle for the territory of K&M. Kosovo is now a so-called independent state and is included among other post-communist countries. The post-Yugoslav area represents the territory of independent countries, created predominantly on a mono-ethnic basis, retaining only a nostalgic connection with communism, which only formally promoted the principles of 'brotherhood and unity'. Studies on political values in post-communist societies show that the ideology of communism has been largely replaced by the ideology of nationalism (Miller, White & Heywood, 1998). Even though there were many examples of brotherhood and equality, that is, the ideal of Yugoslavism, it did not succeed in resolving the question of inter-ethnic mistrust, which strongly separated the members of different nationalities. The ideal of Yugoslavism proved in practice to be too 'regime' and 'ministerial', while at the same time the concept of freedom was understood as inseparable from the concept of the national state (Šutović, 2008, p. 256). It is apparent that the complete dysfunction of Yugoslavia was due to a number of reasons, not only cultural and political, but also socio-economic.

Whether we are talking about a social being and a 'practitioner' or the principle of autonomy, due to the lack of conditions necessary for their fulfillment, individuals will endeavor to reconstruct the symbolic universe and establish new foundations for integrating their and the roles of others into one cohesive entity. Thus, the socialist period of the Yugoslav society is portrayed as a period of politics trying to redefine collective identities, while using democratic principles as a means of applying the basic principles of supranational identity – brotherhood and unity. Even though the eponym 'Titoism' was ingrained in the SFRY, denoting the cult of the ruler but not the ideological course (Kuljić, 2010, p. 225), Yugoslavia tended to execute the social self-government based on the principles of the policy of civil identity in all of its six republics and among the five

¹³ In addition, certain municipalities in K&M were selected as particularly important for the action of the policies directed against the emigration of non-Albanian population.

¹⁴ Sociologists from the socialist period pointed to the mentality of 'universal craftsman' as the basic figure of Yugoslav industrialization, 'for whom the overvaluing of physical labor, understanding of the 'equality of all stomachs' ('egalitarian syndrome' or 'flat-rate pensions'), and 'rental psychology' combined with 'egotistic conscience' were typical (Petranović, 1988, p. 429).

nations, albeit acting from a position of an underdeveloped political culture. Another example was the Albanian national identity constructed on the foundation of the idea of 'civil religion of *Albanianhood*' (Duijzings, 2005, p. 215), which remained distant from the idea of the civil religion of Yugoslavism. Political ideology as such was not sufficient; what lacked here was a political culture as 'the integral part of the cultural social structure', which 'develops over a longer period of learning and internalization of people's experiences about the political environment and issues that are jointly resolved' (Matić, 1998, p. 304). It is clear that there is no ideology without political values, but these types of values are simultaneously a part of a wider political culture. For J. Habermas, the principle of citizenship is the basic form of political identity (Habermas, 2002), while the political culture is widely seen as the most general form of political integration of society. The problem of Yugoslav political culture emanates from the fact that Yugoslav nationalities had an uneven influence on the conditions of their cultural development inside the socialist federal country. Today, members of these nationalities have assumed the role of participants freed from traditional institutions and norms, but dependent on the labor market and modern institutions, which are a part of the contradictory process of socialization and which influence the formation of social identity in individualized cultures (Beck, 2001).

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IDENTITET I SIMBOLIČKE REPREZENTACIJE POLITIČKIH VREDNOSTI: PRIMER DRUŠTVENIH ORGANIZACIJA U KOSOVSKOJ MITROVICI

Apstrakt

Kolektivna identifikacija deo je dijalektike društva u kojoj pojedinci učestvuju kao akteri, nastojeći da definišu svoj socijalni svet u skladu sa objektivno uvrđenim značenjima društvene stvarnosti. Kolektivitet pretpostavlja osećaj pripadnosti, čemu prethodi konstruisanje identiteta putem odnosa subjektivne i objektivne dimenzije društvene stvarnosti. Učestvujući u dvostrukoj internalizaciji kako sopstvenog identiteta tako i društvenog sveta, društveni akteri se različito pozicioniraju unutar tzv. simboličkog univerzuma. Tome posebno doprinosi proces pounutrivanja institucionalnog poretka i institucionalno zasnovanih podsvetova. Društvene organizacije mogu intencionalno i neintencionalno uticati na stvaranje višestruke lojalnosti, koja se izražava u raznovrsnosti kolektiviteta i identiteta. Tada neretko govorimo o nameravanim i nenameravanim posledicama nameravanih akcija društvenih organizacija. Uzimajući u obzir društveni ideal kao motiv identifikacije među akterima, koji vrše srodne društvene uloge i pripadnici su sličnog ili različitog socijalnog porekla i kolektiviteta, očekuje se da će oni, uz izvesnu solidarnost i odanost, deliti i određena materijalna i simbolička sredstva. Predmet ovog rada je analiza procesa reprezentacije i internalizacije podinstitucionalnih poredaka na osnovu kojih dolazi do usvajanja određenih političkih

vrednosti među pripadnicima određenih društvenih organizacija u Kosovskoj Mitrovici. Primenom društveno-istorijskog pristupa, osnovni cilj je da se opišu simboličke reprezentacije „bratstva“, „jedinstva“, „slobode“, „jednakosti“, „ljudskih prava“, „solidarnosti“ i „demokratije“ od strane društvenih organizacija, kao i prakse u kojima se može prepoznati internalizacija ovih vrednosti. Analizom se ukazuje na određene ideale društveno-političkog poretka koje je proučavana populacija imala i ka kojima je, pretpostavlja se, relativno trajno težila.

Ključne reči: identitet, simboličke reprezentacije, internalizacija, društvene organizacije, Kosovska Mitrovica

ISLAM AND THE HEXAGON – CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY THROUGH THE LENS OF MEDIA DISCOURSES IN CONTEMPORARY FRANCE

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Abstract

Directly or implicitly, Islam has initiated numerous debates in French society, some of which resulted in significant changes of the socio-cultural landscape. The rapport between Islam and the Republic is a complex question particularly because of the French colonial history and the principle of public secularism (*laïcité*). The recent immigrant crisis has uncovered new issues while intensifying existing splits. In such a complex social reality, the media may have a powerful influence either on improving social cohesion or on causing social disintegration. The subject of this paper is the analysis of media discourses regarding immigration, Islam, and cultural diversity in France, their deconstruction, interpretation, explication, and contextualization. The sample is extracted from the online editions of the referent French daily newspapers (*Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*) in the period from April 2017 to April 2018. The methodology is primarily based on critical discourse analysis and secondarily on content analysis. The applied methodology is “tailor made” and built as a multi-methodological framework based on the three-dimensional model (Fairclough), methodology of critical discourse analysis (Wodak, Meyer), and the theory of functional grammar (Halliday). The paper examines the role of the media in the construction of social reality through the analysis of discursive practices, and especially with regard to the social and media representation of collective identities. The analysis does not perceive Islam through its dogmatic and theological aspect, but rather as a social practice and cultural order, and evaluates media representations regarding the interaction of the involved collective identities.

Key words: discourse analysis, cultural diversity, immigration, France, Islam

Introduction

Two-century-long history of immigration has considerably influenced the shaping of socio-cultural landscape of contemporary France. It might even be argued that cultural diversity in the French society of today is predominantly derived from the immigration. Integration into the host society, as a consequent prolongation of immigration, is a process encompassing various courses of action by which immigrants become affiliated with the entity of Nation with the purpose of participating in the social life and, subsequently, becoming peer members of the host society. The French model of

integration has emerged from the theory of assimilation presuming that immigrants should fully adhere to the Republican values (Regourd, 2017). As a classical theory, assimilation anticipates that over time and generations, a population of immigrant origins will gradually start resembling the autochthonous society until it completely merges with it. This perspective is backed by the assumption about a natural process allowing different ethnic groups to share a single culture. This process consists of a progressive abandonment of the old culture in favour of the new one (Safi, 2006). From the late 1980s, the “model of assimilation” was succeeded by the “model of integration” (Schnapper, 2007). The aim of the integration model was not to radically eliminate existing differences, but rather to integrate them into the so-called “common project”. It was envisaged as a foundation for rebuilding immigrants’ identities and as a powerful stronghold for bridging mutual differences between immigrants’ original identity and the autochthonous society, aiming to build an environment where the main goal is to live together (orig. “*vivre ensemble*”) (Barreau, 1992). The French integration model, unlike the American one, emphasizes the principle of *laïcité*,¹ which is sometimes discussed as the fourth Republican value. After being set aside for some time, the philosophy of assimilation made an unexpected return during the 2000s: driven by the controversies over Islam, it has been in the heart of the debates about national identity (Roy, 2013).

Muslims are the second largest religious group in France (Tribalat, 2013). France has been in contact with Islam for at least two centuries, but Islam had not been seen as an integral part of traditional, continental France (Sellam, 2006). The process of immigration played a crucial role in the genesis of French (continental) Islam. The encounter between France and Islam has entered a new phase when the immigrants and their descendants from ex-colonial provinces permanently inhabited the continental territory (Godar, 2015). Islam has not always been openly addressed, but rather veiled and often hidden behind other socially, culturally, and politically relevant topics. More precisely, Islam is a sensitive issue in particular because of the French colonial past and the principle of *laïcité*. The rise of the far-right political options in Europe and the escalation of religious extremism all over the world put forward new challenges in the constructive debate about religion in general and Islam in particular. Contemporary political rhetoric is supposed to lead to an open dialogue, but a growing public anxiety related to the ability of Islam to be integrated does not accelerate the convergence of Islam and the Republic (Bowen, 2011).

Discourse as the source of social reality

What we know about reality is based on our perceptions and interpretations of it. Additionally, what we perceive is often someone else’s account, as we usually receive second-hand, already processed and shaped information. Therefore, it is almost impossible to discuss reality in its complete objectiveness. Consequently, the reality might be understood as a sum of different interpretations gathered based on their

¹ *Laïcité* represents a principle, a policy, and a common value asserting that the civil society should be completely detached from the religious sphere within the Republic. Its underlying principle relies on the Republic’s neutrality in the questions of religious confessions or on detachment between the public institutions and the clergy and churches. It is a composite and complex term and an adequate English translation does not exist even though it is often translated as secularism. The concepts of *laïcité* and secularism are often misunderstood or, more precisely, misinterpreted as synonymous. While *laïcité* refers to the political and public order, secularism is related to the socio-cultural order and the social dynamic. Therefore, it will not be translated into English in this paper but used in its original French form.

similarity and affiliation to a certain perspective. Discourse thus stands for a group of interpretations sharing the same creed, ideas, and vision of the world that have been stable through time. In order to identify certain socially-produced ideas, it is necessary to clarify their sources – discourses.

In this section, I will focus on how social representations of immigration, religion, and diversity with their mutual references have been propagated through journalistic discourses in the period from April 2017 to April 2018 in two French daily newspapers of reference – *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*.

Methodological framework

The methodology applied in this paper is “tailor made” and primarily based on critical discourse analysis (CDA) and secondarily on content analysis. The framework of the CDA is founded on Fairclough’s three dimensional model (principal method) (Fairclough 1989, 1992, 1995, 2003) as well as on the guidelines provided by Wodak and Meyer (Wodak, Meyer 2011; Wodak 1996a, 1996b) and the concept of functional grammar developed by Halliday (auxiliary methods) (Halliday, 2014). Fairclough’s model assumes that discourse analysis should recognize the discursive dimension of the identified social problem through analysing the textual fragments in order to determine hidden power relations and to show how a discourse is embedded in a social system. The analysis of the sample is thus conducted in three consecutive phases:

1. The description phase deals with the analysis of text on the linguistic level. Accordingly, it presumes a definition of genres, forms of language, and relations between participants established through this form. In short, vocabulary, semantic forms, and linguistic structures of the text will be examined.
2. The interpretation phase explains the discursive practice aimed at determining the relationship between the production and consumption of discourses. Decryption of the discursive practice thus explains how the discourse represents the external world and how it refers to the participants, occasions, and processes. Through the interpretation phase, I will examine intertextuality and interdiscursivity.
3. Explanation is the final phase aimed at defining how discourses create and depict collective identities. In this phase, discourse is transposed to the wider socio-political and cultural context and the questions of power structure and ideology are tested through examination of the references between the discourse and the social, cultural, political, and historical context. In this phase, we observe discourse not as a textual-contextual fragment but as a socially created agent with the ability to influence the wider, non-linguistic sphere.

The use of language in framing social reality

Discursive strategies represent the ways that language is used to achieve a certain goal – to influence, to persuade, to fight against stereotypes, to demystify, to change predominant opinions, to argument certain perspectives, or to explain the phenomenon. Discursive strategies may be strategically developed and intentionally implemented (which is often the case with political speeches) but may also unintentionally represent schemes that put certain perspectives in desired frames. The repetition of a certain discursive strategy and its implementation in particular situation with regard to the

specific topic/event indicate the discursive goal and, therefore, the power relations relative to the topic and its interpretation.

Discursive strategies are, therefore, wide-ranging frames that implicate how the language is used in order to achieve certain social, cultural, linguistic, political, economic, and/or psychological goal. Within those frames, the process of deduction may be different and versatile. Because of that, I have simultaneously examined *topoi* and their usage within the sample in order to determine if there are linkages and patterns between the implemented discursive strategy and the predominant *topoi*.

Based on the research findings, *Le Monde* tends to maintain a moderate position when reporting on religion, particularly Islam, immigration, and diversity, with the focus on description and narration. According to the choice of discursive strategies and *topoi*, *Le Monde* perceives identity movements as dangerous, the rejection of diversity as perilous, and misinterpretation of facts and figures as a tool for ideological arguments. More generally, the politics of right and far-right options are perceived as a menace that might lead to social disintegration caused by the widening gap between the autochthonous and the non-autochthonous society. When reporting or writing within the *topos* of danger/threat, *Le Monde* often uses sequential reported speech and quotations that are contextualized as a method for emphasizing the impact/threat. The assumptions within this segment are often explicit value assumptions. Additionally, the transitivity is expressed through a relational process assigning an attribute or value to an actor/action. With regard to classification, *Le Monde* generally uses fairly moderate and balanced vocabulary. Sometimes it uses slightly emphasized forms, occasionally lyrical, when reporting within this segment: “to play with the fear”, “obsession about Islam”, “incredibly bellicose vocabulary”, “ode to the silent majority”, “betrayal of the elites”, “rightists cocktail to which he added his small dose of personal wisdom”. *Le Monde* tends to express a reassuring and moderately positive attitude towards Islam in general and towards the mutual efforts that have been made to improve social climate and integration. Thus, *Le Monde* chooses discursive strategies to de-stigmatize the questions of Islam as well as the topics that testify to the positive advancement in mutual interactions between two cultures (work in the field, mediation, education, art production, and cooperation). In addition to this, *Le Monde* uses full-phrase quotations, often implicit assumptions, when reporting on positive results or shifts. Modality is often used as a form of expressing positive attitudes and re-questioning the firmly and deeply embedded societal ideas. It is interesting that I have not detected intensification/mitigation discursive strategy within the sample, which could be explained by the aforementioned claim – *Le Monde* tends to maintain a moderate position in reporting and thus does not exploit the strategy of intensifying the illocutionary forces of (either anti or pro Islam and immigration) utterances, as an intentional production of subjected utterance, but frames the attitudes using other strategies.

Le Figaro shows a firmer, more clearly outlined and sharper journalistic discourse in comparison with *Le Monde*, which is in accordance with its “political inclination” of the central-right to right option. The focus of reporting about the questions of religion, particularly Islam, integration, diversity, and inter-community exchanges in fact falls on the subjects relative to the national identity and on the rapport between Islam and politics and Islam and religious extremism. *Le Figaro* takes proactive steps by initiating social

engagement. It is engaged in requesting reports on certain topics, writing public appeals, and organizing and gathering intellectuals to discuss or act upon certain topics or events. According to *Le Figaro*, the most significant perils to French society are religious extremism, whose roots are footed in the religion whose system does not support democratic values, especially freedom and the politics led by left-oriented political parties, notably *La France Insoumise (LFI)*, who are perceived as “collaborators” of radical Islam. In other words, the leftists are those who allow foreign influences to interfere in the national politics using religion as a medium. When discussing menaces and perils, *Le Figaro* uses explicit assumptions. When reporting on others, it mainly uses the indirect manner or paraphrasing, whereas direct speech or quotation are often sequential and contextualized in the text as the amplification figure. In the sample of *Le Figaro*, modality has been used far less frequently. As explained, the attitudes are more openly and clearly expressed and, with that in mind, modality as a more subtle form of expression is not frequently distributed within the sample. With regard to classification, we may notice a more straightforward vocabulary: “menace”, “totalitarianism”, “neo-colonial racists”, “the post-colonial cause”, Arabian “passion for our ballot”, “subjects of interest in *peripheral France* (clear indication of the discursive practice of the Republicans) have been carefully *ignored, overshadowed, scorned*”, “politico-religious iceberg”, and “to alienate the population”. To summarize, it may be deduced that *Le Figaro* is not positively inclined towards the idea of (cultural or religious) diversity. *Le Figaro* reassesses and re-questions the positive and negative sides, while implicitly showing a disapproving attitude.

Deconstruction of the analysed discourses

The graphic diagrams below represent schematic overviews based on the research findings and they visually present the deconstruction of relevant discourses as well as their constituents.




Figure 1. *Le Monde* – discourse composition

Figure 1 shows significant overlaps between the discourses on Islam and the national identity and also between the discourses on Islam, national identity, and diversity. This mutual correspondence between discourses derives from the shifting of articulations between topics, themes, and styles that are permeated and intercorrelated in the texts. In this context, I have found that interdiscursivity originates from the fact that same genres, arguments, topics, and lexical and stylistic structuralizations attain relative stabilization, frequency, and perpetuity in the order of discourses. Therefore, it is interesting to assume that the discourses about Islam and national identity have the most significant overlap, i.e. they are directly correlated and mutually independent. Additionally, multiculturalism, as a policy, is interrelated both with Islam and national identity, which leads to the conclusion that *Le Monde* believes those three to influence each other directly and reciprocally.




Figure 2. *Le Figaro – discourse composition*

Within the sample of *Le Figaro*, it is interesting to observe that, discursively, acceptance of diversity is related “only” to the national identity. This means that, within this discourse strand, there are no clear linkages between Islam and its “social acceptability” in the broader socio-cultural paradigm, but there is discursive indication that diversity is interpreted as a rejection of the French universalness. Simultaneously, the interdiscursivity of Islam and national identity is visible in their cross-section in a tautological scheme of “protection of Islam equals rejection of the Republic”, which does not directly suggest that the autochthonous society tends to reject Islam and *vice versa*. Additionally, I may note that both the Republican values and religious extremism have been discursively correlated.

It is interesting to observe the variation in the structure of the discourse about Islam. In *Le Monde*, Islam is debated only in correlation with other discourses resulting in the high level of interdiscursivity and intertextuality. In *Le Figaro*, the level of interdiscursivity is relatively high, but Islam, when discussed separately from other discourses, is qualified as

a form of redemption for the colonial past of France. *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* discuss immigration mainly through its legislative aspect, according to the sample.

These discourses and discourse strands were detected while a national debate on the Law on Immigration was in progress. With regard to the aforementioned conclusion, it may be assumed that this debate has in fact been unusually protracted because of the competing and emulating ideologies that have been battling for supremacy. This claim is in line with the actual evolution of events. The leftists claimed that the Law is “repressive” while the rightists claimed that “it does appreciate the seriousness of the situation with the migration fluxes”. After many discussions, the Law was finally passed in August 2018. Based on the presented findings, it appeared that the debate would be continued even after the Law was adopted. And this is exactly what happened – the debate on immigration was reopened in the Parliament during 2019.

The power of words: immigration and Islam – divisive or irritating phenomena?

This section presents a detailed analysis of two compared articles in *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* discussing the same topic. The articles show the results of the annual survey “French Fractures 2017” presented in early July 2017. The reason for choosing this particular topic/articles is because these articles are as typical as possible for the sample and thus for the subject of this paper. The articles discuss immigration, integration, and Muslim culture, which are the key notions of this study, within the same topic and are thus comparable and reliable. This analysis does not discuss the results of the survey *per se* or assess the attitudes of French population towards the analysed questions. However, the analysis does focus on journalistic discourse as a transposition of public or general attitudes.

Appearance and general information

Both articles are comparable in length, the article in *Le Figaro* being slightly longer due to the additional section entitled “three other digits to be retained from this study”, discussing if the division between the right and the left wing still exists, the unemployment through the perspective of willingness to find a job, and the attitudes about the “life before” through the perspective of historical idealization. The structure of the articles is similar as is their number of paragraphs. However, there is a major difference in their graphic layout – while *Le Monde* posts graphical representations of results of the survey (charts), *Le Figaro* adjoined a video to the text about the interdiction of the *burkini* in Corsica. The video includes the pictures from the beaches where women wearing a *burkini* are next to women wearing a bikini, the announcements of M. Valls and E. Macron (former colleagues, now opponents), and the statement of the President of the League for Human Rights. However, it is interesting that this particular video discusses the situation in Corsica, the territory that traditionally supports right and far-right wing. Judging by the comments on the newspapers’ portals, the news provoked significantly stronger reactions among the readers of *Le Figaro* (1.228 comments) in comparison with *Le Monde* (172 comments).

In the *Le Monde* article, there are two externally linked news articles: one about divergences between *LFI* and *Rassemblement national (RN ex-Front National)* and the other about the results of the same survey regarding the political governance; in *Le*

Figaro, the linked articles are about the “drastic” decline of anti-Semite and anti-Muslim acts in France in 2016 and about E. Macron, who advocates an “Islam compatible with the Republic”.

Formulation of the title and subtitles

Le Monde entitled its article “Immigration and Islam remain two divisive topics in France”, while the title in *Le Figaro* reads “Immigration and Islam increasingly aggravate French population”. Here, through the wording choice, we may observe the difference in perspective. *Le Monde* considers those subjects as continuing to divide the nation while *Le Figaro* observes immigration and Islam as topics irritating the autochthonous population. Additionally, *Le Monde* thinks that those subjects divide the whole country, while *Le Figaro* observes them from the perspective of “us” or the autochthonous. The same tendency may be observed in the formulation of subtitles within the paragraphs – *Le Monde* observes that there is “negative evolution towards Islam” while *Le Figaro* remarks that “more than a half of the French population estimate that they do not feel at home”.

“Burning questions” and “steady trend”

The article in *Le Figaro* starts with a similar formulation as *Le Monde*, stating that 65% of the surveyed French population estimate that there are too many foreigners in France, but unlike the *Le Monde* article, it complements the introductory sentence with the interpretation of survey results stating that 60% of the population thinks that Muslim religion is incompatible with French values. The introduction phrases are important in the sense that they usually tone and tint the whole text. In this context, next to the initial observation, *Le Figaro* initiates the question of compatibility of these two cultural orders. This “dilemma” is found quite often in the contemporary scientific works and literature, especially among those who resolutely insist on the national identity. In this context, it has been frequently used as an argument for those defending the hermetic interpretation of the principle of *laïcité*.

The beginning of the article in *Le Figaro* reveals that immigration and Islam were the “burning questions” of the presidential campaign. The use of the idiom “*sujet phare*” is interesting in this context since “*phare*” could also, independently from this idiomatic expression, be translated as a light house, which could implicitly indicate that those questions tinted the whole presidential campaign, both the programs and the debates. In the same paragraph, we noticed the claim that “this fracture (social division, referencing the title of the survey) was even larger in comparison with 2017”. While *Le Figaro* is explicit and explicative in this section, the first paragraph of the *Le Monde* article uses modality and transitivity through relational process – if there are any two questions that have not reduced social divisions, they are immigration and Islam. In the second paragraph of the *Le Monde* article, we may notice that, “in fact”, the tensions towards immigration have remained very strong. Thus, *Le Monde* colours the whole claim with the tone of confirmation of something that it initially doubted. In this context, it displays a feeling of disappointment. Further, *Le Monde* adds additional explication to the claim about the 65% of French population who estimate that there are too many foreigners – the level remained the same as in 2016 and “practically constant from 2014 onward” – while

Le Figaro observes the results only in comparison with 2016 without any further referencing. This additional reference in *Le Monde* is interesting because it indicates that the similar share of the population had the same opinion on immigration even before the big terrorist attacks in November 2015 that were considered a turning point for French society and its attitudes towards immigration and Islam. Within the same paragraph, *Le Monde* makes another intriguing reference in the section that elaborates the political orientation of the surveyed population claiming that supporters of the Republican party who positively responded to the aforementioned claim are “almost as numerous as” the ones of the *RN*. This claim could implicitly indicate that *Le Monde* considers the Republicans to be ideologically much closer to the far-right politics than they present themselves in the public. While analysing the whole research sample, I discovered that *Le Monde* has been vigorously criticizing the Republicans, especially after the election of the new president of the party. In the context of the previous claim, I may conclude that the origins of those criticisms are actually found in the ideology that is pretty close to the far-right wing, according to *Le Monde*. In this regard, *Le Monde* numerically and explicitly states the increase of 7% within this group in comparison with 2016, while *Le Figaro* only declares the results from 2016 without further calculations. This explicit suggestion (7%) may serve as an instrument to increase the visibility of the incremental negative trend towards immigration within the population supporting the Republicans, which could be triggered by their politics gradually becoming stricter and by the newly elected leadership of the party.

“Only” or the majority?

When discussing opinions on the difficulty that immigrants face in the process of social integration, it appears that *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* qualify the numbers quite differently – the results of the survey state that 61% of the population claim that immigrants generally do not make significant efforts to integrate into the society, while 54% of them state that this integration is difficult for an immigrant. *Le Monde* observes that “still a majority of the population (54%) admit” that integration is difficult for an immigrant, while *Le Figaro* notes that “even though 54% of population acknowledge” that integration is difficult, the majority of 61% think that immigrants are not putting too much effort in their integration. This signals that *Le Monde* is inclined towards acknowledging immigrants’ endeavours, whereas *Le Figaro* is focused on the share of the population claiming that immigrants do not make significant efforts to successfully integrate into the society. In this regard, I may assume that *Le Figaro* might support the perspective that immigrants are responsible for their own failure regarding their social integration.

When discussing religious practices of Islam, *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* again have different formulations in accordance with the tendency shown in the previous topic. Thus, *Le Monde* observes that “the evolution of the opinions towards Islam is equally negative” and that “only 40% of the surveyed French population consider” Muslim practices, in the way they are being expressed in France, to be compatible with the values of French society. On the other hand, *Le Figaro* mentions that “four out of ten (40%) affirm” that those practices are unsuitable for the society. I may thus conclude that *Le Monde* expresses slight disappointment and disapproval with the results by using the qualifier “only”, which is additionally emphasized through the usage of the verb “consider”, a

quite neutral, reflective form; *Le Figaro* emphasizes the results both with verbal and numerical explanation accompanied with the verb “affirm”, an active and declarative form.

Le Monde ends the article by discussing survey results about religious extremism and states that “in the end, 46% of population think that *even though it is not its central message, Islam, despite all, plants the seed of violation and intolerance*; even though this judgement is in the minority, it has clearly been reinforced”. Regarding the same result, *Le Figaro* concludes that “this number has been increased by 5% in comparison with the previous year, which testifies to a (single) French society that is becoming increasingly fractured”.

Conclusion and discussion

It may be deduced from the detailed analysis of the articles that *Le Monde* tends to maintain a moderately reassuring and optimistic perspective regarding the analysed questions, while *Le Figaro* is rather sceptical and cautious. Within the discourse of *Le Monde*, the significant element to be mentioned is its perspective on the right political wing in France, which is implicitly and occasionally characterized as latent far-right. According to the discourse construction, graphically represented in Figure 1 above, *Le Monde* considers identity movements as a danger jeopardizing the society and national identity. Since identity movements are often ideologically affiliated to the far-right, I may deduce that *Le Monde* considers identity politics as perilous, even though if it is not openly expressed or articulated. Since the right-wing ideology in France is mainly organized around insisting on the universalness as the main qualifier of national identity, I may assume that *Le Monde* has a moderately affirmative attitude towards cultural diversity.

Le Figaro, on the other hand, is more conservative towards immigration and Islam. It tends to present social integration as a bidirectional, reciprocal process and thus to attribute a share of responsibility for the (perceived or real) failure of integration. However, the concept of Judeo-Christian origins of the principle of *laïcité* is notable within the discourse of national identity in *Le Figaro*. In this context, *Le Figaro* conceptualizes diversity and its acceptability depending on its characteristics. Generally, *Le Figaro* is rather sceptical towards cultural diversity originating from the Muslim heritage.

This paper also demonstrates how the media construct their own realities, and by doing that, influence the construction of social reality. By framing social phenomena in a particular manner, the media create and maintain certain representations and focus public opinion towards a desired direction. Furthermore, being stable over time, media discourses could generate and stimulate specific social climates that might enable and facilitate social changes. The results of this analysis showed that *Le Monde* demonstrates the tendency to support de-stigmatization of immigration and, particularly, Islam by using different tactics – by deflecting attention to the danger of identity/nationalistic movements and rightist discourses, by presenting the positive contribution of specific persons and groups from the discussed social categories, and by promoting and fostering mutual interactions between autochthonous society and the Muslim community and negative and judgemental attitude towards social labelling. On the other hand, *Le Figaro*

tends to express more disapproving attitudes towards immigration and Islam by using various approaches, such as insistence on the principle of *laïcité* and its Judeo-Christian origins, association of Islam with a particular politics (Islamic leftism) and social conformation (communitarianism), amalgamation of Islam with religious extremism, and expression of attitudes towards the (in)ability of Islam to be successfully integrated into the society.

One of the most complex questions in contemporary France is exactly the rapport between Islam and the Republic and the aim of this paper was to propose at least one piece of this puzzle that could provide a better understanding of the discussed phenomena.

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ISLAM I HEKSAGON – KULTURNA I RELIGIJSKA RAZNOVRNOST KROZ PRIZMU MEDIJSKIH DISKURSA U SAVREMENOJ FRANCUSKOJ

Apstrakt

Direktno ili indirektno, Islam je pokretač mnogobrojnih debati u francuskoj javnosti, od kojih su neke rezultirale značajnim društveno-političkim promjenama. Odnos Islama i Republike je delikatno pitanje, kako zbog kolonijalne historije tako i zbog principa laiciteta, jednog od fundamentalnih postulata savremenog francuskog društva i države. Povrh toga, imigrantska kriza je otvorila nova pitanja produbljujući postojeće raskole. U takvoj kompleksnoj društvenoj realnosti mediji imaju snažan uticaj kako na unapređenje društvene kohezije tako i na društvenu dezintegraciju. Ovaj rad se bavi analizom medijskih diskursa referentnih francuskih glasila u vezi sa imigracijom, Islamom i kulturnom raznovrnošću, njihovom dekonstrukcijom, interpretacijom, eksplicacijom i kontekstualizacijom. Uzorak je izdvojen iz internet izdanja dnevnih glasila Le Monde i Le Figaro u periodu od aprila 2017. do aprila 2018. Metodologija se primarno zasniva na kritičkoj analizi diskursa i sekundarno na analizi sadržaja. Primenjena metodologija razvijena je „po meri“ kao multi-metodološki okvir zasnovan na trodimenzionalnom modelu (Fairclough), metodologiji kritičke analize diskursa (Wodak, Meyer) i teoriji funkcionalne gramatike (Halliday). Rad sagledava ulogu medija u konstrukciji društvene realnosti kroz analizu diskurzivnih praksi, a posebno u vezi sa društvenim i medijskim predstavljanjem kolektivnih identiteta. Ova analiza ne posmatra Islam kroz njegov dogmatsko-teološki okvir, već kao društvenu praksu i kulturni poredak i analizira medijske predstave u vezi sa interakcijom predmetnih kolektivnih identiteta.

Ključne reči: analiza diskursa, kulturna raznovrnost, imigracija, Francuska, Islam

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THE MEDIA AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN SERBIA

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Abstract

The spirit of globalism, determined by corporatism and commercialization, has imposed itself on the Serbian public, producing a crisis of national identity. The cracks in the most complex type of collective identity emerge as a paradigm for confronting a society with the consequences of the breakup of the former country and ideology, neocolonial pressure, complicated relationships and obstacles regarding the Orthodox tradition, and the basic determinants of Serbian culture. The adoption of someone else’s view and the destruction of the past, tradition, and national myths are the common denominators of these processes. A pivotal moment in communication is the absence of a national polity for the democratic public. This paper tries to find the narratives pertaining to national identity by analysing the media content in Serbia that deals with significant events from the last few decades through their media interpretation on prominent dates and anniversaries. The media exert a significant influence on the formation of public opinion by imposing specific topics (agenda setting), which go through the process of framing. All of this has a distinct manipulative potential. The search for the so-called Serbian viewpoint (Lompar, 2014) and the analysis of how the media approach this concept provide a productive basis for a national gathering and the elimination of negative potentials, consequently leading to the construction of a healthy national identity.

Key words: media image, national pole of the democratic public, framing, national identity, Serbian viewpoint

Introduction

The concept of national identity is one of the topics that greatly stirs emotions and encourages discussion. National identity is “essentially multidimensional, and can never be reduced to one element, even in a special national fraction, nor it can be easily or quickly created by artificial means in a population” (Smith, 1998, p. 30). With that in mind, the important features of national identity include “historical territory or homeland”, “common myths and historical memories”, “mass and public culture”, “common legal rights and duties of all members of the nation”, and “shared economy with territorial mobility of the members of the nation” (Smith, 1998, pp. 29, 30). Despite

the earlier indications concerning the end of the nation, contemporary developments show that nations continue to form a basis of collective identity, while a sense of national belonging remains a fundamental element of socialization and spirituality.

Serbian identity is one of the current and significant issues in the region, having a prominently far reach in the spiritual and historical context (Čavoški, 2016, p.15). The question of national identity becomes even more crucial, because the current state of contemporary identities, with regard to certain nations, is constantly adapting and changing, often with a dramatic outcome. Serbian national identity is based on Orthodoxy accompanied by the cult of Saint Sava, the Kosovo myth, Serbian language and literature, and the Cyrillic script, and is currently articulated as *a shaken identity* (Bataković, 2016, p. 71). Therefore, it is necessary to talk about it in the current moment, to identify its causes, and to protect it from collapsing.

Considering that culture itself is an essential part of the Serbian national identity, it is important to define the notion of cultural identity before delving into any further interpretation. According to Branimir Stojković, cultural identity is “the self-awareness of members of a group that historically originates and develops depending on the criteria that the group establishes in its relations with other social groups” (Stojković, 1993, p. 26).

Regarding the illusions and pitfalls of national identity, local researchers of these historical processes mention several root causes, the first being *the entrapment in a dual dogma*, communist and Yugoslav, combined into one; *the high cost of royalist commitment*, which led to the weakening of Serbian identity after the formation of a common state; *the defeat in World War II* from the perspective of Serbian interests, despite the great casualties of Serbian people; interruption of spiritual and the lack of social continuity; devastating effect of mondialism on the spiritual unity of the Serbs; the influence of the dominant value matrix of prosperous western societies as a colonial ideology (Bataković, 2016; Krestić, 1999; Antonić, 2014; Dušanić, 2014).

The role of the media

Building and consolidating national identity, in which the media play a huge role, is of paramount importance. Several points are important for a valid theoretical approach to these processes. It is necessary to remember the basic phases relevant for the mass media effect on society: a behavioural worldview – how values and traditional structures change under the influence of the media (Milivojević, 2001); the influence of political discourse of power, influenced by the media; and a cultural pattern through which an individual accepts new ones in addition to basic attitudes. There are also conflicting theories about the “all-powerful media”, where the audience is a passive recipient of messages and the so-called “reinforcing doctrine”, according to which the most significant media effect is “reinforcing existing beliefs” (Klapper, 1960), which is much more effective than “changing existing beliefs.” It should also be noted that the media not only share their content but also exert their influence indirectly through individuals who, as opinion leaders, persuade other people by taking opinions and views from the media and passing them on to others (Rot, 1972). It is also important to emphasize that a new phenomenon is emerging called *mediation*: the media are integrated into the functioning of other social institutions, and social interaction takes place with the help of the media and media logic (Hjarvard, 2008). The media have taken on a new, more influential role: not only do

communities and institutions use them today, but they are also forced to adapt to them (Agha, 2011; Hjarvard, 2008; Hepp, 2012; Krotz, 2007; Lundby, 2009; Shulz, 2004).

It is also necessary to define the notion of the public, which is perceived as “fluctuating social groups of citizens who have an active attitude towards a particular social issue transformed into a problem of general interest, who have access to the public sphere, and who have the opportunity to express their opinions publicly”, thereby participating in the formation of public opinion (Miletić & Miletić, 2012, p. 111). Since the public sphere is located mostly in the media complex, the creation of (provisionally speaking) an authentic and independent public is only feasible if the media organizations that mediate between the state and the citizens are independent.

Concerning the national identity and communication in Serbia, consideration and problematization of the most critical societal issues is possible when, in addition to the general pole of the democratic public, there is a national pole through which things are considered, problematized, and questioned from the national point of view. Under these conditions, it is possible for an authentic public, which include both the general and the national pole, to perform their theoretically recognizable social functions: critical, controlling, enlightening, and developmental. Milo Lompar (2014) discusses this stating that

only when the national pole of the democratic public with its representative media presence is created, in which the idea of a national and democratic state is presented, can the governing politics be problematized in a far-reaching context (p. 196).

A general picture of the media treatment of Serbian identity was framed by the research in which the focus on media content is essential for the preservation of cultural heritage, as a critical dimension of cultural and national identity. Research findings¹ show that “meeting the citizens’ needs for information and content in the field of culture and art is mostly about conveying basic information about cultural and artistic events,” and that this is done through the form of short news. World news are prevalent and there is “a small number of interpretative, analytical, and critical texts,” and “culture and art become a product like any other product on the market”, while published information mostly pertains to popular culture and the culture industry (Đukić, 2012, p. 15, 16).

Qualitative analysis of broadcast media paints an even less favourable picture with regard to contributing to the development of the culture of remembrance – “television, as the most influential electronic medium, which influences the formation of public opinion the most, contains the least represented content on culture and art,” while “commercial television programs do not broadcast cultural content” (Đukić, 2012, p. 21).

Studies also showed the role of the media in the preservation of national and cultural identities² a decade ago in ten Serbian cities. Therefore, “the media in Serbia are transmitters of global media influence” and “only 38.3 percent of respondents believe that

¹ The research in question covers the period of January-April 2012 and is part of the project “Identity and Memories: Transcultural Texts of the Dramatic Arts and the Media (Serbia 1989–2014)” by the Faculty of Dramatic Arts (University of Arts in Belgrade).

² The results are part of an empirical study of by author Zoran Aracki on “The Interactions of Political Elites, New Owners, Editors and Journalists and Their Reflections on Social Change in Serbia at the beginning of the 21st Century.”

they are free from a global media influence” (Aracki, 2011, p. 329). Likewise, more than 50 percent of surveyed journalists expressed dissatisfaction with the contribution of the media to the development, protection, and promotion of national culture (Aracki, 2011, p. 330). The author concluded that “on the one hand, we are confronted with an imitative cultural policy that adopts concepts of Westernisation and commercializes cultural policy and leaves it to the logic of market fundamentalism”; on the other hand, we have a neo-conservative approach to these issues, which relies on patterns of cultural management from the early 19th century” (Aracki, 2011, p. 331). That is why today there are globalized media as “an instrument by which a small number of so-called global players – media owners, are trying to achieve cultural and informational hegemony” (Aracki, 2011, p. 326).

Research findings

Quantitative and qualitative content analysis of the front pages of eight dailies in Serbia – *Politika*, *Danas*, *Večernje Novosti*, *Blic*, *Kurir*, *Alo*, *Informer*, and *Srpski telegraf* – was aimed at reflecting the editorial policy of each newspaper, in accordance with the theoretical framework – *agenda-setting theory* and *framing theory*. The focus of the analysis was on the title blocks (subtitle, title, inter-title, and separated sentences) and photographs (and other illustrations), as common denominators for all dailies, drawing from the notion that “seventy percent of readers exclusively read headlines” (Jevtović, Petrović & Aracki, 2014, p. 56). Pictures of newspaper supplements were not extracted unless the title was explicitly highlighted on the front page of the newspaper and therefore had some significance, while the advertising content was not included.

The analysis covered three significant anniversaries for the Serbian people, which are also linked to two institutions that were trusted the most by the Serbian citizens during the first two decades of the 21st century³ – the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) and the Serbian Armed Forces. The three anniversaries marked eight centuries of autocephaly of the SOC, one hundred years since the end of World War I, and two decades since the start of NATO aggression. This study aims to show how these institutions identify themselves in the daily press, as a still relevant part of the media complex in Serbia, which plays an essential role in guiding the society. Despite the forecasts for a gloomy future of the press at the end of the 2010s, it is still very much alive – “the press survives because it adapts to new trends, but with varying and problematic results” (Petrović, 2017, p. 160). In particular, in Serbia, the press remains influential combined with new technologies, namely their online editions.

The first half of October 2019 marked the 800th anniversary of autocephaly of the Serbian Orthodox Church,⁴ so the analysis included front pages mentioning to this event, whether it was the anniversary itself, the surrounding festivities, or the reactions that emerged. In

³ For more on the results of previous studies in the 21st century, see:
<https://www.blic.rs/vesti/drustvo/najvece-poverenje-u-crkvu/hyqbrv3>,
<https://www.blic.rs/vesti/drustvo/vojska-i-crkva-institucije-koje-uzivaju-najvise-poverenja/7ljh50f>,
<http://www.novimagazin.rs/vesti/istrazivanje-gradjani-srbije-najvise-poverenja-imaju-u-vojsku-crkvu-policiju>,
<http://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/393979/Gradani-najvise-veruju-crkvi-predsedniku-i-vojsci> and
<https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/mladi-neoliberalizam-poverenje-konzervativizam/29589827.html>

⁴ For more, see: <http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/125/drustvo/3681298/srpska-pravoslavna-crkva-obelezava-800-godina-autokefalnosti.html>

this way, the study included 14 percent of the total number of front pages (114) published between 1 October and 15 October 2019, which also included the point of the main celebration.

Figure 1, which shows the individual share of front pages with content relevant for this study, clearly reveals that quality press paid more attention to the 800th anniversary of the SOC autocephaly than the tabloids (namely *Blic*, *Kurir*, *Alo*, *Srpski telegraf*, and *Informer*, which had no front page with this content), with nearly 70 percent of extracted content.




Figure 1. Individual share of the total number of newspaper front pages with relevant content about the autocephaly of the SOC and related topics from 1 October to 15 October 2019

A detailed analysis of title blocks has shown that the topics pertaining to the cult of St Sava, the historical background of this event, and the significance of the event comprised less than 40 percent of dedicated content. On the other hand, more attention was paid to conflicts in the SOC, the failure to invite sister Orthodox churches to the celebration and omission of some priests, relations with Moscow and Constantinople in the wake of the anniversary, especially the medal awarding ceremony and reactions to it, cancellations from various speakers, etc.

The second part of the analysis is related to the centenary of the end of World War I, one of the most significant events in Serbian history. This study considered a broader context, i.e. everything that followed the commemoration in the first half of November, and the consequences and other connotations the celebration received, whether in Serbia, Paris, or other places. If viewed numerically, these topics and the content dedicated to the centenary, directly or indirectly occupied a significant space on the front pages of the Serbian daily press, more than 46 percent from 1-15 November 2018 (from the total of 114 front pages), which was also the period when the World War I Armistice Day was observed (11 November). As seen in Figure 2, tabloids and quality press gave quantitatively equal attention to front-page covering of this occasion.




Figure 2. Individual share of the total number of newspaper front pages with relevant content about the centenary of the end of World War I and related topics from 1 November to 15 November 2018

However, despite the full media coverage, a more modest picture is obtained when we try to establish how much this content would educate readers, through a culture of remembrance, and remind them of the significance of the event that happened 100 years ago to contribute to collective memory and national identity. The intertwining of the past and the present is clear, and it can be claimed that there have been significant moments covering the essential context of this date, and some of them can be interpreted as a revisionist approach to history. The main celebration in Paris was the moment when the attention was diverted from the essence of what was being celebrated, as in the following days the media gave more coverage to the celebration seating arrangements and the alleged humiliation that Serbia suffered, as well as to bilateral and other meetings.

In addition to these two events, this study also included the days related to the 20th anniversary of the beginning of NATO aggression, an event that is still fresh in the public memory and that continues to attract a great deal of public attention every year in the second half of March. Furthermore, it is an event used for collective memory and current political issues. Therefore, the study investigates the dates around and including 24 March, when the first NATO attack on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was carried out, from 23-27 March, with a particular focus on the front-page content concerning the bombing and the events during March-June 1999, as well as the observation of anniversaries in this context – reactions, consequences, emotional accounts and stories, and so forth. Considering that the period of the 15-year anniversary was examined and bearing in mind the publishing trend in the last two decades (from then until the last front page), the analysis included only the newspapers that were continuously published from 2014 until today – *Politika*, *Danas*, *Večernje Novosti*, *Blic*, *Kurir*, *Alo*, and *Informer*.




Figure 3. Share of front pages with content pertaining to the NATO aggression on FRY (in %) in the total number of analysed front pages in the period of 23-27 March, 2014-2019

A total of 202 pages were analysed over a six-year period, with the particular focus on the period of 23-27 March (which amounts to four or five front pages of each analysed daily newspaper per year, depending on whether they had two issues on weekends) and the pertinent content was found in 39 percent of the front pages. However, there is a great discrepancy between different years, as shown in Figure 3. When we compare the two key anniversaries, 15 and 20 years since the NATO aggression, we can see that the number of front pages covering the latter more than doubled. In addition, there is an evident increase of such content on the front pages in the last two years, noting that before that, between 2014 and 2017, *Politika* and *Večernje Novosti* had published the majority of the pertinent front-page content, with a share of three-fifths of the total analyzed content. They were the only two newspapers that contained the pertinent front-page headlines every 24 March over the observed years. In terms of quantity, tabloids (in this study *Blic*, *Kurir*, *Alo*, and *Informer*), which have a dominant role in the market, surpassed the quality press in 2018. At the time, their share of the total headlines with pertinent content concerning the NATO aggression reached 57 percent, while in 2019 it reached 60 percent.




Figure 4. Individual share of the newspapers in the total front-page coverage of NATO aggression on FRY in the period of 23-27 March 2019

If we only look at 2019 (in which the share of front-pages with the required content was close to 76 percent), as the most recent year in the study and the one with the most front pages, it is clear from Figure 4 that all the analysed media paid attention to the anniversary of NATO aggression on FRY. Furthermore, the title blocks announce interviews with the main figures of the time, tributes to heroes, the story on the shooting down of the “invisible plane”, stories about casualties, health effects, and many more.

Conclusion

Through the analysis of selected content and context of daily political events and information in the observed journals, compared with the results from previous studies, it can be concluded that the media treatment of the moments crucial for the consolidation of national self-consciousness is dominantly determined by the initiative and the daily political views of the ruling elite. News content relevant to the strengthening of national self-consciousness follows the rhythm of the government, depending on its political and social needs viewed in a broader context.

This was confirmed by the three analysed cases in this paper, especially by the growing interest in the anniversary of the beginning of NATO aggression, as the most recent national wound, well-known to current generations and an easy background to imprint other messages. On the other hand, looking at the complete media picture of the daily press in Serbia (noting that, in a general context, the quality press had an approach that was certainly more significant for the culture of remembrance than that of the tabloids), it is evident that the events that took place earlier, which speak of the institutions trusted by Serbian citizens (church and military), have been suppressed in terms of collective memory and national identity concerning the daily political topics. Regarding the culture of remembrance pertaining to the eight centuries of autocephaly of the SOC and to one hundred years since the end of World War I, greater focus was given to conflicts in and around the SOC, the tensions in Orthodoxy, and other related topics, while the story of

the glorious days of the Serbian army in the Great War was suppressed by the event of the main celebration in Paris.

This attitude of the media towards national identity can also be linked to the absence of the national pole of the democratic public. The path to its creation leads through a break with the current practice, avoiding the pitfalls and misconceptions and building the authentic domestic public, with respect for the Serbian point of view. Considering the opinion of some authors (Lompar in Bogdanović, 2015; Ković, 2014) and as previously stated, such a view would imply the following: *abolishing the influence of a foreign value matrix, abandoning the ideologies of the past and auto-chauvinism (a term coined in Serbia denoting a hatred of one's own people), adhering to a cultural pattern based on a minimum of shared traditions, and adopting the values and changes of consciousness in keeping with the national needs.*

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MEDIJI U SRBIJI I NACIONALNI IDENTITET

Apstrakt

Duh globalizma, determinisan korporativizmom i komercijalizacijom, nametnuo se javnosti Srbije, proizvodeći krizu nacionalnog identiteta. Pukotine u najsloženijoj vrsti kolektivnog identiteta pojavljuju se kao paradigma suočavanja društva sa posledicama raspada bivše države i ideologije, neokolonijalnog pritiska, složenim odnosima i smetnjama u vezi sa pravoslavnom tradicijom i temeljnim odrednicama srpske kulture. Zajednički imenitelj ovih procesa je usvajanje tuđeg stanovišta o sebi samima, razaranje prošlosti, tradicije i nacionalnih mitova. Ključni komunikološki momenat je, pored prisustva opšteg, nepostojanje nacionalnog pola demokratske javnosti. Imajući sve to u vidu, autori se fokusiraju na analizu sadržaja medija u Srbiji, tragajući za narativima vezanim za nacionalni identitet u sadržajima koji se bave pojedinim značajnim događajima poslednjih nekoliko decenija, kroz njihovu medijsku interpretaciju u danima istaknutih datuma i godišnjica. Sami mediji imaju veliki uticaj na formiranje stavova javnosti kroz mogućnosti nametanja određenih tema, odnosno njihovog postavljanja u centar pažnje (*agenda setting*), a koje prolaze kroz proces uokviravanja (*framing*), što sve ima i izraziti manipulativni potencijal. Kroz traganje za tzv. srpskim stanovištem (Lompar) i analizu medijskog pristupa tom konceptu omogućuje se produktivna osnova nacionalnog okupljanja i eliminisanje negativnih potencijala, što vodi ka izgradnji zdravog nacionalnog identiteta.

Ključne reči: medijska slika, nacionalni pol demokratske javnosti, uokviravanje, nacionalni identitet, srpsko stanovište

GLOBALIZATION, LANGUAGE AND CREDIBILITY OF THE MEDIA: A CASE STUDY – DISCOURSE OF THE WARTIME PRESS IN THE REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA IN TERMS OF CULTURAL IDENTITY

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Abstract

In an era of time and space compression and the gathering of all countries into one entity, the McDonaldization of education, culture, languages, and the media, aided nowadays by incalculable technological advances, introduces new forms of deception. With an abundance of new global rules, non-standard idioms and jargon (put on “ignore”, “post” a comment, “chat”, and “like”), and reduced statements (“cnt” instead of I can’t, “2nite” – tonight, “4U” – for you, or “cul8r” – see you later) where too much information kills the information (Bal, 1997), a person who does not possess a new form of critical competence, that is, literacy under the new rules, will think that everything is as it is written or as it appears. In McLuhan's prophecy of a global village dominated by the absence of identity and the newly created communication ghetto, this powerful process of globalization, under the mantle of transition, has undergone a transformation with the aim of methodologically disturbing and obscuring the class essence of the transition process (Šuvaković, 2015).

This paper analytically and critically analyzes the aspects of the impact of globalization on the Serbian language and media reporting. An analysis of the articles published in the daily newspaper “Javnost” (The Public) during the war year of 1993, which constitutes the material for this research, seeks to show that despite the war, as a special phenomenon dominated by criteria and priorities different from those of ordinary human life, newspaper reports and articles contain a rich and diverse fund of words, expressions, and statements in the Serbian language and rules of the standard language.

Key words: globalization, Serbian language, media, war reporting, national identity

Introduction

The 1990s were marked by tectonic changes in the Western Balkans, which led to what American political scientist Samuel Huntington calls “the war of the civilizations” (Huntington, 1997, pp. 349–353), due to tensions, crises, conflicts, and wars on the line of direct contact between three large religions – Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Islam. The role of the media, especially the global ones, was very important and, observed objectively, their reporting was rather questionable. Many theorists and analysts are inclined to think that the media had a crucial role in the process of condemnation of former Yugoslavia and formally announced its bloody breakup. According to the advocates of this thesis, the media should bear the responsibility for intensifying political and national tensions among ethnicities in such a way as to divide the republics through their comments and reports, spreading the global atmosphere of distrust. Did the media really have that kind of power and influence?

Global media preparation and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The West carefully prepared the ground and influenced public opinion by juxtaposing the parties to the conflict as the good and the bad, as the victims and the aggressors, while consciously withholding ethnical conflicts and national intolerance, which have caused mass suffering of the people in Bosnia and Herzegovina throughout centuries. The phrase “the history of hatred” is common among many authors who observe Bosnia and Herzegovina through the prism of “tribalism” or “ancient ethnical hatred”. In his text, Patrick Bishop writes about “an inability to forget the hatreds of the past, which has condemned successive generations to perpetuate them”,¹ and general Michael Rose, who was a commander of the UNPROFOR peacekeeping forces during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, talks about “hatred and history of violence” (Rouz, 2001, p. 17) in his book “Fighting for Peace”. The Balkans as the playing field for endless wars is Samuel Huntington’s idea, and he presents the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina as “the war on the borderlines of religions” (Huntington, 1997, p. 298). However, the Western public opinion would not have accepted the existence of more than two opposing forces that are equally good or equally evil.

In the media war, what counts is not the truthfulness of facts but the effect of communication, something that is kept in the consciousness. By a skilled camouflage of the terms, Serbs were equated with fascists, criminals, and brutes, and in that way, the West did not have to deal with people, but with the monsters of the modern world (Jevtović, 2000, p. 177).

Both Croats and Muslims intensively worked on the media preparations for the war, which resulted in hiring the American public relations company “Ruder and Finn” in order to demonise Serbs from Slovenia to Kosovo. These people, a kind of news collectors, working exclusively by order, produced several paid propaganda tricks and false reports. Upon being asked by Serbian journalist Miodrag Ilić why his company had led a dirty propaganda war against Serbia, James Harff, the manager of “Ruder and Finn”, responded: “We are professionals. There was a job to be done and we did it”. Ilić

¹ Daily Telegraph, January 20, 1999, available at: <https://www.gale.com/uk/c/the-telegraph-historical-archive>

published this with a stenographic and audio record of the conversation in his book "Medijske imperije" ("Media Empires").

The Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Outbreak of the Civil War

The media in the war create stereotypes and, according to Dugandžija,

use well-known propaganda strategies to give psychological support to the war, using black and white images to demonize the opponent, withholding information, exaggerating the facts, falsifying information, making constant comparisons to historical events and myths, propagating hate speech, and constantly repeating the same messages (Dugandžija, 2004, p. 76).

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, media wars were waged on both ethnical and religious bases, because their dominant characteristic is national-religious opposition. A common information system of Bosnia and Herzegovina disappeared along with the state of which it was a subsystem and two out of three constitutional nations, Serbs and Croats, completely relied on the media from Serbia and Croatia, respectively, and started establishing their own media. The media in Sarajevo were controlled by the Muslim government and the civil war, which broke out on ethnical and religious basis, led to the establishment of a tripartite media space dominated by national and religious intolerance.

Simultaneously with the founding of the institutions and the establishment of civil and military structures of the government of the newly formed Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina, legal requirements were also being met to launch new media of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Legislation pertaining to the media was the first step in establishing an autonomous media system as a subsystem of the Republic of Srpska. On April 7, 1992, Serbian news agency SRNA,² predominantly staffed by the Serbs who had worked in the pre-war media in Sarajevo, was launched in Pale, a place which became home to the institutions and the leadership of the Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In early April 1992, Radio Banja Luka, which had been broadcasting regularly since February 2, 1967 as a part of former RTV Sarajevo, started broadcasting as Serbian Radio Banja Luka. Public Service of Radio-Television of the Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina, nowadays Public Radio-Television Service of the Republic of Srpska, was launched on March 31, 1992 by the decision of the National Assembly of the Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The printed media in the Republic of Srpska in 1993 included "Javnost" (The Public), which represented national and state media, as well as "Oslobodenje" (Liberation), which continued the tradition of the same newspaper from Sarajevo. Under the patronage of the Military Headquarters of the Republic of Srpska, "Srpska vojska" (Serbian Military) newspaper while the defunct newspaper from Banja Luka "Glas" (The Voice) was now published under the name "Glas srpski" (The Serbian Voice). Local media started to be published in some municipalities, such as "Srpsko slovo" (The Serbian Letter), which was published in the municipality of Srpska Ilidža. The main characteristic of the media in the Republic of Srpska is that they were all launched as new institutions in the process of the constitution of the Republic of Srpska and as an expression of the general national interest.

² <http://www.srna.rs/o-nama.aspx>

War reporting and the profession of a war correspondent

For a professional journalist, there is no greater challenge and professional obligation than the task of being a war correspondent. War, as the highest level of conflict, whose main characteristic is combat, primarily places war correspondents in mortal danger but also challenges their professional engagement, which is obstructed by two opposing aspects: emphatic and factual. According to the emphatic approach, the journalist expresses sympathy for those who are affected (Barović, 2010, p. 122), the victims, and the dead. Journalists are humans, too, so they are expected not to report indifferently but to express their opinion about an event. On the other hand, professional ethics obliges the journalists to provide an objective, unbiased, accurate, and truthful report. It is the basis of the factual sphere that obliges the journalists to ascertain all the relevant facts about the event they are reporting on. Balance and distance of those two spheres or theories is a prerequisite for professional news reporting. Considering the influence the media has on the public opinion and the role of journalists in the creation of objective and truthful information, it is widely believed that the factual aspect should be observed in the state of war. Such a professional challenge is even greater if the war correspondents are informing the public about the events in their own country, the suffering of their own countrymen, the war atrocities, and the destruction.

The following three factors are of paramount importance for war correspondents: time, place, and access to the battlefronts (Taylor, 2003, p. 68). Access to the battlefronts is the key requirement for authentic and objective reporting on the war conflict and that right is often denied to journalists. Since the outbreak of the war, in April 1992, nobody controlled the movements of the journalists in the war zones of the Military of the Republic of Srpska. The first government of the Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was formed in the spring of 1992, comprised the Ministry of Information, which established its Press Centre. However, until July 1992, any direct contact with the journalists, foreign or local, was maintained through Radio-Television of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina, called "Kanal S" at the time. Production capacities and the technical service of "Kanal S" were used by foreign media houses without censorship or control of the material, which was sent to their editorial staffs.

In the summer of 1992, the civil government received a request from the Department for General, Legal and Moral Issues of the Military Headquarters of the Republic of Srpska to cease this practice or the access to the war zones would be denied to the journalists. The first organised contact with the foreign media houses was made in August 1992, and this was the time when the accreditations for foreign journalist were issued and their registration began. The Press Centre organised press convoys and provided access to almost all war zones to all foreign journalists, without the obligation to submit their recorded materials to the military or civil authorities for censorship or control. However, this attitude provoked an outcry of foreign journalist teams, who saw the Press centre as a residue of the communist system, in which the state wants to have complete control over free access to the events and reporting.

During 1995, political and military authorities of the Republic of Srpska became divided and those disrupted relationships led to a direct intervention of the government in the media domain. On May 31, 1995, the president of the Republic of Srpska, Radovan Karadžić, issued an order for all media services (SRT, SRNA, "Javnost", "Glas srpski",

“Oslobodenje”, and “Srpska vojska”), which was formally and essentially the beginning of the censorship of the media system of the Republic of Srpska. Referring to the Constitution of the Republic of Srpska and the emergent military and political situation, all media services were ordered to “implement a unique editing policy in close cooperation with the Government of the Republic of Srpska and to run the information and all the statements exclusively through the Ministry of Information”.³ Approval of the Ministry of Information was required to publish information abroad as well as to manage activities of correspondents, agencies, and other media abroad. The order of the former President is the only official and formal form of censorship in Serbian media in the Republic of Srpska. That way, the essence of communication, which is a two-way process (sender-receiver), was reduced to a one-way process in which the official government authority actually determined the essence and importance of information.

The corpus

The present research relies on the relevant corpus for the analysis of journalistic ethics and the way the media operated in the state of war. This research was motivated by the fact that so far all the reviews of wartime media publishing in the Republic of Srpska lacked a systematic approach, which makes it difficult to establish a system of cultural and social valorisation.

The material used in this research was taken from the weekly newspaper “Javnost”, founded by the National Assembly of the Republic of Srpska. The first issue of “Javnost” was published in Sarajevo on October 19, 1990. As a weekly newspaper of the Republic of Srpska, “Javnost” was published from October 24, 1992 (when it was listed in the Register of Public Media of the Ministry of Information of the Republic of Srpska) to the end of the war. The fact that the publication of “Javnost” began in the second half of October 1992 makes this weekly newspaper one of the first printed media in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Weekly newspaper “Behar” (Blossom) was launched in 1993 and in February of the same year “Glas Goražda” (The Voice of Goražde) was published. Later that year, in April, “Liberio” was published in Sarajevo while the Croat and Bosniaks’ weekly newspaper “HB” was launched in 1994.⁴

The sample for this research consists of twenty three single issues of “Javnost” from June 26 to December 1, 1993, issues number 131 to 151. On two occasions, during September and November 1993, “Javnost” was not published, which we learned from the editorial staff notes “Saturday without Javnost” and “The Public without Javnost”.

This research will include the analysis of the content structure and attitude toward the informative value in the selected material, with the emphasis on the patterns of newspaper reports as primarily descriptive text structures, whose basic pragmatic function is to be informative (Glovacki-Bernardi, 2004, p. 49). Analysis of the selected newspaper patterns will be interdisciplinary, comprising their thematic and organizational arrangement, lexical-semantic structure, and contextualization related to war circumstances. Multiple aspects in the research are influenced by the complex nature of the selected newspaper

³ President of the Republic of Srpska, Order no: 01-1029/95, Sarajevo/ Pale. May 31, 1995

⁴ The data on the publication frequency of Bosniak and Croat printed media during the 1990s war in Bosnia and Herzegovina were taken from <https://www.media.ba/bs/magazin-novinarstvo/naslovnice-prvih-novina-bih-nakon-1992>

forms, which define social context on the one hand and the nature of the code used to express it on the other side.

It is well known that no newspaper texts are one-dimensional and that most of them have multiple simultaneous roles. In other words, the role of a newspaper text is never a single clean and distilled task, but always a synthesis of several tasks (Mokriš, 2001, p. 17). According to Stanojević, the journalist is not the prime subject because the language (s)he uses becomes the prime subject. Responsible newspaper language is, “in fact, necessarily based on the characteristics of accuracy, clarity, conciseness, vibrancy, harmony...” (Stanojević, 2011, p. 157). In modern journalism, in fact, in modern media, “paradoxically, despite the fact that the said or written word is the main substratum, we rarely get to widen the cognitive features of language. On the contrary, language is diminished quantitatively and qualitatively, and the meaning moves away from representing the reality instead of moving towards it” (Stanojević, 2011, p. 158). In today’s newspapers, as Malović says, “short forms are prevailing, which there no longer include articles, detailed analyses, or extensive interviews”. They are characterized by “short news, great striking headlines, and big photographs” (Malović, 2007, p. 14).

Content structure and newspaper columns

Newspaper columns are one of the ways of organising the content, which, as an essential part of the newspaper architecture, support the routine of reading. It is generally accepted that not only the media but also the way the media are presented influences the reception of the content. Based on the analysis of twenty issues, “Javnost”, did not have a pre-set model of content organisation. This is understandable if one considers the socio-political, or specifically the war context, as well as the context of the topic itself, war conflicts, and the dynamic contexts which cannot be influenced by the journalists. War reporters and the media during wartime generally have a very difficult task of handling and conveying the truth. Considering the fact that war is a special phenomenon in which, compared to everyday life, different criteria and priorities dominate, their task to convey the truth is quite challenging. As a form of content organisation, columns in the newspaper “Javnost” completely define their content in a way that columns announced in the heading define the content of the page/pages leading up to next column. That model is in accordance with the modern understanding of the newspaper column.

The first issues of “Javnost” in the selected corpus open with domestic political commentaries, articles, reports, and feature stories in columns “Na prvi pogled” (At First Sight), “Osvrt” (Review), “Dogadjaji nedjelje” (This Week’s Events), which were replaced by the column “Tema” (The Topic) from issue No. 137 onward. It was sometimes followed by columns “Odjeci” (Echos) from issue No. 140 and “Aktuelno” (Current Affairs) from the issue No. 146, both of which contain articles with the same topic. These are author monologue formats in which the journalists express their attitude on the socio-political events. The most common columns included “Reportaža” (A Feature Story), “Intervju” (Interview), “Ratišta” (Frontline), “Feljton” (Feuilleton), “Nešto između” (Something in Between), “Umetnički dnevnik” (Art News) and “Omnibus”. Among the said columns, three columns appeared in all twenty issues in the corpus: “Umetnički dnevnik”, “Nešto između”, and “Omnibus”. The column “Nešto između” contains the news and brief information, representing short social chronicles.

“Umetnički dnevnik” contained the columns of the Serbian artist Milić od Mačve (Milić Stanković). “Omnibus” was on the last pages and it was dedicated to entertainment and leisure, such as aphorisms, epigrams, caricatures, crosswords, and sometimes poems.

The reports from the battlefield appear in the special column “Ratišta” (War Fronts) from issue No. 136, which is sometimes replaced by two columns “Žrtve i zločini” (“Victims and Crimes”) (issue No. 138). Occasionally, there were columns “Živa istorija” (“Living History”) and “Baština” (Heritage) (issue No. 138), which contained expert views on historical topics important for the history of the Serbs. Other columns were added that were modelled on the aforementioned ones: “Islam” (Islam), “Vatikan” (The Vatican), and “(U)tisak” ((Im)print) from issue No. 135; “Beščašće” (Dishonour), “Portreti” (Portraits), “Pisma” (Letters), “Svedočanstva” (Testimonies), and “Dosije” (File), from issue No. 136; “Amerika” (America), “Odlikovanja” (Medals), “Ratnici” (Warriors), and “Svijet” (The World) from issue No. 138; “Regije” (Regions), “Povodi” (Occasions), “Polemike” (Polemics), and “Gradovi” (Towns) from issue No. 139; “Vijesti” (News), “Ranjenici” (The Wounded), “Izbjeglice” (Refugees), and “Prosvjeta” (Education) from issue No. 140; “Sudbine” (Destinies), “Kriminal” (Crime), “Ratna privreda” (War Economy), and “Kultura” (Culture) from issue No. 141; “Logori” (Camps) from issue No. 142; “Pravoslavlje” (Orthodoxy), “Esej” (Essay) from issue No. 143; “Mediji” (The Media) and “Knjige” (Books) from issue No. 145; “Terorizam” (Terrorism) from issue No. 146; “Prikazi” (Reviews) and “Jubileji” (Jubilees) from issue No. 149; “Nauka” (Science) from issue No. 150; “Zarobljenici” (Prisoners) and “Sarajevo” from issue No. 151; “Dijaspora” (Diaspora) and “Za i protiv” (For and Against) from issue No. 152; and “Srpska Krajina” (Srpska Krajina) and “Krajevi” (Areas) from issue No. 153. All the aforementioned columns lead to the conclusion that “Javnost” had a variety of topics, whose structure depended on the content. The available content was a signal for the editors to decide which columns to include in which issue and where to introduce new columns when the public interest was so high that the topic deserved its own column.

Types of news reports and reporting methods

News material in the present corpus is characterised by thematic and genre variety. “Javnost” contains diverse informative and interpretative forms, such as news, reports, commentaries, opinions, brief information, notes, chronicles, as well as analytical forms, such as feature stories, interviews, columns, and critiques. “Javnost” also included fiction genres, such as essays and stories, as well as graphical content, such as cartoons and photographs.

In terms of frequency, the overall selected corpus is dominated by longer articles, which contain detailed analyses, analytical notes, views, commentaries, and portraits. The half-page size texts are statistically irrelevant for the research. The form of the news reports together with their scope reveals a pronounced dependence on the information that the media had at the time of the war conflict, because the public relies on the media as a moderator to provide them with the information and an interpretation of the complicated events (Čerina, 2012, p. 110). Among the analysed news reports, interpretative and journalists’ reports prevail, and they are considered as reports with the elements of interpretative content. It is typical for the interpretative type of report to have a journalist who places facts within such an interaction that “the reader gets a clearer picture of the

event from the context, and it helps him take a stance easier...” (Todorović, 2002, p. 74). Journalists’ reports, following an event in its progress, also describe the atmosphere, and the given setting of the event heightens the impression that the reader forms about the described events (Valić Nedeljković, s.a, p. 35).

The dominant stylistic-compositional model of the reports in the selected sample consists of the reports containing the head and the body, so the most important information on the event is given in the first few sentences and what follows is the explication. It is that type of reporting form, written in “an old-fashioned manner”, which is exclusively adjusted to the print media. Longer articles by authors are the most common type of news reporting in the corpus, and they are divided into several sections: a headline, an overline, and subheadlines, whose smaller parts are separated by inter-headlines. The text itself is followed by additional information, expressed by verbal or non-verbal code. Such an approach of “Javnost” to shaping factual content, in which analyses of and commentaries on the events are the primary aim, is something to be expected considering the fact that the said concept is suitable for articles that have political, military, and/or social character. For example:

- (1) July 10, 1993 Turmoils in the Serbian Radical Party of the Republic of Srpska
Political switches (don’t) threaten the split

The president of the Serbian Radical Party of the Republic of Srpska Nikola Poplašen ousted the vice-president of the party Živko Jovanović and the municipality board of that party in Banja Luka as well as the manager of “Radikal” company Goran Mitrović because of – as it was publicly announced – criminal and other dishonest activities.

Recent events in the Serbian Radical Party of the Republic of Srpska have made the summer in Banja Luka, already hot with high political temperature, even hotter. The things that took place on the first days of July this year have increased the circulation of “Glas srpski” and influenced the audience of “Radio Banjaluka”. Of course, we are referring to the “lucky ones”, who had electricity or, at least, radio during those days. What is it about actually? (...)

There were only eight unsigned articles in the researched sample of twenty single issues of “Javnost”. Those were signed either with the initials of the name and surname or with the initial of the name and the full surname. This is a negligible number compared to the total number of signed reports (91). This indicator of how much the transparency of authorship was achieved leads us to a conclusion that the notion of credibility was a very important characteristic of the reporting method of “Javnost”.

In expert and scientific discussions on textual characteristics of the news genre, the distinctiveness of headlines is often emphasised. The emphasis in those observations is on the function of the headlines, their role to attract the readers – by special typeface, by being in a prominent place, by expressive wording, by characteristic punctuation signs, etc. (Silić, 2006, p. 89). Headlines, as well as overlines and subheadlines, are considered to be the strongest position of every text if one disregards its functional and stylistic type (Katnić-Bakaršić, 2001, p. 261). The headline stresses the essence of the news text, setting out the most important information, and strives to epitomise as many facts in fewest words possible (Todorović, 2002, p. 65). From the perspective of receptive

aesthetics, the headline is the “default sign, which contains an “empty” place and is thus related to the text, which is yet to be realised” (Glovacki-Bernardi, 2004, p. 77).

Integrated or complex headlines are prevalent in our corpus. They are headlines that have all three elements of a headline block: headline, subheadlines, and overlines. The uniqueness of overlines in “Javnost” lies in the fact that they were used for different purposes: to mark the event by time or place (e.g. “Ilidža, jedan dan” (Ilidža, a day) or to show the summarised text (e.g. “Previranje u SRS Republike Srpske” (The Turmoil in SRS of the Republic of Srpska). Subheadlines provide short contents and the key thesis of the reporting text. In the literature, the headlines with the said components are also called expressive headlines, as opposed to informative headlines, which more often have no overline or subheadlines (Valić Nedeljković, s.a, p. 55). With regard to the elaboration of the headlines, the selected reports display a unique picture, with rare and minor variations. The reason for that uniqueness of the structure of the headlines is found in the concept of the newspaper “Javnost” itself, considering the fact that it was a weekly newspaper. We can illustrate this with the following examples:

- (2) July 24, Trnovo after liberation
Getting back to the Ruins
These days Trnovo starts tending its big and numerous wounds. Life is slowly getting back to ruined homes. Many inhabitants of this small town rush to their home place to build bigger and more beautiful new homes over the ruined places where their homes used to be.
- (3) August 7, Battlefront in Herzegovina
Crime in Doljani
In the last few days, Alija’s warriors of the jihad committed a horrible crime in the Croatian village of Doljani, near Jablanica, where they killed more than 50 women, children, and elderly people.
- (4) With the soldiers of “Srpska garda” in Ilidža
Heroes from Zoranovo
“Srpska garda” is a special unit of the Ilidžanska brigade and the best sign of how they fight is the fact that Otes changed its name and was named after their killed commander Zoran Borovina.

The informative value of the headline depends on several factors, and they deal with the choice of words, word order, reduction of the sentence parts, etc. Depending on the verb or noun dominance in the headline form, we divide them into informative and nominal headlines. Informative headlines are used “to transfer content, so that the main role is preserved for verbs, verb forms, tenses, question words, and the ways of transferring information on the content using sentence intonation” (Silić, 2006, p. 383). In the present corpus, informative headlines or the ones transferring the content are rarely found. We did find the following examples:

- (5) July 2, Floods *Threaten* Mostar
- (6) October 30, Borik *Knocked down* by Bombers
- (7) December 18, Last Fortresses *Falling down*

Concerning their lexical and stylistic characteristics, most headlines are of the nominal type, with lexico-semantic groups such as general, verbal, and proper nouns. The type is illustrated by the following examples:

- (8) June 26, Fire from the “Charity” Packages
- (9) July 31, The Guard of Majevisa Peaks
- (10) July 10, Mostar as Vukovar
- (11) July 10, Bloody Clash of Allies
- (12) July 22, In Sniper’s Scope
- (13) November 6, The Help for People and Army
- (14) November 6, Warriors in a Kimono
- (15) September 11, Back to Trnovo
- (16) July 17, Generals ahead of Liberators
- (17) September 30, Fraternalization in Trouble
- (18) November 6, Under the Church Wing
- (19) November 27, The Window for the Sniper
- (20) December 11, The Captain of the Special Class
- (21) December 18, The Criminal Better than the Victim
- (22) December 18, Massacre on Saint Patron’s Day
- (23) December 18, The Nightlife of Mrakovo
- (24) December 25, The Second Life of Commander Jola
- (25) December 25, Three more Power Plants

In the examples above, headlines are presented in the form of nominative sentences with the predicate omitted, its role assumed by the main nominative word or the phrase (Katnić-Bakaršić, 2001, p. 254). From the rhetorical standpoint, nominative forms have the status of being marked, where the emphasis is on the phenomenon and naming them and not on the people responsible or the action itself. Nominative units in listed examples are classified as omitted constructions and are considered to reflect a tendency to summarise the headline. On the syntactic level, nominative headlines are formed by omission of the communicatively redundant parts of the predicate, so that it remains untold and the sentence gets the stylistic appearance of live storytelling (Hudaček & Mihaljević, 2006, Katnić-Bakaršić, 2001). For example:

- (26) July 24, Left without Food
- (27) September 4, Sold the Tank to the Muslims
- (28) September 30, Hope Replaces Fear

Dominance of nominal headlines of news reports created by neutral lexical units leads to the conclusion that “Javnost” delivered facts directly, and that the emotional level was delivered in the “background” part of the text. As seen in the given examples, the headlines are characterised by short nominative phrases or simple clauses. In the analysed corpus, most of the news reports headlines are short, and the conciseness of the news headlines is one of their main characteristics. Statistical data reveal that the headlines are from two to six words long, which does not deviate from the newspaper practice whereby five-word headlines are considered successful (Stolac, 2003, p. 7).

The expressiveness of the headline is achieved through the language choice whose characteristic is “reduced informative value and increased poetic function of language” (Valić Nedeljković, s.a, p. 56). It is the reason the focus is often moved from appellative and referential functions to the poetic one; in fact, it makes the message focused on itself. The usage of tropes, i.e. semantic stylemes, is expected in literary-publicist genres, but it is also very common in informative genres, especially the use of metonymy (Hudaček &

Mihaljević, 2006, p. 150). While the news provides straightforward data, the report is changed by additional details and ornaments that describe a phenomenon or an event in more detail (Ćirilović, 1998, p. 15).

The frequency of figurative forms in the collected corpus is very low, so the use of stylistic devices is not prevalent in the interpretative texts and news reports in “Javnost”. Apart from the previously mentioned elliptic forms, we also focused on the use of metonymy, metaphor, and personification. For example:

- (29) August 28, School Bell in Half Voice
- (30) December 18, The Cross on the “Crucifixion”
- (31) July 26, The Underground Hits Back
- (32) October 9, Villages with No Life
- (33) October 30, Tuzla Looks to the East
- (34) September 4, The Country above the Homeland
- (35) July 17, Villages – on the Graveyard
- (36) December 25, Ozren – the Key to Bosnia
- (37) October 30, The Mountain Full of Life
- (38) July 24, Igman March on the Resat Examination
- (39) July 17, The Long Route of Humiliation
- (40) September 4, The Engine of Serbian Army

Metonymy has the greatest frequency of use in the publicist style because it leads to simplicity and conciseness of the expression. As the examples (29)-(40) show, spatial and possessive metonymies are the most frequent, and they emphasise the location where the war conflicts are ongoing, i.e. the lexeme that belongs to the war domain is central to the used phrases. Considering the fact that metonymy is based on the reduction of a phrase, any part of it provides a journalist with the opportunity to concisely express the content and increase its attractiveness. The examples above also reveal that the combination of more than one stylistic model, i.e. polystylistic headlines, is not uncommon, as exemplified by “School Bell in Half Voice”, “Igman March on the Resat Examination”, and “Tuzla Looks to the East”, where metonymy and personification are combined. In the example “Ozren – the Key to Bosnia”, parts of the appositive phrase are rendered expressively and emotionally more complex by the grapho-stylistic use of the dash. The pre-focus stylistic pause in the example “Villages – on the Graveyard” represents the moment of failed expectations, a defamiliarization that the reader does not expect in an informative news text, the purpose of which is to express the affective attitude of the author, in this case a journalist’s attitude to the subject of the text. In the final two examples, metaphorical headlines “The Long Route of Humiliation” and “The Engine of Serbian Army”, given in a form of a genitive non-prepositional phrase, allow the reader to see two pictures in one (Kovačević, 2000, p. 36). The first one has a task to vividly show the abstract phenomenon expressed by the verbal noun “poniženje” (humiliation), and the second one has the task of assessment, because the text provides information about the successful business activities of a military company. A specific characteristic of the use of metaphors in a journalistic text is the inclusion of ambiguity in the message and the requirement of careful attention from the readers. It is the reason why metaphor is not a common stylistic device in genres that require concise, precise, and unambiguous ways of informing the readers. This shows that the selected texts, according to their choice of

lexical and syntactic structure of the headlines, display a high level of automation of the figures of speech as well as a certain level of innovation related to their choice of figures of speech in order to draw readers' attention.

Conclusion

The analysis of the content structure and the attitude toward the informative value in the wartime press of the Republic of Srpska was conducted on the material taken from the weekly newspaper "Javnost". The research sample consisted of twenty three single issues of newspaper "Javnost" from number 131 to 151, which were published from June 26 to December 1, 1993. As a weekly newspaper of the Republic of Srpska, "Javnost" was published from October 24, 1992 up to the end of the war. The issues of "Javnost" that were selected as the research material are characterised by their diversity of informative and interpretative forms, such as news, reports, commentaries, opinions, brief information, notes, chronicles, as well as analytical forms, such as feature stories, interviews, columns, and critiques. In addition to the mentioned genres, "Javnost" also tackled fiction and illustrative genres, some of which include essays, stories, cartoons, and photographs.

In terms of frequency, longer articles prevail in the selected corpus and they offer detailed analyses, analytical notes, opinions, commentaries, and portraits. Descriptive structures of the newspaper texts, whose main role is to be informative, were in the focus of the conducted research. Interpretative and journalists' reports were the dominant type of reporting form. The dominant stylistic-compositional model of reporting in the selected corpus consisted of models with "the head and the body", which are traditional reporting forms of the printed media. In the researched sample, the number of unsigned reports was negligible, as only eight out of 91 samples were unsigned, which indicates that the transparency of authorship was highly appreciated in the reporting model of "Javnost".

The analysis of headline types revealed the prevalence of complex headlines, i.e. those which consist of all three elements of headline block: the headline, the overline, and subheadlines. The prevalence of nominal headlines is influenced by their linguo-stylistic characteristics, so the reporting was done by the model of expressing facts directly, while the emotional level of the message was in the background text. The headlines were characterised by short nominal phrases or clauses, and their lexico-semantic structure mostly consisted of common, verbal, and proper nouns. The conciseness of the headlines was their most prominent feature, reflected in their expressiveness, and stylistic defamiliarizations are not frequent in the news reporting texts of "Javnost". Metonymy was the prevalent figure of speech in the headlines, while polystylematic headlines, which contain combinations of several different stylistic devices, were also not uncommon.

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GLOBALIZACIJA, JEZIK I VJERODOSTOJNOST MEDIJA: STUDIJA SLUČAJA – DISKURS RATNE ŠTAMPE REPUBLIKE SRPSKE U SVJETLU KULTURNOG IDENTITETA

Apstrakt

U eri sažimanja vremena i prostora, okupljanja svih zemalja u jedan entitet, mekdonaldizacije obrazovanja, kulture, jezika, medija, današnjica, potpomognuta nesagledivim tehnološkim dostignućima, donosi nove vidove obmane. U izobilju novih globalnih pravila, nestandardnih idioma i žargona (staviti na „ignore“, baciti „si“, ostaviti „post“, „četovati i lajkovati“), redukovanih iskaza („NMG“ umjesto ne mogu, „VČRS a ne večeras, „4U“ – za tebe, „cul8r“ što

bi trebalo da znači vidimo se poslije) gdje previše informacija ubija informaciju (Bal, 1997), čovjek koji ne posjeduje novi vid kritičke kompetencije, odnosno, pismenost prema novim pravilima, misliće da je baš sve onako kako izgleda ili piše. U Mekluanovom proročanstvu globalnog sela, kojim dominira odsustvo identiteta i novostvoreni komunikacioni geto, taj moćni proces globalizacije, pod plaštom tranzicije, sve je podvrgnuo transformaciji sa ciljem metodološke pometnje i zamagljivanja klasne suštine procesa tranzicije (Šuvaković, 2015). U radu autori analitički i kritički razmatraju aspekte uticaja globalizacije na srpski jezik i medijsko izvještavanje. Analizom tekstova objavljenih u dnevnom listu Javnost tokom ratne 1993. godine, što čini građu za ovo istraživanje, nastoji se pokazati da uprkos ratu, kao posebnom fenomenu u kojem vladaju drukčiji kriterijumi i prioriteti od onih u uobičajenom čovjekovom životu, novinski izvještaji i članci sadrže bogat i raznovrstan fundus riječi i izraza srpskog književnog jezika.

Ključne reči: globalizacija, srpski jezik, mediji, ratno izvještavanje, nacionalni identitet

CULTURAL IDENTITY OF PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES

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Abstract

This paper analyses the genesis of professional athletes' identity. Professional sport is aimed at achieving high-level sports results. Professional athletes are paid, and sport is their core profession. High performance and success in professional sports gain market value, so professional athletes opt to play where they are better paid and where they have better conditions. This is a global phenomenon and athletes often compete within cultures that significantly differ from their own. Professional athletes are adults, with already formed personal, family, national, cultural, and professional identities. In a new cultural setting that differs from his/her culture origins, an athlete is expected to develop a sense of belonging to a new club team, a new environment and a new culture, which is inevitable, as the best clubs gather athletes from different parts of the world, and each has a different national and cultural identity. Sports club owners and coaches demand a high level of team cohesion. Accepting a new cultural identity helps the athlete's adaptation to a new environment but can also lead to discrepancy in the self-experience of one's own identity. Further changes of the environment upon completion of a professional contract or in case of contract termination pose an issue for a professional athlete. In the world of professional sports, athletes are deemed to be able to easily overcome all difficulties as long as their financial compensation is high, while the human side of the sports is neglected – athletes are important in so far as they generate profit.

Key words: personal identity, cultural identity, professional sports, athlete, profit

Identity and personal identity

The origin of the term “identity” is the neo-Latin word *identitas*, which means sameness. The term has two common meanings: (1) in logic and philosophy it represents a relation of sameness, a complete accordance of two concepts, symbols, or phenomena, and (2) in psychology of personality, regarding personal identity, it represents a conscious or unconscious experience of essential self-identity and continuity of one's “I” over a longer period of time, regardless of changes in one's self over different periods and circumstances. The notion of personal identity is the answer to the question: “Who am I?” posed by a person to herself/himself (Trebješanin, 2001, p. 179).

Personality is the irreducible essence we refer to in articulating the first-person pronoun “I” and its forms “me” or “self” (Adams, 1954). The main foundations of the system encompassed by the term personality comprise: the Bios, comprised of genetics and the organ system; the Socius, comprised of socialization, historicism, and political collectivism; the Logos, comprised of prediction, personal constructs, cognitive organization, and meanings; and Physicos, a physical substance of an organism. The foundations of the system of personality are complementary. This is the system that constitutes one’s personal identity (Vuksanović, 2018, p. 14).

Increasingly, the term identity is used to describe one’s place in a group; it determines who and where a person is in the social system s/he inseparably belongs to. It refers to “the content of what we think we are, which is understandable and potentially acceptable for the audience” (Stojnov, 1999, p. 54). Sometimes it is difficult to separate one’s personal identity from the group identity. It turned out that the most common initial answer of the respondents to the question “Who am I?” was their affiliation to a particular social group, mainly to their nation.

Identity formation and development

Identity is formed nearly since as early as birth, when communication established between a mother and infant enables the creation of a unique sense of “I”. (Actually, the mother-child relationship is established even before birth, with the mother’s decision to conceive and subsequently to give birth to a child).

At the very beginning, a baby does not differentiate self from its mother, it does not distinguish “I” from “non-I”, and instead of two separate beings only one merged being exists. Gradually, over time, the baby slowly “realizes” and accepts that the mother is detached from it and that they are separate beings. During the second year of his/her life, the “I” concept appears, which the child uses to speak about him/herself as a determinant to distinguish self from others but also to define self as a separate being.

Personal identity of a mature and adult person represents the enduring personality sameness whose essence has not changed, irrespective of all changes within and around one that occurred in the meantime. This means a personality will always have a sense of self-enduring and consistent identity, regardless of the changes perceived within self. Likewise, social environment will always perceive one’s personality in the same way, regardless of changes in that environment as well as changes within the personality; while the environment does perceive changes in personality, it does not change personality identification. (Exceptions are, of course, severe mental disorders with severe alterations that characterize profound personality psychopathology).

We can conclude that when we speak about personal identity, we speak about two dimensions: the identity which one oneself, personally, feels and perceives, and the identity which one’s environment perceives.

In psychological terms, identity determines some kind of difference between people, but it also determines perception of self as a unique and lasting, wherein the sameness is comprised. The matter of identity is the matter of the core human essence. Identity gives a person a feeling of continuity between the past, the present, and the future the way the person perceives it, which (again) enables uniformity of personality over a period of time.

In this way, identity becomes a unique set of one's qualities, which distinguishes one from all other persons (Vuksanović, 2004).

According to psychologist Ericson (Ericson, 1950), the sense of personal identity is based on two simultaneous observations: (1) the perception of the self-sameness and continuity of one's existence in time and space, and (2) the perception of the fact that others recognize one's sameness and continuity. In his theory of personality, Ericson calls the personality development stage between the ages of 13 and 18 "the identity formation stage", or adolescence. This stage in development and growing up of a young person is characterized by a development crisis "identity – role confusion". Autonomy in relation to family, consolidation of sexual identity, development of a personal value system, and successful choice of life objectives during late adolescence are of paramount importance for the sense of solid, stable identity and self-confidence. Difficulties in relationships with peers, insecurity, as well as failure in choosing an occupation are all indicators of the risk of forming a vague identity and confusion of roles in the adulthood.

The identity, implying one's gender, family, professional, social, value, sexual, national, and religious aspects is in full development in the period of adolescence. Nevertheless, the process does not go smoothly. During adolescence, the identity crises occur as the boundaries are established between what is on the outside and what is marked as "I". In this period of life, peer influence is more important than the influence of parents. A young person partially embraces the value system, the attitude towards power, as well as the life patterns from peers, adopting them as her/his own, just as s/he had adopted the patterns from the original social environment – her/his own family (Trebješanin, 2001, p. 179).

During adolescence, the national identity forms as a sense of belonging to one's nation and a feeling of affinity. National and religious identities are deeply rooted in humans, even if only in the form of the unconscious and the collective (Popović, 2002).

Even though seemingly paradoxical, a firm national identity will actually help one to adjust to and fit in a new environment more easily, for mature people with a firm identity do not feel threatened by others.

Over time, as one grows up and matures, the notion of identity becomes more complex. Marriage creates a marital identity that develops a new type of identity – "We" – representing a new quality and denoting "my spouse and I". At the same time, one keeps her/his personal identity referred to as "I".

When children are born, the family identity develops and it contains all previous identities: personal identity referred to as "I", marital identity referred to as "We" (my spouse and I), and family identity, which encompasses the identity of a married couple and their children as a whole.

There is also a qualitative difference between the family and marital identities, since family ties are determined by blood, kin relationships, while there are no such ties between spouses as they are not relatives (Vuksanović, 1998).

Professional identity

The notion of professional identity is closely linked to the notion of profession. Profession is defined as a vocation, more distinctly than job occupation, with more

specific requirements associated, implying appropriate education, certain skills and personality traits, as well as adequate commitment to work, class, and social interests (Krstić, 1988, p. 470).

Professional identity can also be both individual and collective. When we refer to one's individual professional identity, we refer to a component of the individual identity that is described as "I": "I, as a member of a particular profession".

A question arises as to how professional identity can be determined (defined). Professional identity can be determined by (1) defining a profession, i.e. its field of activity, (2) defining professional competence, and (3) by the reputation of a profession. This means that profession first needs to be determined within itself by what it is, by its goals, and the impact its actions make on the system where it operates.

The attitude of a professional towards her/his profession, as well as the perception of a profession by the environment, will depend on the professional competence. Professional competence implies: (1) conceptual competence, which means understanding the theoretical foundations of a profession; (2) technical competence, i.e. possessing the skills necessary to perform a profession; (3) integrative competence, which implies the ability to apply theoretical knowledge in practice; (4) contextual competence, which enables the understanding of broader social, economic, and cultural conditions where professional activities take place; (5) adaptive competence, which represents the ability to anticipate important changes within a profession and to adapt accordingly; and (6) competence in interpersonal communication.

It was noted above that reputation or status enjoyed by a particular profession constitutes an important element of the professional identity. However, not all professions have equal reputations in a society. The reputation of a profession depends on a number of factors, primarily social, cultural, and material ones (Živković & Randjelović, 2013). The reputation of a profession can be also inferred on the basis of so-called social attractiveness, depending on how appealing a profession is to the competent professionals and to what extent they may be interested in pursuing it. A positive public perception of a profession positively influences its "base" by enhancing it. This is because the more appealing the profession, the more likely it will attract higher quality professionals, i.e. it will become the choice of the individuals with better (higher quality) prospects and abilities. Finally, a positive perception helps a profession achieve its objectives more successfully within the environment where it enjoys a good reputation, gain support from the system, and access material funds of the society more easily.

A common question is how stable and persistent professional identity is. Professional identity is considered to be relatively stable over time. Firm professional identity will help a professional to manage well and be successful even in the jobs other than his/her primary occupation. People who for various reasons change their environment and country of residence, even moving to the other side of the world, are often forced (or choose) to pursue an occupation they did not prepare for during their education and previous work experience. Those who have built their own professional identities will fit into the new circumstances much more easily and successfully.

In modern world, we increasingly speak about the so-called corporate identity (Vuksanović, 2011). Furthermore, some even draw parallels between the family and

corporate identities, equating corporate affiliation with family affiliation. Corporate identity, however, always causes detriment to personal and family identities.

Forcing the teamwork on employees somewhat undermines the individuality. Teamwork encourages joint work, common ideas, and enthusiasm, and the team has the same goal and uses similar tools. When the teamwork involves individual initiative, it takes precedence over other forms of work.

In corporations that lack respect for individuality, where everyone thinks the same and aspires to do the same (and aspirations are imposed from the “top”), individuality is diminished, and family and individual identities are annulled and absorbed into the corporate identity. Problems arise when models from one environment are forcefully imposed onto a different cultural climate. As far as multinationals are concerned, by definition they invalidate national characteristics to the advantage of company affiliation and identity. Wisely run multinationals will not excessively encroach on the core essence of the national and cultural being of their employees; instead, they will tend not to provoke resistance and will strive to enhance employees’ satisfaction by respecting environment-specific national and cultural values. Such multinational companies will incorporate national and cultural values of the environment into the corporate values and apply them in the organizations that operate in a particular culture and environment, all for the sake of profit generation.

The rest of the section will briefly discuss the phenomenon of organizational culture. Organizational culture is made up of the core beliefs shared among its members about what the organization represents, what behaviors its members should display, and how it is defined in relation to the environment (Pettinger, 1996). In short: Organizational culture is a way of life and work in a company or an organization.

The components of the organizational culture are: (1) organizational values – representing all that is good and what should happen for the organization, (2) organizational climate – work atmosphere within the organization, which affects motivation, productivity, creativity, and innovation, and (3) managerial style – behavior of the executives and management of an organization or an enterprise.

The most important elements of organizational culture comprise the following:

- Visible behavior patterns – members of an organization use common language, terminology, rituals, or symbols;
- Standards – codes of conduct as well as work instructions are established;
- Dominant values – the most important values one organization represents and expects all employees to respect are defined (e.g. high efficiency, low absenteeism, high quality of work, etc.);
- Philosophy – rules that more closely determine the relation toward employees and external factors;
- Rules – it is strictly determined what new members of an organization must accept and what they must not do. By accepting the rules, new members qualify to become full members of the organization;
- Organization climate – a subjective experience of work atmosphere within an organization, which results from the interaction among organization members and relations with other people outside the organization.

The foundations of organizational culture are laid by the organization founder. Throughout the selection process, during recruitment procedures, those individuals who fit into the established system will get selected (Vuksanović, 2011). Top management creates the climate, defines acceptable behaviors, and determines criteria for the selection process of new members and the models for their socialization. In this way, organizational culture influences identity of organization members and shapes their professional identity.

Cultural identity

Cultural identity is an integral part of the identity of every individual and every society. Culture is usually defined as the entire social heritage of a group of people, referring to learned patterns of thinking, feeling, and actions of a group, community, or society, as well as the expressions of those patterns in material objects. Through culture, people within a same society share a common behavior and way of thinking.

Cultural identity is a reflex of belonging to a culture or a group (Koković, 2003). Cultural identity is one type of collective identity. It is the self-awareness of members of one group that historically emerges and develops depending on the criteria established by the group in relation to other social groups (Rot, 2017).

With the emergence of nations, cultural identity partly becomes a national identity as well (Rot, 2017).

Cultural identity is the awareness of having certain cultural features that are inherent in a particular social group, but bearing in mind personal characteristics by which one is recognized as a member of a group (Koković, 2008). Thus, cultural identity is both individual and collective. Individual cultural identity makes a person a distinctive and unique individual.

Nowadays, through the media, attempts are being made to (re)model cultural identity (Kovačević, 2013). Likewise, identity, culture, and cultural heritage are increasingly becoming the subjects of political speculation (Srećković, 2012) and globalization.

With new developments in the sphere of labor relations and with the development of multinational companies, there are tendencies towards changing a part of personal identity by imposing company and multinational identity values in line with companies' organizational culture, which is frequently guided by profit generation rather than ethical principles.

Means of mass communication play an important role in identity formation. Their role, as presently designed, is believed to be more harmful than useful for development.

Athlete identity

The Law on Sports of the Republic of Serbia (Article 2) states:

Sport is a part of physical culture that encompasses every form of organized and non-organized exercise of sports activities and sports undertakings by individuals and legal entities in the system of sports, with the aim to satisfy human need for creativity, affirmation, physical exercise, and competition with others.

The Law (Article 3) further defines key terms, including those most interesting for the topic of this paper, “athlete” and “sports activities”. An athlete is a “person engaged in sports activities” and sports activities

are all forms of physical and mental activity that through non-organized or organized participation aim at expressing or improving physical fitness and spiritual well-being, creating social relations, or achieving results in competitions at all levels.

The identity of an athlete starts to shape as s/he gets into the world of sports – by taking up a particular sport, by joining an adequate sports school followed by a sports team and a sports club, and ultimately, for the exceptional and outstanding athletes, by being selected for the national team.

The choice of sport is subject to not only the psycho-physical dispositions of a person engaging in a particular sport (Kovačević, 2013). At first, such dispositions are not perceived as dominant. In fact, the culture in which a person lives, the importance and value of certain sports disciplines as perceived by the environment, and the current sporting success of individual athletes or teams who become idols for the nation and role models for the youth are the factors that play a more prominent role. This way professional reputation of certain sports influences the creation of a broad base of potential athletes, thereby generating stronger competition for a place in a team.

Among the environmental factors, influence of parents, family, and peers is the most important, although influence from the media, primarily the electronic media, has become increasingly prominent.

In economically underdeveloped environments, sport is perceived as the shortest path to fame and fortune.

In the industrial and commercial world emphasized by globalization, pure sports competition unites the desire for national prestige and the imperative for economic growth, when success in the sports arena gets politicized and raised to the level of national prestige (Komar, 2015). It is through sports that countries gaining independence seek their place in the international community, while those already superior seek validation of their power and interests. To some extent, sports activate group ties and provide nations with the opportunity to immerse into and identify with their groups, which makes it a social means for group cohesion and a way for patriotic and national feelings to awaken (Koković, 1986, p. 95). The national identity concept very easily gets transferred from the political discourse to that of sports, which, due to amplified victory imperative, may easily pose an additional stress to athletes.

All factors involved in shaping up athletes’ personality should aim to form a healthy, self-confident, and versatile personality (Vuksanović, 2018), which is often not a primary goal nowadays. Professionalization of sports as well as of athletes puts the profit first. Even health considerations are reduced to concerns regarding the capability of athletes to take part in sports competitions and to return the investments of their clubs and the corporations behind the clubs.

Doing sports nowadays can bring significant benefits, but it also requires many sacrifices. A young athlete does not live a life of her/his peers, nor that of her/his siblings who are

not engaged in intense sports trainings. Attachment to the family identity and values may conflict with the values imposed in the sporting environment, especially in environments with completely different national cultural values and patterns (Vuksanović, 2011).

Nowadays, sports are becoming increasingly professionalized. Professional sport is aimed at achieving top-tier sports results. Professional athletes are paid for active engagement in sports and sport is their primary occupation. Performance in professional sports gains market value, so professional athletes migrate to wherever they are better paid and have better conditions. Professional contracts bind athletes to accept the organizational culture of their clubs in all its aspects: symbols, values, norms, codes of conduct, and rituals. Athletes need to accept the identity of the clubs as a part of their own personal and professional identity.

Athletes with professional engagements in physically distant environments that are very different from their ancestral environments, team up in informal social groups with athletes from similar cultural milieus. Linguistic differences are much easier to overcome than differences in values, norms, customs, and traditions. Thus, Serbian athletes usually form informal social groups with athletes from their country or with athletes from the region of ex-Yugoslavia, while those engaged in Asia do so with athletes from European countries. In such cases, cultural identity proves to be a stronger cohesive factor than national or religious identities.

This comes as particularly difficult for young athletes who get separated from their cultural and national environments and move abroad already in their adolescence, before their mature age. Vast differences may lead to confusion of identity and personality.

In order not to diminish capacities for advancement and development in the personality of a young athlete, it is important to identify methods of guidance and direction that violate none of the crucial postulates or values. Imposing a completely new identity by means of force and pressure is as harmful as insisting on the inalterability of behavior acquired earlier in the primary environment.

Conclusion

Identity is a developmental category. At the very beginning of development of an individual, a personal identity begins to form, initially distinguishing the “I” from the “non-I”. This way, personality becomes unique and inimitable, recognizable for its behavior in different situations and circumstances. Its uniqueness and individuality are also recognized by the environment in which a person functions.

Every personality is unique, but at the same time contains characteristics of the environment, family, and culture in which one grew up. Belonging to a group influences the formation of collective identity, while belonging to a particular culture, religion, and nation influences the creation of one’s cultural, religious, and national identity. Hence, cultural, religious, and national identities can be both collective and individual.

Establishment of one’s own family leads to extension of one’s individual identity from “I” to “We”, comprising spouses and children.

By choosing a particular occupation and job to pursue during professional development, one forms her/his professional identity. By engaging in sports, one forms a specific

athlete identity, which completes and complements all the other components of one's identity.

By joining a sports club, an athlete accepts the organizational culture of the club, its characteristics, and the corresponding identity. All these identities become complementary, rounded up, and they constitute integral parts of a personality and its individuality.

Contemporary athletes incorporate into their identity the personal and cultural identity of the environment they originate from, complementing it with the identity and values they developed while schooling through the development of professional identity, and round it up with the identity and values promoted by their sport, sports club, and sport environment. The merging of these identities should lead to the formation of a healthy, versatile, and self-confident personality capable of adequately functioning even after a sports career.

In professional sports, athletes gain market value. The best athletes join rich clubs in other countries, often with very different cultures. They are expected to adopt the values and culture of the new club and the new environment, as this is important for team cohesion and success in sports competitions. This can pose an issue, especially for young athletes who have not yet completely formed their identity in their own environment. For adult athletes with firmly formed personal, family, national, and cultural identities, it will be easier to identify with the new environment and cultural identity, as they will be able to differentiate and recognize them, thus avoiding personal confusion and increasing the prospect of success in sports within the new cultural environment.

Imposing a completely new identity by methods of force and pressure is as harmful as insisting on inalterability of behavior acquired in the primary environment.

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KULTURNI IDENTITET PROFESIONALNIH SPORTISTA

Apstrakt

Predmet rada je analiza geneze identiteta profesionalnih sportista. Profesionalni je sport usmeren na postizanje vrhunskih sportskih rezultata. Profesionalni sportisti su plaćeni za aktivno bavljenje sportom i sport je njihovo osnovno zanimanje. Uspešnost u profesionalnom sportu dobija tržišnu vrednost, pa profesionalni sportisti idu da igraju tamo gde su više plaćeni i gde imaju bolje uslove. Ovo je globalni fenomen i sportisti često igraju u kulturi koja se u značajnoj meri razlikuje od kulture iz koje dolaze. Profesionalni sportisti su odrasli ljudi, sa već formiranim ličnim, porodičnim, nacionalnim, kulturnim i profesionalnim identitetom. U novoj kulturnoj sredini, koja se razlikuje od one iz koje potiče, očekuje se da sportista razvije osećaj pripadnosti novom klubu, novoj sredini i novoj kulturi, što je neminovno jer u najbolje klubove dolaze sportisti sa različitih strana sveta, svaki sa različitim nacionalnim i kulturnim identitetom. Vlasnik i trener kluba zahtevaju visoku kohezivnost u timu. Prihvatanje novog kulturnog identiteta pomaže sportisti u adaptaciji na novu sredinu, ali može da dovede i do nesklada u ličnom doživljaju sopstvenog identiteta. Problem predstavlja ponovno menjanje sredine nakon isteka profesionalnog ugovora ili u slučaju otkaza. Ljudi iz sveta profesionalnog sporta, koji smatraju da će sportista lako prevazilaziti sve teškoće sve dok dobija visoku novčanu nadoknadu, ne interesuju se za humanu stranu sporta – za njih je sportista važan jedino dok predstavlja izvor profita.

Ključne reči: lični identitet, kulturni identitet, profesionalni sport, sportista, profit

NATURAL DISASTERS AND LOCAL IDENTITY

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Abstract

Natural disasters are some of the problems that modern society is increasingly facing. The analysis of quantitative data indicates their continued increase. While 348 natural disasters were recorded globally between 2008 and 2017, in 2018 alone the number reached 315 (CRED, 2019). According to their frequency, floods are the most frequent. In Serbia, over 70% of municipalities suffer great damage from floods (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, 2011).

The aim of this paper is to point out the impact of natural disasters, floods, and groundwater, on the sustainability of local identity. The impact of floods and groundwater on local identity is investigated in the area of the village of Jaša Tomić, whose population is exposed to their negative effects. Data were collected using content analysis, a semi-structured interview, and the biographical method. The relationship between natural disasters and local identity is also explored through statistics. Statistics represent the basis for monitoring changes in the mechanical movement of the population.

The analysis of empirical data shows that people's readiness to respond to climate change and natural disasters is at a very low level. In order to reduce the risk of climate change and natural disasters, special attention should be paid to continuous education about protection and self-protection during and beyond regular education, public lectures on risk management, natural disaster simulation exercises, etc. The more efficient the prevention and mitigation of negative consequences of natural disasters is, the less local identity will be affected by negative changes.

Key words: natural disasters, floods, groundwater, local identities, migration

Introduction

Personal/individual and collective/group identities are becoming increasingly used in scientific and professional papers and daily communication, both formal and informal.¹ Collective identity is most commonly regarded as national, cultural, religious, professional, gender, etc. It is a network of individual identities and cannot exist without them.

¹ A significant contribution to the interpretation of the concept of identity is given by Erikson (2008) and Berger & Luckmann (1979).

The more congruent individual identities are, the more powerful the collective identity is. The division into personal and collective identity is an ideal typical structure that facilitates theoretical and empirical approaches to the concept of identity. In short, personal identity is a segment of collective identity, i.e. a collective identity of any kind is a synthesis of the same type of individual identities. Personal identity manifests itself through a series of collective identities, through identification with different social groups (national, political, religious, professional, cultural, etc.).

Local identity as either individual or collective is not a subject of broader scientific interest. Based on the experiential data from the research on migrations and natural disasters, we can assume that local identity mostly depends on other types of identities.

The desire to leave home and the weakening of local identity question the purpose of personal commitment to a locality (for example, people who survived losses during natural disasters want to leave the area to which they are bound by unpleasant memories). Local identity features include the following:

- Local identity is a result of the influences of other types of identity. Determinants of local identity can be economic, cultural, national, psychological, and environmental. Identification with the territory will only occur if a positive attitude towards other types of identity is developed. In short, local identity results from the relationship of an individual and his/her environment.
- Local identity is a dynamic category. It can become stronger or weaker over time. Local identity changes with different socio-cultural contexts. A positive local identity replaces the dichotomy I/they with a uniform perception – we, the inhabitants of a particular area. Local identity does not imply residence in a locality. If one leaves the locality reluctantly or if leaving is not a matter of personal choice, local identity remains very strong. In case of forced migrations, local identity is strengthened even more (e.g. migration caused by wars, natural disasters, or forced colonization).
- Individual and group memories determine the strength of local identity and they establish the relationship towards a locality. The content of memories determines whether a sense of aversion or attraction will develop. Overcoming unpleasant memories develops an aversion to the place of residence. Experiences that impair or still impair the physical or mental integrity of an individual are projected on his or her relationship to the environment in which something unpleasant and disturbing happened.
- Local identity is an acquired identity. It may or may not develop. Racial, national, and religious identities are “inherited” and developed in the process of socialization. These are “innate” identities. The “hereditary” identities (nation, race, religion) may be more emphasized by others than by us. They identify us with the groups we belong to by birth without any consideration of our subjective feeling. Therefore, these identities are not only hereditary but also imposed. They evaluate the strength of different types of identities of individuals and groups that are their subjects of interest at a particular moment.

Natural disasters are increasingly affecting the strength and direction of local identity due to a more frequent incidence of both direct and indirect negative consequences. A disaster is defined as

a situation or event that exceeds local capacity, requires external response at national or international level, an unforeseen and often sudden event that causes great harm, destruction and human suffering (Guha-Sapir et al., 2012, p. 7).²

The analysis of quantitative data indicates a continuous increase in the number of natural disasters. During 2018, 315 natural disasters were recorded, which is only 33 fewer compared to the previous 10 years, from 2008 to 2017 (CRED, 2019). Generally, at the global level, floods have been the most numerous. Between 1998 and 2017, they accounted for 43.4% of the total number of natural disasters (CRED, 2018).

According to CRED³, there is evident prevalence of floods compared to other natural disasters. There were 127 floods, 95 storms, 26 extreme temperatures, etc. in 2018. In the same year, floods caused the death of 2,879 people, while the number of affected people was estimated at 34.2 million (CRED, 2019).

The estimates of economic losses indicate an increasingly pronounced negative effect of floods. Their social, economic, and environmental consequences are becoming fully recognized (UN, 2014, January 29). During 2018, the floods caused losses amounting to US \$19.7 trillion (CRED, 2019).

In Serbia, over 70% of municipalities have suffered major flood damage (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, 2011). On an annual basis, direct flood damage is estimated at around €100 million. In the spring of 2014, floods caused damage in the amount of ca. €600 million (Ministry of Agriculture and Environment of the Republic of Serbia, 2015, p. 5). In June 2019 alone, flood damage was estimated at €25 million (Božović, 2019).

Groundwater temporary flooding that occurs outside the floodplain also has a significant impact on social development. The two main sources of groundwater are precipitation, rain, melted snow, and rising water level. They usually occur in the spring and can cause significant damage to agriculture. The negative impact of groundwater is particularly evident in Vojvodina, the northern province of Serbia.

According to the data for 2017, 2,662 ha of land was flooded by groundwater. Out of the total flooded area, 90.5% was agricultural land (SORS, 2017). During 2018, 1,222 ha of land was flooded by groundwater, 85.8% of which was agricultural land (SORS, 2018).

In spite of its capacity to be used to mitigate the consequences of droughts, groundwater is still underutilized. In the period from 2007 to 2013, groundwater accounted for only 12.0% to 14.0% in the total amount of abstracted water, and it is the least used water source for irrigation (Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2013).

Methodological notes

In order to examine the interdependence of local identity and natural disasters, particular attention was paid to transforming a positive into a negative individual local identity, examining the behavior of individuals in the local community, their relationship towards their place of residence, and a sense of belonging. This paper examines the impact of

² EM-DAT categorizes disasters as natural and technological. Natural disasters are divided into 5 subgroups (biological, geophysical, hydrological, meteorological, and climatic), which comprise 12 types and more than 30 subtypes of disasters (for more, see Vuksanović & Nagy, 2017).

³ CRED – Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters

natural disasters, floods, and groundwater on the sustainability of local identity. The basic assumption is that natural disasters and their consequences influence the emergence of a negative local identity. Strong negative individual local identity strengthens the negative collective local identity. Consequently, this results in migrations and abandonment of the locality exposed to disasters. In the settlements with an already disturbed age structure, the effects of emigration are even more pronounced. Bearing in mind that the demographic balance in many settlements of Serbia was disturbed after the Second World War, under the influence of industrialization and village–city migrations, the abandonment of settlements due to continuous exposure to natural disasters and their consequences contributes to further increase of depopulation.

Data sources. This paper is based on two groups of data:

- data generated for this paper;
- data generated from the activities of different social institutions.

For the purpose of this research paper, data were collected using a semi-structured interview and the biographical method. The scientific interview was applied to a sample of 299 subjects. The survey was completed shortly after the 2005 flood. The biographical–type interview was conducted in 2019 with four respondents. Two respondents left the village of Jaša Tomić, while the other two still live there.

Content analysis was applied to the sources from daily print media. This method enabled the monitoring of individuals and social institutions and their attitude towards floods and groundwater over a longer period of time. The analyzed print media covered the years 2005 and 2019 and included three magazines: *Zrenjanin*, *Dnevnik*, and *Politika*. Their content, in geographical terms, covers three levels: local, provincial, and state. For the purpose of this study, three periods were specified according to the data on the events that preceded the overflow of the Tamiš river, the movement of the population, and the withdrawal of water: the week before the overflow of the Tamiš (before April 20); the week after the flood (April 20–26); one week after April 26; the population returns to Jaša Tomić.



Figure 1. *Sečanj municipality within Vojvodina (Republic of Serbia)*



Figure 2. *Jaša Tomić within Sečanj municipality*

Research area. The assumption of a cause-and-effect relationship between natural disasters and the weakening of local identity was studied on the example of Jaša Tomić, a settlement located in the municipality of Sečanj in Vojvodina, the northern province of Serbia (Figures 1 and 2). There are 11 settlements constituting this municipality and Jaša Tomić is the largest. It is located along the border of Romania and Serbia. It is bordered by Romania to the north and the east. The eastern border is the Tamiš riverbed, which is 1 km away from the settlement. The exposure of this settlement to floods and groundwater was the reason it was selected as the research area. In the period from 1919 to 2006, over 200 floods were registered in the part of the Tamiš River that flows through Serbia (Miloradović, 2007, p. 99). According to the same source, 48 out of the total number of floods required emergency defense, while the floods of 1966, 2000, and 2005 resulted in catastrophic consequences.

With the exception of the first two censuses after World War II,⁴ the migrations of the inhabitants of Jaša Tomić are characterized by continuous depopulation. The number of people decreased from 4,420 to 2,373 in the period from 1961 to 2011. In the period between the last two censuses, this settlement was losing, on average, around 67.7 inhabitants every year.⁵

The decrease in the number of inhabitants resulted in an aged population. More than ¼ (27.9%) of the total population is aged 60 or over. Compared to 1961, their share has more than doubled (1961: 12.5%; 2011: 27.9%).⁶

Continuous negative changes in the number and age structure of the population also affected different social areas. Changes in social development index show that Jaša Tomić, as well as the entire municipality of Sečanj, is becoming less suitable for quality living (Figure 3).⁷




Figure 3. *Social development index for Sečanj municipality, 2016.*

Retrieved from <http://www.socijalnoukljucivanje.gov.rs/indeks/>

⁴ According to the 1948 census, Jaša Tomić has 4,378 inhabitants, and in 1953, 4,569 people were recorded (FSO, 1972).

⁵ Sources: from 1921 to 1971: FSO, 1972; for 1981: FSO, 1982; for 1991: FSO, 1993; for 2002: SORS, 2003; for 2011: SORS, 2014.

⁶ Sources: from 1921 to 1971: FSO, 1972; for 1981: FSO, 1982; for 1991: FSO, 1993; for 2002: SORS, 2003; for 2011: SORS, 2012.

⁷ Social Development Index is a composite index that enables a comparison of the achieved level of social development of different cities and municipalities of the Republic of Serbia. The index has values from 1 to 100, where a higher index value also means better living conditions in a particular local government unit. The index was created through the aggregation of 31 indicators in six areas (demography, economy, education, health care, social protection, and other factors). See: Social Inclusion and Poverty Reduction UNIT (2016).

Data analysis

In the area of Jaša Tomić, the last flood with catastrophic consequences occurred on April 20, 2015. There were no human casualties, but according to the data of the crisis center for Jaša Tomić community, 800 homes were damaged as of May 5, 2005. The number of damaged houses increased due to prolonged water retention.

During the flood, the behavior of the population of Jaša Tomić was characterized by solidarity and strong individual and collective local identity. They were willing to do whatever was necessary to protect their settlement. They did not think about leaving Jaša Tomić. Being on their own had been the priority for most residents, but solidarity strengthened during the flood. Human lives, animals, and possessions were saved. The texts published in the press vividly described the events of the period.

The flood caught us sleeping, and we moved everything we could upstairs and now we have been throwing water out of the house for two days – said the Spasić family – we have nowhere to go, this is all we have (Vuksanović, 2011, p. 98).

Prior to the flood, only a few families left Jaša Tomić. Due to poor information distribution, lack of awareness of the possible consequences, and insufficient training to deal with emergencies such as natural disasters, the evacuation was reduced to a chaotic rescuing of human lives and possessions.

After the overflow of the Tamiš, the predominant news in the press included: material consequences of the flood, reactions of local population, reactions of local institutions and provincial and national representatives of the authorities, visits from politicians, and humanitarian aid. In terms of their meaning, the content of the news was neutral for the most part. The inhabitants of Jaša Tomić were suddenly in the limelight. They were primarily proud of their efforts to defend their village and then to save what could be saved from the raging water. Like a pendulum that has reached its maximum, local identity culminated, supported by solidarity both inside and outside the settlement. Local identity was strengthened through solidarity and empathy. The people from Jaša Tomić became recognizable.

The message had negative connotations only if it focused on the causes of the floods and identified the culprit. Both individuals and institutions were blamed. Data from the biographical method revealed theft as a cause of dissatisfaction.

When the water receded, solidarity and local identity were also discouraged. Certain irregularities were noticed in the following activities: assessment of damage to residential buildings, determination of surface area for new houses and flats, selection of the sites for construction, and distribution of humanitarian aid.

A growing number of people became increasingly dissatisfied with their life in Jaša Tomić. Qualitative analysis of this opinion allowed a more comprehensive analysis of the reasons for it. The most frequently mentioned reasons were: damage caused by flood, loss of houses, unemployment, low income, poor quality of flood recovery services, and groundwater flooding. Groundwater also poses a threat to homes and crops. In the total population of Jaša Tomić, the agricultural population accounts for 14.2%, about four times less than in 1961. Although the number of people claiming to be farmers has been declining, agriculture is still an additional source of income for many households. The

data on agricultural land ownership showed that most households belonged to the category of mixed households.⁸

After the flood, the majority of inhabitants described their quality of life in one word – poverty. The times of hardship were also emphasized by the press: “There is no happiness in somebody else’s home; you see we have borrowed a tent and a mattress and we will sleep in the yard” (Vuksanović, 2011, p. 104).

The absence of communication resulted in strong feelings of dissatisfaction with the work of local authorities. Out of 198 respondents who expressed a negative opinion, 65.7% were explicitly dissatisfied with the local authorities’ work. The harshest criticism was expressed against the representatives of municipalities, local communities, water management companies, and local entrepreneurs (Vuksanović, 2011, p. 137).

According to the data obtained from the empirical research, out of the total number of respondents, 85 of them experienced health issues caused by the flood. A significant increase in mortality was also reported. After the overflow of the Tamiš, some people said that about twenty people of different age had died of a heart attack over a period of two months. The press wrote the following about human casualties:

For now, there are no flood victims in the settlement of Jaša Tomić, however, some people reported that two people had died of a heart attack during the night when high waters overflowed the embankment (Vuksanović, 2011, p. 148).

The distribution of humanitarian aid became a continuous source of disagreement. Conflicts most often arose regarding the distribution of clothes and footwear, furniture, and fodder. Considerable bitterness was felt among the people because new houses were built for those who did not live in Jaša Tomić.

In the spring of 2006, groundwater flooding gave rise to widespread dissatisfaction. A new settlement was established in the area prone to groundwater flooding.

One of the impacts of the flood was a sense of insecurity regarding life in the settlement of Jaša Tomić. Influenced by the unpleasant experience, 8.0% of the respondents wanted to move out of the settlement. Despite the fact that the authorized institutions made the decision to increase the height of the embankment, which was indeed done later, 70.2% of the respondents still believe that the settlement is highly prone to floods. A slightly higher number of respondents, 75.3%, emphasized that the area was susceptible to groundwater flooding (Vuksanović, 2011, p. 97). We can assume that the number of those who moved out is much higher than the number of those who expressed their opinion about moving out (8.0%). According to the 2011 census, the population declined by as much as 23.9% compared to the previous census.

Conclusion

The impacts of floods and groundwater flooding are not only reflected in immediate material impacts, such as loss of human lives, but are also reflected in indirect ones, such as abandoning agricultural production. The agricultural sector suffers great consequences

⁸ Sources: for 1961: FSO, 1961; for 1971: FSO, 1971; for 1981: FSO, 1981; for 1991: FSO, 1994; for 2002: SORS, 2004.

of floods and high groundwater levels. With more frequent floods and long and high water table, the negative impacts on the growth and development of agricultural crops become even greater.

Unfortunately, the quantity and quality of yield is not the only consequence of floods and high groundwater level. Data on social and economic impacts of floods and, in particular, on excess groundwater, were very poor. The media did not sufficiently cover the issue of excess groundwater. The analysis of the press releases in 2019 showed that only one article focused on this problem.




Figure 4. Social impacts of floods and groundwater flooding

The following immediate impacts of floods and groundwater flooding should be emphasized: the lack of possibilities for land use, or its limited use; reduced quantity and quality of agricultural products; crop diseases; scarce grazing; reduced amount and quality of silage; inadequate and poor nutrition of livestock; and reduced breeding values of livestock.

The indirect impacts of floods and groundwater flooding may include: rising prices of agricultural products and processed meat products; reduced purchasing power of lower income class population; no savings or reduced savings, especially in the case of agricultural population; high risks result in low investment in the farm; decline in the size of arable land and livestock; partial or total abandonment of agricultural production, or deagrarization; and weakening of local identity: abandonment of rural settlements/depopulation and senilization.

The most severe indirect consequence of natural disasters is the depopulation of settlements. Natural disasters undoubtedly represent one of the causes of such depopulation (Figure 4).

The quality of dealing with climate change and natural disasters depends on: a) obtaining information; b) theoretically educating and practically training the population; c) raising awareness of climate changes and natural disasters by providing information and education (Figure 5).

The analysis of empirical data shows that people's readiness to respond to climate change and natural disasters is at a very low level.

In order to reduce the risk of climate change and natural disasters, special attention should be paid to continuous education about protection and self-protection during and beyond regular education; to public lectures on risk management; to natural disaster simulation exercises, etc. (see: Vuksanović & Nagy, 2017).




Figure 5. Preparation for climate change and natural disasters response

The more efficient the prevention and mitigation of negative consequences of natural disaster is, the less the local identity is affected by negative changes. The awareness of a potentially successful response to natural disasters maintains or even strengthens local identity.

Promoting sustainable development and education about the response to natural disasters, both globally and locally, is a priority of modern society. Education should enable people to become familiar with every possible activity within every stage of risk management (prevention of causes, preparation for response, disaster response, and recovery) and raise their awareness and capacity to prevent the weakening of local identity and the abandonment of settlements. By engaging local, provincial, and national authorities and the relevant governmental and non-governmental organizations, the population will learn to live with floods and groundwater flooding rather than leave the exposed area. The local press no longer writes about possible floods and groundwater flooding in Jaša Tomić. There are only a few of those left who are at risk from this phenomenon.

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PRIRODNE KATASTROFE I LOKALNI IDENTITET

Apstrakt

Prirodne katastrofe su samo jedan od problema sa kojima se sve češće suočava savremeno društvo. Analiza kvantitativnih podataka ukazuje na njihovo kontinuirano uvećanje. Dok je, na globalnom nivou, u periodu od 2008. do 2017. godine evidentirano 348 prirodnih katastrofa, samo u toku 2018. godine njihov broj je dosegao 315 (CRED, 2019). Prema učestalosti, najbrojnije su poplave. U Republici Srbiji preko 70 % opština trpi velike štete od poplava (Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije, 2011).

Cilj rada je da ukaže na uticaj prirodnih katastrofa, poplava i podzemnih voda, na održivost lokalnog identiteta. Uticaj poplava i podzemnih voda na lokalni identitet istražuje se na području Jaše Tomić čije stanovništvo je izloženo njihovom negativnom dejstvu. Podaci su prikupljeni primenom metoda: analiza sadržaja, polustrukturisani intervju, biografski metod.

Odnos između prirodnih katastrofa i lokalnog identiteta istražuje se i putem statističkih podataka. Statistički podaci predstavljaju osnovu za praćenje promena u mehaničkom kratanju stanovništva.

Analiza empirijskih podataka pokazuje da je pripremljenost za suočavanje sa klimatskim promenama i prirodnim katastrofama na veoma niskom nivou. U cilju smanjivanja rizika od klimatskih promena i prirodnih katastrofa posebnu pažnju treba usmeriti na: permanentno obrazovanje za zaštitu i samozaštitu, tokom redovnog školovanja i van njega; javna predavanja o rukovođenju rizicima; vežbe simulacije prirodnih katastrofa itd. Što je sprečavanje i ublažavanje posledica prirodnih katastrofa efikasnije, lokalni identitet trpi manje negativne promene.

Ključne reči: prirodne katastrofe, poplave, podzemne vode, lokalni identite, migracije

EDUCATION AND CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENT OF SERBIAN VILLAGES

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Abstract

The role of cultural institutions such as schools, cultural centres, religious institutions, etc. in rural areas is paramount for village preservation and development. In this process, schools as educational institutions play an important role, with the rural population exercising its basic right to acquire knowledge and skills and to adopt certain values. School curricula achieve important social, cultural, political, economic, educational, and other goals. Schools in rural areas have a special role in primary education. However, out of the total number of schools, there are an increasing number of schools that are small, with few pupils, or that are merely rural outposts of their parent primary schools. This issue is particularly prominent in the regions of Southern and Eastern Serbia, in the districts of Jablanica, Pčinja, and Toplica. As cultural institutions in villages, schools are the centres of cultural life of people living in those areas, but are now facing new challenges in terms of preservation and development of villages and society. This does not mean that cultural centres are in a better position than schools, because many of them are empty and ruined or used least for their intended purpose. They have a different purpose now, even though they once were important cultural institutions for the rural population. There is a growing focus on the reconstruction and upgrade of rural schools with modern equipment to provide their pupils with the same conditions the pupils in urban areas have. The development of rural cultural institutions creates conditions for the preservation and development of both villages and society.

Key words: education, cultural institutions, schools, cultural centres, village

Introduction

The knowledge, value, and cultural systems of any society are based on education. There is no dispute that educated people are better informed, more eager for new knowledge and progress, and quicker to solve problems.

In order to receive adequate education, the rural population needs, above all, schools to provide them with basic education and literacy. There is no rural development without adequate rural schools. Every girl and every boy should have the right to quality

education in order to have more options in life. Through education, we can reduce poverty and improve the health of the rural population. The benefits ensured by education are significant for the society of any country.

Likewise, the rate of increase in employment opportunities is higher if people are more educated. Through education, any learned person may become more productive. Without education, we cannot survive properly nor have a decent job. Education can be defined as a process of acquiring knowledge and information towards a better future. It is necessary to improve the educational structure of the population, because in case of poor educational structure, the process of modernization of the economy, society, and of rural development is also slowed down.

The first section of this paper discusses education and the educational structure of the population. Special attention is given to rural areas and changes that have taken place in Serbia. Education plays an important role in the development of rural areas. It is necessary to improve the educational structure of the population, which will also contribute to the development of rural areas and of society as a whole. Statistically, 40.60% of the total population lives in rural areas, a part of which is engaged in agriculture as their main activity, while the other part is involved in other activities such as: rural tourism, old crafts, services, etc. The development of a number of activities depends on education potential. The educational structure is unfavourable in certain regions, districts, local self-governments, and settlements, which slows down the development of rural areas and activities within them.

The second section of the paper deals with specific cultural institutions such as schools, cultural centres, etc. and their role in the rural development of Serbia.

Education as a significant factor in rural development

Education plays a significant role in agricultural and rural development. The education of young working-age population is particularly important. Knowledge is the resource that determines the future, the only resource that is not consumed through use, and its application saves and rationally utilizes any other, otherwise limited, production factors.

Knowledge has always been a part of societal organization and development. In other words, knowledge has always been a part of society (Avramović, 2008).

The education system is the basis of human resource development. Education should be seen as a “sphere of upgrade” (Nedeljković, 1994, p. 46).

Education plays a significant role in achieving sustainable development. Through education, knowledge about sustainable development is acquired, but it also helps create new human resources who are willing and able to pursue such development. Education, just as sustainable development, has a long-term perspective. In both cases, the interests of the future are taken into account when shaping decisions in the present (Jovanović, Gavrilović & Radivojević, 2017, p. 66).

Educated individuals represent a valuable resource for the development of society, so it is imperative that we bring the educated rural population back to the countryside to contribute to rural development. Education is the cornerstone of the economic growth of

modern society. Rural development influences faster development of the entire country, but rural development itself is influenced by education.

The educated rural population is a strategic basis of rural development, because they are the bearers of ideas, knowledge, and information. Investing in science, research, and education of the rural population should be seen as an investment that undoubtedly contributes to the development of rural areas and villages.

The acquisition of knowledge is not only necessary for economic development, but it is also a growing necessity for the personality development of people as the chief actors of contemporary production work (Marković, 1989, p. 98).

Better education helps rural families escape the vicious cycle of poverty. The better the education, the higher is the income of rural households, which enables their members to have a better quality of life.

In our society, education is a significant factor for development. The process of economic development strategy and capacity modernization requires the introduction of modern labour resources and training of personnel to manage them. Human resources will acquire new knowledge and skills and use them for the purpose of faster modernization and development of society (Jelić & Surčulija, 2013, p. 287).

Cultural institutions relevant to rural development

The most important cultural institutions include schools, cultural centres, churches, etc. Schools are the main educational institutions and very important cultural institutions in every society, and usually the only ones in many villages (Mitrović, 1998).

Rural schools should provide basic education and prepare the young population for their future vocation. The number of primary schools is the highest in the region of Šumadija and Western Serbia. In the period from school year 2015/16 to 2016/17, there were 1,389 and 1,384 schools, respectively, followed by the region of Southern and Eastern Serbia with 1,181 and 1,172 primary schools, respectively (Figure 1). There were five primary schools that ceased their operation within the observed period in the region of Šumadija and Western Serbia and nine primary schools in the region of Southern and Eastern Serbia. Rural schools in remote mountainous areas are closing down due to an insufficient number of pupils. On the other hand, one new primary school opened in the regions of Vojvodina and Belgrade each in the period from 2015/16 to 2016/17.




Figure 1. Number of primary schools in Serbia by region, 2015/16–2016/17
(Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2018, p. 112)

In the observed period, the largest number of pupils was recorded in the region of Šumadija and Western Serbia – 158,857 and 156,192, respectively (Figure 2). However, the number of primary school students should be much higher given the large number of primary schools in the region. The region of Šumadija and Western Serbia has the largest number of rural schools, with some schools having so few pupils that different grade classes are combined. The schools with a small number of pupils are usually four-year primary schools, while eight-year primary schools are located closer to urban areas.




Figure 2. *Number of primary school students in Serbia by region, 2015/16–2016/17*
(Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2018, p. 112)

After primary education, pupils continue to a secondary education program. Secondary schools are located in cities. Children from rural areas sometimes have to travel relatively far to the nearest towns where the secondary schools are located. This also involves students' adaptation to a new environment and a specialization for particular occupation they have chosen. The number of secondary schools in Serbia by region is shown in Figure 3.




Figure 3. *Number of secondary schools in Serbia by region, 2016/17*
(Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2018, p. 113)

There were 251,249 and 246,373 secondary school students in Serbia in 2015/16 and 2016/17, respectively (Figure 4). Region-wise, the highest number of secondary school students in 2016/17, expressed in percentage, was recorded in the region of Šumadija and Western Serbia (29%), followed by Vojvodina (25%), Belgrade (24%), and Southern and Eastern Serbia (22%).




Figure 4. *Number of secondary school students in Serbia by region, 2015/16–2016/17*
(Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2018, p. 113)

Nowadays, all rural children have the opportunity to attend primary school, and the only problem for some children is the large distance between the school and their homes.

Rural cultural centres contribute to the culture of everyday life and work of the rural population. Today, many rural cultural centres are closed down or used for other purposes. People in some villages have to renovate their cultural centres in order to organize certain traditional events.

Rural cultural centres are usually located in the village centre and represent the centres of social, cultural, and entertainment life of the rural population. Rural cultural centres were built in larger villages with their own cooperatives. The main room in each rural cultural centre is a large hall where political gatherings, art events, plays, movie projections, or dances may take place. With the young people leaving at a high rate, some cultural centres have died out together with the villages (Stojanov, 2004, p. 344).

The development of urban and rural areas is characterized by great discontinuity, where the identity of urban and rural settlements is lost.

Cultural institutions play a major role in meeting the needs of people. Bearing in mind that culture is a public service, meeting the needs of the population depends on a number of indicators, such as the size of the area, demographic, cultural, and natural potential, tradition, and customs. It is necessary to meet at least the minimal standards for public services and culture. It is often the case that a number of activities are not undertaken due to a lack of social support and financial resources.

Following the region of Southern and Eastern Serbia, the prospects of the region of Western Serbia and Šumadija were mapped several years ago. The cultural property of this region includes 49 cultural facilities of exceptional importance, 130 cultural facilities of great importance, and 436 cultural facilities of importance, per Serbian classification. There are a total of 142 cultural institutions in the region: 48 libraries, 19 museums, 4 galleries, 8 theatres, 9 historical archives, and 47 multi-purpose centres.

In this region, the medieval religious sites of the Raška and Morava schools are considered as cultural treasures for the most part, having played a significant historical and cultural role. Some cities, such as Valjevo, Loznica, Užice, Čačak, Kraljevo, and Novi Pazar are recognized as cities of culture.

Where they exist, cultural centres are located in the village centre, where the cultural and social life of the villagers takes place. A large number of cultural centres have been closed down or used for other purposes because the villages are either empty or having only a few residents remaining. In inhabited villages, cultural centres are very important, especially for the younger population. In those villages, cultural centres are the centres of both cultural and social life, and they usually involve activists who support and organize various events.

The development and preservation of rural areas and our society shall mean the improvement of the educational structure of the population, the restoration of cultural institutions, and their preservation as a factor contributing to the development of regions, districts, local communities, and society. The revitalization and development of cultural resources in rural areas are indispensable, as they will allow the rural population to obtain the many things they lack.

Educational structure of the population in Serbian villages

Villages have until recently been the centres of illiteracy. The majority of the illiterate are elderly people in remote mountainous, hilly, and secluded villages. The educational structure of the female population is particularly unfavourable (Figure 5). Women assumed the role of caretakers for the family and the household and were deprived of any opportunity to attain a high level of education. However, in recent years, the educational structure of the total and rural population has significantly improved.




Figure 5. Rural illiterate population in Serbia aged 10 and over by sex, 2002–2011

(Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2013, p. 104; Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2003, p. 82)

Based on data analysis from the 2002 and 2011 censuses, the educational structure of the population differs by region, district, and local community (Figures 6, 7). The share of the uneducated rural population is much higher in the region of Šumadija and Western Serbia and the region of Southern and Eastern Serbia than in other regions of our country. Based on the 2002 census, the number of illiterate rural population in the Belgrade region was 8,484. There are 28,173 illiterate people in the region of Vojvodina, 68,011 in the region of Šumadija and Western Serbia, and 69,181 in the Region of Southern and Eastern Serbia.

According to the 2011 census, with regard to the illiterate rural population, there was a decrease compared to the 2002 census, but the largest share of the illiterate is still in the region of Šumadija and Western Serbia as well as in the region of Southern and Eastern

Serbia. Most of the villages where the majority of illiterate people live are spread in these areas.




Figure 6. Number of total and rural illiterate population in Serbia aged 10 and over, by region, 2002 (Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2003, pp. 82–145)

Moreover, there is a larger number of the rural population compared to the urban population in the following areas: Srem, Kolubara, Mačva, Pomoravlje, Rasina, Braničevo, and Jablanica. The largest share of illiterate persons lives in villages in the municipalities of Bojnik (9.09%), Crna Trava (7.58%), Gadžin Han (7.28%), Merošina (6.77%), and Medveđa (8.25%). The number of rural illiterate population in the Belgrade region is 4,856. There are 17,088 illiterate people in the region of Vojvodina, 34,467 in the region of Šumadija and Western Serbia, and 31,351 in the Region of Southern and Eastern Serbia (Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2013, p. 104).




Figure 7. Number of total and rural illiterate population in Serbia aged 10 and over, by region, 2011 (Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2013, pp. 104–137)

According to the 2011 Census, the total number of illiterate rural population was 87,762, which is considerably fewer compared to 2002 when there were 173,849 illiterate persons. Obviously, the share of the illiterate decreased during this period, which is a good indicator for the future rural development. The age structure of the illiterate population in 2011 indicates that almost 3/4 of the illiterate persons in villages were aged 65 or over, more specifically, over 80% were persons aged 50 and over, 76.09% of which were aged 65 and over. Only 2.40% were persons under the age of 19, while 5.30% of them were aged 20 to 34 (Table 1). The fact is that the increase in age means the increase in the share of the illiterate, indicating that the illiterate mostly comprise elderly village residents.

Table 1. *Rural illiterate population in Serbia aged 10 and over, by age (%), 2002–2011.*

Year	Up to 14	15-19	20-34	35-49	50-64	65 and over
2002	0.92	1.00	2.92	4.84	11.75	78.58
2011	1.01	1.39	5.31	5.68	10.52	76.09

Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade, 2013, p. 104; Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2003, p. 82 (authors' calculation)

In terms of professional qualifications of the rural population, the data between the two censuses in 2002 and 2011 indicate that the highest share of the population has a secondary education, 30.55% and 42.37%, respectively, while the share of primary education amounts to 28.17% and 27.67%, respectively. Therefore, compared to the 2002 census, the educational structure of the rural population improved – the share of the rural population with a secondary education increased by 11.82%, while the share of those with incomplete primary education decreased from 26.80% to 19.00%. In addition, the percentage of the population with a college education increased by 1.65% during this period.

The educational structure of the rural population in terms of professional qualifications improved over the specified period, which indicates a decrease in the rural population with no education, with incomplete primary education, and primary education only, and an increase in the share of the population with secondary, college, or university education. The above data indicate that, owing to their improved educational structure, the rural population became involved in activities other than agriculture, as the main rural activity.

Table 2. *Total population in Serbia aged 15 and over, by professional qualification, 2002–2011*

SERBIA	2002		2011	
	Total	Rural	Total	Rural
Professional qualification	6,321,231 (100)	2,754,583 (100)	6,161,584 (100)	2,509,332 (100)
No professional qualification	357,552 (5.66)	244,071 (8.86)	164,884 (2.68)	110,786 (4.41)
Incomplete primary education	1,022,974 (16.18)	738,369 (26.80)	677,499 (11.00)	476,949 (19.00)
Primary education	1,509,462 (23.88)	776,072 (28.17)	1,279,116 (20.76)	694,480 (27.67)
Secondary education	2,596,348 (41.07)	841,647 (30.55)	3,015,092 (48.93)	1,063,177 (42.37)
College education	285,056 (4.51)	58,119 (2.11)	348,335 (5.65)	73,760 (2.93)
University education	411,944 (6.52)	41,624 (1.51)	652,234 (10.59)	79,311 (3.16)
Unknown	137,895 (2.18)	54,681 (1.98)	24,424 (0.41)	10,869 (0.43)

Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2013, pp. 34,35; Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2003, p. 18,19 (authors' calculation)

As an important social subsystem, education serves as a social filter that can steer society towards a stable value system. The power of education and knowledge in modern society is growing with the new organization, specialization, and division of labour and with the application of scientific and technological achievements of the information age (Jovanović, 2011, p. 337). The implementation of information age achievements in the education of rural children has significantly improved today compared to earlier years. Education should be the same for all children, regardless of whether they live in rural or urban areas. Rural schools have been significantly modernized with additional equipment so as not to lag behind the urban schools, owing to the efforts by the competent institutions of the country, region, and local communities.

Conclusion

The population's educational structure is still unfavourable, especially in rural areas of specific regions and local communities, which also affects cultural institutions, the development of culture and identity, and consequently the development of these rural areas and the society itself. Different rural areas in Serbia are differently developed. There are regions, areas, and local communities where there are imbalances, depopulation, high levels of labour force involvement, non-competitive agriculture, or a low degree of integration of agriculture and food industry, and all these issues pose serious difficulties regarding the development of numerous activities in rural areas, the development of said areas, and the development and conservation of cultural institutions.

Culture and creation of the identity of groups and communities play an important role in society. In this sense, their role in villages and in the way people interact with others – thus becoming used to living together – is crucial. These people identify themselves as belonging to a culture, and others also identify them as such. In order to better meet the needs of the population in rural areas, schools, as well as other institutions, such as cultural centres, churches, or other religious and cultural institutions, play a significant role, aimed at better meeting the needs of the rural population.

The definition of cultural identity in a village is significant, on the one hand, for communities that are developing cultural identities, and on the other, for cultural institutions. Identity is not only a product of the culture of the village community in which it originated; it also encompasses the characteristics of each community with forms of cultural identification of the members living in the village. Cultural institutions play a major role in preserving the culture and the identity of the people in villages and beyond. The role of rural schools is particularly important, since that is where people acquire knowledge and skills and adopt specific values. Education programmes are, in fact, achieving significant goals, such as cultural, economic, political, and educational, in society as well as in rural areas. This influences the creation of identities of groups and communities in villages and in schools. Bearing in mind the levels of education, village schools play a special role in primary education. However, out of the total number of schools that operate in villages, there is a growing number of those that are very small, with only a few pupils, or those that are merely detached units of other larger primary schools.

The educational structure of those who live in villages in our country has significantly improved in recent years. Data from the last two censuses indicate differences in the

educational structure of the population depending on the region, area, and local community. The greatest percentage of the rural population now has a secondary education, which indicates a decrease in the rural population with lower education levels and an increase in the population with secondary, college, and university education.

Support for rural development in the country needs to be sufficiently consistent both in terms of selection of measures and in terms of funding. Based on a series of measures of all societal institutions and programs, activities need to be undertaken in order to ensure better implementation thereof as part of the development and preservation of villages and cultural institutions.

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OBRAZOVANJE I INSTITUCIJE KULTURE U KONTEKSTU RAZVOJA SELA SRBIJE

Apstrakt

U seoskim područjima nesumnjiva je uloga institucija kulture kao što su: škole, domovi kulture, verski objekti i dr. u očuvanju sela i razvoju. U tom procesu škole, kao institucije obrazovanja, imaju značajnu ulogu gde stanovništvo sela ostvaruju osnovno pravo na sticanju znanja, veštine i usvajaju određene vrednosti. Programi obrazovanja realizuju važne društvene ciljeve kao što su: kulturni, politički, ekonomski, socijalni, vaspitno-obrazovni i dr. Škole u seoskim sredinama imaju posebnu ulogu u osnovnom obrazovanju. Međutim, od ukupnog broja škola sve više škola su male sa malim brojem đaka ili je reč o isturenim odeljenjima u školama od matičnih škola. Poseban problem je u Regionu Južne i Istočne Srbije u oblastima Jablaničkoj, Pčinjskoj, Topličkoj oblasti. Škole su, kao institucije kulture u selima, osnovno središte kulturnog života ljudi koji žive u seoskim područjima i nalaze se pred novim izazovima u svetlu očuvanja i razvoja sela i društva zemlje. Domovi kulture nisu u nekoj boljoj poziciji od škola jer je veliki broj prazan i urušen te se najmanje koriste za šta su namenjeni. Dobili su drugu namenu, a nekada su bili značajna ustanova kulture stanovnika sela. Sve više se poklanja pažnja i stvaraju uslovi u seoskim školama koje se rekonstruišu i opremaju sa savremenom opremom kako bi đaci u seoskim sredinama imali iste uslove u toku školovanja kao i đaci u gradskim sredinama. Sa razvojem institucija kulture u selima dolazi do stvaranja uslova za očuvanje i razvoj sela i društva.

Cljučne reči: obrazovanje, institucije kulture, škole, domovi kulture, selo

TRADITION OF SOCIAL RESISTANCE AGAINST OUT-OF-COURT ENFORCEMENT IN SERBIA

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Abstract

After decades of court enforcement of judgments and other enforcement titles and authentic documents, Serbian 2011 Law on Enforcement and Security has introduced public enforcement agents that were not employees of the court. According to that Law, public enforcement agents were legal professionals with mandatory law school degree but without the bar exam. A lot of competences that had previously been exercised by enforcement courts have been delegated to public enforcement agents. In 2015, the new Law on Enforcement and Security was passed by the Serbian Parliament. Its implementation began on 1 July 2016. This Law gave more powers to the public enforcement agents. Two years later, certain organisations and the media started to fight against the system of enforcement based on public enforcement agents. The media campaign against public enforcement agents has been conducted during the work on changes of amendments to the Law on Enforcement and Security. In 2019, the amendments were adopted by the Serbian Parliament, new competences were transferred to public enforcement agents, and the campaign against them became even stronger. Opposition to the system of public enforcement agents is often organised in the form of physical obstruction of enforcement proceedings. The aim of this paper is to analyse the tradition and causes of social resistance against out-of-court enforcement in Serbia.

Key words: enforcement proceedings, public enforcement agents, delegation of powers, social resistance, media campaign

Introduction of public enforcement agents according to the 2011 Law on Enforcement and Security

Since the 1930 Law on Enforcement and Security, enforcement of court decisions and other enforcement titles has been vested in the courts. That was the system of enforcement that has not been challenged for almost 80 years. Laws passed in 1978, 2000, and 2004 were based on authority of enforcement courts as central organs of enforcement proceedings. The main argument was that it would be most appropriate if enforcement is carried out by the very same authority that passed the decision that needed to be enforced. When Serbia joined the European Convention on Human Rights and

Basic Freedoms and when the European Court of Human Rights started to exercise its competences regarding the decisions rendered by Serbian courts and other organs, the first judgments were passed finding that Serbian courts were incapable to conduct enforcement proceedings in line with the standards set out in the European Convention on Human Rights and Basic Freedoms. According to these judgments, Serbia has repeatedly violated the following rights of enforcement creditors: the right to a fair hearing within reasonable time protected under Article 6(1) and the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions protected under Article 1 Protocol No 1 to the Convention.¹

The system of court enforcement seemed to be ineffective and inefficient. That was the reason to establish public enforcement agents as new legal professionals who would be in charge of conducting enforcement. The 2011 Serbian Law on Enforcement and Security² introduced public enforcement agents into our legal system. They are legal professionals with a required law degree, but without a required bar exam. Public enforcement agents perform their activities as entrepreneurs or members of partnerships comprising exclusively public enforcement agents. They became exclusively authorised for issuing enforcement orders and conducting enforcement for the collection of claims for utilities and other similar services (exclusive jurisdiction of public enforcement agents). At the time, the First Basic Court in Belgrade had approximately 2 million unresolved enforcement cases for the collection of utilities and other similar services (Uitdehaag et al., 2014, p. 66). In addition to this backlog, the enforcement courts suffered a lack of infrastructure and personal and material resources (Uitdehaag & Vincken, 2011, p. 25). Consequently, public enforcement agents were established and put in charge of certain activities in the enforcement proceedings. The enforcement courts remained exclusively competent for ordering and conducting the enforcement of decisions concerning family matters and employment reinstatement (exclusive jurisdiction of enforcement courts). For all other means of enforcement, the enforcement court was competent for issuing an enforcement order, and it was up to the enforcement creditor to decide whether he wanted enforcement to be carried out by an enforcement court or by a public enforcement agent. The enforcement creditor was also authorised to choose the public enforcement agent who would be handle his/her enforcement case. The first public enforcement agents began their work on 1 June 2012.

This Law was amended in 2014. The change reflected the distribution of enforcement cases for the collection of utilities and other similar services. According to the new provisions of the Law, the enforcement creditors (mostly public companies providing utilities and other similar services), were no longer allowed to choose their enforcement agents. The distribution of these cases had to be conducted through the Chamber of Public Enforcement Agents in order to ensure that every public enforcement agent received an equal number of cases and in order to prevent underhand deals between directors of public companies and some public enforcement agents.

¹ Case of Ilić v. Serbia, European Court of Human Rights, October 9, 2007 (§§74–75, 90–93). Retrieved from <https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#%7B%22documentcollectionid%22%3A%5B%22GRANDCHAMBER%22%22%22CHAMBER%22%7D>

² Law on Enforcement and Security, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 31/2011, 99/2011, 109/2013–Constitutional Court Ruling, 55/2014 and 139/2014.

Challenges before the Constitutional Court

The delegation of powers previously been by the courts to the legal professionals who were not a part of the court system has been challenged before the Constitutional Court. The principal arguments were focused on the authority of public enforcement agents to decide on a motion to enforce in enforcement cases concerning the collection of utilities and other similar services. According to the initiative filed to the Constitutional Court, public enforcement agents have thus received competences that should be reserved only for enforcement courts. Petitioners cited Article 32 (1) of the Serbian Constitution,³ according to which everyone has the right to an independent and impartial court pursuant to the law to decide on his/her rights and obligations. That is why public enforcement agents cannot decide on a motion to enforce and issue an enforcement ruling in any enforcement case.

In its ruling *IY3 –782/2012*, rendered on 27 February 2014, the Constitutional Court found that the delegation of power to a public enforcement agent to decide on a motion to enforce and to issue an enforcement order in cases related to the collection of claims for utilities and other similar services was not in violation of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court interpreted Article 32(1) of the Constitution in such a way that does not imply that the court has to be exclusively competent, in each specific situation, to decide on the rights of legal subjects in every phase of the proceedings. The Constitutional Court had already adopted this legal opinion following a similar legal issue in the case of challenged constitutionality of the Law on Misdemeanours (*IY3–1577/2010*). Furthermore, in its reasoning, the Constitutional Court cited the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, according to which the right to court protection deriving from Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Basic Freedoms does not mean that every dispute concerning civil rights and obligations has to be decided by the court. The procedural safeguards from Article 6(1) are also adhered to if the initial proceedings are not conducted by the court but the court's review of the decisions has been provided. Therefore, the competence of public enforcement agents to issue enforcement orders and to conduct the enforcement of claims for utilities and other similar services is not in breach of the Constitution. It is up to the legislator, when exercising his constitutional powers following the principles of legislative policy, to decide which enforcement cases shall be conducted by the court and which by public enforcement agents and to decide on the rules of those proceedings. No other decisions have been rendered by the Serbian Constitutional Court regarding the position and authorities of public enforcement agents.

In the Republic of Croatia there was an opposite situation. In 2010, the Croatian Parliament passed the Law on Enforcement Procedure, which never entered into force. A long vacation period was left in order to create public enforcement agents as new legal professionals. It was delayed several times until the new Law was finally replaced and Croatia returned to the old system of court-based enforcement (Ernst, 2013, pp. 445–455). The appointed public enforcement agents never began their work. They filed complaints to the Constitutional Court, which adopted their requests for damages in amount close to 3.000 euros for every appointed public enforcement agent, did not affect

³ Constitution of Republic of Serbia, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 98/2006.

their right to file more claims before competent civil courts. In its reasoning, the Croatian Constitutional Court clearly stated that it was up to the legislator to choose which enforcement system will help provide the most effective, efficient, and cost-effective enforcement. However, changes in the system have to be conducted if one follows the principle of fair balance regarding those who will be affected the most by these changes (Decision of Croatian Constitutional Court U-I-5612/2011, cited in Bodiroga, 2017, p. 59). In Croatia, public enforcement agents were established by the Law on Enforcement. They were appointed, but they never became operational. The decision of the new government was to revert to the court-based enforcement. By abolishing public enforcement agents, Croatia violated the right of appointed public enforcement agents to peaceful enjoyment of property.

New Law on Enforcement and Security

Following several years of double-track enforcement, in 2015 the Serbian Parliament passed a new Law on Enforcement and Security.⁴ The Law came into force on 1 July 2016. The division of competences between enforcement courts and public enforcement agents was now organised in a different way. Instead of parallel jurisdiction of enforcement courts and public enforcement agents, the legislator opted for exclusive jurisdiction of enforcement courts for certain types of enforcement and exclusive jurisdiction of public enforcement agents for the majority of other types of enforcement.

In the phase of issuing enforcement orders, public enforcement agents remained exclusively competent for ordering enforcement in cases concerning collection of utilities and other similar services. For all other enforcement cases, enforcement courts were exclusively competent for issuing enforcement orders. With regard to conducting enforcement, the enforcement courts became exclusively competent for the enforcement of court decisions dealing with family matters, joint sale of immovables and movables, employment reinstatement, and obligations regarding action, non-action, or sufferance. All other enforcement types were under the sole jurisdiction of public enforcement agents. The 2016 Law on Enforcement and Security dealt with old enforcement cases that were still in court. The enforcement creditors had a deadline to choose between leaving these cases in courts and transferring them to the public enforcement agents. If the enforcement creditor failed to make a choice within a prescribed deadline, the enforcement should be dismissed. Approximately one million enforcement cases have been dismissed in this way.

The division of competences under this Law was clearly in favour of public enforcement agents. Following the extension of their powers, public enforcement agents were required to have both a law degree and a completed bar exam. Those appointed under the previous Law were obliged to pass the bar exam before 1 January 2018, otherwise they would be dismissed.

Organised resistance against public enforcement agents

After almost two years of implementation of the new Law, organised resistance against public enforcement agents began to emerge. Organisation “Krov nad glavom” (Roof over

⁴ Law on Enforcement and Security, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 106/2015, 106/2016, 113/2017.

the Head) is an association of individuals and other organisations whose aim is to protect the right to housing. They are fighting against the eviction of people from their homes and request the abolition of public enforcement agents. According to the information available on their website, they want to put pressure on the state, cities, municipalities, banks, courts, and public enforcement agents in order to address the problems of homeless people (Organisation “Krov nad glavom”, About us, 2019).

Organisation “Krov nad glavom” provides legal assistance to enforcement debtors in a way that represents a violation of Article 85 of the Civil Procedure Code⁵ and Article 9 of the Free Legal Aid Act.⁶ Legal assistance is not the only way of helping enforcement debtors. According to the information available from their website, it appears that help also means buying time and defending enforcement debtors (preventing enforcement) physically. Members of this organisation have a score of 151 prevented evictions. It comprises more than a hundred individuals and nine organisations.

“Krov nad glavom” was unknown to most people in Serbia until the end of 2018, when the first organised public campaign against public enforcement agents was launched. It included stories and media reports on some enforcement cases citing alleged violations of laws and abuse of powers by the public enforcement agents. The media were covered with one-sided stories in which only the voice of enforcement debtors could be heard. Together with other similar organisations, “Krov nad glavom” created the political party called “Socijaldemokratska unija” (Social Democratic Union) and the leader of “Krov nad glavom” became the president of the party (Zlatic, 2019).

In March 2018, Ministry of Justice formed a task force, which was entrusted with preparing the amendments to the existing 2016 Law on Enforcement and Security. Several months later, the task force was faced with a campaign that aimed to influence the direction of amendments to the Law.

“Krov nad glavom” was not the only organisation involved in this campaign. For example, the organisation “Efektiva”, whose goal is to protect consumers from the banks (Organisation “Efektiva”, About us, 2019), also participated in this campaign. Special TV shows were broadcast in order to expose the “criminal system of public enforcement agents”. These TV shows only included enforcement debtors, members of their families, and organisations that advocate the abolition of public enforcement agents.

Simultaneously, public enforcement agents have faced a lack of cooperation with the state bodies involved in enforcement proceedings. This lack of cooperation may be regarded as passive resistance against enforcement proceedings. With regard to eviction, enforcement mostly depends on the involvement of police officers. The public enforcement agent must request police assistance at least five working days prior to performing an action if resistance has occurred in earlier stages in the course of enforcement proceedings, or if resistance is expected to occur. The request shall be made in writing, accompanied by the copy of the enforcement order (Article 143, para 1, Law on Enforcement and Security). In urgent cases, police assistance may be requested verbally, in which case the written request has to be submitted within 48 hours. An urgent case is defined as danger to a

⁵ Civil Procedure Code, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 72/2011, 49/2013, 74/2013, and 55/2014.

⁶ Free Legal Aid Act, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 87/2018.

large group of people or danger to health or property (Article 143, para 2, Law on Enforcement and Security).

Police officers shall act on request and conduct all security checks, temporarily confiscate weapons from the persons who can jeopardise the enforcement, and take other measures pursuant to the Law. They shall warn the enforcement debtor and other persons that coercive measures shall be used if they continue to prevent the enforcement. The police shall act on request of a public enforcement agent, or on their own initiative. If excessive violence is expected, the police shall request that the enforcement be suspended, so that the necessary activities could be performed. In that case, the enforcement shall continue within 10 days. If the police does not provide assistance, senior officials of the Interior Ministry, as well as the public prosecutor, shall be informed (Article 144 Law on Enforcement and Security).

In practice, the cited provisions of the Law on Enforcement and Security are not being implemented. The police often fail to provide necessary assistance to the public enforcement agents and the evictions are being delayed, but the costs of the delay shall be borne by the enforcement debtor at the end of the proceedings. The lack of cooperation from the police escalated on 26 March 2019, when a public enforcement agent was verbally and physically attacked by the members of “Krov nad glavom” in the presence of police officers (Public enforcement agent attacked during eviction of enforcement debtor, 2019). As of the completion of this paper, no criminal proceedings have been instigated, although ten months have passed from the assault, and the whole incident has been recorded and livestreamed on the “Krov nad glavom” Facebook page. Other actions of this organisation were also livestreamed, and it can be heard from the conversation of its members that their goal is to prevent enforcement (We have come here to prevent the public auction of the enforcement debtor’s flat, 2019).

Amendments to the Law on Enforcement and Security

On 26 July 2019, the Serbian Parliament passed the Amendments to the Law on Enforcement and Security.⁷ These amendments came into force on 3 August 2019, but they shall apply from 1 January 2020. In addition to other changes, these amendments have significantly improved the social rights of enforcement debtors.

No sale of the only real estate belonging to the enforcement debtor / physical person can be ordered for collection of debt for utilities and other similar services not exceeding the amount of 5.000 euros (Article 394, para 1 Law on Enforcement and Security). Regarding the collection of debts not deriving from utilities and other similar services, the sale of the enforcement debtor’s real estate remains the last option. According to Article 151a, public enforcement agent shall change the object of enforcement *ex officio* or on the motion of the party, if there is obvious disproportion between the claim of the enforcement creditor and the value of the enforcement debtor’s real estate and there are other enforcement means and objects that may be used for collection of the enforcement creditor’s claim.

The proportionality principle has been clearly defined. It is up to the public enforcement agent to conduct enforcement in a way that is the least intrusive for the enforcement

⁷ Amendments to the Law on Enforcement and Security, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 54/2019.

debtor. This principle shall not apply only if enforcement debtor has agreed in a special form that enforcement shall be carried out using certain means and objects, or if there is only one available object of enforcement (Article 56 Law on Enforcement and Security).

The percentages of wages and pensions that may be seized in enforcement proceedings have been reduced (Article 258 Law on Enforcement and Security). The enforcement against minimum wage may not exceed $\frac{1}{4}$ of minimum wage (before these amendments, it was $\frac{1}{2}$ of minimum wage). The enforcement against a wage that is not higher than the average wage may not exceed $\frac{1}{3}$ of that income (before these amendments, this rule was not in the Law). The enforcement against a wage that is higher than the average wage may not exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ of that income (before these amendments, it was $\frac{2}{3}$ of that income).

Pensions of enforcement debtors are also protected. Enforcement against minimum pension may not exceed $\frac{1}{10}$ of that income (before the amendments, it was $\frac{1}{4}$ of the minimum pension). Enforcement against a pension that is not higher than the average pension may not exceed $\frac{1}{4}$ of that income (before the amendments, this rule had not been in the Law). Enforcement against a pension that is higher than the average may not exceed $\frac{1}{3}$ of that income (before these amendments, it was $\frac{2}{3}$ of that income). Limitations of the rights of enforcement creditors should ensure a true balance between interests of the parties in enforcement proceedings, but a certain social and political factor always disrupts it (Gureev, 2015, p. 324).

Special proceedings for the protection of social rights of enforcement debtors were prescribed in Article 310 of the Law on Enforcement and Security. In the case of enforcement against wages, pensions, and other protected incomes of enforcement debtors, the money is transferred to the special account of the public enforcement agent. It must be kept on that account for eight days and it cannot be transferred to the enforcement creditor during that period. If the enforcement debtor alleges that these social provisions have been violated and that his/her wage, pension, or other protected income has been seized in a higher percentage than allowed under the Law, he/she may lodge a complaint within eight days and submit proof that his/her protected income has been seized contrary to the Law. In that case, the public enforcement agent shall order the money to be transferred back to the enforcement debtor's account or to another account designated by the enforcement debtor.

With regard to eviction, the deadline for voluntary eviction has been extended from eight to thirty days. The assistance of the Social Services is mandatory when minors or persons that are in need of housing are involved. The Social Services shall provide housing assistance to these people.

Most of these changes have been in accordance with the proposals that "Krov nad glavom" had submitted to the task force. However, this organisation did not want to participate in public debates that were organised throughout the whole country. Its members organised their own debates as street protests. Although most of their proposals have been accepted and implemented as provisions of the new Law, the members of this organisation keep opposing it, arguing that these changes are unacceptable (Amendments to the Law on Enforcement and Security are unacceptable, 2019) and they keep inviting people to physically prevent evictions of enforcement debtors (Homes of "Hidrotehnika" employees attacked by public enforcement agents, 2019).

New draft of the Law on enforcement and security – the abolition of public enforcement agents?

Two months after the Serbian Parliament passed the Amendments to the Law on Enforcement and Security, the Serbian Radical Party submitted the Draft of the Law on Enforcement and Security. Simultaneously, this party collected a support of more than 100.000 citizens requesting the abolition of public enforcement agents.

The Serbian Radical Party proposes that the system of enforcement based on public enforcement agents should be replaced by court-based enforcement. There are more than 1,000,000 citizens that are involved in the enforcement procedure as enforcement debtors, so MPs from the Serbian Radical Party argue that the claims that are being collected by public enforcement agents mostly pertain to utilities and bank credits. Furthermore, they argue that debt can become ten to twenty times higher than the original amount because of the alleged abuses by public enforcement agents. According to the Serbian Radical Party, public enforcement agents have become very rich while the Serbian citizens are getting poorer. The enforcement debtors are losing their houses in the course of enforcement procedures. The MPs from the Serbian Radical Party also claim that Serbian citizens are strongly opposed to the system of public enforcement agents as the behaviour of public enforcement agents has become intolerable. They accuse public enforcement agents of arrogant and unscrupulous behaviour.

For all the reasons stated above, it is necessary to go back to the court based enforcement. The MPs of the Serbian Radical Party do not only want to end the system of public enforcement agents, but also want to re-establish a system of enforcement that was abandoned several years ago. They believe that by sending enforcement cases back to enforcement courts the sale of enforcement debtors' homes as well as their evictions from their homes will stop. It is believed that the homes of enforcement debtors shall be better protected if the enforcement of civil claims is being conducted by enforcement courts. This is not true. In its judgment Gž.5611/17 from 24 May 2018, the Belgrade Court of Appeal ordered the Republic of Serbia to pay more than 20,000,000 million dinars to an enforcement debtor, because the IV Belgrade Municipal Court (later integrated with the First Basic Court) carried out the enforcement by selling the flat of the enforcement debtor for a disproportionately small debt, which could have been collected by enforcement against his pension. The Belgrade Court of Appeal established that the enforcement court in this way violated the right of the enforcement debtor to peaceful enjoyment of his/her property, protected under Article 58 of the Serbian Constitution. State Attorney's office has lodged an appeal against the final judgment rendered by the Belgrade Court of Appeal on the points of law with the Supreme Court of Cassation, but it was rejected as ill-founded (Supreme Court of Cassation Judgment Rev. 4947/2018, 22 February 2019). The enforcement in this case had been conducted by the enforcement court several years before public enforcement agents began to operate.

The Serbian Radical Party wants to allow enforcement debtors to pay their debts in a more humane way, which would be achieved by the passing of the new Law on Enforcement and Security. Banks as creditors should bear the risk, because the risk cannot be borne only by the enforcement debtor. Public companies providing utilities and other similar services should not allow the debts to become excessively high. They must warn the enforcement debtors about their debts before entering the enforcement

procedure. Enforcement shall be conducted on chattels, salaries, and other incomes of the enforcement debtor, while selling the only real estate that belongs to the enforcement debtor shall not be possible if the new Law is passed.

Analysing the draft submitted by the MPs from the Serbian Radical Party, we can conclude that they proposed a recycled 2000 Law on Enforcement Procedure, when a member of this party was the Minister of Justice. According to Article 12 of the Draft, the rules of Civil Procedure Code shall apply accordingly in the enforcement procedure, unless otherwise stipulated in this or another federal law. The Republic of Serbia is no longer a part of the federal state, which it was in 2000 (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), so there are no federal laws to be applied in the Republic of Serbia.

In addition to this, there are also other serious errors in this Draft. According to Article 4 (“Protection of the enforcement debtor”), the enforcement creditor should be left with a minimum of 12m² of living space regardless of the amount of the claim (Article 4, para 3). According to Article 7, para 1, an appeal may be lodged against the ruling of the first instance court, which contradicts Article 46 of the Draft, according to which the enforcement ruling may be challenged only by objection.

The reasons for passing the new Law on Enforcement and Security stated by the MPs of the Serbian Radical Party mostly have nothing to do with the system of public enforcement agents. The enforcement debtors usually lose their homes in the course of enforcement procedure when they fail to pay the annuities for the loan they took from the bank. In that case, the enforcement procedure is carried out based on the mortgage statement or the mortgage contract as enforceable documents. For these documents to be valid, among other conditions, they have to contain a statement of the owner of the real estate, authorising the enforcement creditor to collect his/her claim through the sale of that real estate, vacation and surrender to the buyer (Article 15, Para 3, Line 1, Mortgage Law). The sale may be conducted in accordance with the Mortgage Law or in accordance with the Law on Enforcement and Security.

Public companies that provide utilities and the way they take care of their claims is not the subject matter of the Law on Enforcement and Security. When they file motions to enforce, whether they wait for the debt to become higher or not, the issue goes outside the scope of the Law on Enforcement and Security. In order for this to change, it would be necessary to revise the laws governing such companies and their business policies.

The same applies to interest. The Serbian Radical Party objects to high interest rates. The type and the rate of interest are not determined by public enforcement agents. There is a special law dealing with these issues.

The Serbian Radical Party is not the only political organisation advocating the abolition of public enforcement agents. On 14 September 2019, the organisation “Jedan od pet miliona” (One of Five Million) held a protest rally in front of the Chamber of Public Enforcement Agents, requesting their abolition. This request was upheld by opposition parties that were in power in 2011 when the Law on Enforcement and Security that introduced public enforcement agents was adopted by the Serbian Parliament (Nešić, 2019). Organisation “Srpski živi zid” (Serbian Human Wall) has gathered the support of almost 35,000 citizens requesting the abolition of public enforcement agents (Nikić, 2018).

All these organisations emphasise the important social issues in our society. However, these problems cannot be solved by changing the system of enforcement in Serbia. The most important changes would have to be implemented in some other laws. Organising protests with the goal of physically preventing enforcement of final and enforceable court decisions, regardless of who is in charge of their enforcement, represents clear and direct danger to the rule of law in Serbia.

We may ultimately ask whether it would be feasible to abolish public enforcement agents and to transfer all enforcement cases back to enforcement courts and what impact this would have on the effectiveness and efficiency of the enforcement procedure. On 30 June 2019, there were 673,134 unresolved enforcement cases in the courts of general and special jurisdiction in Serbia. There are 656,607 unresolved enforcement cases in basic courts, 15,055 unresolved enforcement cases in commercial courts, 1,376 unresolved enforcement cases in higher courts, and 96 unresolved enforcement cases in the Commercial Court of Appeal (Instruction for Implementation of Amendments to the Law on Enforcement and Security, signed by the Minister of Justice and President of the Supreme Court of Cassation, October 2019). This situation reflects the conditions in courts with respect to enforcement cases. It has been more than three years since the majority of enforcement cases were transferred to public enforcement agents and the enforcement courts still have a significant backlog that prevents them from dealing with other cases. Since the first public enforcement agents began to operate (1 June 2012), many judges, judges' associates, and trainees have quit their positions in courts to become public enforcement agents, their deputies, or their assistants. If the system should revert to court-based enforcement, which would mean sending all the enforcement cases back to enforcement courts, it would destroy the system of enforcement of civil claims because the enforcement courts now lack the personal and technical capacities to conduct enforcement and the already high backlog of enforcement cases would increase disproportionately.

System of enforcement of civil claims – from legal to political issue

In recent years, opposition to the system of enforcement by public enforcement agents and to enforcement in general has shifted this issue from the legal to the political arena. This is not a case exclusive to Serbia. The current mayor of Barcelona, Ada Colau, owes her political rise to preventing evictions of enforcement debtors who were affected by enforcement because of unpaid mortgages (Ash, 2014). In Croatia, political organisation "Živi zid" (Human Wall) has built its public image on the fight against forced evictions of enforcement debtors. This organisation won its popularity by preventing evictions resulting in their candidate coming out third in the 2014 presidential elections (after the candidates from the two mainstream parties), winning the respectable 16.42% of the votes (Organisation "Živi zid", political program, 2019). Meanwhile, the organisation became a parliamentary party. This organisation does not advocate the abolition of public enforcement agents, because there are no public enforcement agents in Croatia. In this country enforcement is carried out by the courts, notaries public, and the Financial Agency.

In Serbia, parliamentary elections are due in spring 2020. Among Serbian voters there are more enforcement debtors than enforcement creditors. One way to get the votes from the

large population of enforcement debtors is through advocating the end of public enforcement agents. The Serbian Radical Party has already started the initiative to re-establish court-based enforcement in accordance with the Law that was in force from 2000 till 2005. Members of the opposition alliance “Savez za Srbiju” (Union for Serbia) also advocate the dissolution of the “unfair system of public enforcement agents” (Opposition alliance “Savez za Srbiju”, political program, 2019). All these requests are not supported by legal arguments.

There is no comparison between the court enforcement system and a system of enforcement based on public enforcement agents in terms of efficiency and costs of enforcement proceedings. The problem of costs and their distribution between the parties is one of the most important issues. In countries that have a court enforcement system, the problem of inefficiency of enforcement courts remains unresolved, which is why there are other bodies involved in the proceedings that help the enforcement courts to reduce their backlog of enforcement cases (Brox & Walker, 2014, pp. 7–13, Leuenberger & Uffer–Tobler, 2010, pp. 432–437). If successful enforcement depends only on the efficiency of enforcement courts without precisely defined relations with other bodies that have to be involved, then the rights of enforcement creditors protected under European Convention on Human Rights and Basic Freedoms will be violated (Grossi & Cristina Pagni, 2010, pp. 345–346).

While they were in power, the very same political parties that are now fighting for the rights of enforcement debtors by advocating the termination of the system of public enforcement agents used to promote a legal framework that was completely in favour of enforcement creditors.

The Serbian Radical Party was in power in 2000 and its Minister of Justice proposed, and Parliament adopted, the Law on Enforcement Procedure, which completely disregarded the rights of enforcement debtors and the rights of third parties. The right to appeal was not guaranteed under this Law and there were no legal remedies for the protection of rights of third parties. Enforcement debtors could even face prison, if they failed to perform an action that could be only done by an enforcement debtor (Rajović, 2000, pp. 73, 74).

The Democratic Party, now a member of the opposition alliance “Savez za Srbiju” was in power in 2011, and its Minister of Justice proposed the Law on Enforcement and Security, which actually created public enforcement agents. This Law was also very restrictive in terms of the rights of enforcement debtors and other participants in the enforcement procedure (Jakšić, 2018, p. 867). The first public enforcement agents were appointed by a Minister of Justice who was also a member of the Democratic Party. During that time, the Chamber of Public Enforcement Agents elected its bodies.

Considering all the arguments stated above, it can only be concluded that the system of enforcement of civil claims is going to be one of the main topics in the political campaign for the upcoming parliamentary elections in Serbia.

Conclusion

In 1978, the Law on Enforcement Procedure was passed by the Parliament of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Over the next forty years in Serbia, four completely

different laws governing the enforcement and security procedure have been in force, but the system of enforcement of civil claims did not come into the focus of the general public until recently. Until 2011, all laws regulating the enforcement and security procedure had favoured the interests of the enforcement debtor and disregarded the rights of the enforcement creditor. The Law on Enforcement and Security passed in 2011 has introduced revolutionary changes in that regard. In addition to introducing strict procedural rules and a reduction of legal remedies, this law ended the tradition of court-dominated enforcement in Serbia. Public enforcement agents became the most important bodies of the enforcement procedure. With the exception of enforcement cases dealing with the collection of claims for utilities and other similar services (exclusive jurisdiction of public enforcement agents) and the enforcement of decisions related to family matters, as well as employment reinstatement (exclusive jurisdiction of enforcement courts), for all other types of enforcement it was up to enforcement creditors to choose between conducting enforcement through an enforcement court and conducting enforcement through a public enforcement agent. This double-track system was changed with the adoption of the new Law on Enforcement and Security, which came into force on 1 July 2016. Under this law, the majority of enforcement types have been transferred to the exclusive jurisdiction of public enforcement agents.

In 2018, the first signs of organised resistance against public enforcement agents began to appear. Based on the models used in some other countries (e.g. Spain or Croatia), several organisations were created in order to fight not only the public enforcement agents, but the system of enforcement in general. Their aim is not only restricted on providing legal assistance to enforcement debtors, but it also involves the use of physical violence to prevent enforcement. Although preventing enforcement represents a crime under the Serbian Criminal Code, no criminal proceedings have been instigated against members of these organisations, despite the existence of clear evidence of physical assaults against public enforcement agents. At the same time, police officers that have a duty to help public enforcement agents in conducting the enforcement remain passive observers.

As we approach the 2020 parliamentary elections, many political parties are trying to get support by promising to end the system of public enforcement agents. They are hoping to get the votes from the large population of enforcement debtors. Thus, the system of enforcement of civil claims has become an important political issue.

Meanwhile, no one attempted to analyse the causes of resistance against public enforcement agents. When enforcement courts had sole jurisdiction to carry out enforcement, there was no violence used against the court enforcement agents in order to delay the eviction or public sale of homes belonging to the enforcement debtors. The enforcement courts and court enforcement agents were inefficient in carrying out their powers. Court enforcement agents are paid by the state and they are part of the judicial system. Their efficiency does not affect their salaries. They receive the same salary regardless of their success in conducting enforcement, which is why they are not motivated to carry out the enforcement efficiently and successfully. The enforcement courts lack personal and technical capacities that are necessary for the enforcement procedure. All these circumstances have produced a backlog of enforcement cases in enforcement courts – procedural actions have not been conducted in years and enforcement debtors thought that these cases were never going to be resolved. On the

other hand, public enforcement agents perform their activities as entrepreneurs, which means that their success rate has a high impact on their salaries and salaries of their employees. They are motivated to conduct the enforcement and successfully complete it, as opposed to enforcement judges and court enforcement agents. The other important reason for resistance toward the system of public enforcement agents is the upcoming parliamentary elections in the end of spring 2020. Many political parties and organisations are trying to win their political popularity by requesting the termination of the system of public enforcement agents in order to get votes from enforcement debtors.

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TRADICIJA DRUŠTVENOG OTPORA VANSUDSKOM IZVRŠENJU U SRBIJI**Apstrakt**

Nakon više decenija sudskog izvršenja radi naplate potraživanja po osnovu izvršnih i verodostojnih isprava, Zakon o izvršenju i obezbeđenju iz 2011. godine uveo je u naš pravosudni sistem javne izvršitelje koji nisu bili zaposleni u sudu. U skladu sa rešenjima tog zakona javni izvršitelji su bili diplomirani pravnici bez položenog pravosudnog ispita. Brojne nadležnosti koje su ranije obavljali izvršni sudovi prenete su na javne izvršitelje. Donošenjem novog Zakona o izvršenju i obezbeđenju 2015. godine i njegovim stupanjem na snagu 1. jula 2016. godine, javnim izvršiteljima delegirane su nove nadležnosti. Skoro dve godine nakon početka primene ovog zakona, pojedine organizacije i mediji započeli su kampanju protiv sistema izvršenja putem javnih izvršitelja. Ta medijska kampanja nastavljena je i tokom rada na izmenama tog zakona. U 2019. godini usvojene su izmene Zakona o izvršenju i obezbeđenju, javni izvršitelji su dobili nove nadležnosti, a otpor i medijska kampanja protiv njih postali su još snažniji. Suprotstavljanje javnim izvršiteljima često je praćeno fizičkim nasiljem usmerenim na ometanje sprovođenja izvršnog postupka. Cilj ovog rada usmeren je na istraživanje tradicije i uzroka društvenog otpora vansudskom izvršenju u Srbiji.

Ključne reči: izvršni postupak, javni izvršitelji, prenošenje nadležnosti, društveni otpor, medijska kampanja

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